AUGUST 17 COMMUNIQUE AFTERMATH: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00551R000200010005-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2008
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: August 27, 1982
• Content Type: CABLE

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00 RUEAIIB
ZNY SSSSS ZOC STATE ZZH
STU1734
00 RUEHC
DE RUMJPG #1609/01 2391032
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
0 271021Z AUG 82
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6597
BT
S E C R E T BEIJING 11609
EXDIS
E.0.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: US, CH, TW, MASS, PEPR
SUBJECT: AUGUST 17 COMMUNIQUE AFTERMATH: ANALYSIS AND
- RECOMMENDATIONS
1. (S) - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY. THE CHINESE RETREAT ON KEY ELEMENTS IN THE
COMMUNIQUE AND AMERICAN POST-COMMUNIQUE MOVES TOWARD CON-
TINUING SUPPORT FOR TAIWAN HAVE PRESENTED DENG WITH CER-
TAIN POLITICAL RISKS, PARTICULARLY ON THE EVE OF THE 12TH
PARTY CONGRESS. COUNTERBALANCING THESE RISKS ARE POTEN-
TIAL BENEFITS WHICH WOULD INCLUDE: AVOIDANCE OF A DOWN-
GRADING WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN INTERPRETED AS A DEFEAT FOR
DENG AND SERIOUSLY COMPLICATED CHINA'S ACHIEVEMENT OF
STRATEGIC FOREIGN POLICY GOALS; THE COMMUNIQUE FURTHER
BINDS THE USG TO A "ONE CHINA" POLICY; AND, THE DOCUMENT,
IN CHINESE EYES, MAY INCREASE POLITICAL/PSYCHOLOGICAL
PRESSURE ON TAIWAN, WEAKENING ITS POSITION IN THE SINO-
AMERICAN-TAIWAN TRIANGLE. CHINESE CONCERN WITH APPEAR-
ANCES, ESPECIALLY IN THE PERIOD BEFORE AND DURING THE 12TH
PARTY CONGRESS, WOULD BE SEVERELY JOLTED BY A SERIES OF
LARGE-SCALE U.S. ARMS SALES ANNOUNCEMENTS, ESPECIALLY IF
COUPLED WITH U.S. PUBLIC EXPRESSIONS OF SUPPORT FOR TAIWAN.
BEIJING'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS SINCE THE COMMUNIQUE HAVE
SOUGHT TO SIGNAL THAT FUTURE SIND-AMERICAN RELATIONS WILL
REMAIN HOSTAGE TO CONTINUED MOVEMENT TOWARD SOLVING THE
ARMS SALES PROBLEM. PRIVATELY, THE CHINESE HAVE ALREADY
BEGUN TO PRESS US FOR AS MUCH INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE ON
EACH TRANSACTION, WHILE ARGUING THEIR INTERPRETATION OF
ELEMENTS IN THE COMMUNIQUE IN AN ATTEMPT TO CONSTRAIN OUR
MANEUVERABILITY.
3. PRIVATE STATEMENTS ON PROSPECTS FOR SING-AMERICAN
RELATIONS BY CHINESE HERE, INCLUDING DENG XIAOPING, HAVE
BEEN SOMEWHAT UPBEAT, SUGGESTING EXCHANGES OF VISITS TO
GET THE RELATIONSHIP BACK ON TRACK. MFA OFFICIALS HAVE
MENTIONED FINALIZATION OF THE DATES FOR THE NEXT MEETING
OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMISSION AND RENEWED MOVEMENT IN
THE MILITARY FIELD. WE BELIEVE THAT, DESPITE THE UNCER-
TAINTIES WE WILL BE FACING OVER THE NEXT MONTH OR SO, WE
SHOULD PROCEED PRUDENTLY TO EXPLORE EXPANDED CONTACTS. WE
COULD FIRST FOLLOW UP DENG'S SUGGESTIONS FOR VISITS BY
SECRETARY SHULTZ THIS YEAR, AND PREMIER ZHAO
AND PERHAPS
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PRESIDENT REAGAN NEXT YEAR. SENIOR WORKING LEVEL CONSULTA-
TIONS ON BILATERAL AND STRATEGIC ISSUES IN EITHER CAPITAL
BEFORE THE VISITS WOULD BE USEFUL. WE SHOULD REITERATE TO
THE CHINESE THAT THE LIU HUAQING INVITATION REMAINS ON THE
TABLE. END SUMMARY.
- CHINESE PERCEPTIONS OF THE AUGUST 17 COMMUNIQUE
4. IN THE NEW U.S.-CHINA COMMUNIQUE, DENG XIAOPING MADE
POLITICALLY-SENSITIVE CONCESSIONS BY ACQUIESCING IN
LANGUAGE WHICH ANTICIPATED DIMINISHING U.S. ARMS SALES TO
TAIWAN BUT HELD WASHINGTON TO NO FIXED TIME SCHEDULE AND
LINKED SUCH REDUCTIONS TO CHINA'S CONTINUED.PURSUIT OF ITS
PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION POLICY. WHILE THE AGREEMENT REPRE-
SENTS A CHINESE RETREAT FROM PREVIOUS POSITIONS TAKEN PUB-
LICLY, DENG AND HIS SUPPORTERS PRESUMABLY CALCULATED THAT
THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF THE COMMUNIQUE OUTWEIGHED THE
INTERNAL POLITICAL RISKS. WE BELIEVE THAT SOME OF THE
PERCEIVED BENEFITS WOULD INCLUDE:
- -- THE MODUS VIVENDI ON THE ARMS SALES AVOIDED A DOWN-
GRADING OF SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS. IN CHINA, THIS WOULD
HAVE BEEN INTERPRETED AS A DEFEAT FOR DENG, TARNISHED HIS
IMAGE AS A LEADER, AND CARRIED NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS FOR
HIS WESTWARD-LOOKING "OPEN DOOR" POLICY. IT WOULD ALSO
HAVE SERIOUSLY COMPLICATED ACHIEVEMENT OF THE PRC'S FOREIGN
POLICY GOALS, AND CAUSED CONCERN-AMONG SOME FRIENDS AND
NEIGHBORS OF THE PRC.
- -- THE U.S. POSITIONS REFLECTED IN THE COMMUNIQUE WILL,
IN THE CHINESE ANALYSIS, FURTHER BIND THE CURRENT ADMINIS-
TRATION AND ITS SUCCESSORS TO A POLICY OF NON-SUPPORT FOR
ANY TWO CHINAS" OR ONE CHINA, ONE TAIWAN" OPTION.
- -- THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE
COMMUNIQUE WILL ENHANCE CHINESE LEVERAGE VIS-A-VIS THE
JAPANESE AND, TO AN EXTENT, THE SOVIETS.
5. APART FROM THE ABOVE ADVANTAGES, THE CHINESE SEE
ISSUANCE OF THE COMMUNIQUE AS APPLYING GREATER POLITICAL
AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURE ON TAIWAN, WEAKENING ITS POSI-
TION IN THE SINO-AMERICAN-TAIWAN TRIANGLE. BEIJING PROB-
ABLY DOES NOT EXPECT THE COMMUNIQUE TO SPARK A NEAR-TERM
CHANGE OF ATTITUDE IN TAIPEI; AND, NO DOUBT, IT ANTICIPATED
EXDIS
THAT TAIWAN'S PUBLIC. REACTION WOULD UNDERSCORE ITS UNQUALI-
FIED REJECTION OF ANY CONTACT WITH THE MAINLAND. NEVERTHE-
LESS, DENG AND HIS ALLIES PROBABLY HOPE. THAT THE COMMUNI-
QUE, IN COMBINATION WITH OTHER FACTORS, WILL HELP GENERATE
WITHIN TAIWAN A SENSE OF HISTORICAL INEVITABILITY. COMING
AFTER THE COMMUNIQUE'S LIMITATIONS OF QUANTITY AND QUALITY
OF U.S. ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN, HU YAOBANG'S AUGUST 23 STATE-
MENT TO AFP CONCERNING CHINESE INTEREST IN FRENCH MIRAGES
COULD AT LEAST IN PART BE AIMED AT EXACERBATING TAIWAN'S
CONCERNS ON THIS SCORE. BEIJING PROBABLY CALCULATES THAT,
NOTWITHSTANDING CONTINUED INTRANSIGENCE FROM TA9PEI, OVER
TIME AND AS A RESULT OF ITS CARROT AND STICK TACTICS,
TAIWAN LEADERS WILL FEEL OBLIGED TO DEMONSTRATE SOME FLEX-
IBILITY IN THEIR RESPONSE TO CHINA'S OVERTURES. IF TAIWAN
TOOK EVEN THE SMALL STEP OF PERMITTING LOW-LEVEL CONTACTS
WITH CHINA, THE REFORMIST LEADERSHIP IN BEIJING COULD POINT
TO ANOTHER MAJOR POLICY SUCCESS WITH POSITIVE IMPLICATIONS
FOR EVENTUAL REUNIFICATION WITH TAIWAN NOT ENTAILING RESORT
TO MILITARY FORCE.
6. AT THE SAME TIME, WE BELIEVE THAT THE CHINESE WILL BE
WATCHFUL AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY THAT TAIWAN MAY ATTEMPT
TO NEUTRALIZE PRC MOVES BY TURNING TOWARD INDEPENDENT
COUNTRY STATUS OR A NUCLEAR WEAPONS OPTION. IN HIS AUGUST
23 DISCUSSION WITH VISITING MIT PROFESSOR WILLIAM GRIFFITH,
VICE FOREIGN MINISTER HAN XU TOOK THE OCCASION TO CITE DENG
XIAOPING AS PREVIOUSLY STATING THAT A DECISION BY TAIWAN TO
UNDERTAKE ONE OF THESE OPTIONS, OR TO MOVE TOWARD THE
SOVIETS, WOULD COMPEL A BASIC REAPPRAISAL OF CHINA'S PEACE-
FUL REUNIFICATION POLICY.
THE COMMUNIQUE AND CHINESE-;.INTERNAL POLITICS
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7. OWING TO DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS, CHINESE
LEADERS ARE LIKELY TO BE AS MUCH CONCERNED WITH APPEARANCES
AS WITH SUBSTANCE WHERE U.S. ACTIONS ON THE ARMS SALES ISSUE
ARE CONCERNED. ALL PUBLICIZED U.S. SALES WILL, AT MINIMUM,
PROVOKE CHINESE WARNINGS AND REMINDERS THAT THEY ARE CARE-
FULLY WATCHING OUR ACTIONS. WHILE THE CHINESE WERE PRE-
PARED FOR THE F-5E DECISION, MINIMIZED THEIR PUBLIC RE-
ACTION TO IT, AND APPARENTLY WERE ABLE TO MANAGE THE DOMES-
TIC FALLOUT, THEY COULD BE JOLTED BY A SERIES OF MAJOR
PUBLICIZED NEW APPROVALS IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE COMMUNIQUE
BILLED BY US AS CONCRETE EVIDENCE OF U.S. INTENTIONS TO
SUPPORT TAIWAN. THIS WILL BE ESPECIALLY TRUE DURING THIS
PERIOD BEFORE AND DURING THE 12TH PARTY CONGRESS WHEN DENG
AND HIS POLICIES WILL BE IN THE SPOTLIGHT -- AND ON THE
SPOT. ALTHOUGH DENG WOULD CLEARLY PREFER TO AVOID AN EARLY
CONTRETEMOS ON THE TAIWAN/ARMS SALES ISSUE, HE CAN BE EX-
PECTED TO MOVE PROMPTLY AND DECISIVELY TO HEAD OFF CHARGES
BY DOMESTIC OPPONENTS THAT, AS IN 1978, HE HAD BEEN "TAKEN"
BY THE U.S. AND COMPROMISED CHINA'S SOVEREIGNTY.
8. FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, BEIJING WILL BE AT PAINS TO
DEMONSTRATE THAT IT IS LIVING UP TO ITS SIDE OF THE BARGAIN
SET FORTH IN THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE. CHINESE OFFICIALS, IN-
CLUDING SENIOR ONES, WILL CONTINUE TO ENUNCIATE BEIJING'S
FUNDAMENTAL POLICY OF PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION. CONCURRENTLY,
CHINA WILL CONTINUE TO PROMOTE ITS MORE BENIGN POLICIES
TOWARD THE TIBETAN AUTONOMOUS REGION, SO AS TO DRAW ATTEN-
TION TO THE TAIWAN PARALLEL. SIMILAR CONSIDERATIONS MAY
INFLUENCE BEIJING'S APPROACH TO DEALING WITH THE HONG KONG
ISSUE.
9. BEIJING'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS SINCE THE SIGNING OF THE
COMMUNIQUE HAVE SOUGHT TO SIGNAL THAT FUTURE SINO-AMERICAN
RELATIONS WILL REMAIN HOSTAGE TO CONTINUED MOVEMENT TOWARD
A SOLUTION OF THE ARMS SALES PROBLEM. THE AUTHORITATIVE
AUGUST 17 MFA STATEMENT, FOR EXAMPLE, DIRECTLY LINKED THE
"MAINTENANCE AND DEVELOPMENT" OF SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS TO
THE "EARNEST" IMPLEMENTATION OF "RELEVANT PROVISIONS" OF
THE COMMUNIQUE. A SIMILAR NOTE WAS SOUNDED IN AMBASSADOR
CHAI'S AUGUST 24 STATEMENT TO CBS THAT ONLY WITH THE
THOROUGH IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE PRINCIPLES AND COMMITMENTS
WILL SINO-U.S. RELATIONS DEVELOP SMOOTHLY."
10. PRIVATELY, THE CHINESE HAVE ALREADY BEGUN TO FOLLOW UP
NEW U.S. ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN BY PRESSING US FOR AS MUCH
INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE ON EACH TRANSACTION WHILE ARGUING
THEIR INTERPRETATION OF COMMUNIQUE POINTS IN A WAY DESIGNED
TO CONTRAIN OUR MANEUVERABILITY. THEY WILL POINT TO
"APPROPRIATE CONSULTATIONS" IN PARAGRAPH 9 AND OTHER
COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE IN DEFENDING THEIR RIGHT TO ASSURE THEM-
SELVES THAT EACH ANNOUNCED SALE LEGITIMATELY FALLS WITHIN
THE FRAMEWORK OF THE AGREEMENT.
BECAUSE OF THE HIATUS IN
NEW U.S. APPROVALS OF ARMS SALES OVER THE PAST YEAR AND A
HALF, THE CHINESE MAY HAVE STEELED THEMSELVES FOR SEVERAL
MORE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. WE CAN EXPECT MEASURED CHINESE
EXDIS
RACTIONS PROVIDED WE CAREFULLY MANAGE PUBLICITY, MAINTAIN
THE UTMOST SECRECY IN OUR MILITARY-RELATED DEALINGS WITH
TAIWAN, AND ARE SEEN BY THE CHINESE TO BE OPERATING CLEARLY
WITHIN THE GUIDELINES OF THE COMMUNIQUE. THE CHINESE WILL
TRY TO ENGAGE US IN REPEATED DISCUSSIONS OF THE MEANING OF
THE COMMUNIQUE AND OUR VIEW OF GUIDELINES OF "QUALITY AND
QUANTITY," PERHAPS IN TIME ASKING FOR A MORE FORMAL REVIEW
OF OUR ARMS SALES. IT IS CLEARLY IN OUR INTEREST TO POST-
PONE ANY SUCH REVIEW, AND TO AVOID CREATING UNNECESSARY UN-
CERTAINTIES THAT MIGHT STIMULATE ONE.
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CHINESE VIEWS ON PROSPECTS FOR SINO-AMERICAN
- RELATIONS
11. WHILE UNDOUBTEDLY CONNECTED WITH THE LEADERSHIP'S
DESIRE TO PLACE THE COMMUNIQUE IN THE MOST FAVORABLE LIGHT
ON THE EVE OF THE PARTY CONGRESS, THE INITIAL LOW-KEY
CHINESE REACTION TO THE F-5E ANNOUNCEMENT AND TO THE EX-
PRESSIONS OF SUPPORT FOR TAIWAN BY U.S. OFFICIALS IS A
POSITIVE SIGN. DESPITE THE OCCASIONAL PUBLIC CALL FOR A
"THOROUGH SOLUTION" OF THE ARMS SALES QUESTION "AT AN EARLY
DATE," WE BELIEVE THAT THE CHINESE ARE RESIGNED TO A FAIRLY
LENGTHY TIME PERIOD OF REDUCTIONS OF U.S. ARMS SALES. THE
CHINESE HAVE INDICATED THAT THE NEXT MONTH WILL BE A PERIOD
IN WHICH THEY WILL EVALUATE HOW THE COMMUNIQUE WILL BE
INTERPRETED IN PRACTICE. THIS PERIOD, OF COURSE, COINCIDES
PARTLY WITH THE 12TH PARTY CONGRESS, BEGINNING SEPTEMBER 1.
WE SHOULD, THEREFORE, PROCEED PRUDENTLY TO MAKE RECOMMENDA-
TIONS TO THE CHINESE CONCERNING REVIVED MOVEMENT IN OUR
RELATIONSHIPS, INCLUDING IN THE MILITARY AREA.
12. IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT COMMENTS OF CHINESE OFFICIALS ON
FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR THE RELATIONSHIP HAVE BEEN MORE UP-
BEAT THAN BEIJING'S SOMEWHAT WARY AND NONCOMMITTAL PUBLIC
POSTURE ON THIS SUBJECT:
- -- DENG TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT THE COMMUNIQUE WILL
LEAD TO A CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT OF SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS"
PROVIDED NO "NEW SHADOWS" APPEAR DURING THE IMPLEMENTATION
PHASE. HE WELCOMED THE PROPOSAL FOR SECRETARY SHULTZ TO
VISIT CHINA, REMA2KED THAT PREMIER ZHAO WOULD DEFINITELY
VISIT THE U.S., AND SUGGESTED THAT DATES FOR THESE VISITS
BE WORKED OUT IN DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.
- -- IN AN AUGUST 24 CONVERSATION WITH EMBOFFS, MFA USA
DIVISION DEPUTY DIRECTOR NI YAOLI, AFTER NOTING NEAR-TERM
PROBLEMS WHICH SHOULD BE ADDRESSED, INCLUDING ECONOMIC
DIFFERENCES AND "DEFECTIONS," SAID THAT THE TWO SIDES
SHOULD LOOK TO EXCHANGES OF VISITS AS A GOOD FIRST STEP TO
GET THE RELATIONSHIP BACK ON TRACK. AFTER MENTIONING THE
VISITS BY SECRETARY SHULTZ AND PREMIER ZHAO, HE STATED THAT
THE TWO SIDES SHOULD FINALIZE DATES FOR THE NEXT MEETING OF
THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMISSION AND RESUME DISCUSSION OF THE
MILITARY RELATIONSHIP. IN CONNECTION WITH THE LATTER POINT,
NI ASKED FOR THE STATUS OF THE LIU HUAQING VISIT TO WASH-
INGTON. EMBOFF REPLIED THAT THE INVITATION REMAINED ON THE
TABLE. WANG LI, AN MFA AMERICAN SPECIALIST ALSO PRESENT,
INTERVENED TO ASK IF THE U.S. COULD "MAKE THE FIRST MOVE"
IN RENEWING THE INVITATION. EMBOFF ANSWERED BY REPEATING
THAT THE INVITATION REMAINS ON THE TABLE. DURING THE DIS-
CUSSION, NI STATED THAT, WHILE "OF COURSE" IT WILL BE A
FEW WEEKS OR MONTHS BEFORE SINO-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES PICK UP
AGAIN, IT WOULD BE GOOD TO BEGIN THE PLANNING PROCESS NOW.
13. WE ARE CLEARLY IN A PERIOD IN WHICH BOTH SIDES ARE,
PROBING THE OTHER'S LIKELY APPROACH TO IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE COMMUNIQUE'S PROVISIONS. DURING THIS SENSITIVE TIME,
OUR BEST COURSE IS A POSITIVE BUT SOMEWHAT RESERVED ONE,
GEARED TO BUILDING THE FOUNDATION FOR A NEW, MORE FORWARD-
LOOKING PHASE OF THE RELATIONSHIP, WHILE FEELING OUT THE
CHINESE AS TO JUST WHAT THEY HAVE IN MIND. TO THIS END,
WE COULD FOLLOW UP DENG'S SUGGESTION TO SET THE DATES FOR
SECRETARY SHULTZ' VISIT, WHICH WOULD BE THE RETURN VISIT
FOR HUANG HUA'S TRIP TO THE U.S. LAST OCTOBER. WE COULD
ALSO BEGIN PRELIMINARY PLANNING FOR A TRIP BY PREMIER ZHAO
TO THE U.S. NEXT 9EAR. AS SUGGESTED IN BEIJING 11539, IN
ADVANCE OF SUCH HIGH-LEVEL VISITS IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL TO
SCHEDULE SENIOR WORKING-LEVEL CONSULTATIONS IN EITHER
CAPITAL TO PERMIT AN IN-DEPTH EXPLORATION OF OUR MUTUAL
POSITIONS ON BILATERAL AND STRATEGIC ISSUES. ALL SUCH
STEPS, OF COURSE, COULD BE PEGGED TO ARTICLE 8 OF THE
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14. EVEN THOUGH NI YAOLI DIRECTLY RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF
RENEWED MOVEMENT IN THE MILITARY AREA, WE NEED TO EXERCISE
SOME CAUTION. WE CANNOT YET BE CERTAIN THAT NI'S RECEPTIVE
ATTITUDE REFLECTS THE CONSENSUS OF HIS SUPERIORS AND OF THE
CHINESE LEADERSHIP GENERALLY. FOR THE MOMENT, OUR BEST
EXDIS
COURSE MAY SIMPLY BE TO REITERATE THAT THE LIU HAQING
INVITATION REMAINS ON THE TABLE, ADDING OUR HOPE THAT THE
CHINESE SIDE WILL BE ABLE TO FOLLOW THROUGH AT AN EARLY
JUNCTURE. ALSO, RECALLING THE LENGTHY DISAGREEMENTS WITHIN
THE USG WHILE PREPARING FOR THE SCHEDULED LIU HUAQING VISIT
LAST YEAR, WE SUGGEST THAT NEW DECISIONS OR REAFFIRMATION
OF OLD ONES SHOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED SOON SO AS TO BE READY
FOR A VISIT. HUMMEL
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