SOVIET INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES - 1952

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A000300360002-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 20, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 1, 1952
• Content Type: IM

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iPEFSEIRirr
ENCLOSURE nAtt
psnuT plum= AND 9APAB1iAlp6 1952,
221LJULLIK
1. To estimate Soviet intentions end capabilities in the event
of war daring n 1952.
,24, The problem assuitias tie outbreak of a general war during?!
3.952 as a result of Soviet aggression.
3, It is also astoumed that, at the catbreak of war:
hi. The existing military occupation of Germany, Austria, and
Japan will still be in offset.
lit The European Reooverr Piograai will have resulted in greater
eoonomic and politioal Ata
ity in Western Europe.
a, A North Atlantic kaot i*1iiii tor a system of collective
security embracing the United States, Canada, Great Britain, Iceland,
Norway, Denmark, the Bewails countries, France, Portugal, and Italy
will have been adopted and inplemented.
?
it, Substantial US military aidw.iL have been provided to the
participants in the North Atlantic Pact and also to Austria, Greece,
Turkey, Iran, Korea, and the Philippines, but this aid will not have
been sufficient to permit any oontinental recipient to resist Soviet
invasion successfully without direct US military support.
a. The situation in the Near and Middle East will be relatively
Whale, despite underlying tensions. In Mina the Conmuniets will
control the national government, bat their actual local control over
extensive areas and their relations with llosoow will remain uncertain.
The situation in Southeast 'Asia will remain unstable,
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rounca4LND PSYCHOLOGICAL
1, Soviet war14ms. The rulers of the USSR have as their ultimate
objective a Communist world order under their own domination. The role
of the USSR in the attainment of this objective is to provide a secure
base and powerful support for the international Communist movement.
Soviet resort tower in the circumstaneen enVisaged in the Assumptions
presupposes a conviction on tho part of, the Kremlin that the progressive
economic recovery, political coalesoence, and military rehabilitation of
Western Europe pose an intolerable threat to the security of the Soviet
Union, or at least such an obstacle to the attainment of its ultimate
objective as could be overcome only by military force, and that it had
become imperative to act before the relative Strength of the hest had
been further enhanced.
The immediate Soviet objective in resorting tower, then would to
to smash the supposedly hostile alliance of the West and to subject
Europe and the Near Beet to Soviet military domination. A consequent
objective would be to convert the resources of the conquered area to
Soviet use, greatly enhanoing the potential strength of the USSR in
relation to that of the surviving capitalist states. It might also
be hoped that the strain of war and the oho* of defeat would hasten
the expected disintegration of capitalism throughout the world.
2. ?? The hussian people
have on occasion r ma :.? icently o foreign invaders from
their homeland (e.g., 1812, 1942), but have never successfully waged
aggressive warfare azainst a major power. (In 1814. and 1945 they were
carried forward by the momentum of their pursuit of a defeated invader
and were powerfully aided by Western allies.)
The Russian people presently dread war, but coact be driven to it
by the absolute power of their totalitarian state. The war would, of
course, be presented to them as 'essential to their national survival,
and few would be in a position to know better. Secure against imme-
diate invasion and ignorant of the potentialities of strategic ban.-
li
bardment the vast majority would acquiesce in the decision of the
KremlinpaIbeit'without enthusiasm.
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The immediate poychological reiotien of the Russian people to
prompt Allied strategic air attack, indluding the use of atomic bombe:
cannot be predicted. The.consequent-diSruption of national life would,
however, subject the police contra apparatue to severe strain, and -
sustained strategic bombardment would have cumulative psychological
effect. Soviet vulnerability to peyehologicel Warfare would increase
as time passed without a favorable Militerecision and as a Western
eounter-offensive effort got underway. Disaffection in the USSR could
not be expected to express itself openly, however, until assured Western
support and protection was at beryl. ,
3, The situatlonLio the SatellieAtatea. The populations of the
Satellite States are thoroughly disaffected toward the Soviet Union.
They would welcome war in hope of liberation, The outbreak of hostili.
ties would probably raise a wave of anti...Soviet eabotage? perhaps even
scattered insurrections,
which would be ruthlessly suppressed. Effective
resistance movements could not be developed and Maintained until Western
forces were in a position to render appreciable support and there was
reasonable hope of eventual liberation.
lagulaskt. Yugoslavia is a -special case. The outbreak of war
would pose for Tito the ultimate dilemma. The primary requirement of
his position would be to keep Soviet forces out of Yugoslavia. Active
participation in the war, either as hn ally of the USSR or as an ally
at the West, would lead directly to Soviet intervention in rUgoslavia
and consequently to Tito's own destruction. Neutrality would result
in isolation, merely postponing the day of reckoning to a date more.
convenient for the USSR. Among these hard choices, indecision and
inertia would be on the side of neutrality. Whenever soviet intrusion
occurred, the bellicosity of the Yugeolave would favor a vigorous
guerrilla resistance. ?
5. ramelizajda.thaAsa. Under the Assumptions the political and
economic power of the Communist Parties of Western Europe would be sub-
stantially neutralised by 1952, but there would remain, especially in
Italy and in Prance, a dangerous fifth column of trained and reliable
militants. Their efforts would facilitate the advance of the Soviet
armies and contribute materially to the control of civil populations
in their rear.
6. Asa; ,,unistchina. The situation which will exist in China in
1952 is a z 1 highly problematical. It has been assumed, with good
reason, that the Communists will then control the national government,
but that their actual local Control over extensive areas and their
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relations with Moscow will remain uncertain. Attive Chinese participation
in the war on the side of the USSR is not aloregone conclusion. Never.
the:loses the presumption is that Communist china will cooperate as required
with the USSR.
7. Communisu i; :The situation which will exist in
Southeast Asia in 1952is4eo problematical. Seviet.aligned nationalists
will presumably still control most of. Indochina. The existing situations
in Burma and Indonesia are particularly susceptible to Communist exploita-
tion ands unless radioal solutions ire founds this condition will pre.
eumably have developed favorably for the USSR by 1952. Western failure
to solve these problems would enhance Communist capabilities for mis.
chief in Siam and Malaya.
SCONOMIC
S. Aiduatrial oarecitr. Sven if the planned development of Soviet
and Satellite industrial production Were to be fully realized, the
industrial potential of the USSR in Wg would still be markedly inferior
to that of the United States. Soviet ghd Satellite industrial develop.
ment is retarded ten shortages of high.production machine tools, indus-
trial equipment, and precision instruments, and Of facilities for producing
them; shortages of skilled personnel, both technical and managerial; low
productivity of labor; rail transport stringency; and shortages of high-
grade gasoline and lubrioanta, of certain ferro.allop and non-ferrous
metals, of certain types of finished Steel, and of industrial diamonds.
While the outbreak of hostilities would find the Soviet armed forces
gefteralLy well provided with standard equipment, Soviet and Satellite
industry could not meet the requirements Of a long war of attrition.
9. Varierebilip? te taleckade. The vast continental area controlled
by the USSR istelatively invulnerable te blockades but is under neoessity
to eport, not only certain manufactured iteMe indicated above but also
natural rubber, industrial diamonds, tuhgeten, tins cobalt, moiybdenum,
and high.grade Swedish iron ore. Moreover, it is dependent on Yugoslavia
for an adequate supply of lead, zinc, and copper. These needs maybe
covered to some extent by stockpiling (especially in the ease of natural
rubber), but would make themselves felt in the event of a long war.
10. Transeertaggp. In 1952, Soviet internal transportation will
.still depend essentially on the railroads, which now carry about 90 per-
cent of all inland freight traffic, Their capacity is barely adequate
to meet present industrial needs, and is unlikely to increase at a
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greater rate than the expansion or industry. At the outbreak of war
this leek of reserve capacity would severely limit the ability of the
USSR to support vast armies operating at extreme distances from the
centers of Soviet war production. The shift of soviet industry east.
ward for greater seaurity actually aggravates this problem and to that
extent reduces Soviet offensive capatdlities. There is also the handi-
cap of transshipment required by gauge differences between the USSR and
the Satellite Stateas
Because of limited inland transportation facilitios the USSR must
continue to rely to a considerable'extent upon coastal shipping in the
slack and Baltic Seas and in the Far East.
es
14 Soviet acquisition
of the ustria and scion ic facilities Western Europe would
greatly enhance the Soviet war potential.- The industrial labor force
and skilled manpower (technical and managerial) available to the USSR
would each be more than doubled. Western Enropean facilities for the
production of precision instrUMents and Machine tools would supply
critical Soviet deficiencies. Soviet steel capacity would be almost,
-doubled; shipbuilding capacity would be increased five4old. If these
facilities were acquired intact and their peaceful assimilation were
permitted, the joint economic pcwer of the USSR and continental Europe
could probably be made, in the course of ten years, to equal that of
? the United States,
? 140 such gain Could be realised, however, under conditions of mili-
tary aggression and continuing war, including demolition, blockade,
aerial bombardment, and popular resistance. Deprived of fuel and raw
materials which the USSR could not supply from the resources at its
command, the industrial Plant of Western Europe could function at net
more than 60 percent of, its 194$ capacity. The effects of demolition,
boMbing, popular resistance, and general disorganization are lees sus-
ceptible to estimate, but might be severe.
It may be concluded that the oocupation of Western Europe Could
significantly increase the economic capability of the USSR to support
a long war, the actual gain depending on the actual degree of des.
truction ad popular resistance. In any case, the Soviet liar machine
would remain primarily dependent on the wer.industrial capabilities
of the homeland.
12. Effect of jhe ecepeetionelirpee Near East. The single critical
economic consideration in this area is oil. Its acquisition by the USSR
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would be important in terms of denial to the west, but of limited direct
benefit to the Soviet Union. Because of traneportatioo difficulties,
Bear Eastern oil could not be made available for use in the USSR and
Soviet Europe in any significant quantity, although it could be used
to support Soviet farces in the Near East. The most important acquisia
tion for the USSR, would be the realities at Abadan for the production
of high-grade gasoline and alkylate blending agents. These facilities,
however, would be sublect to demolition.
MILITARY
(Chitted)
POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
13. hs tl4ptio P? It is to be presumed that the Atlantic
Pact countries would lolly fulfill their commitments on the assumed
ioutbreak of var. This would include, presumably, an attempt to hold
on the line of the Rhine and the Allais pending the arrival of:teinforce-
tents. The quality of resistance would depend, however, upon the morale
of the defenders as well as upon 1be quality of their organisation,
equipment, and training. The morale factor is likely to .1)0 critical
with respect to the continental statee directlarexposed to Soviet mass
attack. Their determination cannot be sustained by promises of eventual
liberation and ultimate victory, but will depend on confidence in imme-
diate and decisive support. If the idea, which the Communists will
assiduously propagate, that the 'United States will defend the Rhine to
the last Frenchman, should ever, take hold, the moral effect would be
disastrous and a collapse of rehistanoe comparable to that in 1940
might well ensue.
In this event the analogy to previous experience, 1940-44, might be
carried further, with this difference, that European forces outside of
Europe would be disposed to continue the fight against Communism without
question, Underground resistance within Europe might be gamer in devel-
oping without the benefit of Communist leadership and conspiratorial
skill and under experienced and ruthless Soviet police control, but
would develop as Western counter-offensive action gave promise of approach.
ing liberation.
14. den. an These countries would cling to a policy
called neutraliv4bmttaatually, directed toward avoidance of Soviet attack
on any terms short of national surrender. If attacked, however, they
would resist to their utmost ability.
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15. pielan4, The Irish would atleast support the West 'by measures
sheet of warp and might well be persuaded to become co-belligerent.
166 alga. Having no hope of accommodetiot with the USSR, Spain
would seise the opportunity to escape from iocaatiOn into active alli-
ance with the Atlantic Powers and would offer fanatical resistance to
Soviet invasion.
17, Seem, If not attacked i Turkey would probably seek to postpone
involvement in the ear, but not at the, cost of iodation from the West
Or of fatal conoessione to the USSR. If attacked the Turks would resist
? to their utmost ebilitY4
le, glagatijiaLkaa, The frontal resietanoe of these countries to
Soviet invasion would be shortlivedi but guerrilla resistance would pro-
bably continue, its effectivenese varying with the availablity of support.
19. 2rac. Syria and The political situetiOn in these
countries is extrem$y unstable. Thor would seek to avoid involvement
in the war, but would be psychelogioally as well as militarily incapable
of offering effective aid or resistance to either the West or the usaR,
20. jaw. Israel's posAion ie one of neOtrality between the
East and West. Western ties are predominant so tar, however, and, if
compelled to take sides, Israel Would probably align itself with the
West,
ri, 4 These states would be
effectiv a igned with the West, thoib in a paesive role =less
actually invaded. Egypt is vulnerable to eubversion.
22, adz. The African continent may, be regarded as securely con.
trolled by the West, at least during the first phase of the war, despite
the existence of certain potential.fooi of disaffection. South Africa
would participate actively in defense of the continent,
23. lbeLInitip Wiont Afohatistens,akisten? and India would .
endeavor to remain neutral, but would resist attack. Ceylon would be
aligned with the West.
24 rioutbadadia The situation in this area in 1952 is proble_
matical, especially so with respect to Burma and Indonesia. Soviet-
aligned native nationalists are likely to control Indochina, excepting
perhaps the environs of the principal cities. Siam will probably remala
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anti...Soviet, but officially neutral. British control of Ualaya is
likely to be secure. The Philippines will be aligned with the
United States,
25.' Aumtralia atvi pewjealae. These Dominions would take
active part in the war in support of Great Britain,
26, Aggag, The regime in South Korea would be US-aligned,
but could offer no serious resistance to Soviet invasion.
27. atm. The Japanese would support OU defense of Japan,
not only by reason of traditional Ruesophobia and anti-Communism,
but also in hope of rehabilitation as the premier military power
in East Asia.
28, Late. Ameace. The Latin American statefewould support
the United States within the framework of the Rio. Treaty, in various
degrees of effective cooperation.
29, Becaeitp1Pliorit
froleable all*: the partioipants in the North Atlantic
Pact, Ireland, Spain, Greece, Turkey-, Iran, Egypt, Transprdan,
Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Ceylon, Australia, New Zealand, the
Philippines, Korea, Japan, and Latin AMerica.
la. Zagertain.a.matteas Sweden, Switzerland, Iraq, Syria,
Lebanon, Israel, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Burma, and Siam,
ECCEMIC
? 30 . The Allied economic capability to support a long
war is greatly superior to that of the mgt. Given effective organs!.
ization and advanced planning for the optimum utilization of available
resources, no insuperable economic difficulties should limit Allied
'military capabilities. The principal factors of strength in the Allied
position would be a markedly superior industrial potential and comer-
ciel access to all the material resources of the World outside the arca
of actual Soviet occupation. The principal weakness would be an ines-
-capable dependence on overseas shipments, often at long distancesp-with
consequent loss of time and effort, limitation in terms of availability
of shipping, and exposure to Soviet submarine attack.
31, gfeet 47the lesp.ot_Wegmajmduetry. The war industrial
strength of the Allies would be located in the United States, Canada,
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and the Untted Kingdom. Loss of continental European industrial
potential (with simultaneous relief, from responsibility for BAP*
porting the civilian econ.,v of that area) would not Beriodeli
offset the war potential 4) the Allies. The possible reduction
of WIWI production by heavy and persistent air and missile
attack would be more serious, hut not :stall
32, Effget ofmthe 14084 litier East 040 Loss ci? the oil
production of the Near &et would be a severe ?Am to the Allied
war effort, although its effect would be cushioned to some extent
if responsibility far supplying oil to Western Europe were eliminated
at dila the sem, time. The oil ,resouroes remaining available would
be sufficient to meet Allied needs, but.the inconvenience and risk
involved in long overseas shipments would hinder the conduct of the
war,
343. : 9 'AI " IC,' " 41+4 4 -....-' ''. '? :: Ii r` - The
adverse ec ., s . 111? t ese resources principally natural
rubbers tin end oil) would not be insuperable (they have been lost
before, 194245) tut the diversion of effort that would be required
to make up for the loos would be hampering.
=nay
(omitted)
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