PROBABLE POLICIES OF GENERAL DE GAULLE'S IN NORTH AFRICA AND EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-02771R000100070011-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 7, 2000
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: May 27, 1958
• Content Type: IR

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AND RESEARCH SECRET/NOFORN Copy No. 145
Intelligence Report
No, 7728 May 27, 1958
Office of Intelligence Research
and Analysis !*t rx.
PROBABLE POLICIES OF GENERAL DE GAULLE''I1T by CIA has
NORTH AFRICA AND EUROPE
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report attempts to estimate what his probable policies
will be in the spheres that most directly affect US
interests: (1) Algeria and North Africa and (2) European
integration and defense. In the absence of recent
statements of policy, either public or private, by de Gaulle
himself, this estimate must be based primarily on opinion
and indirect reports. Although these sources of information
clearly establish the broad lines of the Generalts views,
they cast far less light on his chances for translating his
views into policy. This report also attempts to estimate
these chances, very tentatively, in the light of all the
complex factors involved.
De Gaulle's plans for Algeria and North Africa
appear to be rather flexible. He is believed ready to grant
immediate "internal independence" to Algeria and, then,
(1) either tie her separately (or together with "Black
Africa") to France in a close federation (with Morocco and
Tunisia federated with France on a somewhat looser basis)
or (2) establish a North African federation of Morocco,
Tunisia, and Algeria, linked to France in a manner that
would permit French control of the federation's military
and foreign policies. To realize this aim, de Gaulle is
reported to have stated h s ~s to negotiate th
dff
presuma y including even the Moslem reU-61-677LN).
While not willing to grant outright independence to Algeria,
he has indicated his willingness to consider eventual
independence, and he has reportedly stated privately that
all France's possessions should be completely independent
AN Di N0t_J~
E-4 T
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within twenty years,
Taken at face value, these views indicate a more
liberal policy for Algeria than that of any other French
postwar government; and the belief is almost universal
in France that de Gaulle is the only leader with the
prestige and authority to put such a policy into effect.
On closer examination, however, his plan would qDpear to be
too liberal for the Algerian Europeans and not liberal enough
for the Algerian Moslems. It is doubtful that de Gaulle
would be able to coerce the very elements that have been
instrumental in bringing him to power, and the Moslems are
sure to be suspicious of de Gaullets supporters, if not of
the General himself. It must therefore be concluded that
de Gaullets chances of bringing about a quick and peaceful
solution to the problems of North Africa are considerably
less than is generally assumed; and the danger exists
that his extremist supporters may use his good name to
accomplish aims, such as the reconquest of Morocco and
Tunisia, that de Gaulle never envisaged.
De Gaullets hostility to European unity organizations
and to NATO is well known. The most optimistic estimate
possible is that he would take a "very tough" attitude
toward these organizations. His strongly nationalistic
concept of Franco as a? ~dn nt ~ es a rising
equilibrium between the US and the USSR could,__e. view
o_ enc , e se r `sto "nTanti-.Euro ean"ne;ma
ra is policy. The fact that his government is 1 ely
to ''dictatorship, strongly supported only by
the extreme right and the military, will in itself further
hamper cooperation with the other countries of Western
Europe.
If the General should succeed in restoring peace
and stability in North Africa quickly, as well as avoiding
serious civil disturbances at home, France may settle
down to becoming a more stable, though somewhat more
difficult, partner in Europe. If, however, as is likely,
his policy in North Africa is thwarted, the General's
efforts to seek a "new way" out of France's sterile
conflict with the Arab world may lead him on the path
of "adventure", resulting in further confusion, and even
chaos, in France.
Report
During the past few months and especially during the last two weeks,
the likelihood has increased that General de Gaulle will assume power in
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France. If power is granted to him on his own terms, as now seems likely,
it will be unlimited power and will last for a relatively long period.
The General's first and most urgent task would be to seek a
solution to the problem of Algeria. He will also give considerable
attention to the role of France in European defense and integration, as
well as to France's relations with the US and the USSR. The circumstances
under which he comes to power, as well as his choice of advisers, Vh ich
at this point cannot be predicted with any accuracy, will condition to a
considerable degree the attitudes that he takes on these matters. But,
in view of the General's dominating and stubborn character, there is no
reason to doubt that his own personal views would be decisive in any
important decision that France would take under his leaderships
It is therefore of importance to consider what these views are,
Unfortunately, this task is not easy, for de Gaulle himself has made very
few public statements on political matters during the past several years
and such statements as he has made, even his recent ones, have been so
cryptic and vague as to be almost meaningless. Still, the General's views
on the various questions in which the U.S. is most interested have become
known to us in their broad lines not only through fairly authoritative
comment in the French press but also through private conversations
between representatives of the US Government and various aides, associates,
and others in whom he has confided. Though it must be kept in mind that
all indirect information is subject to distortion, if not outright
inaccuracy, an analysis of the available information of this type shows
a near unanimity of opinion as to the broad lines of the General's views.,
which strongly vouches for their authenticity.
There follows an analysis of these views on the subjects of
greatest interest to the United States, as revealed in the available
sourcesa
(1) Algeria and North Africa
De Gaulle has always insisted that he is the only man in whom
the people of the French Union, especially those of North Africa and
"Black Africa"., have sufficient confidence to permit them to collaborate
in working out a solution to the problems of French relations with these
areass
opponents,
The General's/concen-brated heavily in the left-of-center parties,
including the Popular Republicans (IMP) and the Radical Socialist Party,
have sought to brand this attitude a myth, but with only limited success.
A great majority of political leaders and influential editors, whether or
not they favor de Gaulle's actually assuming power, have come to accept
at least this premise, especially since it seems so obvious that the
General has a better chance of imposing his solutions on the military
than any other political leader. The present crisis, precipitated by
the Sakiet bombing, has accelerated the trend toward accepting the idea
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of de Gaulle's -indispensability in solving France's North African problems;
and it may safely be assumed that, by now, even many of the left-wing
rank and file must share deep down the prevailing opinion that de Gaulle
is the only leader who commands sufficient respect, prestige., and
authority to carry out (or impose) a new, and most likely liberals policy
toward the dependent areas, especially Algeria, This feeling is intensified
by the corollary belief, perhaps even more widely shared, that the present
republican "system" is incapable of solving the complex North African
problem,
One aspect on which everyone agrees in discussing de Gaulle's
probable North African policy is that it would be exclusively French, The
General. himself has made it abundantly clear in public declarations, as
well as in private conversations, that he vigorously opposes any kind of
foreign intervention in such matters, and, specifically, that he opposes
such actions as the recent US UK Good Offices Mission,
Other aspects of his policy are far less specific., however; but
his supporters imply that his failure to reveal details of his plans is
intentional, not because such details have not been worked out in the
General's mind, they say, but because he is unwilling to provide ideas
that would be helpful in any way to the politicians of the system that
he so despises.
At a press conference on June 30, 1955 (the last such conference
prior to that of May 19, ].958), de Gaulle lifted the veil on his North
African plans slightly by asserting that there was no valid policy for
North Africa other than "association", if these territories were not to
"fall prey to misfortune outside of France"A By "association",, he said
he meant the establishment of a federal link between "states", such as
France, Morocco, and Tunisia, whereas territories that were not states,
such as Algeria, should be integrated in a "community broader than France,
with all political, economic, and administrative participation to be
supplied by the Algerians themselves."
By September 1957, he was reliably reported in the press
(Maurice Clavel, LtZxpless, Sept. 7, and Le Monde, Sept. 8-9) to have
stated that, in seeking a solution to the Algerian and African problems,
he would talk with everyone---" one excluded" (presumably referring
to the FLN). He went on to say that rFrance liked "grand concessions from
which she reaped everything" rather than "half-measures which were turned
against her" and was prepared to give "the maximum" to the dependent
peoples. Algeria, he said, would be "all the more united with France
because she was more free". He hastened to add, however, that he did not
mean to imply total independence,h.ich he thought was a false issue,
though some type of eventual independence (.terms) was perhaps possible,
though not important "in a solid federation".
In March of 1958 at the beginning of the present crisis in French-
North African relations, Jean Daniel, a repected reporter of the weekly
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liberal paper, I-Ex-press, in a private conversation with a member of
Mr. Murphy's staff, stated that de Gaulle had in mind granting immediate
independence to Algeria and then establishing a federation of North Africa
with France. He added his belief that de Gaulle would be the "Mendds-
France for Algeria"o
The General's own aide-de-camp, Baron Guichard;, supplied more details
in a conversation with the same US representative. He said that de Gaulle's
conception was that of a federation between France and North Africa, as
well as Black Africa. This would mean that Morocco and Tunisia would have
to give up certain aspects of their sovereignty, whereas Algeria would
have to be brought forward to a status relatively comparable to that of
Morocco and Tunisia. He asserted that President Bourguiba of Tunisia and
the King of Horoceo had made it clear "several months earlier" that they
would be willing to accept such a status of less than full independence.,
but he admitted that it was questionable whether they would still be
willing to do so after the bombing of Sakiet?
In a conversation with the departing Italian Ambassador (reported
to GAS by a usually reliable third person), presumably sometime in Marche
General de Gaulle put the same idea more succinctly. After remarking
that there were two types of Frenchmen--"those who want to change nothing
and those who want to abandon everything"--and that he stood between these
two extremes, the General said that North Africa must be given immediate
internal independence, but France must retain control of the Army and
Foreign Affairs. He added that "in 20 years, all our possessions should
be completely independent" and that France must have "a dynamic., long-
range policy not only in North Africa but in all Moslem states from Egypt
to Indonesia".
This general position of de Gaulle was corroborated, with some
embellishments, by the General's close associate, Gaston Palewski, now
French Ambassador to Italy, in a conversation with an Italian Foreign
Office official in late April (reliably reported to CAS through a third
person), Palewski said that de Gaulle's solution for the Algerian
situation would be to form a "confederation" of France, Algeria, Morocco,
and Tunisia., "with Paris as its political and administrative center"o
He said French residents of Algeria would have double citizenship in such
a confederation. This solution, according to Palewski, would give Algeria
complete freedom and independence in domestic affairs, would guarantee
the rights of the French minority in Algeria, and would make it possible
for France to control Algeria's foreign policy.
However lacking in vital detail, all these accounts indicate that
de Gaulle's solution for Algeria would be a liberal one. Since it would
appear highly unlikely that such views could be a secret to the French
extremists in Algeria, it is therefore difficult to understand why they
are now clamoring for de Gaulle's leadership, while hotly opposing any
liberal solution proposed by others. The most likely explanation is
that de Gaulle's supporters have no common views on an Algerian solution
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and that each prefers to read into de Gaulle's vague remarks the
particular policy that he espouses. As Maurice Duverger put it in a
recent Le Monde article: "hen Jacques Soustelle and Frangois Mauriac hope
that the Genera. will solve the Algerian problem, they are not thinking
of the same solution. Each party sees in de Gaulle the instrument which
will permit his own policy to triumph,....Everyone imagines in his own
way what the Sphinx is saying." Duverger adds that, if de Gaulle would
repeat publicly what he has been saying in recent private convey-sations
(presumably his liberal views), the Algerian policy pursued by France
since 1956 would not be possible.
There is every reason to believe, therefore, that de Gaulle, while
accepting the support of the Algerian European extremists, still has a
fairly liberal solution for Algeria in mind; and the fact that he is
reported to have disapproved of Jacques Soustellets going to Algeria at
this time indicates that his solution is not that of the latter. At any
rate, the return to the old unworkable policy of "integration", currently
being so enthusiastically espoused by Soustelle and the Algerian Committee
of Public Safety, would hardly seem to be the first step toward the
realization of the policy that de Gaulle has in mind,
The question that then arises is whether General de Gaulle, once
he is in power,, could reasonably be expected to impose his North African
solution on the Algerian Europeans, the French Army in Algeria, and the
North African Moslems themselves. There would seem to be little reason
to believe that the Algerian "insurgents", once havitg forced their will
on the government of France by literally choosing its leader, would
easily bow to his wishes if they did not agree with their own. Already
one warning has been expressed by a spokesman of the Algiers "junta",
as reported in the Journal dtAlger (Algier's telegram No. 107, May 20,
1958), to the effect that, if de Gaullets policies do not jibe with those
of the Committee (which, however, the spokesman thought was improbable),
the Committee would have to "reconsider the situation". If the
extremists balk at de Gaulle's solution, the next question is whether
the French military in Algeria, apparently so penetrated with the
sentiments of the local European population, would be substantially more
willing to carry out a liberal policy for Algeria under de Gaullets orders
than under the orders of the present government.
The third question is whether, if both the Algerian Europeans an
their military supporters bowed to de Gaullets solution of the Algerian
problem, the Moslems of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia would be willing
to go along. Certainly there is no reason to assume that the solution
that de Gaulle envisages is liberal enough to satisfy the Moslem rebels
(FLN); and Morocco and Tunisia, after all that has happened recently to
shake their faith in France, would undoubtedly be most reluctant, even
with the assurances of de Gaulle, to relinquish voluntarily any of the
tenuous sovereignty that they have so painstakingly wrested from France
in the past. With the whole Arab world opposed to anything short of
independence for Algeria in a purely voluntary association with France
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and with the likelihood of an Algerian Government-in-exile being declared,
there can be no reasonable doubt that the Moslems inside Algeria, even
those now "fraternizing" with the French under considerable artificial
stimulation, would very soon revert to their old sympathies with the FLN0
If thwarted in his plans by noncooperation from one or more of
the interested parties, de Gaulle would then be faced with the choice of
either resigning or of altering his plans to suit those of the Algerian
Europeans and continuing the war against the FLN to the bitter end, There
is, also, the possibility that the General's good name may be used by his
unscrupulous supporters of the extreme right for aims that he himself
never envisaged, for example, a reconquest of Tunisia and Morocco,
triggered by incidents that the extremists themselves might provoke, As
the editor of Le Monde phrased it in a recent editorial (May 19S8):
"Behind him, monarchist in tendency but respectful of democratic principles,
would not others stretch the sails to all the winds of adventure'".
Whatever the turn of events., it can safely be concluded that
de Gaulle's task in trying to find a solution to the Algerian problem
that will bring peace and security to the area will be very difficult.
And his chances of ultimate success must be considered far less likely
than his supporters, or even the general public, so easily assume.
(2) NATO and Europe
All observers agree that de Gaulle is hostile to the concept
upon whits P~ f:~nuropeari organizations, including NAT;wis built
a tat his v e on France's role vis- is the US and e USSR ,are
'
His almost
arious variance with the role she pis present~.y playing.
s zc concep ion o ranee' s destiny as -A r t,^ d- dependent power
d es no perm? _ .is?e'I;ariysacri"ice of Fre,,,n~l sovereignty
W~tT"i" n supranational European organizations; and his idea of a North
A antic all aaanvie ussaf . %o o be=ta_lned at
ail, appears , `?~ 5e that of an old=style military alliance between equal
and-Independent- goers with a minimum of coordinated action. The
oo}bsition of the General and of his strongest suppor`ters to European
organizations in the entire postwar period is a matter of public record;
and the influential Le Monde reminded the world in a recent editorial
(May 21) of de Gaullets remarks of December 195 to the effect that
France had no means within NATO to act on its own and that the alliance
should be revised from top to bottom.
With more direct regard to the US, the General's views are strongly
tinged with resentment against the Americans for what he believes to be
the dominating role played by the US in Europe, especially in NATO, and
he appears to h acrp~ecT fide widely held Frencff e9 ateT~ opposes
supplant her des ean is supporters are so resentful of the
growing in l ence of West Germany in European councils and appear to
believe that the West Germans., as the favorite partner of the US., will
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e_.
I Sov?et_u as.Lr
that of strong independent.?power, estab ,shin - emu? 1?brium betwe t
eventually dominate European organizations, as the US, to the Gaullist
way of thinking, now dominates NATO,
It is clear that, although he is not particularly friendlto
e conce vi es rarice r5 =Y-r ole o- e;g :e "aarayss has as
v rs
es a ash peace in i s o e
thus enabling her to throw the entire weight of the French "commonwealth"
into the world political scales. As noted in the previous section, he
believes he is the only man who can bring this about. While it is being
accomplished, it is difficult to predict whether de Gaulle would withdraw
entirely from European organizations, including NATO, or whether France
would remain as a rather passive and unwilling partner until such time
as she could assert her full authority. In either case, the effect on
Western Europe would be highly disruptive. Under the circumstances,
de Gaulle's regime in France would almost of necessity be a virtual
dictatorship, which in itself would greatly hamper cooperation with the
other countries of Western Europe, in most of which the Socialists either
play a leading role or exercise great influence.
It must be concluded, therefore, that France under de Gaulle's
leadership would be, at the very least, a difficult partner. As a French
Foreign Office spokesman put it privately, de Gaulle could be expected
to take a "tough line" toward France's NATO partners. The fact that
de Gaulle is likely to be brought to power by a combined military-
nationalist action certainly increases the chances that this line will be
eas areas and a stable government at home,
't
tough. In the view of West Germany, as expressed by Foreign Minister
Brentano in a conversation with the American Ambassador in Bonn several
days ago, the assumption of power by General de Gaulle would be cata-
strophic for the future of Western European cooperation.
Within the last two weeks, Gaullist supporters, and at least one
unofficial "emissary" from de Gaulle's headquarters, have attempted to
reassure the American authorities in Paris as to the General's intentions,
but much of their comment still gives little ground for optimism, On
May 16, for example, the unofficial emissary, while insisting that
de Gaulle would maintain full participation in and not disrupt NATO, added
that the General believes France should be a "member of NATO" and not
"employed by NATO" and that he deplored French concessions to NATO in
exchange for American loans (which he believes to be the practice of
France's parliamentary governments). The spokesman for de Gaulle denied
that the General was anti-American or anti-German, but strongly stressed
that he was pro-French and implied that he would be willing to sacrifice
very little of French sovereignty for the sake of European unity.. In
fact, the source added that, though de Gaulle favored European unity),
he was convinced that that unity, as presently constituted, inevitably
meant an inferior position for France that she could not accept. Once
again, the spokesman echoed a favorite Gaullist theme that France must
be strong before it can play its full role in any European unity program.
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De Gaullets hostility to European organizations and NATO is so
clear that it is not necessary to document it in detail. However, it
may be interesting to review briefly some of the opinions of other French
leaders that have come to us in the last two or three months,
An article in the MRP party organ in early 1958 asserted that
de Gaulle's coming to power would risk plunging the Atlantic Alliance
and the European edifice into such a broad crisis that it would give the
Soviet Union and the Communists unhoped-for chances.
Socialist leader Guy Mollet, in a private conversation in March
1958, expressed his conviction that de Gaulle would shift France to a
neutralist and independent position, thereby undermining her memberhip
in NATO and her participation in European unity programs. Mollet added
that de Gaulle was certain to pursue a unilateral, neutralistic policy
toward the USSR,
Moderate leader Antoine Pinay recently expressed views essentially
the same as those of Mollet. He predicted a shift of French foreign
policy under de Gaulle toward a neutralist, independent position for
France, inevitably involving a mortal danger for NATO and accompanied on
the internal scene by a political fusion of the French Socialists with
the French Communists, resulting later in a Popular Front government,
French Socialist and noncommunist labor sources, queried in March.,
believed that de Gaulle was convinced that there was no immediate danger
from the Soviets and no urgency about Western European defense within
the framework of NATO. Therefore, they maintained, the General believed
that it was possible to come to an agreement with the Soviets, that the
American alliance, though acceptable, was not indispensable, and that the
Americans needed France more than France needed the US. These sources
were convinced that the General considered European unity and al, related
projects secondary to the need for a "national revolution" (not
specifically political or economic) in France,, They described his views
as being in general, neutralist, nationalist., and anti-European. While
believing that the nature of the conditions under which de Gaulle came
to power would determine his attitude., they felt that., if he were brought
to power by groups that take a nationalistic line on Algeria., he would
be anti-American or., at least, neutralist.
In his on recent remarks to the Italian Ambassador (as referred
to above), de Gaulle is reported to have said: "I am not against .Europet
but against Europe as presently organized with its institutions, assemblies,
and bureaucrats. In other words, I am against the Europe of Jean Monnet,
If it were possible to have a type of personal union amongst governments
as under sovereigns in the past, I would gladly support such a union."
The General added that it was necessary to maintain an equilibrium between
the US and !"SR, ' Th U S S R ' ~ y h e said "ca dip us be: I as
,pen e-75 on the US",. De Gaulle is reported to have made essentially
the same statements to a president of Air France, adding, wit regard to
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the theme of maintaining equilibrium between the US and the Soviet Union,
the phraCmem. Eby Zng t there is' but removi:rie of `d i c iaYaoteristics."
De Gaullets aide-de-camp, in his private conversation with a US
representative in March, gave a slightly more optimistic interpretation
to the same attitudes. After conceding that de Gaulle was anti-American,,
the aide went on to say that the general would certain not pull France
out of NATO,; 49Ra he,would make it. clear 'that was se '7to~
the`aon of a ttstrong federations" between prance anoi Arica,
with which NATO policies would not be permitted to interfere. The aide
added that de Gaulle had always been a European federalist but there would
have.., to be a federation of all Western Europe and not the little union of
the Six, which simply had the effect of cutting France off from North
Africa. With regard to the Generalts attitude toward the Soviet Union.,
the aide asserted that his chief had learned a good deal since 1946 and
that only the Generalt enemies and t"Cie ommun sz s c acme e wo make
a rate aea wztin one o
A number of French journalists have also sought, rather unconvincing-
ly, to put a more optimistic light on the same views of de Gaulle. For
example, Jean Daniel of ILE)t ress, in the same interview referred to
above (in Narch), told the US representative that he did not believe
de Gaulle would pull France out of NATO, though he might change the pattern
of the organization. He also believed that, though the General might
try to reach a settlement with the Soviet Union, this could be done in
agreement with the US.
State - FD, Wash.,D.C.
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