MEETING ON DISCLOSURE OF U.S. SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM AND CAPABILITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67B00558R000100020021-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 17, 2002
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: June 18, 1964
• Content Type: MFR

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DD/S&T-1790-64
18 June 1964
SUBJECT: Meeting on Disclosure of U.S. Satellite Reconnaissance
Programs and. Capabilities
1. The following individuals met on 17 June 1964 in the Office of
U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Depart-
ment of State, to consider the desirability of revealing U.S. satellite
reconnaissance capabilities to the Soviet Union and. to discuss the
manner in which such revelations would. be handled.:
Department of State:
U. Alexis Johnson, Chairman
Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson
Leonard. C. Meeker, Legal Advisor
Wreatham E. Gathright, Policy Planning Council
George C. Denney, Jr., Deputy Director, TNR
Raymond. L. Garthoff, Spec. Asst. for Soviet Bloc Political-Military
Affairs
Arms Control and. Disarmament Agency:
Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy Director
Dr. Herbert Scoville, Jr., Assistant Director (Science and Technology)
National Aeronautics and. Space Administration:
Robert Seamans, Associate Administrator
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SUBJECT: Meeting on Disclosure of U.S. Satellite Reconnaissance Programs
and, Capabilities
White House:
Charles Johnson
Spurgeon Keeny
Edward, Welsh, Executive Secretary, National Aeronautics and. Space
Council
Department of Defense:
John T. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)
Arthur Barber, Deputy Assistant Secretary (Arms Control)
Colonel Marshall E. Sanders, ISA
Brockway McMillan, Director, N50
Central Intelligence Agency:
Dr. Albert D. Wheelon, Deputy Director for Science and. Technology
R. Jack Smith, Assistant Director for Current Intelligence
25X1 A
2. At the request of Mr. Johnson, Mr. Fisher of ACDA outlined.
broadly a proposal for "legitimatizing" satellite reconnaissance. The
proposal was for the creation of an international organization to be
responsible for the storage and., possibly, readout of photography sub-
mitted. to it by the U.S. and. USSR. Both parties would. continue to operate
their own satellite reconnaissance systems and. the quality and. quantity
of the photography submitted, to the organization would. probably remain a
unilateral decision. It was not contemplated. that material of the highest
resolution be disclosed-by the U.S.
3. In the course of a long and, involved. discussion of U.S. objec-
tives in the proposed. exposure of satellite reconnaissance capabilities
to the USSR and. Soviet motives in making public its operation of space
reconnaissance systems, the CIA view was sought. Dr. Wheelon described,,
in general terms, the Agency view set forth in the 15 June memo prepared
by a DDI/DD/S&T group under the chairmanship of F_ I Mr.
Smith noted that an important aspect of the CIA position was that the
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 SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/06/11 : CIA-RDP67B00558R000100020021-5
SUBJECT: Meeting on Disclosure of U.S. Satellite Reconnaissance Programs
and Capabilities
USSR has not yet committed. itself on an endorsement of satellite recon-
naissance and that CIA was reluctant to embark on any disclosure scheme
without assurance that the USSR would not exploit such disclosures to the
detriment of the U.S. intelligence collection program. For that reason,
CIA feels that the tacit acceptance now prevailing is satisfactory and
is preferable to a possibly adverse Soviet reaction to official disclosure
of the U.S. program.
4. Dr. Wheelon informed the Committee of the Director's view that
if the USSR were to come to the U.S. with a formal proposal for disclosure,
the U.S. might be in a better position to assess the risks and. advantages
of revealing U.S. capabilities. He also noted. that we were now able to
describe the Soviet satellite reconnaissance program in some detail and,
that a recent CIA document could. be made available.
5. The following concensus emerged, from the Committee discussion:
a. That some initiatives on the part of the U.S. would. be
desirable to achieve public acceptance of satellite reconnais-
sance and, possibly, legal legitimacy.
b. That the thrust of the U.S. initiatives should be
directed. at the Soviet satellite reconnaissance program,
rather than the U.S. program, in an effort to impress the USSR
that Soviet secrecy practices are not infallible, to elicit
a positive Soviet position on disclosure, and to acquire detail
on Soviet capabilities.
c. That to assure support to the U.S. in achieving these
objectives, the NATO Advisory Council and the Senate Foreign
Relations and Armed Services Committees could be briefed on
the Soviet satellite reconnaissance program in as much detail
as possible at the SECRET level. The CIA was asked to provid.e
its memo on the Soviet satellite reconnaissance program to the
Committee membership and to prepare a proposed briefing for
the NAC and. Senate Committees.
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SUBJECT: Meeting on Disclosure of U.S. Satellite Reconnaissance Programs
and Capabilities
d., That to anticipate questions concerning the U.S.
program which would. be generated. by the foregoing briefings,
a talking paper should. be prepared. by the National Recon-
naissance Office on what could. be imparted. to the NAC and.
Senate Committees in a manner that would. not imperil the
U.S. program if inadvertently leaked.. The departure point
for this discussion, it was agreed., would. be an analysis of
recent Soviet statements on the substitution of satellite
reconnaissance for manned. aircraft overflights of Cuba
and. an explanation of why such substitutions are not
feasible.
e. That a draft proposal incorporating the points
noted. above be prepared, by Mr. Johnson for consideration
by each interested agency.
6. Other conclusions of the Committee were:
a. To put aside, for the moment, the proposal for a
private approach to Chairman Khruschev to reveal the fact
of and. the success achieved. by the U.S. satellite recon-
naissance program. The Department of State was assigned,
responsibility for developing contingency plans in anti-
cipation of new overtures for the exchange of satellite
photography by Chairman Khruschev.
b. To recommend. that a recent Rand. Corporation report
on the use of satellites for the verification of arms con-
trol agreements, based, on unclassified. sources., be published.
in mod.ified.form. Dr. Scoville was asked. to prepare and.
coordinate comments on this document for transmittal to the
Rand. Corporation.
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 SFQRET
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SUBJECT: Meeting on Disclosure of U.S. Satellite Reconnaissance Programs
and. Capabilities
c. Mr. Johnson and. Dr. Scoville reported. that Roswell
Gilpatrick had. advised, them that he had. been asked. to pre-
pare an article on satellite reconnaissance for the New York
Times, and. that he had. requested. guidance and. assistance.
It was agreed. to suggest to Mr. Gilpatrick that his article
be delayed. until the Fall of 196- when. the effect could. be
assessed. of the proposed briefings of NATO and. the Senate
and. the publication of the Rand. report.
25X1A
R. Jack Smith
Acting Deputy Director (Intelligence)
Distribution:
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DD/I 25X1 A
Albert D. Wheelon
Deputy Director
for
Science and. Technology
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