Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP85-01156R000100010007-9
Body:
Approved For Release 2008/06/20: CIA-RDP85-01156R000100010007-9
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, National Intelligence Council
FROM: Maurice C. Ernst
NIO for Economics
SUBJECT: Memo on marketing of Intelligence
1. Although brings up some useful points, I believe his memo is
mmisleading in certain respects. My reactions no doubt are colored by the
fact that I took an "old hand" DDI perspective for many years, but I
believe the problem is not well understood and has been misinterpreted many
times in the past.
2. In the first place, the term "marketing of intelligence" is
inappropriate. What is needed is not marketing the CIA product but rather
gaining a sufficient understanding of the actual and potential policy
concerns of the US government, so that the CIA product may become more
relevant. This is not just a semantic problem. DIA, for example, has been
strong on "marketing," but has rarely been involved meaningfully in the
policy process.
3. The allegation that CIA (NFAC, DDI) did not make much effort to
deal with policymakers is greatly overdrawn. Since military, technical,
and scientific analysis consisted mainly of basic research which took
highly institutionalized forms--largely, contributions to elaborate
national estimates--there was relatively little reason for many direct
contacts with consumers. In economic intelligence, OER prided itself on
developing and maintaining a wide network of contacts throughout the
economic policy community. Indeed, OER took Schlesinger's criticisms very
much to heart and shifted resources substantially in favor of what came to
be called "policy support." In the political area, the record was a mixed
one, with some division chiefs maintaining close relations with their
counterparts at State and the NSC, while others stayed close to home. The
main problem in political intelligence was, and to some extent still is
that much of the product is driven by cables rather than by issues.
4. I agree with 0 that NIOs have and can play a crucial role in
developing a sophisticated understanding of US policy issues and
processes. They can thereby help make DDI intelligence product more
relevant, more timely, and generally more useful. DDI office and division
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chiefs, however, should be strongly encouraged to develop their own
customer' network. NIOs should help to stimulate this process and assure
that the linkages are at a sufficiently high level so that we can be
confident that requests for intelligence support are on issues of truly
high priority and not just grist for the desk officer's mill. It is useful
to support lower level requests as well, but not with the same resource
commitment.
5. I am very skeptical about the notion of establishing a "systematic
marketing program;" if by "systematic" 0 means establishing a formalized
system, including consumer surveys, etc. Surveys will give you any answer
you want. The important thing is for the NIOs, the DDI line of command,
and some senior analysts to understand that dealing with customers is an
important part of their responsibility.
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Maurice C. Ernst
Approved For Release 2008/06/20: CIA-RDP85-01156R000100010007-9