HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE EIGHTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00001R000200200002-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 11, 2000
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 13, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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THE MM l1FREE 11~~~, WORLD THE O"RLD POLICE
[AN EXPOSE OF CROWD-HANDLING METHODS]
HEARING
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
65683 0 WASHINGTON : 1961
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington 25, D.C. - Price 15 cents
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2 OCT. 161
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COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
JAMES 0. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman
ESTES KEFA.UVER, Tennessee
OLIN D
ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisco
sin
. JOHNSTON, South Carolina
JOHN L
M
EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRK
EN, Illinois
.
cCLELLAN, Arkansas
SAM J
ROMAN L. IIRUSKA, Nebrask
. ERVIN, In., North Carolina
JOHN A
KENNETH 13. KE.ATING, Ne
York
. CARROLL, Colorado
NORRIS COTTON, New Hamp
hire
THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut
PHILIP A. HART, Michigan
EDWARD V LONG, Missouri
WE. A. BLAKLEY, Texas
SUBCOMMITTEE To INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
JAMES 0. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman
THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut, Vice Chairman
OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina ROMAN L. IIRUSKA, Nebrask
JOHN L. MCCLELLAN, Arkansas EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRK EN, Illinois
SAM J. ERVIN, In., North Carolina KENNETH B. KEATING, New York
NORRIS COTTON, New Hamp hire
J. G. SOURWINE, Counsel
BENJAMIN MANDEL, Director of Research
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RESOLUTION
Resolved by the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Committee on
the Judiciary, That the injunction of secrecy be removed from testi-
mony given in executive session by Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, on June
13, 1961; be it further
Resolved, That said testimony be printed and made public.
Dated September 25, 1961.
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A COMMUNIST PLOT AGAINST THE FREE WORLD
POLICE
TUESDAY, JUNE 13, 1961
U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE To
INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND
OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS,
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2 p.m., in room 3234,
New Senate Office Building, Senator Thomas J. Dodd presiding.
Present: Senator Thomas J. Dodd.
Also present: J. G. Sourwine, chief counsel, and Benjamin Mandel,
director of research.
Senator DODD. The committee will come to order.
Mr. Kirkpatrick, I am advised that you have some startling and
rather terrifying information about Communist methods of coping
with the free world police. I understand, further, that you are willing
to impart that information to the Internal Security Subcommittee so
that we may pass it on to the American public as a means of protect-
ing themselves against being drawn. into a Communist demonstration.
Mr. KIRKPATRICK. Thank you, sir. I have some information
along the line you spoke about. I shall be glad to tell the committee
what I have learned and I hope it will dull the point of the Communist
sickle.
Senator DODD. General, I know it is unnecessary, but it is routine
committee procedure. Will you be sworn, sir?
Mr. KIRKPATRICK. Certainly, Senator.
Senator DODD. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will
give before this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and
nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. KIRKPATRICK. I do.
Senator DODD. Please give your full name and address for the
record.
Mr. KIRKPATRICK. I am Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., inspector
general on the staff of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,
and I am stationed in Washington.
Senator DODD. Thank you.
Proceed, Mr. Sourwine.
Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Kirkpatrick, just to get you in perspective:
Will you give us a brief biography?
Mr. KIRKPATRICK. Certainly. I was born at Rochester, N.Y.;
educated at Deerfield Academy, Deerfield, Mass., and at Princeton
University, where I majored in international relations. I was gradu-
ated in 1938 and was hired as assistant managing director, later
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an editor and personnel director, of the Bureau of Natio al Affairs,
a publishing concern which David Lawrence had" establish d to issue
several technical journals.
In June 1942, I went to work for the Office of the Coordinator of
Information. When the Office of Strategic Services was created from
that staff, I was assigned to OSS, went to London, an in 1944,
landed with the 1st United States Army in Normand . I was
transferred in August of that year to Gen. Omar Bradley's 12th Array
group and served until V-E Day as General Bradley's G--2 briefing
officer. While I was in the United States en route to a new assign-
ment in the China-Burma-India theater, the Japanese surrendered and,
after some months, I became an editor of the news magaz ne, Wo::?ld
Report, another David Lawrence enterprise.
Mr. SOURWINE. When did .you become associated with IA.
Mr. KIRKPATRICK. In 1947, when Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg was
named Director of the newly established Central Intelligence Group,
he asked me to assist in organization of some parts of the undertaking.
I took leave from the magazine and have remained with C A.
Mr. SoURwINE. I believe you served as Division Chief Assistant
Director, and as executive assistant to the Director before you assumed
your present position?
Mr. KIRKPATRICK. That is right.
Mr. SOURWINE. You believe that the organization has become an
important facility in the security field and that its services re needed
in a cold war as much as in a hot war?
Mr. KIRKPATRICK. I do. I think it is imperative that the security
forces of the free world be kept currently informed of subversive
activities anywhere in the worla which may affect their countries.
I believe, also, that the public should be alerted whenever it appears
they are likely to be the unwitting tools or the victims o a, specific
campaign of subversion.
Mr. SouRwINE. Mr. Kirkpatrick, last year the Intern 1 Security
Subcommittee published a staff study rounding up detail of recent
riots against constituted authority all over the free world including
the United States. Copies of that small pamphlet disappeared like
magic, indicating, it would seem to rue, a deep concern among the
American people lest this type of protest should get out of hand.
Now, I am sure those who read that pamphlet, and many others
who asked for copies we couldn't supply, will profit by th explana-
tions you gave of handling this form of revolt and the suggestions you
offered for avoiding the traps set by the highly skilled Communist
agents who may always be found directing these mass upheavals.
Will you proceed, please, at your own pace?
{
Mr. KIRKPATRICK. Senators and Mr. Sourwine, many of us know
what is back of the mob violence which we have been considering.
It is probable, however, that few of the demonstrators realize tl:Lat
they are victims of a war that is being waged in the free world today.
It is a life-and-death struggle between communism, which makes
the people the slaves of the state, and free world democracy, in which
the state carries out the will of the people.
Our police are among the foremost guardians of freedom and thus
a major target of the Communists. The better the force, he greater
its efficiency, the higher its competence in preserving the peace, the
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more vital it is for the Communists to destroy it. I understand it is
the committee's desire that I outline the tactics of Communist sub-
version and describe several case histories illustrating their technique
for attacking the police.
The international Communist organization provides a training
manual for espionage agents in which their duties are enumerated.
This pocket-sized pamphlet was seized in Europe. Let me paraphrase
the tasks assigned to agents in one of the countries of the free world.
First, make investigations and report on the activities of the police
and security services.
Second, investigate and repress those security organizations which
support the government.
Mr. SOURwINE. Would that task include action against such organ-
izations as CIA, the FBI, and even this subcommittee and the House
Committee on Un-American Activities?
Mr. KIRKPATRICK. I would assume so.
Third, find ways to infiltrate into the police and security organiza-
tions to steal documents-particularly those recording their knowledge
of communism-and to destroy everything of value.
I believe that the manual is specific enough in those instructions.
Senator Donn. We had sworn testimony a few months ago that
almost the first thing the Castro forces did when they took over
Havana was to destroy all government records of Communist investi-
gations, including the dossiers of more than 250,000 Communists
and Communist supporters.
Mr. KIRKPATRICK. I have a second example. Let me describe
briefly the history of the Coinmupist war against the police in one of
the major countries of the free world. I should state initially that
this particular country has a long history of excellent police service
and a law, dating back many years, requiring that the police force be
completely divorced from all politics. Further, until the Communist
politicians started to create trouble in recent years there had never
been an incident on record showing political interference with the
administration of the police force.
In this particular nation there-is a national police force which has
five levels but is organized on a national, provincial, and local basis.
The Communist technique has been directed primarily toward dis-
crediting the police in the eyes of the people. On the local level,
Communist troublemakers would, start fights in public places in order
to involve the local police. When the police went into action, the
troublemakers linked arms in an effort to show that it was the police
who were causing the incident.
The handbook from which I have been quoting very generously
provided graphs or sketches to illustrate this point. Of course, they
are designed to facilitate training of Communist agitators. The
sketches show, in the most elementary fashion, how crowds can suc-
ceed in crushing police opposition. Those not familiar with Com-
munist techniques will more easily understand, by examining the
pictures, how a few well-trained Cornu unist agitators can utilize
crowds for their purposes. I have photo copies here, somewhat en-
larged, which I shall leave with the committee. Attached to each is
a brief description of the situation it is designed to portray.
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D POLICE
2
Illustration No. 1.-Shows a crowd coining down the street to face a
men who are blocking the path.
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Illustration No. 2.-Shows that the police have deployed into two lines opposing
crowd. Members in front of the crowd are to engage each policeman so that
the rest of the crowd can surge around them.
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Illustration No. 3.-Shows that the police have moved into the cla sic phalanx
in order. to give mutual protection.
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Illustration No. 4.-Shows the crowd swarming around the police in an envelop-
ment.
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Illustration No. 6.-Shows the police surrounded and obviously incapable of any
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V-
Illustration Nos. 6, 7, and 8.-Show the agitators what to do if the police phalanx
comes in from the right. In classic military terms, this would be another
envelopment in which the bulk of the crowd passes to the left of the police
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10 PLOT AGAINST FREI: O P L
I
//,
0
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Illustration Nos. 9, 10, and 11.-Show the identical techniques
phalanx conies in from the left.
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P',
(j
I of
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Mr. KIRKPATRICK. The Communists, of course, try to tell the
people that the police are in the pay of foreign powers. Efforts were
made to penetrate the police and to recruit personnel in headquarters
and provincial offices and in security units. Further, a smear cam-
paign attempted to discredit the leaders among the rank and file.
The more outstanding and upright the senior police officers, the more
certain they were to become a major Communist target.
As has occasionally happened, the Reds reached cabinet level in
this particular country, not as Communists but using a political front
party. The Communists in the cabinet paid particular attention to
the police, making frequent visits_ to the police chiefs in charge of
provinces to check on such things as administration and security
units. One cabinet member demanded that his Communist-front
party have full freedom of action and threatened dismissal of police
who interfered with Communist agitators. Another cabinet minister,
also a member of the Communist-front party, threatened the officer
in charge with dismissal because of refusal to release from jail a
member of the Communist Party"sentenced for an ordinary crime.
The chief of the metropolitan police was threatened with disciplinary
action because lie arrested hired Communist troublemakers who were
responsible for a bloody riot in which a large number of police were
injured.
The above history is a rather awesome example of Communist
techniques against the police. Fortunately I can report that in this
instance they failed and, although it was a critical period in the
history of this particular country, the fine traditions of the police
have been restored and this nation is on the road to true freedom
and democracy.
Senator Donn. Mr. Kirkpatrick, suppose the police got the upper
hand in a crowd demonstration. What do the Communists do about
that?
Mr. KIRKPATRICK. The Communists are taught how to prevent
such a situation, if it is their mob. Here are some graphs which
show the situation you have in mind :
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Illustration No. 12.-Shows a crowd unprotected by action nits.
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wpm; Ii I
Illustration No. 13.-Shows police units blocking a street with reserve units
capable of moving in any direction in order to act against the crowd and effect
its dispersal.
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PLOT AGAINST FREE WORLD POLICE
and permit the demonstrators to go on their way which might wel
at the American Embassy.
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Illustration No. 1.5.--Shows how the Communists organize their crowds to frus-
trate any police attempts to control them. These formations provide maximum
flexibility for envelopment tactics.
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mma
Illustration No. 16.-- -Shows once again the use of military-type envelopn-.ent
techniques with the central column surrounding the small body of 1 olive dire 3tly
in front of them and the two columns on the parallel streets flu k n
the ter, e
g
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Illustration No. 17.-Shows another technique for the same problem. The police
have blocked the route of march so .that the Communists have broken their
column into three bodies, moving one to the right and one to the left to flank
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Illustration No. 18. Shows the agitator how to cope with the poli e roadblock.
They divide the crowd into four groups to attack the police froi all sides.
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Mr. KiRKPATRICK. In another country a Communist, under the
label of another political party, became the Minister of Interior. He
was the direct boss of the Director General of Police-a career police
official loyal to his country. The Minister spent most of the 6 months
he was in office attempting to find out what the police knew about the
Communist Party. Through some fast footwork, at the risk of losing
his job, the Director General was able to keep most of the police
knowledge away from the Minister.
As you know, there are two general aspects of Communist activity:
(1) The subversive aspect where efforts aie made to penetrate and
control every phase of the political, economic, and cultural life of a
country; (2) the militant aspect which involves agitation, demon-
strations, riots, insurrection, and rebellion. Police must have a
capability of dealing with both the subversive and militant aspects of
communism. This requires an internal security mechanism which
provides an investigative apparatus capable of identifying and
developing information on subversive individuals and organizations
and capable of neutralizing their activities. It is also necessary that
this highly trained and highly specialized investigative apparatus be
supported by a larger force which, in addition to performing routine
police duties, must be capable of controlling demonstrations, riots, and
other civil disorders.
Lest I give the impression that the Communists are concentrating
only upon the newer nations and younger democracies, I would like
to mention an incident in an important and major parliamentary
power. In this particular country the Communist press specializes
in playing up and discrediting all police action against rioters, strikers,
and mobs. The Communists have exerted considerable effort to
penetrate the police and to sap the morale of the force. Following
this pattern, an article was published in a paper of national circulation
concentrating on the following themes: that the police were distrusted
by the people; that the enlisted personnel of the police were ill treated;
that the officers were incompetent; that it was basically a repressive
force; that it should be reorganized on regional lines because it did not
represent the people.
Here in one place is a listing of the themes used by the Communist
subversives in an attempt to undermine police authority, weaken its
efficiency, and embarrass the government. It should be noted that
the article was written by a confessed member of a wartime Com-
munist espionage network. Unfortunately many readers were un-
aware of this fact. Here, again, I would say that, despite the Com-
munist efforts against the police in this particular country, they have
succeeded in protecting themselves and in continuing a bulwark against
illegality and disorder.
Communism will work openly and legally where it can. But it
will work secretly and illegally where it must. Its capability for
conspiratorial work largely accounts for the survival of the interna-
tional Communist conspiracy.
This international movement has developed a system of defensive
measures to protect itself against the police, against intelligence
agencies and against a hostile public. Knowledge of party activities
is carefully compartmented. An intraparty detective service and a
control commission guard against police penetration.
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Plans for offensive action are carefully devised and except for
minor local adaptations constitute a detailed blueprint for worldwide
agitation.
I have here another g?oup of illustrations from the hand ook which
will show how the Communists make use of an unorgani ed crowd.
In addition to the agitators or action units, there is always of course,
an invisible cadre of hard-core activists, skilled in in iting mob
action and in exploiting civil disorder.
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Illustration No. 19.-Shows an unorganized crowd being transformed into two
organized groups.
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26 PLOT AGAINST FREE WORLD POLICE
Illustration No. 20.-Shows the same crowd after being organi~ed into two
groups protected by advance action units.
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Illustration No. 21.-Shows that the police are starting to break up the crowd
by driving into the center.
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Illustration No. ~22.-Shows the agitator how this maneuver can b thwarted
by an envelopment movement.
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Illustration No. 23.-Shows that the crowd has- succeeded in dividing the police
into two units, will surround them and render them ineffective.
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Illustration No. 24.-Gives the agitator an idea of how to prot~ct a public
meeting by stationing action units at the streets leading to thesqu re in which
the demonstration is being held.
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Mr. KIRKPATRICK. Separate groups perform other functions for
the party such as espionage, sabotage, liquidation, terror, riots, et
cetera. When police measures become severe, they establish bases in
another country and operate from there. They use every technique
of clandestine activity. They are very strict about personal behavior:
about alcoholism, private correspondence, friends, mode of living,
behavior in case of arrest, professional competence as a clandestine
operator.
I would mention here that the Communists will even use fiction in
their attacks on the police. I am thinking particularly of one book
published quite a few years ago in which there was a chapter devoted
to the police with the obvious design of holding them up to ridicule
and to undermine the respect of the people.
As a group, the police are among the most anti-Communist of the
professional organizations in the free world. There is a natural
antipathy between police and Communists. The police learn early
in their careers that the Communist Party is not just another political
movement but is an international conspiracy. Properly armed with
knowledge of the techniques of Communist subversion; alert to the
fact that no organization, no group of people, and no individual can
be disregarded as a possible Communist target or tool; the police of
the free world can counter the Red threat and drive these outlaws
from the free world.
None of us should feel that the task is -easy, nor that the victory
will be quick. The Communists are a dangerous, fiendishly clever,
ruthless, determined enemy, and their potential loot the biggest pos-
sible-control of the world. They will not give up this goal as long
as they last.
The task of containing communism is not made easier by the lack
of awareness on the part of many of the Communist threat. Thus
one of the first tasks is education- to get the word to the people about
ers of communism.
the dan
g
In some countries there is an absence of legislation defining "espio-
nage," "sabotage," or "subversion." This plays into the hands of the
Communists, and they will go to great extremes to prevent such
legislation from being enacted. The absence of such laws puts the
police in the position of the boxer whose hands are tied and who is
sent into the ring against a killer.
In other countries there is inadequate enforcement of existing laws.
And there are technical problems which further handicap police efforts
against communism. These include lack of equipment, communica-
tions, records, a shortage of trained personnel, and too often an under-
paid staff potentially vulnerable to subversion through the lure of
money of which the Communists have plenty.
To solve problems such as these, the police must have the support
of the government and of the people. In certain of the have-not
countries of the free world, the building of a well-trained, disciplined
police force, responsive to the needs and the will of the people, is a
well-nigh impossible task without external economic and technical
assistance. For some years the U.S. Government, through its mutual
security program, has fought world communism with a many-pronged
attack. It has sought to improve the economic well-being, raise the
industrial capacity, and increase the internal security of friendly
foreign countries vulnerable to Communist subversion or aggression.
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Today there are active U.S. police assistance programs in 2 countiies.
These programs are designed to provide the police with equipment,
communications, records, and transportation needed to do an effecsive
job; to train them in the use of equipment and in modern techniques
of patrol and investigation; and, perhaps more important, to instill
in them the concept of public service which distinguishes our American
police.
The Communists will exert every effort to prevent the develop-
ment of a strong police force. They will pose as superp triots, and
ruthlessly slander those who oppose them. The Communists will pervert to their own use, words and phrases that have a connmon
meaning in the Western World. Their slogan today is truggle for
Peace" while they make any area of their choosing into bloody battle-
fields, turning neighbor against neighbor, and brother against brother.
If we are alert, if we are vigilant, if we are just, the victory will be
to the free world. The Communist Party can be paral -zed by an
efficient police force. T Federal Bureau of-Investigation and the
police forces in the United 'motes; as- well as those of tl t`?f other
countries of the free world, have demonstrated this time and age,in.
The Communist attack on the police of the free world i dangerous
for two reasons: The first is that the attacks are fanatical, iscipl.ined,
and skilled in underground methods. Here we can m tch them.
We believe in our cause just as firmly, we are equally disci lined, and
If there are no further questions, the committee will adjoi,irn.
I attended recently a meeting of the International Association of the
Chiefs of Police. 8iieh `tneetings are the best kind of evidence of our
common will to help one another. The more we share our experi-
ence, skills, and problems, the better we can deal with their tactics.
They cannot divide and conquer, because we are united i the joint
defense of our laws and liberties through common bonds. I am glad
to have had an opportunity today to present my views t this sub-
committee and to congratulate it on the thoughtful work it is doing.
Senator Donn. Thank you, Mr. Kirkpatrick, in behalf of the sub-
committee and of myself, particularly, for the very effective way in
which you have turned the tables on the Communists in illustrating
an
0
be-and is-coordinated with plans to penetrate the p lice in an
The second element of Communist gy and technique is cen-
tralization. A campaign against the pe`of one free country is not
planned and directed by the Communist Party of that country; it is
planned and directed by the strategists of international c mmunhm.
Vilification of the police by the Communist press in one c untr ,
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