FOREIGN RADIO REACTIONS TO THE PRESIDENT'S HYDROGEN BOMB DECISION-NO 2

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000500730140-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: R
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2004
• Sequence Number: 140
• Publication Date: November 11, 1998
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP80-00809A000500730140-2
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
REPORT
INFORMATION FROM
25X1
FOREIGN DOCUM
ENTS OR RADIO BROADCASTS
CD NO.
25X1
Foreign
FOREIGN RADIO REACTION& TO THE
PRESIDENT'S HYDROGEN BOMB DECISION-NO 2
Radio Broadcasts
MIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFIICTIM? ?fit NATIONAL DIFNNSN
OF TMs UNITED MTATIS WITNIM TUN MMAMINO OF ESPIONAGE IACt $0
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Nlsli[D ST LAM. REPRODUCTION IIF'i tOls FORM Is POOMISITID.
DATE: OF
INFORMATION
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
INTRODUCTION: On 3 February, after a delay of three days, the Moscow radio
Issued its first and to date its only commentary on the President's hydrogen-bomb
I
I
paralleling', the initial Soviet-controlled German reaction, the Soviet commentator
as yet, it has not been monitored in any of the Soviet-orbit languages. Partially
decision. It has been broadcast in several languages to the Western world; buti,
blackmail attempt. He also alludes to, the "horrors of a now war" that cannot be
Petrov concentrates on the theme that the decision represents a new American
escaped "if!such a war is unleAehed by the U.S. imperialists." And he speaks of
the need for "adjusting" American-Soviet relations, but associates this with
"adoption of the' peace-loving Soviet proposals and banning of the atomic weapons...."
The Soviet commentator does not explicitly consider the questionv of priority or
Czechoslovakia, and Soviet-controlled Germany, following the latter's initial
monopoly inlthe field of hydrogen-bomb development; but Satellite radios in Poland,
atomic bomb; and just as the latter one is no secret, the former one will not
lead, take ',pains to remind listeners that"the hydrogen bomb is a variety of the
remain secret." ,Radios outside the Soviet sphere continue generally to approve
agreement on international atomic-energy control are heard; but there are also
the President's decision as "Inevitable." Pleas ,_. a further attempt to secure
some warnings against complete reliance on such agreement, even if it could be
achieved.
STATE
ARMY
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"HONEYMOON OF THE HYDROGEN-BQM11 BOGEY": Although Petrov ovoids explicit reference
to priority and monopoly of hydrogen-bomb development, he does make some remarks
that could be Interpreted as very indirect allusions to the subject. His opening
statement, for example, identifies the hydrogen bomb and the atomic bomb in the
following marr.jr: "In the same way as the U.S. atom bomb was once in vogue, now
it is the new hydrogen bogey that is enjoying its honeymoon." He also uses the
phrase, "the myth about the hydrogen bomb"; and his warning that the West cannot
escape the horrors of a new war if unleashed by the "imperialists" may give some
listeners the Impression that the Soviet Union has or will have available the
same kinds of weapons that the r'imperialists" may use. The Satellite radios, con-
siderably more outspoken, recall explicitly the American "delusion" about the
atomic-bomb monopoly which was broken by the Soviets and predict similar failure
for the current hydrogen-bomb "blackmail."
AMERICAN AIMS--(1) TO RATIFY THE "AGGRESSIVE WAR BUDGET": Petrov Interprets
the President's decision as part of e now attack o war hysteria... (which) is
needed by Wall Street both for its domestic and its foreign aims. Domestically,
itlia allegedly designed to heighten the atmosphere of tension "in order to put
through the aggressive war budget at a time when the U.S. is not threatened by
anyone...."
AMERICAN AIMS--(2) TO REASSURE AMERICANS OF "AN EASY PUSHBUTTON WAR": This is said
tolbe another secret purpose" of the President's decision. "The U.S. Imperialists
want to make their people swallow the idea of the possibility of an easy push-
button war which would allegedly demand no sacrifices at all on the part of the
U.S. but would be something In the nature of an air promenade of bombers--.like a
U.S. version of Hitler's notorious blitskrieg." (This is consistent with the
standard line of Radio Moscow which previously, but infrequently, has pointed to
the importance of manpower in warfare--as did an Initial Soviet-controlled German
comment on the President's decision.) Petrov, however, does not elaborate. But
he does warn that it. will be impo sible to escape the horrors of a war that may be un-
leashed by the U.S. imperialista' use of either "atomic diplomacy or the hydrogen
bomb." He also proclaims that although "the camp of peace and democracy stands
opposed to war,.., it isfirmly onfident of its strength (and) Its final victory
should war be unleashed."
AMERICAN AIMS--(3) TO INTIMIDATE THE FAINTHEARTED ABROAD: "The myth about the
hydrogen bomb," says Petrov, Ia~aleo intended for export beyond the borders of
the United States. American diplomacy, which failed so completely with its atomic
blackmail, is looking for a new bogey to scare the faint-hearted." Consequently,
the "hydrogen bogey" has been seized upon by all the warmongers, "frightened as
they are by the mounting popular movement for peace." But since Wall Street was
not able to alarm the peoples of the world by the atom bomb, it is concluded that
It will be equally unsuccessful with "Its fairy tales about the hydr.)gen bomb.
Thelchampions of peace are not the kind to be frightened easily."
THE NEED FOR PEACEFUL AMERICAN-SOVIET COOPERATION: Toward the end of Petrov 'a
commentary, he considers the deli'ability of 'adjusting" American-Soviet relations--
which desire he attributea to "evier wider masses of Americans (who) demand.., the
banning of the atomic weapons ands the establishment of strict international
control over this ban." Having thus defined the Soviet position as the only right
one, he concludes: "The U.S. people understand that only on the basis of peaceful
cooperation between the United States and the USSR and the countries of People's
Democracy in Europe and Asia on the basis of cooperation between all countries
can peace be secured." This theme is echoed occasionally in Satellite comment.
And TAEGLICHE RUNDSCHAU, Soviet army organ in Berlin, recalls that exactly a year
ago Stalin submitted to Truman a proposal for a joint meeting.
INADEQUACY OF ANY AGREEMENT ON INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC-ENERGY CONTROL: From Western
radios come occasional warnings against staking too much on the idea of securing
international control. They are based primarily on the assumption that any agree-
mentlwould probably be circumvented by the Soviet Government. "I do not think
the Americans could ever bring themselves to trust Soviet Russia," Bays a Manila
commentator, "or to believe that somewhere in some secret corner of that forbidden
land the Soviet Government wee not violating the agreement."
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