SECOND REVISION OF CPPG ISSUE PAPER ON SOVIET LEADERSHIP TRANSITION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R000800100002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 11, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 2, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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September 2, 1982
SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR:
OVP - Mr. Donald P. Gregg
S/S 8226355
NSC_ - Mr. Michael O. Wheeler
S/S 8226356
CIA
JCS - MAJ Dennis Stanley
Treasury - Mr. David Pickford
5/5 bzzbj--)u
S/S 8226359
S/S 8226360
SUBJECT Second Revision of CPPG Issue Paper on Soviet
Leadership Transition
Attached for your concurrence is a second revised edition
of the issue paper on the Soviet leadership transition, reflect-
ing agency suggestions and discussion at the August 26 CPPG
meeting. Further comments or suggestions may be forwarded
before September 13 to Tom Simons in the Office of Soviet Union
Affairs, Room 4217, telephone [phone]. If no revisions are
received, we will consider the paper to be approved on a contin-
gency basis by principals.
r,
Executive Secretary
State Dept. review completed.
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CPPG ISSUE PAPER
Soviet Leadership Transition
SITUATION:
No conceivable Soviet succession scenario is likely to
precipitate a serious immediate crisis either within the USSR
or in US-Soviet relations. It is conceivable that Brezhnev
will step down, be kicked upstairs, or be replaced in a
pre-planned move by the collective leadership. Under these
circumstances, the potential for sharp near-term conflict
among Brezhnev's successors would be minimal. The potential
for a sharp struggle among the leadership would be somewhat
higher in the event of Brezhnev's sudden death. However, in
either case the overwhelming preoccupation of the Soviet
leadership will be to project an image of calm and policy
continuity. Even if a serious crisis is unlikely to result
from Brezhnev's leaving office, we should be prepared to
respond quickly and effectively to his passing from the scene,
under whatever circumstances this occurs.
INTERESTS:
U.S. Interests: To underscore the continuity of our
policy and U.S. leadership in world affairs and avoid actions
which needlessly raise tensions or convey the counter-
productive impression that we are seeking to take advantage of
the Soviets at a time of uncertainty and potential instability;
to convey to a successor leadership the message that if there
are significant positive changes in Soviet policies there will
be a significant positive response from us; and to test the
willingness of a successor leadership-to improve relations
with the U.S. on the basis of our agenda. Pressures will
build for unilateral U.S. gestures to improve the
relationship; these should be firmly resisted.
Soviet Interests: To smooth the transition of power to
Brezhnev's successors, ensure internal security, and avoid
creating an atmosphere of crisis which could be exploited by
external adversaries. The immediate period will be a time of
internal adjustment as the new leaders maneuver for power,
with consensus lacking for major new initiatives until their
own positions are.secure. Although the propaganda machine can
be expected to project a 'peace-loving' image, significant
near-term changes in Soviet foreign and domestic policies will
thus be unlikely.
Key third party interests:
(1) U.S.Allies: We expect that our allies will wish to
influence our policies toward the new leadership, and they
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will want-us to act with restraint and to avoid any actions or
statements which are likely to raise East/West tensions unduly,
as they shape their own courses. For their part, allies will
be teiTi ted toward in%div id'ual initiatives vis-a-vis the nc::
Soviet leadership, with some danger of competitive activism.
From us, the allies will welcome assurances of continuity in
U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. They. may press for a
return to detente and a quick summit invitation to the new
Soviet leadership.
(2) Soviet allies: Brezhnev's departure will have major
political repercussions in Eastern Europe, since the current
leaders throughout the area, with the exception of Poland,
have close and longstanding personal ties with Brezhnev. We
doubt that Brezhnev's ouster or death will precipitate wide-
spread civil disorders in Poland or elsewhere in Eastern
Europe, but his successors will seek to avoid any impression
of political weakness in Moscow. Soviet allies and proxies in
the developing world may well minimize activities which could
provoke a U.S. response until the initial stage of the Soviet
leadership transition has been completed. Vis-a-vis the
Soviets, they will be looking for new opportunities to press
individual claims on Soviet attention and resources, but such
opportunities will probably be rare, at least at the outset.
(3) Neutral/Non-Aligned: The NNA, like our allies, will
be motivated by concerns for stability and avoidance of an
atmosphere of East/West crisis.
CURRENT U.S. OBJECTIVES AND POLICY PLANS
Political: Our principal objective in the immediate post-
Brezhnev period will be to make clear that we deal with the
Soviet Union as a country and not with any particular leader-
ship. We will want to emphasize that our approach to US-
Soviet relations will continue to be based on the principles
of reciprocity and restraint. It would be advisable to
emphasize points of continuity in our relations, such as
negotiations on START and INF. To underscore our world
leadership, our response should be authoritative, at
Presidential level.
Should Brezhnev die in office, we would expect that his
death will be marked by a Soviet state funeral. We recommend
that our delegation be headed by the Vice President, rather
than the President, in view of the current strains in US-Soviet
relations.. The delegation should include Secretary Shultz and
prominent, bipartisan Congressional, business, and scientific
leaders. We would, of course, want to consult closely with
our allies on level of representation at the funeral.*
*The Office of the Secretary of Defense agrees that our dele-
gation should substantially match Allied delegations, but it
should not be of such a scope as to convey an unrealistically
positive image of bilateral relations.
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Economic: As part of our larger response we will wish to
make clear that we are prepared for an expansion of mutually
beneficial economic relations, in the context of general
upward movement based on significant changes in Soviet
policy. At the same time, there will be no requirement for
immediate decisions on East/West economic questions.
Military: The Soviets may place some limited forces in
Moscow and possibly other urban areas on increased readiness
status as a contingency measure against domestic unrest.
However, the Soviets will almost certainly'avoid any unusual
military activities which might provoke a U.S. reaction. We
should avoid any military actions which could be seen as
provocative by the Soviets or our allies. Freedom of
navigation manuevers should be examined carefully on a case by
case basis. Any military actions that can be considered
beyond normal and could possibly evoke an other than normal
response should be reviewed carefully.
Domestic/Legal Constraints: U.S. Congressional and public
opinion will undoubtedly favor a restrained U.S. response
which emphasizes policy continuity and our willingness to
respond favorably to new signs of moderation in Soviet
international behavior.
Information/Media Policy and Plans: Our information
policy should be geared to our broader political objective of
avoiding actions or rhetoric which would appear designed to
exploit the Soviet leadership transition or needlessly
exacerbate East/West tensions and of testing the new
leadership's professed constructive intentions. It should be
keyed to the policy line announced by the President.
SPECTRUM OF U.S. OPTIONS
Intelligence Assets Available
Our ability to predict events before and during the Soviet
political transition will be limited. We would want to make
maximum use of Embassy Moscow's contacts. Our embassies in
third countries, particularly those in Eastern Europe and
where the Soviet Ambassador has Central Committee status will
be additional sources of information. Of course, the
resources of the intelligence. community will have to be
heavily targeted on the Soviet political transition as well as
Soviet military activities. Another important source of-
information will be our allies with whom we would pursue an
active program of intelligence sharing.
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Political/Diplomatic; Economic; Military Options Available
We see three broad options for our initial response to the
leadership transition:
(1) Embark on a concerted effort to influence the Kremlin
leadership transition process. This course of action would
almost certainly be futile in view of the closed nature of the
Soviet decision-making process and our limited leverage over
internal political developments in the Soviet Union. We lack
precise enough information about the political beliefs and
potential policies of various contenders to be able to predict
with any certainty how they would behave once they had suc-
ceeded Brezhnev. Even if more precise judgements on this
question were possible, an attempt to favor one candidate or
group over another could redound to the disadvantage of those
we favored. Moreover, such an effort on our part would appear
provocative to the Soviets and to our allies and friends as
well.
(2) Adopt a posture of willingness to deal, on the basis
of the policy approach which we have outlined since the
beginning of the Administration, with whichever leadership
group emerges. We would underscore that we remain ready for
an improvement in US-Soviet relations if the Soviet Union
makes significant changes in policies of concern to us, and
particularly policies affecting the prospects for peace.
Announced by the President, this approach would stress our
readiness for a reduction of tensions and progress in specific
aspects of our relationship if the Soviets are prepared
seriously to address the full range of our concerns. There
are two possible variants: 1) a restatement of our agenda
inviting new Soviet restraint in response, with private
emphasis on selected elements of high priority to us at the
time; or 2) an elaboration of our agenda with new negotiating
proposals in a few specific areas, as concrete tests of the
new leadership's intentions and agility. We favor the first
variant as our initial approach, although we believe the
second variant should be kept under review as the Soviet
succession process, which is likely to be prolonged, develops
within the USSR.
(3) Adopt a posture of watchful waiting. We do not favor
this course, since it would dispense with the limited leverage
on Soviet outcomes we do have, and since it would be seen as
purely reactive and unworthy of our world leadership role.
Resources/Assets Available
Political: In addition to Presidential-level statements
and communications, we would want to carry out an extensive
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diplomatic dialogue with the Soviets on all outstanding issues.
For example, we should be prepared to continue with the START
and INF negotiations without interruption. In those cases
where we have active dialogue on specific regional issues, we
should indicate willingness to continue if warranted by indi-
cations of Soviet seriousness. Depending upon the timing and
circumstances of the transition, we might wish to consider an
early Ministerial-level meeting between Secretary Shultz and
the Soviet Foreign Minister. The agenda for such discussions
will depend on the overall posture we adopt.. We should consult
closely with our Allies to ensure maximum policy coordination
and unity during the transition period. U.S. statements
reiterating policy continuity will serve this end, and we may
wish to reinforce them with high-level private messages to
Allied leaders.
Economic: We should not change our approach to East/West
economic issues solely as a response to the Soviet political
transition. However, we should make clear to the new
leadership that future economic relations will depend on
Soviet actions across the full range of our relationship.
Military Forces: As noted above, U.S. and allied military
forces should maintain their normal posture unless Soviet
military activities dictate otherwise.
Informational Capabilities (VOA, ICA, etc): U.S.
information agencies should continue their normal operations,
including those which are critical of Soviet policies, such as
the occupation of Afghanistan and support of martial law in
Poland. However, these agencies should conduct their opera-
tions in accordance with our overall objective of avoiding
actions or rhetoric which could appear designed to exploit the
Soviet political transition or needlessly raise international
tensions.
FOR A RECOMMENDED COURSE OF ACTION
Timing Considerations: We might have some advance warning
of the impending transition, although our ability to predict
such developments will be limited at best. It is also possible
that Brezhnev will, die or be ousted with no immediate warning.
Thus, contingency planning for U.S. participation in a possible
state funeral as well as certain other preparations to enable
us to respond promptly to a leadership change should be under-
taken. For example, we should agree to prepare draft
Presidential statements which could be modified as necessary
when the transition occurs. To do so,. we need early consider-
ation of what our overall posture should be. Draft condolence
messages and an initial White House message also should be
prepared. Illustrative texts of such messages are attached.
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Coordination Requirements:
1. National: At the time-the actual transition takes
place, State would establish a discreet working group to
coordinate U.S. participation in a possible'state funeral and
other aspects of our policy during the transition. It might
also be necessary to establish a special SIG/IG mechanism to
coordinate the longer-term USG response to the transition.
2. International: Among our first responses to a
leadership change would be letters from Secretary Shultz to
key allied and friendly foreign ministers providing our
assessment of the situation and recommending close policy
coordination. The North Atlantic Council in Brussels will be
a key mechanism for continuous exchange of information and
policy coordination with our European Allies. We will want to
devote similar sustained attention to consultation with the
Japanese and ANZUS allies, with the Chinese and with key third
world countries.
Implications of Decision
Degradation of Operational Capabilities Elsewhere: It may
be necessary to shift some intelligence collection assets from
other priorities to effect required close monitoring of the
Soviet transition and military posture. There need be no
other degradation of operational capabilities elsewhere.
Political Impact:
(1) International: Our ability to bring about a
coordinated and restrained Western response to the transition
will be a key in our ability to induce Soviet international
restraint and to convince the new leadership that its interest
lies in adopting a more moderate course.
(2) Domestic: We will come under pressure to change our
policy toward Moscow, both from those who would advocate an
appeal to Soviet "doves", and those who would argue for an
aggressive posture toward the Soviet Union during its
leadership transition. However, as stated above, we believe
the vast majority of the Congress and the American people will
support a statesmanlike posture stressing the continuity of
U.S. policy.
Economic Impact: We would not expect that existing trade
and economic relationships, e.g. grain sales, would be
affected by either the Soviet transition or our response to it.
Security Requirements: Certain domestic groups might
seize upon a transition as a pretext for demonstrations or
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even violent activity against the Soviet diplomatic or
commercial presence in the U.S." Should this happen, the
Soviets might retaliate against our personnel and facilities
in the Soviet Union. We should be prepared to take such
measures as are necessary to fulfill our obligations to
provide appropriate protection. We otherwise anticipate no
increased security threat to our personnel and facilities in
the Soviet Union as a result of the transition.
Legislative Coordination Requirements: As early as
possible following the announcement of Brezhnev's death or
ouster, we should brief the House and Senate leadership on our
assessments of the succession. Secretary Shultz might wish to
testify in open session before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee and/or the House Foreign Affairs Committee on our
approach to US-Soviet relations in the transition period.
However, in our contacts with Congress, we should avoid public
speculation on the details of the leadership struggle or
premature judgments on the policies of the new leaders.
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Statement by the White House Press Spokesman
The President has expressed his personal condolences
to Mr. Kuznetsov, First Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of
the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., on the death of Soviet
President Brezhnev. A high-level delegation will represent
President Reagan at the memorial ceremonies in Moscow.
As leader of the Soviet Union for nearly two decades,
President Brezhnev was one of the world's most influential
figures. President Brezhnev played a very significant role
in the shaping of U.S.-Soviet relations during his presi-
dency.
President Reagan has conveyed to the Soviet Government
the strong desire of the United States to continue to work
for an improved relationship with the Soviet Union and
to maintain an active dialogue between our societies on
all important issues. The President looks forward to a
constructive relationship with the new leadership of the
Soviet Union.
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From President Reagan to Kuznetsov
Please accept my'condolences on the death of President
Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev. President Brezhnev was one of the
world's most influential leaders for nearly two decades.
May I ask you to convey our sympathies to the President's
family.
I would also like to convey through you to the Soviet
Government and people the strong desire of the United
States to work toward an improved relationship with the
Soviet Union. I look forward to conducting relations with
the new leadership in the Soviet Union with the aim of
expanding the areas where our two nations can cooperate to
mutual advantage.
Sincerely,
(1207M)
Ronald Reagan
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From Secretary Shultz to Gromyko
Please accept my condolences on.the death of President
Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev. I can appreciate your sense of loss
at the death of a colleague who played such a leading role
in your nation and in relations between our two nations.
We hope to continue efforts to improve these relations in
the future, and I look forward to working with you toward
this end.
Sincerely yours,
George Shultz
(1207M)
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From President Reagan to Brezhnev's Successor
(if Brezhnev--retires alive)
Please convey to Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev my best wishes for
good health and long life upon his retirement from office, and
please accept my congratulations upon assuming the new duties
and responsibilities that are now yours.
I would also like to convey through you to the Soviet
Government and people the strong desire of the United States to
work toward an improved relationship with the Soviet Union.
For my part, I will be seeking relations which expand the areas
where our two nations can cooperate to mutual advantage and
which contribute to the cause of peace.
Sincerely,
? Ronald Reagan
(Rev. 8/30/82)
(1207M
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POSSIBLE MEMBERS,
U.S. DELEGATION TO
BREZHNEV FUNERAL
Head of Delegation: Vice President George Bush
Members of Delegation:
Secretary of State George P. Shultz
US Ambassador to USSR Arthur A. Hartman
W. Averell Harriman---respected senior figure from World
War II period, former Ambassador to USSR, last met
with Brezhnev in December of 1978.
General Maxwell Taylor---no direct USSR tie, but also symbol
of earlier allied cooperation during' World War II.
John Eisenhower or Milton Eisenhower, same qualifications
as Taylor.
The Honorable William Verity---ARMCO head, Chairman,
US-USSR Trade and Economic Council, represents desire
for continuing limited economic and commercial
relations.
David Rockefeller---Chairman, Board of Directors,
Chase-Manhattan Bank, frequent visitor to USSR.
Frank Press---President, National Academy of Sciences,
visited USSR in 1978.
William W. Scranton---Chairman, Parallel Studies Program
with the Soviet Union, United Nations Association,
former U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN.
Alexander M. Haig, Jr.---former Secretary of State.
Cyrus Vance---former Secretary of State.
Henry A. Kissinger---former Secretary of State.
William P. Rogers---former Secretary of State.
Dean Rusk---former Secretary of State.
Thomas Watson---former Ambassador to the USSR.
Malcolm Toon---former Ambassador to the USSR.
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Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.---former Ambassador to the USSR.
(R) Senator Howard-H. Baker---Senate Majority Leader,-has
visited USSR.
(D) Senator Robert Byrd---Senate Minority Leader, major
visit to USSR in 1979.
(R) Senator Charles H. Percy---Chairman, Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, major visit to USSR in 1981,
met with Brezhnev, Gromyko, Ustinov.
(D) Congressman Clement J. Zablocki---Chairman, House
Foreign Affairs Committee.
(R) Senator Richard G. Lugar---Chairman of European
Subcommittee, Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
(D) Congressman Lee H. Hamilton---Chairman, European/Middle
East Subcommittee of House Foreign Affairs Committee.
(D) Senator Claiborne Pell---Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, ranking minority member.
(R) Congressman William S. Broomfield---House Foreign
Affairs Committee.
(D) Congressman Thomas P. O'Neill---Speaker of the House.
(R) Congressman Robert Michel---House Minority Leader.
(0093A)
(Rev. 8/31/82)
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