PHILBY DIRECTED, EXPOSED ALBANIAN VENTURE SPY FOILED U.S.-BRITISH GUERRILLA PLAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000600330049-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 2000
• Sequence Number: 49
• Publication Date: October 15, 1967
• Content Type: NSPR

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S Py Pored
LONDON Harold (K
'Philby, the Soviet spy w
had penetrated the heart f
the British Secret Intelligen e
Service, moved into a new j
in Washington in Octob
1949, and began the most d -
structive phase of his to g
career as a double agent.
Philby went to America s
liaison man' between the S
and, the American CIA. No v
he was at the. hear ox we -
ern intelligence - at a ti e
when, as a top CIA man f
the period 'said, "relatio s
were closer' than they ha e
been between any two ser .
ices at any time.".
"You must remember,"
said, "that at this time t 1a
CIA regarded themselves a:-
most as novices."
,by, considered Britain s
most brilliant. operative, ha I
particular value to the CI
at this time. Being the Wes -
ern expert on the subject,
virtually set u the CIA
anti-Soviet espionage o er
--Tl' a damage Philby did du
ing his two years in'Washin -
Approved For R4I
9 0 ,/-/y 7 ~,C r O
on is almost impossible to as-'I Certainly, the operation wasi
well planned. One of the first
oss without access to b0crot steps was the forniatien
nformation. But The London t around the summer of 19401
unday Times has pieced to-;of a "committee of free Al-I
ether the story of the worst banians," based in Italy and
i'saster that was ultimately - apparently a front organiza-
hargcd to Philby's account, tion for recruiting guerrillas.
he Albanian debacle. In the'. spring of 1950, the
What Philby betrayed in guerrillas were , ready to go.
his affair was an attempt by''First in small groups, then in
ritain and America, at the':
Height of the Cold War, to
verthrow Russian influence
n Albania by means of guer-
illa-fomented uprisings.
For 17 years, this has re-
ained one of the, most ex-
raordinary secrets of the
old War. It has suited both
larger bands, they slipped up
into-th'e ' mountains and over
the border into Albania, The
plan is said to have been that
the groups were to make for
their old homes and try to stir
up' trouble there-taking to
ides to leave it that way. For !,the mountains if things got
he West, the Albanian affair too hot.
as a disaster costing. 15011 It was a disaster. The Rus-
ives. For Russia it was a 11 sians just seemed, to know
asty preview of what could they were coming.
Within -a month, 150 or so
guerrillas - about half the
total force - were either kill-
ed or captured, along with a
number of Albanians who had
been unwise enough to wel-
come the warriors.
The 150 survivors struggled
back into. Greece - to the em-
barrassment' of - the Greek
'government. The SIS in Lon
don had to hastily bully the
b
i
ew
ldered Home Office into
Russia to move her own';
"technicians" and "advisers":. allowing. 150 mysterious Alba-
into Albania. ,'mans into", Britain (where to
appen in other parts of her
neasy empire.
In 1949, the weakest sector
f the Russian empire was the
alkans. The Communistreb-
ls in Greece were on the
oint of collapse.. Yugoslavia
as Communist but had bro-
en with Russia. Even Al-
ania was unsteady. Tile Yu-
oslav' Communists' had 'run
lbania since the war, ' but
ow Tito's cooling had forced
At this point the British
Foreign Office and the Amer-
lean State Department had
the same idea: Could Albania
nationalism be harnessed to
overthrow Russian influence?
And could the process of dis-
affection even be helped along
a bit?
Ernest Bevin, the Foreign
Secretary, was adamantly op-
posed to the idea. But he was
persuaded. to sanction a "pilot
experiment" in subversion: a
clandestine operation, to be
organized jointly by the SIS
and the CIA to infiltrate guer-
rilla bands into ' Albania to
foment anti-Russian uprisings.
The man responsible for co-
ordinating the British and
American halves of the joint
operation was, naturally, the
British liaison man in'Wash-
ington, Kim Philby. His ex-
perience as ex-controller of the
Turkish station - the biggest
and most active in that part
of the world-made his advice'
e ga~'ly" t tVaft RUF
weird "welcome back" party
was thrown, `Por. them at the
.Caxton Hall in'London).;It'is
unclear- whether the Home .Of-
ifice was told the 'truth about
these refugees-'according to
the source the. Albanians were
improbably.desciibed;as "'good
friendi of tours In` Greece.".
it,
The post-mortem on the de-
bacle was prolonged..After.,a
year, opinion was still split:
The Americans were uneasily
convinced of treachery. And
what few indications there
were pointed to Philby,, they,
thought. But in Britian the SIS
appeared not to have accepted,
even the evidence of treach-
cry.
Knowing what is now ,own
of Philby, it is clear that the`
Albanian expedition - and;:
indeed, many other aspects'of
the information flow between
British and American intelli-
gence - must have been leak-is
ed to the Russians. The effect,
was totally to discredit in Brit-'.
ish eyes the policy of "positive.
intervention", in Communist
Europe, and to weaken_it-.for.
some years in America.