Approv,~ F
D~?CT_1~.SSIFI~,D
r.
Auth:
INTk",LI.IGEriCE LT~&iEIR~IDUdd N0, Tl''~e
By:
24 day 19.9
SUBJECT: Estimate of'Swiet Propaganda Ob3eetivss and Tactics Relating
to the GFIrt
To achieve ite ob,~ectives at-the current CFbd meeting, it is estimated
that the USSR X311 utilise the follaeting strateg~t~ tactics amd themes in
the field of propaganda. ?
1. Volume and ~gphasis of the paropaganda autpnt will. ba regulated ac-
cording to intended audience, i.e, v+h?thar it is aimed at (s) the ~~este~~n
audi.enee~ (b} the t3errsaen audience, (o) the Soviet home audience.
~. The strategy wi].1 call fo~? the exploitation of themes susceptible
to adaptetian to ar~r eventv~al cut~:ama of the CFDd meeting. ? ~`~ith char~~ter-
istic flexibility, Soviet propage~a rill be prepared, according to the
directions the negaEiatioas take, toe
,~. Denounco a deadlock (ta all audiences} as proof of Western
obstructitxnism, militarism and plans far aggression, lack of a sincere
desire for ~ae~ and (Particularly to the Gera:an aud::enae} intentions to
divide GermarU- permanently end ut~.lise its lands, resources, and people
for ho$tile manes against the USSR.
~. To interpret Soviet concessions or a radial revision of Soviet
proposals (ta the ~~estern acid German audiences) as tangible evidence of
the USSR's meet lave of peace, o#' its reasoaiableness awl desire to shun
obstructicsli~n, and (to the Sovie~., home .audience} as an an~dia caunterbl~-
-~ mi.'s world leadership,. a triumph of Soviet diplomacy,
to the ~Yarmengerin8 machinations of ~+estern delegations.
Tac,~ticss
~ propaganda tactics in ,general gill be vt-ried in aeaordenee with the
audience for which it is intendedo
1. CdosedMr's themes for F~eetern cauntri$s gill be directed to the end
pf' trying to bring pressure ~ the G~ delegations to find some basis far
agreement, whatever degrefl of aceeptaace of Soviet danands this imrolvas.
No means of discrediting the delegations in the eyes of their peoples will
bs neglected if the meeting appears to be going e~inst 3oRtiQt desires.
Ncrtet This report has nat been cacn+dinated with the iatelligenae aa~gani-
~ations of the Departments of State, erm~, btavy'~ and the gar Farce.
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Approved For Release :CIA-RDP78-01617A000500170001-4
?~i~A ~~eu~a, 4 Apr 77
DDA Ra,G. 77/1763
Approved~or Release- :~DP78-0161.7~0005b0:170001-4
Effoa~ts to drive a ~vedge between different t~astern Powers sill be i;ntensi-
fied, ~rticularly between the Fre:~ch on one hand end the US-UK on the other.
Soviet propaganda will roflect solicitude for Frenco.Soviet friendly rele-
tians, '
2. Output directed to Germar~~r gill concentr~.te on eonv3ncinp, the Gsr-
mane that only the USSR is holding out for aJrealisation of goals which the
Germans generally wist?.
3. Tactics affecting the Soviet home audience vai11 be primarily con-
cerned c:ith maintaining Soviet prestige and freedom of i.nitiEtive in the
CFA meeting and caunterinS any prc-~a~nda Qven remotely capable of reaching
a ;,oviat audience clha ch might qu?s?~ian Soviet motives or picture Soviet aims
in a 1;Yght differing from the offi+ial version,
~~ e3.s..ans~..~3~~.~3
>~iascoM- can be expected to shirt Sts emphasis an various themes and sub-
. tnemss to .serve its presswre needs during the progress of the C~'P,?i negotiations.
isa estimate of the themes to be employed places these themes in a priority
position:
1. jT~5 ~s et ale for, ,ne_; oe:s a heavy p1.ey to aLl audiences explriting
these sub-themes:
~. Only the T,JaSR adheres faithfully to the Potsdam-Yalta principles.
,j,, USSR's solitary stand for peace in the iTN ahaws' it will repre-
sent cause of peace st the CF~l,
g. The peace-laving messes of the world de~aand thaat the CFIrI s~~pport
the IISSR's peace proposals. '
,~. The USSR suprorts witt.drawal of all occupation troops from Germany
which proses its pe~.eeful intentio~rs. (Nate: This theme is beamed to German
sad iYest~~^:? audiences. It is ,gg~ yet exploited in the USSR ,Z
,~. The German people's d~:sire for'paacej -and a unified nation has
been expressed particularly in the: Valksko~ngress election. The USSR shows
by its Position that it wishes to c:onfa~ to this popular wi11. (Notes Far
Gormsn and Frestern dissemination.)
2. l~estern mili~r,~_~ n1~~ns P {~,~a'ressiont some shifts of emphasis
on the following sub-themes of thi