ANALYSIS OF ORE PRODUCTION WITH CONCLUSIONS FIRST REPORT AD HOC PRODUCTION REVIEW SUBCOMMITTEE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67-00059A000400050001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 54
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 26, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 19, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

20601
,SECURITY INFORMATOR Ok-
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ANALYSIS OF ORE PRODUCTION
with conclusions
FIRST REPORT
5tfTtlITT:F5.777,1"
Ad Hoc Production Review Subcommittee
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
19 Ally 1949
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ANALYSIS OF ORE PRODUCTION
with conclusions
FIRST REPORT
Ad Hoc Production Review Subcommittee
19 July 1949
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ANALYSIS OF ORE PRODUCTION, WITH CONCLUSIONS
INTRODUCTION
The Committee was directed, by memorandum .fr.omAD/ORE date
4 May, 1949, to "review past and present ORE production, for the purpose
of appraising the degree of correspondence that exists between the ORE
production effort and its mission." The Committee proceeded, (a) to ex-
amine the basic NSC, CIA, and ORE directives for an authoritative state-
ment of an ORE mission; and (b) to examine the actual ORE production in
order to establish the direction it has taken. The Committee agreed that
It would limit itself to a descriptive and quantitative analysis of ORE production,
and not to make judgments respecting the quality of this production.
L THE. BASIC DIRECTIVES (See Appendix- "A")
ILL
A. No adequate definition of an ORE mission exists. The Committee
could not find in the basic NSA 1947, NSC, CIA, and ORE directives any
statement of a specific ORE mission that was sufficiently clear and
detailed, and generally understood and accepted both within and outside of
ORE to provide a proper continuing basis for guiding or appraising ORE
activities and production.
The National Security Act of 1947 and the basic NSC directives pro-
vide an extremely general definition of a CIA mission. CIA is _made
responsible-for producing "National Intelligence," and for performing
"4ervices of Common Concern" on behalf of existing intelligence agencies.:'
NPCID #3 further defined National Intelligence as "integrated departmental
intelligence that covers the broad aspects of national policy and national
security, is of concern to more than one Department..., and transcends the ILLEGIB
exclusive competence of a single Department..."
This broadly stated CIA responsibility was not, however, given the
more explicit definition that would have spelled out its relevant parts in
the form of a mission for ORE. Consequently, ORE has been without an
authoritative. frame of reference by which its production effort could have
been planned, guided and appraised. The difficulties inherent in this
situation have been dealt with by administrative decisions which have,
in general, been directed to problems of procedure, forms of production,
and inter-agency relations rather than to the development of a clear
official policy that would act in lieu of an authoritative statement of
mission.
Consequently, the Committee considered that a significant gap
developed between the basic NSC directives which broadly indicated a
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mission fOr CIA, and the actual basis on which ORE produces intelligence.
B. This gap, which could have been bridged by spelling out a broad
statement of a CIA mission in terms of a precise operational mission for
ORE., has instead been filled by ad hoc judgments and commitments.
These developed in connection with specific external requests made
upon..ORE.; and, more significantly, from individual and subordinate concepts
of function and method based on the judgment of Branch and Group chiefs
and reflecting the capabilities, work-habits, and internal organization of
Branches and Groups.
Thus, in the absence of specific definition from above and overall
policy guidance from within, the production effort of ORE represents an
essentially uncontrolled evolution, in the course of which patterns of
production have been initiated on an ad hoc basis and become confirmed by
repetition. These patterns, which are identified below, gradually came to
have some of the validity of "missions." While no single mission of ORE
has been established, a variety of "missions" have evolved in practice.*
* Note is taken of certain ORE Operating Procedures, in which over-
all policy guidance is introduced; but the Committee cannot find that the
development of a variety of patterns of production was significantly checked
IL PATTERNS OF ORE PRODUCTION (See Appendix "B")
type.
ILLEGIB
The following patterns emerge when ORE production is broken down by
1. Periodically Recurrent Production,
2. Reports and Estimates.
3. Production of intelligence support on a continuing basis for
' other CIA offices and outside agencies; and the performance of
Services of Common Concern,
A. Periodically Recurrent Production. (See Appendix "B", Sect. II)
This category includes the CIA Daily and Weekly Summaries,
the CIA Monthly Review, Branch Weekly and monthly working papers, and
Branch daily and weekly estimates.. Production of this category claims
approximately 15% of ORE professional man-hours. There is evidence
that, ILLEGIB
This category of production has steadily expanded in volume
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and variety of publication. Expansion has been particularly marked during
1948-49.
(2) The concept of "current intelligence" has broadened beyond the
definition given in NSCID #3.* There is a marked tendency to comment on
* The Cornniittee decided not to use the terms "Current" and'"Staff"
intelligence in its Report. These terms, as employed within ORE, do not
correspond with the definitions given by NSCID #3; and, in additions, the
distinction between them has become blurred. NSCID #3 defines "Current
Intelligence" as "spot information ...0 of immediate interest and value to
operating or policy staffs ...0 without the delays incident to complete
evaluation or interpretation."
ILLEGIB
and to evaluate the "spot information" reported. There is also a tendency
to produce comprehensive area reviews and analyses of significant develop-
ments.
B. Reports and Estimates (See Appendix "B", Sect. I)
This category includes the SR, ORE, and IM Series, and Special
Evaluations. Production of this category claims approximately 23% of ORE
professional man-hours (16% for ORE and IM items; 7% for SR items.) There
is evidence that,
(1), There has been a trend away from the handling of broadly defined
to the handling of narrowly defined problems; from long-term to short-term
problems; from the predictive method of treatment to the non-predictive;
and, finally, from the fully and formally coordinated type of 'publication to
the incompletely or informally coordinated type.
(2) This trend generally correlates with an increase in the number
of specific external requests made upon ORE, and reflects the character
of these requests.
C. Supporting Services and Services of Common Concern (See Appendix
"B", Sect. III
This category includes the evaluation of 00, OSO, A-2 and State
Department Reports; support of OSO, OPC, NSC-4 Committee, and External
Research Program; the review of MS material; and the activities of the
Map Branch. Excluding the Basic Intelligence Group and Map Branch,
activity in this category claims approximately 16% of ORE professional man-
hours. This represents as much time as is currently spent on Periodically
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Recurrent production or on the production of ORE and IM items. It is
considered that,
(I) The man-hours spent on these activities take up an increasingly
significant proportion of ORE professional time.
(2) Although some of these activities might fall, within the meaning
of "Services of Common Concern," few of them ca be seriously cOnsidered
as related to the production of "national intelligence," no matter how that
general term is defined.
D. ORE production can also be classified according to the-presumed
use for which it is in ei?T-i-a-ed-
1. To meet high policy level needs. The CIA Daily and, to $onie
extent, the Weekly Summary, the CIA Monthly Review, and miscellaneous
ORE and IM items fall within this category.
R. To meet the needs of a wide range of lower -level users, in both
policy-making and other intelligence agencies. A large number of-ORE and
mcist rm items, the CIA Weekly Summary to some extent, Branch working
papers, and almost all Supporting Services fall within this category.
IIL DETERMINING FACTORS IN SHAPING PATTERNS OF PRODUCTION
The present patterns of ORE production are the result of an
essentially uncontrolled evolution, in which the significant determining
factors have been external demand, individual and varying cnncepts of
function and method, and internal pressures, all of which have had relative-
ly free play.
A. Much ORE production has followed from external requests, and
from the presumption that such requests indicated a continuing need. The
CIA Daily Summary, the SR Series, the "Current Situation in " type
of ORE, a large number of ORE and IM items, and many Supporting
Services were initiated and then continued in this way. This factor, however,
is considered less significant than those operating within ORE itself because
the bulk of production has been self initiated.
B. The self-initiated production of ORE has, in considerable part,
been shaped by various and often contradictory ideas about the mission of
ORE and the method in which it might best be carried out. The following
concepts a mission are noted as having been influential:
1. ORE should produce intelligence in support of high-level policy
makers.
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2. ORE should produce intelligence for a wide-range of loWer-
level users.
3. ORE should produce intelligence in continuing support for
Departmental planning and operations.
The following concepts of method are noted as having been also influential:
L ORE intelligence should be produced on a periodically recurring
basis, ranging in time span from daily to monthly, and in content from
analysis of significant developments to comprehensive area reviews.
2. ORE intelligence should consist of reports and estimates, which
should be made only as a significant need exists, or is considered to exist.
3. ORE intelligence should be restricted to evaluations and predictions.
4. ORE intelligence should emphasize reporting and "spot informa-
tion."
C. These cnncepts were for the most part formulated within ORE
and withoii.t direct reference to the needs of high policy bodies or other
consumers of intelligence. This is due to the fact that no close working
relationship has developed between ORE and the policy-making bodies. Hence
it has come about that ORE production, both in its doctrine and practice, has
been based largely upon the producer's judgment and his informed guesses
as to what was important or what might be needed.
D. Of equal im tance is the fact that ORE production has also been
conditioned by other idt. ,able internal considerations. The following are
noted as having been inn._ ial:
1. The long establisi tradition in all intelligence agencies of
producing current periodical views.
2. The belief that perio,..,ally recurrent production is excellent
training, particularly for junior analysts; serves to maintain a running
record; and provides a morale-boosting medium of expression.
3. The fact that much periodically recurrent production, as-well as
many IM items are a natural by-product of the intelligence process employed
to produce fully developed estimates.
4. The desire to avoid the difficulties of coordination with other
intelligence agencies.
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5. The existence of competition between Branches and Groups.
6. The less rigid qualitative demands upon personnel if production
"follows the cables," does not require special aptitudes, and can be
systematized into a controllable routine.
IV, COMPETITION AND CONFUSION BETWEEN PATTERNS OF PRODUCTION,
A. In the absence of a defined mission or basic administrative control,
little uniformity of production has been established among the Branches
and Groups. One Branch puts its major effort into ORE items. Other
Branches emphasize periodically recurrent production. Two Branches
expend the largest single portion of their professional time on supporting
services.
B. Furthermore, the various patterns of production make competing
claims on limited professional time. Each Branch or Group, and every
analyst within a Branch or Group tends to acquire a multiplicity of functions
and responsibilities which prevents adequate attention being given to any
particular category of activity or production. Thus methods and concepts '
of mission, which are essentially complementary, appear as competitive.
External requests, periodical production, and supporting services tend to
take precedence over other types of production because they so frequently
inyolve working to fixed "dead lines."
C. The free play of competing concepts of function and method
has left ORE exposed to the pressure of external requests because, in the
absence of a uniform authoritative concept, it becomes very difficult to '
judge the validity of such requests.
V. SHIFT IN THE EMPHASIS OF ORE PRODUCTION
The most significant trend revealed by the Committee's examina-
tion is that the effort of ORE has quantitatively shifted from the produc-
Tkii of hig -eve nte igence or a restr cted policy-making audience to
the produc ion of a wide range of general intelligence for a broad lower-
level auc?lel?'--1--------7-iceeSee Appendix rt," Sect0 III)
A. The production of Reports and Estimates during the period
July 1946 - December 1947 suggests an effort to establish a pattern
emphasizing a broad political-economic-strategic approach and attempting
to project trends and predict future developments. During the same
period, the CIA Daily and Weekly Summaries were the only official
periodical publications, and were distributed to a highly restricted audience.
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B. In the period 1948-49, this pattern altered. The emphasis in Reports
and Estimates shifted from the broad, long-term type of problem to the
narrowly defined, short-term type; and from the predictive to the non-
predictive type. It is significant that the IM Series, designed to meet
external requests and essentially more limited in scope and method than the
ORE Series, was initiated in this period. A quantitative displacement of
ORE by IM has occurred. Simultaneously, a wide range of Branch working
papers were disseminated to a working-level audience outside ORE. In
addition, ORE accepted an increasing number of commitments to provide
supporting services for other CIA offices and outside agencies. Thus, while
ORE has attempted to maintain its original high level function, its produc-
tice effort has quantitatively shifted to the fulfillment of basically different
types of requirement.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
That Committee finds that,
A. The present production effort of ORE is the product of an
essentially uncontrolled evolution.
B. The reasons for this form of development are considered to
have been,
1. The absence of a mission for ORE defined at the
NSC level.
2. The absence of a clearly and consistently developed
policy within CIA to stand in place of a defined mission.
3. The consequent free play given to internal suggestions
and external requests.
C. Uncontrolled evolution has resulted in the establishment of a
variety of patterns of activity and production. Each of these has, by
repeated use, become a determining influence almost equivalent to that
of a "mission." These "pattern - missions" overlap, interfere, and
compete with each other for limited professional man-hours.
D. In particular, the emphasis in production has shifted from
reporting, synthesis and estimating for a restricted, high-level, policy-
making audience to reporting, periodical review, analysis, and short-
term prediction for a comparatively unrestricted lower-level audience.
E. A significant consequence of this evolution is that CIA, though
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still defined as the apex of the governmental intelligence structure, seems
to be increasingly regarded as in the status a a competing IAC Agency.
ORE is unfavorably placed to compete at this level, since it is without the
definitive guidance provided by a traditional Departmental responsibility.
F. There is no evidence in the basic documents that it was
intended or desired that ORE, as the producing component of CIA, should
be simply an additional intelligence unit in the governmental structure.
There is, on the contrary, evidence that it was intended and desired that
ORE should provide a final point of intelligence synthesis in that structure;
and that, as such, its authoritative focus should be the highest policy-
making level of government, particularly that sector of policy-making that
lay beyond the competence of single Departments or Agencies.
G. Many of the patterns of activity and production, even though
by strict definition they appear remote from the general responsibility
of CIA as laid down in the basic documents, may, however, be valid;
L Because they are an indispensible even if subordinate
part of the whole intelligence process which leads to synthesis
and estimate.
2. Because they fill a positive need which cannot, in the
present state of the governmental intelligence structure, be met
in any other way ILLEGIB
H. The immediate problem is not necessarily to be solved by
a wholesale lopping off of all activities and categories of production that
do not conform to a strict interpretation of the basic directives. It can,
however, be realistically approached by recognizing and separating the ILLEGIB
various categories of production in relation to
(I) The reporting, reviewing, and analytical part of
the intelligence process
(2) The synthesizing and estimating part of the intelli-
gence process.
This then makes it possible to decide which activities and categories of
production are valid and on what grounds; and to establish priorities among
them as a first step toward
(I) Making the organizational changes required to
discharge effectively the responsibilities accepted;
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(2) Establishing the administrative controls needed
to check further undirected evolution, to eliminate conflicting
claims on limited capabilities, and to keep future production
in accord with agreed and understood Mission or Policy.
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10 The basic documents examined were:
(a) The National Seourity Act of 1947 (NSA 1947), sec.
(b) National Security Council Directives (NSCID).
No. 1 of 12 Deo. 1947; No. 3 of 18 Jan. 1948. ,
(c) Director of Central Intelligence Directives (Da),
No. 314 of 8 July 1948; No 4/2 of 13 Sept4.10414
(d) ORE Statement of Functions of 15 Jay 1948, oginfirmed
in Orinization and F?iiotione CIA of 1 Jun. 1949.
2. pisnussion
(4) NSC 1947, Soot. 102 (d) (3), defined one of,the:duties
of CIA aai "to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the
national Seourity, and provide for ... appropriate dissekination
and to perform *.. additional services of common concern
(b) NSCID 1, pares 4, 7, 6, expands the preceding se follows:
(1) "... shall produee intelligence relating to the
national security, hereafter referred to as national
(2) "00. ?hall perform for the benefit of the existing
intelligence Agencies such services of comtiOn concern to
these Agencies as the MSC determine:60.0"
(3) "... shall disseminate national intelligence
Intelli once so disseminated shall be official concurred
in e nte I once A ranotes or s a oar an ree
statement oss tadssent
Note is taken that sub-pare (3) introduces questions of procedural
relations between CIA and Intelligence Agencies, but does not
define or necessarily limit the responsibility of CIA.
(c) NSCID 3, pares, 1 (d) (e), defines National Intelligence,
(1) Regegyely, by distinguishing it from Departmental
Intelligence, which is, "that intelligence, including
basic, current, and staff intelligence needed by a
Department Cr independent Ageney ... to execute its
mission and to discharge its lawful responsibilities."
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(2) Ebeitively, as "integrated departmentil 'intelligence
that covers t6 broad aspects of national Poliby and
national security, i8 of concern to more thee One
Department ...., and transcends the e2tblusiVe competence
of a single Department.**
It is Aeted that Current Intelligence is defined is "OPot informa-
tiet er:intelligenese ... of immediate interest and to
operating be policy staffs 0..1" and that it shill iiC'Preduced
anddiliSeMinated by all Departments and Agencies, iiielUding CIA,
"to Meet -birsir internal requirements or external reSPonaibilities...."
, -
It is noted that Staff Intelligence is defined ,as ineelligenoe
prepared by any department through the correlation and interpreta-
tion Of all intelligence materials available to it to meet
its ePecikio requirements and responsibilities; and that a depart-
ment has the "ultimate responsibility for the preparation of such
staff intelligenoe as its own department Shall require."
(d) PC additional spelling out of the CIA responsibility to
produce national intelligence was made at the NSC level. In particular,
the relevant parte of the state70176-;;;WiEITAIWoMbility were not
reformulated as a statement of mission for ORE. DCI Ddreotives, examined
on s po o ow) pro e no s s 'Ume'nti. They spell out
problems of concurrence and dissent. This lack of specifie inter rota-
tion, not significantly felt at the Dieotor tiC level. create
Erficulties at the operational level Of ORE where it war11;i7sary to
plan production with no other guide then a broad responsibility to
produce national intelligence.
(e) ORE has attempted to fill the need in its Statement of
Functions, later approved by DCI and incorporated in 0i7Mill7anran4
raariarCIA of 1 Jan, 1949. ORE is there defined as the ex(' usive
(except for science) intelligence evaluation, analysis, and production
component of CIA." *
A question arises of whether other Offices of CIA OSO. 00 --
do not also produce and disseminate; and whether ORE is committed
to their support.
The mission of ORE is there stated to be responsibility for the produc-
tion and presentation of national intelligence. A slight expansion of
the basic definition of national intelligence is made in the phrases,
"required for the formulation and administration of policy and operational
decisions affecting national security;" and "reports and estimates mill
present and interpret the significance of foreign conditions and develop-
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1.
te.'N
ments which affect national security." 'q,ctually the effort to fill
a need does not result in an essentita definition of ingitMirE7IMICh
Branches and Grou s oun unifOari be-7=07?Me spe 1T1ng out is in
functions terms descriBlEFEEW7exidt ng activities and procedures of
Branches and Groups. The statement is primarily descriptive of what
has been and is being done; and of the division of responsibility among
the Branches and Groupb. In consequence, a statement of an ORE mission,
capable of being used to guide a production effort, does not emerge. '
3. Conclusions from Discussion
(a) It is considered, on the basis of this analysis, that a
11110.1Elmatja exill.;717174-.1, the basics NSCID documents, which broadly
indicate the mission o IA, and-iTifliatirle.-Tial-firrch ORE ?roduces
intelli since. This a , which s o ? norms ly ave'eon ?ridged .y
spellg out the broa statement of mission in precisely clarified
operational directives, has apparently been filled instead Iv
(1) An accumulation of ad hoc commitments, in consequence of
responding to fritra-Ari-equests.
(2) An accumulation of articular inter rotation of mission,
derivini-MR774e?capa lit es, organizat on, wor huits,
inter-agency-contacts, end personal judgments of Brunches
and -Groups.
(b) It is considered that there is no available basis for
"appraising the degree of correspondence that exists between the ORE
production effort and its missions" because
(1) National Intelligence, which it is the mission of (RE to
produce on behalf of CIA, has not been defined in a way
that permits the planning and operation of an effective
production .effort.
(2) The productipn effort. has, inetead &rown up in response to
various andlnot necessaril correlated demands, and to various
and nec?tt
ocument ?eon
(c) The'beSic.rea nsibilit of CIA, phrased in terms of
"national'inteili once, t ug stated in t e general direotivos,
has not een iven t e more ex licit statement arid definition needed
ii it was to provide. t e basis for arui an. ? root C717.77.
tie miss on
(d) are essentially concerned with procedures
and do not provide the statement and definition of mission required by
ORE.
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Azancji.. 13: "Prelll_niimmatarli_Juaa3_,:ak_ORE
Production,"
The following general types of production, covering the
period Feb. 1946 to 23 May? 19499 were considered,
(a) .13.10rts and Estimates: (ORE, lid, SR Series, and Special
Evaluations).
(b) Periodical recurrent: (ORE Daily and Weekly, CIA
Monthly Series, Branch iilie?, Vtkliea, Monthlies).
(o) Su rtin : (Services of Common Concern, Support for
operation of other A components and other Agenoietj).
2. No use has been made of technical distinctions employed
within ORE, as "Staff" and "Current Intelligence." Reference is
occasionally made to these terms but only in the sense in which they
have been defined in NSCID
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I-AmnLEASUatimata:t
A. Situation Regan!. (SR Series)
Developed by combining an external request from ONO (ONI) for
a basic handbook on selected countries and a presumed need for basic
country studies to fill the gap that would exist until NIS volumes wore
ready. A total commitment of 47 items was made and is inconsiderable
part fulfilled. Scheduling calls for completion in 1950. The Series
is regarded by the Committee as static and has been given no further
consideration. The following statistics give the picture:
Peblished to date
24
Under Agency review
6
In progress or scheduled
17
47
B. ORE and Intelligence Memoranda (I11) Series (See Appendix C)
1. It was essential to devise descriptive categories for
use in classifying items. The following categories were agreed upon
after a spot check of the contents of an adequate number of items.
Group A: A Situation sis
Essentially an estimatingpr, of which the intent is
to give an accurate descritono astuat on and to rO' ot future
broad develo ents. Situation can mean, the state of an area urrent
it ion in pa n ORE 53) or a political, economic or socilA7EriTzi
complex akInsideration reardin the Italian Colonies -- ORE 39;
Si ificance torn federat on of Trade tnions -- 0 . 214-8; Political
and Economic Situation Sileoted iFger=rgti). The method-177ra-
a paper is to iiTh1Tgence in order to predict
the operation of inter-related factors and trends.
2smapja .The Pi.0121912122122221t2LE Seleoted Factor
Essentiall an estimati . ? .;
a r, narrower in scope than
a Situation Analysis s noe it se eats a sing e factor or isolates a
siTtrend for analysis. It frequently gives detailed treatment to
material that would otherwise be handled as an aspect of a situation
Analvis. The intent .of such a paper is to ro'ect into the future
the o oration of the factor or trend selected. "81 6222E:glEMEIE
in estine, 0 -48; EigEgyaz777: Soviet Moves in Germany,
IM-24),
Group C: The Consequences of a Selected Course of Action.
A paper that usually proceeds from action decisions or
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REUTRICTED
accomplished facts to a prediction of the consequences that can be
presumed to follow. An important variant of this type is noted: an
action deoision assumed to have been made, or an event to have
taken place, and the consequences are then predicted as if developing
from actual fact. (Gonne minces of the Withdrawal of US broes from
Tsingtao -- ORE 47- ; *I 8 e vie sect on to S AttelFE763---
Force Berlin Blockade, IMA18).
Group D: _tack rour_clateLlal
This type of paper essential' selects factual data in
order to ovide a correct frame .117reterenoe. Te method used is
histor ea n that t organ zes ? interprets established data, and
does not undertake predictions. (France's Policy toward Gere,
ORE 39-48; World oil Data, IMF.128),
211.2.M.A: Spot Reporting of tellience_Information
This type of paper essentially reports,on the basis of
timeliness, intelligence information of any or all kinds. It may,
as part of its intent, include an evaluation of the material reported,
or an indication of the material's significance. (H arian Efforts
to Circumvent Prohibited Purchase of US Machine Too s, M-8 3J.
2E2112: Unclassifiable
This category is used to cover items which, for various
reasons, were unclassifiable.
2. Table I Total Production distributed
proups,
by Groups
ORE Ill
A.
Situation Analyses
28
11
B.
Probable Developments
40
42
C.
Consequences Analyzed
13
10
D.
Background
23
22
E.
Spot Reporting
10
80
F.
Unclassifiable
1
7
115
172
Total Production
287
a 3 a
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25X1C
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3. Table II Origin of items distributed by OrOupS
Self-initiated
ORE
IM
Groups
18
4
A
Situation Analyses
A
30
7
Probable Devolopments
B
3
4
Consequences Analyzed
0
18
2
13
Background
D
4
g6
Spot Reporting
E
0
, 0
Unolassified
F
73
43
287
ternal Roe teats
ORB
0 7
10 35
10 6
6 20
0 54
1 ? 7
1M
4. Table XII External Requests detailed
Groups ABC
Totals ORE INE
Executive Office President $ 6
Ilse 18 4
NSC-4 Committee 1 0
Sec. Defense 2 7
JIG 0 18
;AC 5 3
NSRB 0 1
Munitions Board 0 0
ECA 0 0
SANACC 1 0
0 to
US congreSs 0
0
42
129
Groups DEF
ORE ILI
5 8
1 0
O 0
1 7
1 15
5
O 3.
O 1
5
O 3.
3
0
81
30 48 11
-62/14-44"c44-7:v
5"4roduotion for this period is 37 items in tlisi orti Series.
The distribution by Groups is
1946 I2nd half)
1947 1st half)
1947 3rd quarter)
1947 4th quarter)
Groups ABC Groups DEF
2
9
2
15
4
3
1
1
28
19 items were self-initiated; 18 requested, Of the requested
items, 11 come in the Fourth Quarter of 1947.
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6. Production Jan. 1948 to 23 May 1949 analyzed.
(a) Chart It Distribution of Groups ABC and DEP on a units
per month basis.
See insert following
(b) Chart II: External requests distributed by Groups
AEC and DEF on a units per month basis.
See insert following
(c) Chart Distribution of Self-initiated and
Externally requested items, all Groups and all Series.
Sito insert following
(d) Chart TV: Distribution by ORE and /M Series.
See insert following
7. Special BValuations
Treated separately because they have not developed into a
fixed pattern of production. no Special Evaluations have been issued
since Dec., 1948. It is possible that the purpose they were intended
to serve has been absorbed by the growth of the IM Series, by the .
increased volume of periodic production, and by the external distribution
of Branch Working Papers. The following breakdown is given for
comparison.
A. Situation Analyses 1
B. Probable Developments 16
C. Consequences Analyzed 7
D. Background Material 2
E. Spot Reporting 12
F. Unolessifiable 0
Total
38
8, Comnents on production of Reports and Estimates,
(a) Production during the period July 1946 - Deco 1947
eats an efTM-Erialtablish a ttern for the reduction of ORE-.
or es. e character of th a pattern s n cat? TrEge
manderance of Group ABC items (75% approx)irianEr a broad
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CHART I - DISTRIBUTION BY GROUPS ABC AND DEF ON A UNITS PER MONTH BASIS
II ORE
sz
Z.?
Appruved Fur Reledse 200 IA7bt2b . CIA-RD1-67-00059A0CM41700517uu-i-1
(ABC)
IM (ABC)
E ORE (DEF)
0 lit (DEF)
',TRW
JAN'48 FEB MAR APR MAY
JUL AUG
LII
SEP
OCT NOV DEC JAN '49 FEB MAR APR
CHART 2 - EXTERNAL REQUESTS DISTRIBUTED BY GROUPS ABC AND DEF ON A UNITS PER MONTH BASIS
MORE
(ABC)
lit (ABC)
VA ORE (DEF)
Ej IM (DEF)
JA '48 FEB
1 x
MAR ATArovkftfor FMase11/601/0,31128 : drAeRDIVA2000MCOOON6b566t/OP FEB
MAR
APR
HART 3 - DISTRIBUTION OF SELF INITIATED AND EXTERNALLY REQUESTED ITEMS ( ALL GROUPS; BOTH SERIES)
Self Initiated
Externally requested
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HART 4 - DISTRIBUTION BY SERIES ( ORE and I M
N'48 FEB
APR MAY JUN JUL AIJG
Approved For 1-( I
ase
SEP
OCT NOV DEC AN 49 FEB MAR APR
ZUU1/U0/10 ? Laf-KTri.87*&059Aii)&0496404304-4
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RESTRICTED
paliiii0O-000nomic-strategic line of approach is taken and where an
attempt is made to project trends and predict future developments
rather than to report and evaluate current events. This pattern
appeared to be given approval during the Ust three months of the
period by requests from the NSC, made in conjunction with items on its
staff agenda, for the production of eleven items in Group A (66%
approt. of total production for the period)*
(b) Produotion during the period shows
11d6id trends away from this pattern.
(1) shift from the broad, long-term type bi Iroblem
to the ro -defined short-term of .robletw (There is a
quantita, Itw s t rom c. up an froup ms Group D and
Group E ita6.)
(2) A shift from the iredietive type of item (Group
ABC) to the non-prediTtM7 type (Group DE).
(3) A shift from 4N,14_. and formally tinted produo-
tion (ORE, Series) to Informally end oven even uzioac..........z2.:A.tL.osi
(IM Serio).
(4) The above trends correlate with gni:lore:me in
external &Stands and are considered
olribeee external demands. ViloWNO
II. Periodically recurrent IToduotison.
A. MIS production consists of
I. Current Intelli once as defined in NSCID #3, in the farm
of CIA Daily uuary op ore and CIA Weekly Summary (Secret).
Both are issued officially after coordination within CIA/CRE.
2. CIA Series, "Review of World Situation as it affects
the security of the
3. Periodio publications by Branches and Groups. These
are officially described as "Working Papers," They are given lees
complete coordination within CIA/ORE, but are regularly though
informally disseminated outside CIA/ORE and even outside CIA.
B. The total of Periodic production, expressed in numbers of
issues, is as follows:
ORE Daily (since 14 BO. 1946) 1000
B/WE Daily (since 16 Jan, 1948) 312
Total of daily issues 1312
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ORE Weekly (since 7 June 1948)
156
Branch Weeklies
724
B/WE "Weekly Estimate"
31
Total of Weekly issues
Branch Monthlies 16
CIA Menthly Series 21
Total Monthly ISOUOS
Grand total of PoriOdieul
Publications 2262_
3* 22411.211V--.ESE (Top 3"ket)
1, JICAgiNg an original and specific commitment, da,.
Feb., 1946. -1%-ase from a direct presidential request for ,a
summary to replace the three or four dailies and a mass of cables
which awaited him each morning.
2. Chsnee and trends t two such are noted, (a) it Rae
become shorter, (b) a pal oy has developed of ocassionally moulding
an evaluation or comment when possible.
3. Present ur sea to select and brief eaoh day ea es
of eateet a the seourity of the US1n order io, ring
tip= a a n on a the hi hest offioials. Degree of significance
depends enti e y on w ppens to ve ? en carried by the ingesting
and oodivaionelly? the outgoing traffic of the day.
D. =Weekly Summary (Secret)
1. 9tigia: self-initiated in June 1946. Conceived as a
vehicle inwhrah--iiirging trends were interpreted for high level use;
and hence supplementary to CIA Daily Summary, in which comment Was
expressly forbidden by NIA action.
911
2. C
for the same giatr
was downgraded to
included the wprki
policymaking love
OS and Trends: originally 'lop Secret" and designed
u ion list as the CIA Daily. .0n2 May 1940, it
"Secret" and von a wider distribution, Whit& now
nt levels of .e.,rints ;., a eno es as well as
3. Present ur Set to evaluate and project such events of
a week as are o moat importance to US security. The evaluating and
projecting function has been emphasised as against reporting of. briefing.
07
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E? CIA Series
A Monthly publioation timed to meet the second regular meeting
of the NSC..Originated in a suggestion of NSC, Seoretary and Secretariat.
Coordinated within ORE,
F. 132....*AiiLiffitelgat
14 Ptig_in: with one exception, self-initiated. (See para.
IL 413010W.)
2. Oh' s and Trends: soon after their inception they
became the source o raw mater al for the CIA Weekly Summary. This
relationship was made official and was regularized by (RE Operating
Procedure #9 of 14 May 1948. While no fundamental change in character
was made, it lit noted that the number of longer ansdytical artiolea
has increased. A significant change in the use made of this p.rodne-
tion came mith their informal distribution outside ORE and CIA. This
development appears to have come about as 'to rking.level personnel in
other offioee and agencies become aware of the existenoe of the type
of production and asked to be put on the distribution list.
3. Present se: to ?rovide material r the CIA We kl
to pror ,for extens vs site co nt, to broa
the workin level excha e of inforMatiOn and evaluation. They are
produces on m t e same pr p e con se A Weekly Summary,
i.e., seleasiOn of sigrtifioant events and evaluation and projeation
from them.
G. Brandi: Menthlies
1. Origins self-initiatedi one in Sept. 1148, two in
Jan. 1949. OIr two now produced, one having been discontinued after
1 May 1949. One Branch, which does not produce a Monthly, regularly
adds a "Situation Memorandum" to ite Weekly and this -serves the intent
of a Monthly. All Ilanthliee are disseminated outside ORE, and for
the most part outside CIA,
2. ;Pxn.r e lle: to rovide a:riodic review or the situation
in the area o- the ranch's concern. hey are ieting a ? on
the Branch Tleekly by an intent to review a month a trends area by
area and aside from the occurrence of significant events as reported
on a weekly basis. In two instances, this intent is accompanied by
an effort systematically to predict developments in the ensuing 30 days.
H. Da_21z, Weal Esti. tearatt (produced by one Branch only).
1, :Origin: self-initiated as a method of analytical exercise.
-
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Approved For Release 2001/08/28 : CIA-RDP67-00059A000400050001-1
Distributed outside ORE*
to provide ferments for the oountriea Concerned.
Systematie prediCUOo is emphasized.
I. A:4110ents on Peri_odioallreour_2....hati_cn..
-1. Produotion has eteadilljnoreased: the volume of
duct o 4rz ills oats o has ateadii e dad, and the =mbar of
icat ns haa inoreasi. e increase has
been =Oat marked in 1948-49*
Chart 16 Growth of Periodioal Production.
See insert following
, The Oonce of "Current Intelli.74Aele haiii:broadened
beyond the de 4' Aotto A". T:4 t a ton* ate only
of the :CIA Daily and *ekly Summaries, which report04:0*Onts and
developments considered significant. These have dentinued. but to
them has been added area reviews. In addition, a .trend toward
comment, evaluation, estimating, and predicting is Oticeable. None
of the publications in this oategory avowedly goee,:in for "spot"
reporting; test specifically emphasize the estimatdhg process.
3. Production in into
(a) Palications whose sub eot-matter is determined
rtaat am as arm
rtant events
7ee y ummaries, Dram
(b) 'PObliostions which
stook-taking er es,
Vbekly Estimetes. and "Situation
(d the baele of voldMe Of production,
official importance than (b) above.
4.1FraarlAevel222Alrom other considerations
21922a "mission".ar
A
rano
a
08.
seek to ? .vide a.riodio
anc jai y and
Memoranda" referred to above.)
432
(a) above is of bore weight and
hen
(a) Except for CIA Daily Summary, which originated
on external demand and which generally conforms to the NSOID
definition of "Current Intelligences," production has been
self-initiated by components of ORE in E220.se_S?Zaz
Trar-siTerrtelone of which the more obvious are note .
- 9
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CHART 5 - GROWTH OF PERIODICAL PRODUCTION
Period of external distribution
Period of internal distribution
"Current Intelligence" within NSCID #3 definition
CIA WEEKLY
co C4
f
ArAIIrrn
B/NEA MONTHLY
111111
B/FE MONTHLY
1
B/WE WEEKLY EST.
B/WE MONTHLY
1 1I I s.rft
G/Io WEEKLY
1I 1 1 1
B/FE WEEKLY
1 I 1
G Tr WEEKLY
1 1 1
B/No WEEKLY
1
B/WE DAILY
" jV V VV /BM
A zA 4A ,
vv/
4 , 40
..
9f/"r" 7M11
0i118111
7V V7 V7 V MENNEN"
,,z4z4
Az
lAV41iv4/A' ,v;AvA117,741INIENEEMEN
r4r" AV",7,rft," 4/4' ;v41NEMBENIMMEN
VAr ArillArzvAr;4%3BEEMENNOMEMBE
'11 r' 'IMMEMBEEMEMBEIN
B/LA WEEKLY
1111
B/EE WEEKLY
1111
B/NEA WEEKLY
1111
/WE WEEKLY
CIA DAILY
t- co
=nr,s10043 - 43 44 cy 44
1r al
ZwX 4c 2 .4u1OZAZrz42,44 2 6. a rn o z cz z rz4 2 a X 44 c/a 0 Z 0 Z 44 2 a 2
44 44 44 44
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Approved For Release 2001/08/28 : CIA-RDP67-00059A000400050001-1
RESULT Ctill
? (1) The need to maintain a runni reaord in
vibioh evaluation an est mate ftms an esae?tal uppleMent
to,files of raw material,
(2) The need to train anal to in mak estimates
and projecting situa one ?y o g em per as a y
gather scattered facts and evidences and to forMulato
conclusions respecting them.
(3) For reasons of morale, a training preeedure
became an organized publication and provided a vabiO4#of
ficession.
(4) The need to ex e information and Corolusions
ataworking.ftleveLow us rano. as in i11:0 ere
a large number of small countries are covered), between
Branches and Groups (as when a Regional Branoh and a Functional
Group must correlate), and finally outside ORE (as with the
working levels of LAG Agencies),
(5) The responsibility of supporting the CIA
Weekly Summary,
(b) The devoloment of this type of production la
considered to have . oseded more from the internal neseasities
am cus ?m an a. one
5. The audience has reatl ex aided and cones uen
1212.261--!..112-r-22.22----0?
ORE "Current Intelligence" Was origivali;produced for
a small select audience at the hi jiost t Ievo1. Ii3s has
coiri' u 0 e gro o per o. op ..uo- on, the nature of
its content and the range of its distribution, has resulted in a
broader and more systematic analysis of current developments for the
workirg
III. .q...14="4--Eiatlucl:..1.1n
ORE production in ? rformanoe of services of common concern, in
support of the operation o ot er If o otrar---
Agencies, and in support of its own internal requirements has no
analyzable pattern. It is, accordingly, merely reported var
comments.
A. Services of Common Concern
CIA/ORE is officially committed to the maintenance of two
- 10 -
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IREMICTED
Approved For Release 2001/08/28 : CIA-RDP67-00059A0004000flailk1TED
continuing services of common concern:
(1) The coordinatin edit and ?roduction of the
he as a nte genes Group/ORE
eolaly for this commitment. It is
estimated that the following components of ORE (0E, B/VE? OE,
001 and GAO are at present expending between 5 - 10% of their
available manr.hours in reviewing material for NIS on behalf of the
Basic Intelligence Group.
- (2) ORE/Mai Brandh is committed to services of oomman
concern, in the course o which it also fills the requirements of
CIA/ORE.
B. rations of Other ?fries!, of CIA.
(1) ORE re ularl evaluates 00 and OSO field re rts. Between
March 1948 and May 49, 0 e uute. ' 00 reports, t e ?west
number in any one month being 504 and the highest 807.
(2) ORWEE has recently undertaken a limited research
project in support of CIA/080. This project is the preparation
of encyclopedia information. It was not considered within the present
terms of reference of the Basic Intelligence Group.
(3) pIA/Ol requested au2port from CIA/ORE for its
operational responsibilities, an commitments have been accepted.
0, ,Operations of other D.tp._....rati__artnm and Agencies
(I) MARE is formally directed to support the Information
P I
res nsibili of the N8C-4 Committee, and in addrtron
y suppor s operat esks o t e State Department
Information Program.
(2) CIA/ORE jointly participates with the State Department
in the development of an External Research Pro ram designed to correlate
the work of scholars an the needs of government intelligence.
(3) CIA/ORE has accepted a commitment to evaluate FS
lieizitt.S2E:L.h2 State D_es.arbnent and AA Re rts foi-Eg-EIF-Mrce.
orme.
D. Miscellaneous
It is noted that the key personnel of ORE/Group Economics
(00) serve as members of inter-de artmental or a en committees
or are LuISE?I_InT:021_,?ta ()tier apartments or ageno es.
It is estimaeUthat as atacs 20% of the time of this key personnel
is thus employed,
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E. Comments on Supporting /,ctivities
1. It is noted that the professional man-power employed in
this type of activity is develo into a si ficant drain =the
ORE oduction effort (16.0 0 to a man ours, o w Jo .5
atilaWoSeiiii-eis of Common Concern).
2. It is noted that a high proportion of the working time
(20.00%) of Group/Economics is dispersedexternal con IEitions
and committees, of which only a smul part is drirsic1rgrirte2-17
the production effort of ORE. It is possible that this nay be the
result of the present disorganized state of economic intelligence
generally.
is
3. It is noted that oonudtments to , a e in su. ? .rti
aotivities have steadil increase 9 t at the
expansion has J42 p ace on an i. ..c?asis an not in accordance
with any observable principle.
Distribution profesionai
The information that follows is based upon data provided by
ORE components. This data has been weighted to take into account the
varying size of Branches and Groups. The percentages given are to
be taken as approximate only. The Committee considers, however, that
they do not significantly distort the over-all picture.
A. General Research and Administration 4600%
This includes processing raw intelligence
material, research activities, organized discussions,
and administration.
B. itzE...._t ar.A...E.L.SrasProduction
1. ORE and IM
2. SR Series
16.00
7,00
This includes the productive process and coordina-
tion with Ihe Agencies.
23.00%
C. recurring 15.00%
This includes only the productive process
from selection of material through final editorial
work.
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RESTRI CTED
Do St_324LIA, Production
This includes the performance of Services
of Common Concern and Supporting Services. (1)
16000%
???????????110...1
(1) The percentage is high because of the great proportion of
time spent in supporting services by WEE (22.00%)s
(24.5%).
? 13 ?
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Approved For Release 2001/08/28 : CIA-RDP67-00059A000400050001-1
APPMIX "C"
to
First Report
Ad Hoe Production Review Subcousaitteo
rXiC UMENTATI ON
CtRE :and IM Reports,. June 1946 ? May 1949
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Approved For Release 2001/611MaCOADP67-00059A000400050001-1
gazamLA4 atoidisaAMIzall
Essentially an estimating paper, of which the intent is to give an
accurate description of a situation and project future broad developments.
Situation can mean the state of an area or a political, economic, aa.
sociological complex. The method of such a paper is to correlate intelli-
gence information in order to predict the operation of inter-related factors
and trends.
LE= Mela grA0.12
WE 5/1 The Situation in Korea. B/EE
ORE 6/1 The Situation in Greece. p/Ns
ORE 13/1 The Situation in Austria. G/SI
CRE 15 The Hatay Question,, WNE
CRE 39 Significant Considerations Regarding the Dispcb. G/SI
sition of the Italian African Colonies,
ORE 45 Implementation of Soviet Objectives in China. B/FE
ORE 47 The Current Situation in Italy. ESC
ORE 47/1 The Current Situation in Italy.NSC
ORE 48 The Current Situation in Iran. NSC
URE 49 The Current Situation in Palestine. NSC
ORE 50 The Current Situation in Turkey. NSC
WE 51 The Current Situation in Greece. NSC
CRE 52 The Current Situation in the Mediterranean and ESC
the Near East,
ORE 53 The Current Situation in Spain NSC
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Ada; ntar.2 kulsdP,
CRE 54 The Current Situation in Egypt. NSC
ORE 62 Implementation of Soviet Objectives in Korea. B/FE
ORE 63 Current Situation in French North Africa. NSC
ORE 64 The Current Situation in France. DAM
WE 1348 Current Situation in Austria. BAE
ORE 15-48 The Current Situation in Korea. B/FE
CRE 21-48 The Significance of the World Federation of Trade 0/10
Unions in the Present Fewer Conflict.
ORE 23-48 The Current Situation in the Free Territory of B/EE
Trieste,
ORE 28-48 Current Situation in Greece. B/NE
CRE 35-48 Current Situation in Burma. B/FE
ORE 45-48 The Current Situation in China. B/FE
ORE 65-48 Current Situation in Iran.
ORE 78-48 Current Situation in the Philippines. 4/FE
ORE 1-49 Current Political Situation in the Union of South B/No
Africa?
IM45 Soviet armed forces strength and budget DCI
IM-16 Soviet policy in Austria B/WE
IM-51 Political and Economic Situation in. Selected Areas JIG
at the outbreak of East-West Hostilities by July
1949
IM-97 Current Considerations affecting Argentine Foreign 0/SI
Policy
- 2.
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Approved For Release 2001/DS ICIWRDP67-00059A000400050001-1
max 2111s Stign
111.105
Soviet Capabilities to Wage Biological Warfare?
JIG
IM.106
Soviet Capabilities to Wage Chemical Warfare.
JIG
11/1-311
Strategic Importance a Taiwan-.NSC
IM.117
Soviet Capabilities for Employing Biological and
JIG
Chemical Weapons.
111-14.7
Obstacles to Early Formation of a Western Trade
(2/ID
Union Federation?
1101.154
40'1, cw(funist Influence in the Government of
JIG
IM.-172
The situation in Argentina
B/LA
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?
Essentially an estimating paper, narrower in scope than a Utgalga
Amazaa since it seleots a single factor or isolates a single trend for
analysis. It frequently gives detailed treatment to material that would
otherwise be handled as an aspect of a ?1132,ajjalmiall. The intent of
such a paper is to project into the future the operation of the factor or
trend selected.
NuMber
ORE 1
ORE 1/1
ORE 9
ORE 10
ORE 14
ORE 19
1E44
on 56
ORE 7-48
ORE 8-48
ORE 9-48
ORE 11.48
ORE 12-48
ORE 14,48
111119.
Soviet Foreign and Military Policy.
Revised Soviet Tactics in International Affairs.
The Succession of Power in the USSR.
Forthcoming Elections in Bolivia.
Future Soviet Participation in Lome-Range Inter-
national Air Transpewt.
Developments in the Azerbaijan Situation.
Problems, Issues,
The ea future in Spain.
Possible Developments in Palestine.
Peron and the Argentine Congressional Elections.
Cuban Political Trends,
Possible Developments Resulting from the Granting
of Amnesty to Accused Collaborators in the
Philippines.
Prospects for a Negotiated Peace in China,
Prospects for International Air Transport.
kigiu
WE
WH
G/SI
BAJA
G/Tr
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B/FE
B/NE
B/NE
.B/L&
B/LA
B/FE
B/FE
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j13q Tinekigin
ORE 22-48 Possibility of Direct Soviet Military Action IAC
during l948.
ORE 22-48 Possibility of Direct Soviet Military Action IAC
(Addendum) during 1948-49.
ORE 25-48 The Break-up of Colonial Empires and its impli- G/GS
cations for DS Security.
ORE 26-48 Prospects for a United States of Indonesia. B/FE
ORE 27-48 Possible Developments in China. B/FE
ORE 29-48 Possible Program of Future Soviet Moves in Germany. B/WE
ORE 32-48 Communist Capabilities in South Korea. B/FE
CRE 38-48 Possible developments from the Palestine Truce. SecDef
ORE 44-48 Prospects for Survival of the Republic of Korea. B/FE
ORE 49-48 Trend of Soviet-Yugoslav Relations. B/EE
ORE 50-48 Probable Argentine Policy to 1952 and its effects on B/11
US interests.
ORE 51-48 Possibility of Soviet Troops Viithdrawal from V3C-4 Staff
Germany.
CRE 60-48 Threats to the Security of the US. NSC
ORE 61-48 Probable Effects of Postponment of Italian Colonies G/I0
Question.
ORE 67-48 Continuing Satellite Aid to the Greek Guerrillas. B/NE
CRE 77-48 Chinese Communist Capabilities for the Control of NSC
all China.
ORE 16-49 The Yugoslav Dilemma. BAB
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aRE 17-49
ORE 28-49
ORE 29-49
ORE 39-49
ORE 43-49
(RE 46-49
CRE 48-49
The Strategic importance of the Far East to the
US and the USSR.
2Elgin
B/PE
B/NE
BAE
NSC
G/Tr
IAC
G/dS
B/WE
IAC
IAC
B/FE
B/WE
JCS
Possible Dvlps. in Soviet Policy toward Austria.
Prospects for Soviet Control of a Communist China.
Probable Developments in Taiwan.
Trends in Airy Ocean and Railway Transportation.
The Possibility of direct Soviet military action
during 1949.
The Soviet position in the WM.
IM-13 Probable Soviet reactions in Berlin to Western
European union talks.
IM-17
IM-21
Memorandum to the President on Soviet intentions
for the next 60 days.
Soviet intentions for the next CO eays,
IM-23 Soviet objectives in the Far East.
111-24. Possible program of future Soviet moves in
Germany.
Enemy attacks on continental US in the event of
a major war.
IM-36 Probable Purposes of the Warsaw Conference.
1M-38 soviet Tactics in Berlin.
IM-45 Current Soviet Grain Situation,
IM-47 Estimate of the current Palestine Truce Situation,
IM-29
IM-48
Palestine Truce Situation.
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DCI
B/WE
DCI
SecDef
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?.-*-t2E nat kttgbia
IM-50 Immediate Objectives USSR Negotiations re WH
GermanY.
IM-52 Current Thinking in the US about East-West Trade, SecDef
IM-54 An Estimate of the Advance Warning to be Expected JIG
by the Western Powers in the Event of Soviet
aggression in 1956.,
IM-55 Review of ORE 38-48 (Secretary of Defense). To be SecDef
issued as Addendum subsequent to coordination.
1M-57 Political Stability and Alignment (1956) of
Selected States and Areas (TS) - for Director
Joint Staff, JCS. (and Supplement 24 Nev.
formerly IM-84)
IM-59 CIA Answers to Selected Questions for the Intelli- SecDef
gence Briefing by the intelligence Divisions of
the Armed Services.
JCS
im-fa Summary Economic Outlook in Union of South Africa,
France, and Benelux, in 1956. JIG
IM-65 Effect of Situation in Indonesia on Strategic WH
Interests of the US.
Possible Transportation Crisis at Vienna.
DCI
? IM-69 Possible Communist Inspired Disturbances in Paris DCI
at Time of UNGA (S) - for DCI.
IM-77 Soviet Troop Withdrawals from Germany. rso-4 Staff
Supp. Possibility of a Soviet Proposal for Quadripartite NSC.,4 Staff
Troops Withdrawn from Germany.
IM.. 89
Ec
IM,90 y o CT OMM s ar y o cuade Noe to G/SI
Disrupt the West Indian Conference.
IM-108 IAC
I/4-112 Xffeot of tile Co': Iniot-dominated China on South- WH
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IM-123 Estimate of Current Soviet "Peace" Moves. NSC-4 Staff
1M,124 Continuing Instability in Greece. JIG
25X1C IM.-].33 JIG
IM-135 Estimate of the Situation in the Event of War JIG
During FY 1952.
IM,141 Brief Evaluaticn of Soviet Intentions. SeeDef
IM-142 Probable Enemies, Allies9 and Neutrals in the Event NSRB
of War before 1953.
111-144
Soviet-Communist Capabilities for Sabotage.tral.
JIG
IM-]45
Political Repercussions of the Economic Situation
in Spain.
B/WE
IM-146
Soviet Deficiency in Strategic Items in 1952.
JIG ,
116-149
Soviet Reaction to Scandinavian Adherence to the
SecDef
Atlantic Pact.
1M-151
Probable Significance of Bulganin-Vasilevski
DCI
Shift.
IM-156
The %ill and Ability of Certain Countries to
JIG
Support and Develop their Armed forces, from
their own Resources and with US Aido
IM.159
Estimated Budget and Manpower Available for Mill-
tary Purposes in Certain Countries Through 1953.
JIG
114,161
Reactions in Tripolitania to an Italian Trustee--
ship.
NSC
IM.164
The %ill and Ability of Certain Countries to
Support and Develop Their Armed Forces, from
16.168
Their Own Resources and with US Aid,
The Will and Ability of Certain Countries to Sup-
port and Develop their Armed Forces, from their
JIG
JIG
Own Resources and with US Aid.
.2 8
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faMIL3L42229A-.0i_EL?2.12.9.10-g.2.110.9.-g...L.1911911.
A paper that usually proceeds from action decisions or accomplished
facts to a prediction of the consequences that can be presumed to follow.
A common variant of this type is noted: the action decision is assumed to
to m.ve been made, or an event to have taken place, and the consequences
are then predicted as if developing from an actual event.
Iota
au; 214
ORE 55
ORE 69
CRE 6-48
ORE 10.48
CR E 41..48
CRE 47-48
25)(6 ORE 48-48
ORE 57-48
ORE 58-48
ORE 3-49
lita2 Ori7in
Probable Soviet Reactions to a US Aid Program SANACC
for Italy.
The Consequences of the Partition of Palestine. IAC
Consequences of Communist Control of Greece. NSC
Consequences of Communist Accession to Power in NSC
Italy by Legal Means.
Consequences of Certain Courses of US Action in NSC
Greece.
Effect of Soviet Restriction on the US position B/GE
in Berlin.
Consequences of the Withdrawal of United States NSG
Forces from Tsingtao.
Probable Effects IAC
of a UN Arms Embargo.
consequences of a Breakdown in Four-Power Nego- B/WE
tiations on Germany.
The Strategic Value to the USSR of the Conquest G/GS
of Western Europe and Near East (To Cairo)
prior to 1950.
Consequences of US Troops withdrawal from Korea NSC
in the Spring of 1949.
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CRE 40-49 Consequences of Dutch "Police Action" in WH
Indonesia.
ORE 41-49 Effects of a US Foreign Military Aid Program, SecDef
IM-18 Possibility of Soviet military action in conse- IAC
quence of Congressional action on UM or SS acts.
IM-31 Kremlin reaction to US aide-memoire of 4 May. B/EE
IM-34 Kremlin Reaction to Unification of Germany. B/WE
IM-53 Review of ORE 47-48 (Tsingtao). 'Issued as addendum NSC
to ORE 47-48.
IM-100 Consequences of Expedfting US Military Aid to China. NSO
IM-113 Consequences of Dutch "police action" in Indonesia. WH
IM-118 Probable Soviet Reaction to a US Attempt to Force WH
the Berlin Blockade.
IM-167 Estimated Effects on Poland of a Softer United WEE
States Economic Policy.
IM-173 Revision of ORE 41-49 "Effects of US MAP". SecDef
-10.
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.9111WIEL.2: kagrakualkles.4.4
This type of paper essentially selects factual data in order to provide
a correct frame of reference. The method used is historical, in that it
organizes and interprets established data and does not undertake prediction.
This type of paper essentially reports on the basis of timeliness
intelligence information of any or all kinds. It may, as part of its intent,
include an evaluation of the material reported, or an indication of the
material's significance.
25X6
25X6
Eta= Title jgj
ORE 2 Analysis of Soviet Foreign Propaganda Broadcasts. WH
ORE 2/1 Analysis of Soviet-Controlled German Broadcasts. WR
ORE 7 Chinese Minorities in Southeast Asia. 11111111111111
ORE Ail Petroleum Resources Within the USSR.
ORE 11/1 Review of the Soviet, British and French Programs 0/SI
with Respect to Germany.
(RE 16 Soviet Objectives in Latin America. B/LA
ORE 16/1 Soviet Objectives in Latin America. B/LA
ORE 17 G/Ec
ORE 20 Basic Dutch-Indonesian Issues and the Linggadjati B/FE
Agreement.
ORE 65 The Venezuelan Elections of 14 December 1947. B/LA
ORE 16.48 NSG
ORE 20.48 Soviet and Satellite Grain. G/EC
ORE 24.48 The Ryukyu Islands and Their Significance. B/FE
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ORE 30-48 Limitation of South China as an Anti-Communist B/FE
Base.
ORE 3448 Future Danube River Navigation and Control. IAC
ORE 39-48 France's Policy Toward Germany, B/WE
ORE 42-48 Soviet Rolling Stock and Motor Vehicle Industries. G/Eo
25X6 ORE 46..48 B/F17,
ORE 53-48 Postwar Industrial Recovery in France. B/WE
oaE 71-48 The Kurdish Minority Problem. B/NE
CRE 2-49 Major Problems of Italian Government Policy. B/WE
ORE 6-49 Rubber Supply Situation in the USSR. G/Ec
ORE 50-49 Significance of the Council of Economic Mutual B/EE
Assistance.
IM-4 Paulus Army DCI
IM-6 Rubber production in the USSR; Proven world oil DCI
reserves.
IM-9 Soviet armed forces statistics. DCI
IM-12 Soviet aircraft estimates. DCI
IM-22 Ruhr coal production (rations problem) B/WE
111-26 The Colombian political situation preceding the DCI
Bogota conference
IM-40 The Food Supply or Certain Areas. JIG
Chinese National Government. WH
-
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IM-63 Military Strength Data on Selected Powers. Mun.Bd, 25X6
111.72 Postwar Sugar Production of the USSR.
111-73 Recent Soviet Purchases of and Negotiations to Congress
Obtain Natural Rubber,.
1M-76 Soviet Economy. SecDee
IM-88 Tungsten in South Korea. ECA
IM.91 World's Proved Crude Oil Reserves. Congress
IM.104 Petroleum Products in the USSR. IAC
IM.126 World Oil Data. IAC'
IM-127 Significance of Western European Exports to the ECA
Soviet Bloc.
Transportation Facilities of Germany and France JIG
1938 and 1948.
1M.157 Soviet Economic Conditions. WH
IM.158 Soviet Press and Radio Reaction to the first SecDef
Public Announcement of the Atomic Badh?
IM-166 The Commonwealth Conference of 21 April and B/Ho
India's Constitutional Status.
IM-171 Soviet Industrialization. JIG
.13.
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222t-AL112E.IB.IPX?Qr-L1-tgligaEgrt.-aru.9XMa,A211
This type of paper essentially reports on the basin of timeliness
intelligence information of any or all kinds. It may, as part of its in-
tent, include an evaluation of the material reported, or an indication
of the material's significance.
WE 3/1
ORE 17-48
25X6 WE 18-48
WE 19-48
ORE 31-48
25X6
25X6
WE 37-48
CRE 40-48
ORE 68-48
ORE 9-49
ORE 11-49
Title =du
Soviet Capabilities for the Development and :CS
Production of Certain Types of Weapons and
Equipment.
Civil Aviation Policies of Selected Powers.
Soviet Military and Civil Aviation Policy.
Vulnerability to Sabotage of Petroleum Installa-
tions in Venezuela, Aruba, and Curacao.
Prospects for Internationalization of Air Trans-
port.
Opposition to ECA,
The Caribbean Legion.
Technical data: Soviet RR gauge; tungsten.
1!1-2 Soviet Army deserters in US and UK zones.
IM-7 Soviet pressure on Finland.
1M-8
Finnish resistan6e to Soviet Pressure.
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50cDef
L'WE
GAr
ECA
0/SI
EVLA
DCI
DCI
DCI
DCI
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Ists
=gin
11-10 Disturbance in Central America and Antarctica. WH
Recall of Soviet ships from US ports. G/Tr
IM-14 Soviet airstrength in the Port Arthur naval DCI
base area.
IM-19 1948 Soviet defence appropriations. DCI
IM.20 Soviet acquisition of crude rubber. Congress
IM-25 Clandestine air transport operations in Europe
IM-27 Evaluation of Soviet officers" predictions of war. Da
IM-30 CRE comments an testimony of 23 April on Indonesian Congress
strategic materials. (Has two supplements).
IM-35 Evaluation re Movement of Soviet Embassy Per. DCI
sonnel from Mexico to USSR.
IM-37 Cominform Denouncement of Tito and Yugoslav B/EE
Communists..
M.39 Reaction of Satellite States to Tito's Defiance WEE
of Cominform.
1141 Intelligence Information received by CIA bearing SedDef
on the rift between the Cominform and the Tito
regime.
IX.42 Extent of Soviet and Satellite Fulfillment of Trade DCI
Pacts with the West.
IM-44 Expansion of Communist-controlled commercial air DCI
services.
-15.
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IM-.49 Participation of Czechoslovakian Government in
Clandestine Air Transport Operations.
25X6 111-56
IM-58
IM-60 (a)
IM-60 (b)
14.62
1M-66
geigla
DCI
Soviet Military Expenditures in 19480
na
CIA Comments on JIG Paper on Economic Potential JIG
of Soviet, Satellites, and Allies, in Event of
War in 1956.
Relocation of Soviet Industry.
JIG
Significance of Movement of Soviet and Satellite SecDef
Military Personnel.
Communist Air Network in Southeast Asia.
DCI
IM768 Possible Use in Costa Rica of Equipment for whichB/LA
Export License Has Been Requested..,
1M-70 Foreign Construction of Tankers for the ussn ECA
for Special US Rep. of ECA in Europe.
IM-71 Illegal Transshipment of Oil Equipment to Rumania WEE
by US Firm.
IM-74 Evacuation by Air from Palestine of a Party Impli- G/Tr
cated in the Assassination of the UN Mediator. ,
IM-75 and
IM-75 Supplement - Export Shipment of Ball Bearings to Satel-
lite Countries,
B/EE
B/EE
IM-78 Soviet Penetration into the Fisheries of the West IAG
Coast of Latin America,
IM-79 Relative Importance of the Soviet Union to Mer,BOA
chant Vessel Construction Demanded as Repara-
tions from Italy.
IM-80 Reply to Request for Certain Information on Pre- Congress
cision Bearings.
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1M-81 Soviet and Satellite Armed Strength. Congress
IS-82 Intensification of Soviet Efforts to Procure Stra- B/EE
tegic Material. (Supplement 2/10/49) Soviet B/EE
& Satellite Procurement of Strategic Materials.
IM-83 Hungarian Efforts to Circumvent Prohibited Purchase JIG
of US Machine Tools.
Comments on SANACC Paper (Subcommittee Near & SANACC
Middle East.
IM-86 Receipt of Non-Licensed US Equipment through B/EE
Other Countries,
111,87 Soviet Financing of the French Coal Strike. (184 DCI
IM-92 Soviet Air Force "Brief". DCI
IM-93 Methods used by Soviet-controlled countries for B/EE
acquisition of Strategic Commodities.
1M-94 Matter of possible interest with reference to the B/LA
visit of President Frio of Cuba.
IM-95 Memorandum to President: Assumption of Power by WH
the Military in Latin America.
IM-96 Attempts by Eastern Europe to obtain I A and I B B/EE
export control items through transshipments?
IM-98 Possible Evacuation of Bernadotte Assassins from G/Tr
Palestine?
IM-99 Possible Cessation of Soviet Manganese Shipments G/EC
to the USA.
Extent of Soviet Industrial War Potential East of JIG
and including the Urals; Activities in Trans
Caucasus Area.
IM-102 JIG
-17?
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IM-103 Views of Indonesian Republic Representatives HMI
now in US.
IM-107 Achmed Soekarno, President of the Republic of WH
Indonesia.,
IN-110 Alleged Argentine Participation in Recent Latin DCI
American Military Coups,
IM-114. Uncontrolled International Air Traffic Endangers G/Tr
US National Security, and addendum 1/7/49 in
Ap/Recs file.
IM-115 JIG
IM-116 Flight of French Capital Through Underinvoicing., G/Ec
IS.119 Inflationary Trend in Germany? H/WE
IM-120 Possible scale of Transport Aircraft by Israel GAR
to Czechoslovakia.
IM-121 Brief Evaluation of Transportation Maps of the IAC*Air
USSR,
IM-122 Imminent Reinforcement of Israeli Air Force. G/TR
IM.125 CIA Comments an JIG Estimate for War Plan for an JIG
Emergency Occurrency in 1952.53.
IM-128 The Change in Government in Paraguay. B/LA
IM-129 Foreign Reaction to the US Position on the Stalin lAG.Stete
"Peace Interview".
IM-131 CIA Comment on Despatch No. 276 Jidda to State Iiteraste
dated 27 December 19480.
IM-132 Harmon Committee Project. JIG
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25X1C
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1M-134 Soviet Rubber Purchases in Indonesia. DCI
IM-136 Military Budgets. SecDef
111.437
1M-138
114.139 Estimate of the Significance of Soviet Personnel SecDef
Changes.
M143 Soviet All-Union Budget for 19496. DCI
In.148 External Financial Operations of the USSR &the NSRB
Satellites. '
1M-150 Attempts to Procure Strategic Items Iriclirectiv ECA
From US by the USSR and Satellites.
M152 Construction of Short-Nave .Transmitter in the 1AC
Spanish Colony of Fernando Po.
IM-153
M-155 Recent Anti-American Demonstrations in Latin DCI
America.
IM-16O West German. Reaction to Unity Overtures. B/WE
IM-165 CIA Evaluation of the Zapotocky Remarks Concerning SecDef
Soviet Plans for East-West Conflict. ?
IM4.170 Munitions Production at the Skoda Works in Czech?. WH
slovakia_
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Approved For Release 2001/0BEEITRE3*JEIDP67-00059A000400050001-1 ?
gEDMQ-E: g1.2211102.11....
This category is used to cover items which, for various reasons,
were unclassifiable.
Aga= StIsin
diE 6448 Evidence of USSR Military Intentions in Soviet
Propaganda Broadcasts.
IM4 Protocol IIM9. DCI
IM-28 Questions prepared for Ambassador BulJi t. DCI
IM.32 Questions prepared for Ambassador Harriman. DCI
IM-33 Questions prepared for Forrestal contact bound DCI
for Africa.
1M46 Inquiry concerning Service Airways personnel. DCI
IM-64 CIA Recommended Redraft of Selected Sections of JIG
JIG 380/5.
MI40 Estimate of the Optimum Time of Year for War to JIG
Commence, from the Soviet Viewpoint.
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