CRITICAL INDICATORS IN YUGOSLAV-COMINFORM PROPAGANDA: AN INTERIM REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000500730202-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 2, 2003
• Sequence Number: 202
• Publication Date: November 11, 1998
• Content Type: REPORT

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~ CLASSIFICATION SECRET
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION FROM
FOREIGN DOCUMENTS OR RAD16 BROADCASTS
COUNTRY Yugoslavia-Cominform
SUBJECT CRITICAL INDICATORS IN YUGOSLAV-CQAINFORM
PROPAGANDA: AN INTERIM REPORT
HOW
PUBLISHED Radio Broadcasts
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Reported herewith are interim results of a continuing quantitative analysis, begun 11
October 1950, of Cominform and Yugoslav war-of-nerves propaganda.
The analysis has been undertaken in order (1) to detect any changes which suggest 1_? cam;
imminent Communist aggression, that is, to determine whether certain postulated indicators..'.
of war-expectation are suddenly and simultaneously stepped up by either antagonist to' ._,iw,~,.
level significantly higher than any previous level; (2) to provide background knowledge
of types of changes which, not having been followed by military action, may in the future---';
be discounted in predictive value; and (3) to throw light on the Yugoslav and Cominform :E?',,
use of propaganda for purposes other than psychological preparation for imminent war.
Such purposes might include, for example, diversion of attention from another major ra .~
The evidence on these three points is as follows:
1. During the period covered there has been no change great, enough to
suggest imminent aggression.
2. The quantitative peak in batellite mil it charges against in
25X1 occurred during the summerlof 1950 and a lesser peak
November 1950 were not accompanied byArq-rauzU sharpening of the
qualitative character of the material.! In specificity, especially, the
charges fall far short of the maximum 'attainable. Quantitative peaks of
this magnitude may be discounted in future interpretive evaluations..
3. The study provides some evidence bearing on the hypothesis that war-
scares in the Balkans maybe used by the Kremlin to divert attention
from other major theaters pf conflict. The timing of the summer high
phase of Cominform anti-Tito propaganda, coinciding with the first two
months of the Korean war, is consistent with such an interpretation.
However, the November peak' in this propaganda had already passed and
Satellite military chargesl had returned to more or less normal levels
when the December Communist offensive in Korea began, and emphasis on
Albania in this November high phase suggests that it had more relevance
to concern over the effect of Greek-Yugoslav rapprochement on Albania
than to any diversionary Hectic.
4. Charges that Albania was to be the victim of Yugoslav attacks have been
rare in the Albanian Home Service. This avoidance suggests official
Albanian belief that propaganda concerning a Yugoslav attack:would be
more likely to increase than to decrease the divisive tendencies in the
country. ff'KfM T3 MOM 4ENTER
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NO. OF PAGES 10
SUPPLEMENT TO
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A. RODU TON: NATURE AND PURPOSE OF STUDY
report seeks to provide basic information on the nature of the war-of-nerves pzopa-
gane broadcast by Yugoslavia and by her Satellite enemies with respect to indicat1ona
f
e
o
Suiiet-Sat
llite policy and intentions.! The bearing of the data on a possible
intention to initiate overt aggression will be considered, as well as its relevance
other1 purposes, primarily psychological ones.;
Altho igh Radio Moscow continually charges the West with aggressive aspirations, it has
by d large avoided detailed and concrete recitations of facts and figures such asthe
numbers, types, dispositions, strategy, location and equipment of 'the armed forces of the
West.j Condemnation by generalized cnarges~has been the rule. Onlthe other hand, the
war-or -nerves propaganda broadcast by the Satellite radios departs from the Moscow l
pattern of broad charges of aggressive intentions by placing considerable stress on more
concrete charges of actual military preparations for attack. Sunh charges are herein
poste ated to carry greater conviction and alarm than generalized' statements do.
The mre concrete charges comprise descriptions of:
The construction of military installations
(airfields, fortifications,
fi etc.,) and the increase o:, arms and munitions.
b
The recruiting, training and strengthliof the armed forces.
The disposition and operations oflthose forces.
! I
B. ACTNE PHASE. SUMMER 1950
Concu rentiy with the start of theKorean war: the Satellite radios initiated an extended
campaign of stress on preparatory charges of the kind outlined above, a campaign which re-
sulted,in a good deal of concern about possible Soviet-directed action against Yugoslavia;
reports were received that this war-of-nerves campaign caused considerable anxiety among
Satellite populations.
These charges differed from the previous pattern of war-of-nerves charges in the following
ways:
The quantity of charges sharply increased.
2.l New charges, indicating propaganda s andal initiative, g P P g were introduced in con-
siderable number.
3.! Operational charges of a threatening nature appeared more frequently, e.g.,
that General Von Kleist had been released to plan an attack against Albanian
using U.S. troops to be shipped from the Middle East via Greece to Yugoslava.
4 The detail and specificity of charges increased; that is, lmore names, place
numbers, and dates were used, indicating greater concentration of effort
to be convincing on the part of the propagandist.
5 "Newsitems--with their stress on the immediate--were used as a vehicle
for some of these charges, giving a sense of urgency and alarm to the
reports.
6 I Zhe target of Yugoslav attack was named more often; whereas the "People's
1 Democracies" had previously been cited as the object of attack, post-Korea
I'I propaganda focused its attention on a specific Satellite--Albania.
These Shifts inlthe content of charges and in their beaming and manner of presentation
combin d last summer to indicate that Satellite propagandists were 'engaged in a distinct
effort1to create a state of psychological tension.
The accompanying chart, which graphs the total number of military charges made by
Satellite radios week by week, beginning 11 October, indicates a clear peak during late
Novembe.. Thislphase occurred shortly after the Greek-Yugoslav rapprochement and the
closing 'of the Albanian Legation in Belgrade,; during the period President Truman
submitted the Yugoslav aid bill to Congress. The peak includes a reflection of consider-
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SEGUE l
Line graph represents total of',
charges each week. Strength
claims are not included. Bar
graphs show armed forces charges
excluding border viole'sions.
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able Satel_'.ite stress on the charge that Yugoslavia was about to initiate some sori of
action against neighboring Albania. On the world front, the Chinese Communists
initiated their first major offensive from the Manchurian border as Satellite war if-
nerves charges against Yugoslavia mounted to the high point.
Did the character of these charges warrant the conclusion that a serious effort was
being made to disquiet Yugoslavia and indirectly those in the West? Did the naturelof
this campaign reveal a serious attempt to consolidate Satellite people behind their
=y;;czl regimes or seriously to prepare them for action? How does the pattern evidenced
in that peak phase differ from more recent propaganda? An attempt is made to answer
these questions in the following discussion. Emphasis is placed on the November peak
because it is a completed phase: as the graph reveals, current attention, while fairly
high, has not reached a comparable peak, and the direction of the present trend is,l
indeterminate. The findings erived from the study of the November high phase willl be
most usable when they can be compared with a subsequent phase of comparable magnitude and
duration to determine whether important shifts of emphasis and direction have occurred.
1. Nature of November Peak
Although propaganda attacks against Yugoslavia increase considerably during late
November and early December, reiteration of standard charges accounts for a large share
of the volume. The high volume recorded in the peak weeks of 15 November to 11
December results in part from the 10 rebroadcasts--an exceptional number--of the
virulent Popivoda speeches made before the World Congress of Peace and by the rebroad-
casting of a NOVA BORBA article which contained some of the most detailed charges yet
made concerning Tito's alleged preparations for war.** Also heavily emphasized in lthe
last two weeks of the high phase were protests against violations of the Albanian and
Bulgarian borders. These protests alone constituted almost 40% of all charges made)
during the last two weeks of the phase. Condemnation of U.S. aid to Tito, in applica-
tion to the military aspects of that aid, increased the total of military charges
also.xxx No appreciable sharpening of tone occurred in the context of the aid question,
however. As with Radio Moscow, primary emphasis was given to the charge that Tito tas
an American vassal and that his 'troops were part of the whole aggressive system erected
by the warmongers.
On the assumption that charges of concrete military preparations by the Yugoslav Army
constitute an especially alarming type of charge, such charges have been given special
scrutiny. The findings are as follows:
a. Ouantlt : In absolute number, there was a great increase in these charges
during the first part of the high period (8-27 November), and in ratio to other types
of charges the proportion was almost double the average for the 12 weeks measured during
1950. Thus the first half of the upsurge period revealed a definite stress on the!l
military-preparatory type of charge, as compared with the full rage of war-of-nerves
charges.
b. Character:I However, when these charges of the peak period are compared inl
character with charges of the same type broadcast in preceding and succeeding weeks, uo
startling shifts toward more threL1.ening charges are r^vealed. Concretely, the
* For an anti-Tito speech, very wide distribution was accorded this item by Radio
Moscow--the widest in many months. The speech signaled the beginning of P. trend in
Soviet broadcasts concerning Tito. Since then a threefold stress has been given to
topic of Tito's military preparations, which now constitutes from one-third to one-
half of all Moscow's attention to Tito.
This commentarylcontains one of the very rare Satellite allusions to the strategic
objectives of the Titoites in their coming attack, alleged to be aimed across
Satellite boundaries: "The Titoites in elaborating their plans are foreseeing a
blitzkrieg a Is Hitler and the quick disintegration of Bulgaria and Rumania, together
with a '.'.ghtning breakthrough to the Black Sea."
In addition to the usual speedier Satellite reaction, Satellite condemnation ofi
American aid differed in two ways from Moscow's treatment of that event: (1) the line
that'U.S. food would be used for the Army alone was a less prominent theme in Satellite
charges; (2) the whole subject of U.S. aid constituted a much smaller part, relatively,
of all the propaganda against Tito in Satellite output, Moscow gave it huge emphasis
relative to total comment on Tito; the Satellites did not.
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following elements do not receive markedly greater relative stress than in other weeks:
1. The degree to .1hich American partic3patic'n is brought into the charges.
2. The snecificitvliof the charges, i.e., the tendency to give specific names,
locations, numbers, and times in detailing military preparations.*
3. The extent to which such preparations are said to be taking place on the
frontier.
Moreover, the use of relativelylnew and unusual charges, though somewhat higher than in
other weeks, does not bylany means appear to represent a maximum effort. Extremely few
of the charges under consideration appear to be broadcast in the form of news items,
in conformity io the pattern evidenced over the whole period under survey.":
In sum. notwithstanding some tendency to play up the more threatening charaviceristics
of armed forces' preparations for aggression during these three weeks, the greater part
of the charges consist of the reiteration of standardized phrases. During the propa-
ganda offensive of summer 1950, the major impact was much less the function of a simple
quantitative increase than of a,shift toward more threatening and more original charges.
In November, however, nolextreme qualitative shift occurred.
2, aturre of Subsequent Material
Satellite charges of armed preparation for attack have again increased, both absolute-
ly and relative to other charges, since Tito 's speech to the Assembly calling for in-
creased appropriations for defense. They have not, however, approached thelhigh period
of 8-27 November, nor has there been disproportionate stress on the operational aspects
of these alleged preparations.
A considerable portion oi; the preparation charges made in the first three weeks of 1951
are explicitly or implicitly reactions to Tito's Assembly speech. The increase also re-
flects an increase in specific Yugoslav charges of Satellite military preparation.
Before Yugoslav Army Day, 22 December, very few of the charges from BelgradeLe.ted con-
crete Satellite army preparations.
3. Relevance to World Situation''
In view of the coincidence of last summer's heightened charges with the beginnning of the
Korean war, a check was made to see if the most heavily emphasized elements in' the
November upsurge had any relationship to events on the world scene. It might, for
example, have been considered good diversionary tactics to stimulate tension concerning
Yugoslavia at a time when the West was concerned over the first Chinese Communist
offensive in Korea.
The propaganda evidence here seems negative. The heavily played Popivoda speech and the
NOVA BORBA article mentioned above were both broadcast in quantity well before! the
Chinese offensive started on 26 November. The first (and heavily emphasized), Bulgarian
note protesting border violations was broadcast two days later, and three additional
border violation notes (one each! from Bulgaria, Albania, and Hungary) were all broad-
cast by 14 December. As the graph indicates, however, military charges against Tito
drop off rapidly while these notes are being broadcast during the first half of
December, just at the period of maximum dismay in the West over the Chinese advance.
And although Satellite propagandists might have been expected to continue rebroadcasting
these notes of protest during the last two weeks of December in order to sustain an
appearance of Titoist militancy, it is then that charges of border violations reach the
lowest ebb recorded during the period covered by this study.
Moreover, these broadcast charges were apparently not particularly intended to'stir the
fears of Yugoslav listeners, since out of the 377 charges contained in the broadcasts
and rebroadcasts of theselnotesbetween 28 November and 1S December, constituting almost
a third of all military charges made. only 23 were broadcast to Yugoslavia, and these in
Macedonian.
Thus relatively more emphasis was given to border violation charges and less Ito armed
preparations for war after the Chinese offensive began. This picture contrasts sharply
with that at the beginning of the Korean war; at that time relatively more emphasis was
devoted to the more alarming charges of concrete preparations of the armed forces for
war and less to the customary and familiar charges of Yugoslav border violations.
a flavor of currency absent in retrospective and reiterative cosmentary. Ij
* In the first of the three weeks, the degree of specificity, reflecting the NOVA BORBA
article, exceeded the normal range of variability markedly; this high level was n)t sus-
tained in the following two weeks, however.
**The useof the' news item as a propaganda vehicle is considered significant not' only be-
cause it commands attention but because news items, even in Communist propaganda, contain
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in late', November; seemed to have little relevance to the
that Albania was a potential object of Yugoslav attack.* V
Although Satellitepropag lists Freely charge that Tito intends aggression against the
"New Democracies" collectively, Albania is by far the most frequently specified object
of attack. Except in the bnplication of border violation charges, Satellite radios
rarely cite the other Satellite states ajoining Yugoslavia--Bulgaria, Hungary, and
Rumanian--a.s objects of potentiallyattack. Although its isolated position might be
expected to center attention on Albania, it is surprising that the otters are so
neglected. Apparently Satellite propagandists do not really attempt, during the period
covered by this study, to make a plausible case that Yugoslavia intends to attack
Bulgaria; Hungary, or Rumania, but' are content to generalize the threat to "the People's
Democracies" or to "Yugoslavia's neighbors."
Of concern is the question of whether there''l has been any significantly increasing
tendency to emphasize Albania as the target of Yugoslav attack.
Prior, to the high phase of summer 1950, theilmost prominent scaremongering device used
by Satellite transmitters as to charge the Yugoslavs with frontier violations and to
publicize trials of alleged Yugoslav espionage a.iLd sabotage agents. These trials and
frontier violatiora have been given intermittent attention by Satellite propagandists
for several years,J and so constitute a somewhat routine method o' picturing Tito as en-
dar,.gering his neighbors.
Since i December tiro spy dials and two border violation notes, liven fairly wide
publicity by Sate `'.ite radios, particularly', by the Albanian radio and particularly in
home broadcasts, have served to focus attention on Albania as a recipient of Yugoslav
action. If at that time Satellite broadcasters had desired to make a major pretext out
of alleged violations of the Albanian border, wide repetition of Albania' s?protest *note
of 5 December might have been expected. This did not occur. The note was apparently
broadcast twice only, both Itimes in the Tirana home service. Bylway of, contrast, the
longer Bulgarian protest note broadcast only two days later was picked up and rebroad-
cast by Rumania, Albania, and Free Greece.
When references to trials of Titoite agents and frontier violations in Albania are
subtracted from the total of charges of Yugoslav intent or preparation against that
country, it becomep clear that there has been no increase in other war-of-nerves charges
in this regard during January as against the weeks before the November high phase.
During the high phase there was a definite increase in the cita- on of Albania as a
potential recipient of Yugoslav action. During that phase, Albania wasl for the first
time since early October explicitly cited as the object of concrete Yugoslav Army
preparations said to be under way.)' Since that time, however, the specification of
Albania in connection with Army charges has all but disappeared from Satellite output,
despite the continued emphasis on border charges and the Peskopi trial. Thus, though
attention is high, it is of,a routine character.
Concerning the audiences tq which these allegations are beamed, a suggestive differentia-
tion emerges fromthe examination of charges citing Albania as the object of Yugoslav
war-of.-nerves charges during those weeks in November when Albania was increasingly
specified as the object of potential attack.) Except in the case of border violation
charges, Albania was specified only in Albanian and other Satellite broadcasts in Serbo-
croat and in non-Albanian home broadcasts. No such statements were made in the Albanian
home ser-+rice.*x*
Charges of Greek participation'iin these 'attacks were freely alleged during this
period, especiallylbyithe Free Greece radio,) which sharply increased its charges of
Yugoslav prepara'tionsagainst AlbarAa during the week of 21-27 November. However, the
recurrently more alarming tone of Free Greece-for example, its prediction of attack
"within a matter of days" was not,, characteristic of Satellite charges.'
+~- As between the three eastern neighbors of Yugoslavia, slightly greater emphasis seems
to be given Bulgaria as a potential!, object of attack than to Hungary or Rumania, after
border violation charges are discounted.
* Albania was cited 119 times by all sources during this high period, 15 November
to 11. December, Of this number 71of the statements were made by, Radio Tirana, but in
Serbocroat only. I
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4. Relevance to Albania
If the peak phase jrecordedi
number of charges
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While the Albanian radio cited Albania in home broadcasts as an object of general Yugoslav
hostility during this period, there seems to be a deliberate effort on the part of Radio
Tirana to avoid broadcasting war-of-nerves charges to its own listeners.
A recent example of extreme military specificity illustrates how far. short of the attain-
able qualitative high current broad':ast military charges fall. A commentary disseminated
by the Rumanian press service in Morse Code on 19 January 1951, but apparen';ly not broad-
cast, after claiming that the West German Government is allowing the training of anti-
Albanian spies and saboteurs in its' territory! continues!
"Suspect troop movements are taking place in Yugoslavia in the frontier zone-
with Albania. An infantry division was thus removed from Trebinie and occupied
positions in the Scadarsko Lake region, in the Podoritsa, Plav, and Gusinie
directions. Advanced units of this division are established in Bindjia, Dinosha,
Zatrepchie, Gplubovtsi, and Planitsa. The headquarters are in Martinichi, in
the nearby (sic) of Danilovgrad town.
"An Alpine regiment was camped in Masline, Podgoritsa, in barracks recently
constructed. Some units of this regiment are in Korita. The 19th division, which
was formerly garrisoned in Knin town, was not included into the 6th military
region, which is concerned with the operation sectors along the frontier with
Albania, between Montenegro and Sanghiak
"A. division of Prishtina-Kosovo and Metohia--spread its troops along the
Albanian frontier as well. The staff ofi,a regiment of this division installed
itself at Giakovitsa, and units of the mentioned regiment were sent to the
frontier locality of Chiaf Morina.
"The armored car corps of Skoplje was strengthened with an armored car brigade
from Sisak, Other units also occupied positions near the Albanian frontier.
"The movements of land troops are accompanied and supported by movements of air
force units. Fighting plane regiment Number 113 was established in Skoplje. A
bomber escadrille arrived in (name mission-Ed.) airdrome; another escadrille
arrived in Chemovsko Polie airdrome. Meanwhile, the Alpine airports of,Radovehe,
Brezna., and Berane, in the neighborhood of the Albanian frontier, are hastily
accommodated and rehabilitated."
These charges are unique in their specificity, their detail, and their attention to named
units engaged in tactical movements on the frontier of a specific neighboring state.
Only once to date have Satellites even mentioned the number of a specific military unit,
and that one was not said to be engaged in operational activities',?fuch as those described
above. In talking about troops at the frontier, Satellite radios rarely specify even a
given number of troops.
E. STRENGTH PROP
AGANpA
One of the most direct ways in which Satellite propagandists might undertake', to prepare
their own peoples for war or to frighten Yugoslav audiences is to' play up the armed
strength, efficiency and preparedness of their own war machines. Although any direct and
sustained vaunting of the military strength of his own country makes the broadcaster
vulnerable to charges of militarism or even of warmongering, and may also give rise to
fears on the part of one's own people that the regime contemplates war, the idea of the
army's strength and capability in any potential crisis may to advantage be conveyed
subtly by stressing the defensive role of the army, its peacefulness, and its oneness with
the regime and the people, and by describing its more routine activities. When such
material is broadcast to a potential enemy, it may serve to disquiet the listener.
Satellite radios place extremely little stress on their own strength. Somewhat fewer than
3% of the charges and claims that fall. within the definition of war-of-nerves material as
outlined are made up of military strength statements, even when military strength is
defined very broadly. Moreover, most of those claims are quite indirect, and few of them
are made in a context which deals explicitly with Tito and his alleged aggressiveness.
As in the case of Soviet broadcasts,' attention to strength is prominent mainly during the
celebration of military anniversaries.
Of the 56 military strength statements tallied up to the end of 195%. only three were
broadcast to Yugoslavia. The total number of strength statements has been even lower
since the tarn of the year. A policy of extreme avoidance of the subject in' broadcasts
to Yugoslavia is apparent.
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This extreme avoidance is observed also with respect to satellite denials of Yugoslav
charges. There are extremely few of these, fewer than une percent. Of denials of army
prepa"at.~i.onsf,-' attack there is practically a oc:aplete blackout. During the 12 weeks
under measure in 1950, only one denial of any army charge occurred: during the third
week in November, when Satellite charges against Titolwere heavy, the Hungarian radio
denied the charge that the Satellites were moving troops along the Yugoslav frontier.
It is undoubtedly significant that the only Yugoslav charges concerning Satellite armies
which has been denied during the first three weeks of 1951 is Tito's widely broadcast
statement that those armies have exceeded the strength limitations imposed by the peace
treaties. '_he number of repetitions of that denial, -hen compared with all denials lmade
by Sa.tellite,transmittrrs over the whole period, is markedly large. These facts suggest
considerablelsensitiviy on the question of their troop strength.
Expanded use of the strength theme might be expected in the event that Satellite propa-
gandists were required1to reassure their home audiences or to disquiet Yugoslav listeners.
The beam distribution pattern of this theme may in the future provide clues to Satellite
prepare.toiry'or diversionary psychological tactics.
it
F. -('A1cNESSII' PROPAGANDA
If Satellitelpropagandksts do not spend much time in discussing their own military
strength, neither do they make a particular effort to play up claims ofldisaffection or
weakues: of'Tito 's Army. This low emphasis serves to avoid contradicting the picture so
continuously drawn of an aggressive Yugoslav Army engaged in extensive preparationslfor
attack. Most of the weakness charges are made only by implication, principally by
discussing the resistance of the soldiery to Tito's control, and it is seldom plainly
stated that the Army its weak or inefficient. The subject is also relatively avoided in
the Satellite home services; four out of every five weakness claims are broadcast to
Yugo 9la.vi a .
Two allied weakness claims conform to this pattern. One isllthe claim that Yugoslav
youth are refusing to undergo military training, a theme which receiveslbut little
attention. The other is the claim that the people are directing their resistance against
the military preparations of the Titoites by sabotage, slow-downs in the production of war
goods, and the like. This theme, which receives somewhat less attention than more
direct statements of resistance in'the Army, had not at the end of the year received
appre'iabl.y,more attention than during the first weeks under measure. In the consider-
able attention devote by Satellite radios to descriptions of allegedly, widespread and
growing resistance in general there seems to be no marked trend towardsfocusing
discussion on internal resistance directed against the militarization of Yugoslavian.
G. I.4"` T'- TTE REACTION
Claims of widespread desistance in'ithe Yugoslav Army did not show an upward movement
until. Yugoslav Army Day on 22 December. Attention jumped noticeably, however, during
the week after the Army Day speech'iand again for three weeks after Titol's military
budget speech to the National Assembly on 28 December; which gave enormous attention
to the actual and prospective strength of the Yugoslav Army. These twol periods saw' an
appreciable increase in the use of the military weakness line: attention increases from
the previous average of about 3% of all charges to about 10%. During the most recent
week under survey, 16-122 January, emphasis began to decline, however.
It is of interest that concurrently with the increase in attention to weakness by
Satellite radios Radio Moscow gave, a very heavy stress to the same subject which persisted
for one week only, however, before, dropping off sharply. The Satellites and the USSR
thus appear to have made something!, of an effort--primarily for the benefit of Yugoslav
audiences-* -to counts act Tito's emphasis on his own trengt1h during the last two weeks
of 1950.
Considered broadly, however, there is certainly no ev dence'of a sharp rise in theisubject
of Yugoslav, military disaffection and weakness eit'~er]to Yugoslav audiences as a maneuver
of intimidation or ofldiversion or'ito home audiences by way of reassurance. Any real
stress in the output of Satellite radios to their own people on the topic of the military
weakness of, the Yugoslav Army would carry particular weight ..s t..n Indict tor of expected
military action by virtue of the fact that it would tend to, contradict the picture 'drawn
of an aggressive Tito
* None of the Soviet broadcasts nn'the subject were heard in Satellite lilanguages.
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H. IUOO.SLAV REACTION
Although in last summer's high phase the Yugoslav radio may almost be saidlto have traded
charge for charge with the Cominform, its output during all of October and November and
most of December was characterized by great restraint. The volume of charges was much
lower than that of the Satellites; in one week only did Yugoslav charges, most of whihes
concerned border violations, exceed Satellite charges. The more tlreateninig army charges
account for a smaller percentage of the total number of charges made than the output
of Satellite radios.
Restrained or at least delayed response is also reflected by a reversal of phase; the
total number of Yugoslav charges goes gradually down and then up over the same period
when Satellite charges go markedly up and then down. Even the number of denials voiced
by Radio Belgrade--normally a sizeable part of Yugoslav war-of-ne es charges-does not
increase as Satellite charges increase.*
It is only after the conclusion of the November peak th-_.t Yugoslav charges mount;d during
the week of 12-18 December, before the celebration of Army Day, bo charges
go up appreciably. But even then, charges and denials were both concentrated nn border
violation cases, one of the least inflammatory of the themes that could beiused. Something
of the restraint which still characterizes Yugoslav output is reveled by an incident on
21 January: the Belgrade radio, quoting TANYUG, reported that more than 100 planes
flying from Bulgaria to Albania had crossed Yugoslav territory; later TANYUG withdrew the
report, and the Home Service radio called it exaggerated and described thelincident as an
"ordiszry violation."
Belgrade has always emphasized denials of Satellite charges; the practice of Soviet
and Satellf,te radios suggests that they consider this a poor propaganda tlechnique.
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1. Definition of Indicators
Charges of armed forces' preparations for war: supplies, equipment, training, strength,
operations. Such charges are considered to be of a more threatening nature because they
focu=-as Communist radios usually do not--on the military means to be used in imple-
menting an aggressive intent.
Charges of psychological preparations for war: stirring up war hysteria, spreading news
of troop movements, etc.
Charges of econo pAS preparations for war: increasing the military budget, building
war factories, etc.
Charges of bQrder violations.
Claims of the military strength of the -oadcaster: Army ley; morale, efficiency of the
armor, defensive capacity, warnings, etc.
Claims of the military weakness of the opponent: officers and men imprisoned, resistance
to the army leadership, poor morale, etc.
Charges of Para-military activities: militarization o' youth, training spies, trying
captured spies, guerrilla action, etc.
Charges of forming agsres_ive alliances:I the Athens-Belgrade Axis, the Mediterrean
Pact, joining NATO, etc.
Charges of aiming to overthrow he rep-ime or to partition or annex the country, etc.
2. Definition of Sample
This study is based on voice broadcasts only. It includes items from press service
transmissions such as TANYUG, AGERPRESS, ATA, etc., only when they are subsequently broad-
cast in voice.
The broadcasts systematically surveyed are as follows:
a The output of the' Yugoslav and Satellite central home services. Coverage is
almost complete, except for slight deficiencies in regard to Albania and
Bulgaria. No regional services are included.
b. Belgrade broadcasts to the six Satellites. Coverage, about 6$. No Russian-
language broadcasts are included.
The output of thelsix Satellites to Yugoslavia. Coverage, about 37%, none
of which is Slovene.
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