OCB REPORT ON TAIWAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP61-00549R000200030020-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 26, 1999
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: May 11, 1959
• Content Type: MF

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SECRET
C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
11 May 1959
MEMORANLUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SUBJECT: OCB Report on Taiwan
1. The Chairman desires to discuss the following matter
briefly with the Members at the USIB meeting on 12 May 1959.
2. The Chairman notes that in a current draft of an COB
report on Taiwan and the Government of the Republic of China
there are certain statements which do not appear to be entirely
consistent with judgments contained in SNIE 100-12-58, Probable
Developments in the Taiwan Strait Crisis, 28 October 1958. He
also notes, however, that developments since the publication of
the SNIE may have changed the views of the Members on these
points. The statements in question, underlined in the quotations
from the two documents here below, bear on the willingness of the
GRC to withdraw from the Offshore Islands and the csnsequences on
Taiwan and in Asia of such a withdrawal.
a. OCB Report, Paragraph 7
The Problem of the Off-Shore Islands. The crisis in
the Taiwan Strait highlighted the problem posed by the GRC-
held off-shore islands. A substantial body of public opinion
in the Free World was revealed as favoring GRC withdrawal
from them once the situation was tranquilized. The United
States for its part does not consider wise, from a military
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standpoint, the GRC'a cc iiitment of so large a portion of
its armed forces to the defense of the islands. Whatever
the views of other countries regarding the matter may be,
however, the facts are that the GRC attaches enormous
political and psychological importance to the islands and
is adamantly opposed to abondoning them. If the ni Q
States should attempt to.+egsuade the GRC to remove its
forces from the islands, it would undoubte y refuse to.
,Q .
do on, We can offer no ] nducements which w1&.
ficient to cause t_he GRC to give tL n An effort-.
force the GRC to take this as n tfr threatening refusal
to assist in their defense or a reduction of aid would
probably not succeed but only cause deep resentment and
suspicion among Chinese leaders which would destroy our
present close and cooperative relationships with the GRC.
The Communists, who are seeking to create divisions between
the United States and the GEC as part of their politico-
military campaign to seize Taiwan and destroy the GRC,
would exploit such a situation fully. There is also a
danger that evacuation would undermine tie GRC as an
alternate Government of China by tending to reduce it to
thethe status of a Government of Taiwan thus de riving it
of its basic reason for existing. Such developments would
px babo lyengender a disastrous deterioration of GRC morale
and stability which would have grave cons
entire Free World position in the Far East. Furthermore,
evacuation of the islands would in no sense remove the
threat of aggression by the Chinese Communists, who have
repeatedly made it clear that their purpose is to seize
Taiwan, the Penghus, and the off-shore islands as a whole
and that they will accept no compromise.
alternative would be an almost coriplete collapse of their
b. SNIE 100-12-58
"...if the Chinese Nationalists were convinced that the
position,
persuasion. Tn doing so, they would insist that further
US commitments be m .de for the strengthening of Taiwan and
for the continuing of US support of the GRC as the government
of China.
we believe that the chances are better than even
that the Chinese Nationalists would in time yield to US
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"The adjustment to the new situation following the
loss of the offshore islands would be exceedingly
difficult, involving a shift in the GRC's view of its
role in the world, some change in its policies, and
severe strains in the US-GRC relationship. At the
same time, susceptibility of some groups to Communist
propaganda and subversion would almost certainly increase.
Nevertheless, provided the US had carefully paved the
way and had made w ne and convincing demonstrations ihat
it was still determined to rotect Taiwan and to su ort
e GRC's international position, we believe that the
is & the offshore islands would not lead tea collapse
of the GRC's will to exist or to the overturn of the
GRC lay groups seeking accorunodation with Peiping, or
the creation of an independent" Taiwan.
"The impact on US presti e of the loss of the.offshore
islands would va widely, de ending on the circumstances,
being least ible in 25X6
India in the event the US had persuaded the Chinese
Nationalists to withdraw their garrisons in the i to rests
of pecicc most pronounced inte vent Chinese Cc~znmunist
ore :s had successfully overrun the garrisons. While
there would be some sense of relief that Vhis source of
friction between Communist China and the US had finally
been liquidated, there would be concern for the future
security of their countries against Communist China,
and the ROK and many Southeast Asian countries would
levy new requests on the US for support.
"It is unlikely, however, that the loss of the offshore
islandalone would have any substantial effect on the 25X6
foreign policies and orientations of India, Indo-
nesia, Burma, the OR; M .laya, Cant odta~or South Vietnam.
The government of Thailand might seek to increase its
contacts with Peiping. Opposition political groups in
Laos and the Philippines would probably be able to exert
greater pressures on their governments to adopt more
neutralist policies. The positions of pro-US groups
in some neutralist countries might be weakened. Despite
these reactions however, we do not consider that the
of the offshore islands alone-would cause any Asian govern-
ment to fall to the Cor.'Murlists, or that the US presence and
osition in East Asia would suffer critical D6a e."
25X1A
Deputy Assistant Director
National Estimates
DISTRIBUTION A
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