TALK TO THE OVERSEAS PRESS CLUB

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70-00058R000100250078-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 7, 2000
• Sequence Number: 78
• Publication Date: April 2, 1953
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT I Talk to the Overseas Press Club
8-8
1. There follows a preview of the possible questions that will
be asked you and some suggestions as to the answers and other statements
that you may wish to make in your talk to the Overseas Press Club on
3 April. It is my recommendation that inasmuch as your audience will
probably include some Americans and possibly others to whom we would
not wish to reveal classified information, that you make your talk "not
for attribution" rather than "off the record". The difference between
the two is that your audience will be able to use your material in
their writings without attributing it to you, whereas "off the record"
would preclude any use of it whatsoever. It gives them a better break
and inasmuch as you will be using unclassified information, will give
you a better audience reaction.
2. My recommendations for the general body of the talk include
the following. Inasmuch as General Smith addressed the Overseas Press
Club two years ago, at yhich you were present, I have made this
slightly different approach.
The Central Intelligence Agency considers itself as the first
line of defense of the country. It is our belief that only when
intelligence fails will it be necessary for the military forces to take
action. If there is no failure in intelligence, then our policy makers
be kept continually advised, well in_ advance of the diplomatic
and military movet all nations, particularly dose hostile to this
country.. Obviously, this is the ideal goal of a perfect intelligence
organization and, equally obviously, the Central Intelligence Agency is
too young to hive bad approximated this goal:.
This lead could be followed with a general description of the
responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency to the National Security
Councili.a description of the processing Of intelligence from the flow
of raw intelligence into the organization from all sources, through the
production or finished intelligence studies such as the basic volumes
on every country and strategic commodity, to the production of National
Estimates. The actual process of producing National Estimates is an apt
itbject fOr discussion and expansion, and gives you a chance to point
out to your audience the coordination functions of the agency.
Of course, this group will be interested in the clandestine
aspects of our organization, and to completely ignore them in your
discussion would simply leave you opeotio more pointed questions at
the conclusion. In the several talks that r have given, I have generally
treated thesubject in somewhat the followingmanner: "While there are
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probably clandestine operations conducted by the Urited States Govern-
ment, it is the general policy not to advertise which agency has the
responsibility for these operotions or the manner in which they are
conducted, because this only gives aid and coefort to those forces
hostile to the American way of life. Suffice it to say that it is the
policy of the Government to fight fire with fire and to give all
poesible assistance to the forces of freedom and combat the forces of
oppression".
3. Here are some of the questions which will probably be directed
at you:
Q: Do you use newspapermen in your work over as?
P To do so wovld prove a serious detriment to the
effectiveneos of our overseas journalists and raise
serious questions as to the integrity of the American
press.
Q:
How good is our intelligenceservice?
A: No intelligence service is as good as it wants to be
or should be. We have certain gaps in the informat on
which we need. However, our information is constantly
improving and we are able to keep our policy makers
better informed than they have been before.
Is the United States Government supporting the (Thinese
Nationalist Forces in Burma or has it ever dons so?
The Government is not supporting these forces and is
anxious to assist the Burmese in eliminating this
cause of friction. However, this is a matter under
the purview of the Department of State.
d) Q: What is CIA's estimate of future Soviet intentions?
A: This hae been a matter of interest to the CIA ever
since ite organisation. We constantly follow all
Soviet activities to determine their intentions,
peaceful or otherwise. The death of Stalin of course
injected a new but not unforeseen element into the
Soviet picture. (Allen: I phrased the above in this
fashion in order to counteract certain newspaper
publicity to the effect that the death of Stalin
caught the psychological effort of the Government
unprepared. You may wish to add to it aome thoughts
as to how we do feel about Soviet intentions.)
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e: Q: Are there Communists or subversives in CIA?
A: Not to my knowiodge. We are constantly thoroughly
investigating 011 new employees and keeping a careful
check on all of our present employees. Obviously, es
General Smith arcs pointed out and received wide
publicity for his frank admission, there is always
the danger that a highly trained long-term Soviet
espionage agent could infiltrate our agency as well
aa any other part of the Governeent. However, we are
constantly alert to this danger and together with the
FBI exerting our best efforts to prevent it from
happening to us or to any part of the United States
Government.
f: Q: Why did the important administrative official" of
the CIA kill himself the other day?
A: As far as we can determine this waa a case in which
the pressure of the work became too great for the
individual. This is a matter of extreme regret to
me as would be the loss of any of our people, but
particularly sek in this case as TT had worked with the
Individual over a period of years. You should all
understand that the nature of our work is such that
the pressure an the individual can become qstte great.
We do our best through careful supervision as well ps
periodic medical check-ups to prevent this from
happening, but unhappily it does occur.
g: Q: Were the two newspapermen who were captured by the
Communists off Hong Kong working for CIA?
A: No.
There probably will be questions on most of the hot spote
throughout the world. In addition, of course there will be a lot of
epecific questions as to intelligence operations, most of which T
would recommend making no camment on.
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
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