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OF RADII? FREE OPE
September 1956
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CRITICISM OF RADIO FREE EUROPE
Contents
1. summary
A. RFE' s Overemphasis on Propaganda
B. Unreliability of RFE Broadcasts
C. Tone
Counterproduc t ire ne s s
E. Communist Orientation of RFE
F. FEP Balloon Leaflets
Survey of Material Examined
III. Views of US and Foreign Officials
W. US' Newspaper Correspondents
V. Views of the Satellite Audience
VI. PEP Balloon Leaflets
l7
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CZSM OF RADIO FREE EUROPE
expressed by US and foreign officials, US news'
a.pe
Radio Free &urope (M) and Free Europe Press
The following is a. a ry of the major Grit
correspondents, and native listeners (satellite defectors,
ais le al. travelers, and individuals behind the Iron
urtain . Information is dated late 1955-1956.
Qv
Propagan
1. News Information vs. Propaganda
three groups do not explicitly define what they
& eke on individuals, to information on border conditions.
Correspondents and listeners agree that propaganda is
remphaetsed in programming and that more news and factual
ormation is desirable. US officials do not advance
ng r :n is from news commentary, exhortations to revolt
propaganda." From the material examined, Its
views on the relative merits of news and propaganda. Their
criticis focuses on the exaggeration and manner of presen-
tation of Rl propaganda, not on the faet that propaganda
is programed.
20
n to e s of Propaganda
The opinions of correspondents and listeners on types
of propaganda show considerable uniformity. Commentary
geared to news is welcomed and recommended, although some
opinion in both groups holds that even this kind of propa-
ganda is apathetically received, One official comment
supports this view.
ropaanda on liberation and propaganda inflaming feel-
ings or inciting to action are deplored, Attacks on I di-
viduale also are deplored but for different reasons depend-
ing upon the respondent group. Correspondents report that
individuals are sometimes 4n juatly attacked. Listeners do
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not mettian mistaken accu ations, but instead disapprove
the undesirOle consequences which impel the individuals
attacked to greater loyalty to the regime and to greater
erity toward the population.
opinions conveyed by correspondents and listeners dif-
rc paganda advising the population how to respond
ti.ons in their homelands. Correspondents report
,t the coca .population resents such advice. Though men-
oned only twice listeners, both reactions to such
were favorabe. Despite the fact they tend to dis-
urage prcipa, nda, correspondents and defectors alike
recommend pro sing some kind of propaganda such as
ant ,-ei e a ticks, or more information to persuade the
population of U3 strength vis-a-vis the Soviet bloc.
scab
The alleged unreliability or inaccuracy of RFE broad-
Ea is asserted by all three groups but in contexts
e to estimates ' o the situation and its potentialities,
description of existing conditions, to statements of
simple facts, or even to incorrect pronunciation. For
each there are isolated examplea of criticism. In only
e did a US official define what he iftant by inaccuracy
in his reference to RFEme assertion concerning the disin-
tegration of a satellite Co unist 'Party. 'Examples of this
type of error are not directly corroborated by correspondents
and listeners, but seem Implied in some of their more general
criticism. Listeners also charge that emigre broadcasters
are out of touch with the realities. What specific items
of information or judgment occasioned statements by listeners
that RFE is inaccurate or false are not indicated in avail-
able material. Correspondents speak of events and self-
criticism on the part of the satellite regimes having out-
run M's ability to keep pace.
The VOA -and the BBC are often held by correspondents
and defectors alike to be more 'objective' and "accurate"
althou not as opular as M. Available reports do not
indicate how seriously or slightly RFE is thought to offend
on this score of inaccuracy. Although none of the corre
pon,dent_s stated that R]E was objective, some detectors
asserted they found ' s news objective and accurate.
Whatever the extent of the imputed inaccuracy and the
validity of the criticism, what emerges is a measure of
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agreement by all three groups on some undefined kind and
degree of unreliability and inaccuracy of RFE broadcasts, but specifics are either lacking or not comparable.
All three groups express the opinion that "strident" some of RFE4a
propaganda has an undesirable tone (the term
used by representatives of all groups). This charge applies
presumably to the "inflammatory type of propaganda men-
tioned or implied by all groups.
1i. Counterproductiveness
US of `ieial.s mean by counterproductivefess that RFE
and information activities carried
aa-Aa
d
th
p
e pr
aces
. ,Li
Regime protests to US diplo-
urisdiction
ir
th
.
j
e
n tender
matte missions are accompanies by direct or indirect restric-
tion of the missions' own information programs.
E. Comunit Orientation of
A number of articles contain accusations that H:E employs
Communists among its emigres and disseminates pro-Communist
Sudeten anti-Ma campaign, and can .one occasion to a named
Czech exile. This charge is not voiced by US officials or
the listener group.
F. F? Moon Leaflets
The almost total lack of data on correspondents' opinions
and specific leaflets precludes any accurate comparison of
l~P balloon leaflets. However, according to the scanty
W,L
data available, the ineffectiveness imputed to balloon propa-
ganda by correspondents citing Western officials is not
supported by the defectors, the majority of whom believe
it effective. Sulzbe `ger reported that the Ten Demands
thprn
cal
at
h
. s
- E" r
1 f VVL.i.s
data though one defector mentioned
th
e
vident fret
is not e, they were ineffective, another that they were "intresting,"
t
d
still another stated. he Was irrppressa
. Oth
ments by the correspondent group such as the
co
m
er
physical hazards involved and Communist regime criticism
find neither corroboration nor contradiction among defectors.
3
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Sure of Material Examined,
Cr ticis t of RFE by US officials is represented In the
opinions expressed by diplomatic mission chiefs and other
officials in ?gland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Rumania.
This criticism has been supplemented by comments occasion-
al l,y 'volunteered by members of friendly embassies. The
` icial con ent eeined is of limited value for the pres.
ent study because of the small number of opinions reported,
nature and the lack of specific and illustra-
4-ve supporting data. '3 and foreign officials do not make
cl ar? what the basi=s of their oriticism is. In the mater
available, criticism of R; seems to be based partly on
Communist reime reaction, and partly on their estimates of
the mood and receptiveness of the captive po ulation.s to
western and R broadca,..ats an well as on talks with eatel-
lite residents. On one occasion cri.tictsm was based on an
e ration of E. scripts measured against the situation
judged to exist in the country in question.
The sample of criticism by US correspondents also is
relatively small and lacking in homogeneity. It comprises
nine individual. evaluations (including one British), of which
four are
publ.i,shed, and five were given privately to M.
Ot the four published, two are extensive criti(
RFE,
and the others contain passing or indirect references to
sans of Communist Poland speaking to Western sources have
been included for a comparleon of their opinions with
others. One was by a correspondent of the T buns lei du,
the other was by a group of Polish writer traveling
in the West.
Ito Included In this study is the criticism of
which appeared In the articles concerning Communist infil-
tration of RE and the allegedly pro-Communist propaganda
broadcast by TFE employees.
The sources of Information for S correspondents are
mainly residents of the satellites (often from "all walks
of life' and to all appearances a random selection) and the
views of American and friendly diplomats.
For the listener group sample, a total of '78 reports
were analyzed in the survey of satellite audience critiels
and reactions to RFE broadcasts. All reports are recent,
ha in. been published in 1956, although in a few cages the
information was acquired during the latter part of 1955.
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fire satellites contributed comments. The
broken down geographically, shows that 26
yes were Czech nationals, 16 Hungarian. 16 Polish.
rx.an, anct ( Rumanian. Comments were received from
travelers, and individuals still residing in a satellite
country. Thirty-three of the sources were not described
in sufficient detail to be assigned to one of the four
categories. Of the total of identifiable sources, 29 were
defectors, 6 satellite residents, 5 legal emigrants,,. and
legal travelers.
Sources came from all walks of life including peasants,
factory workers, students, teachers and other professional
people, businessmen and artists. Wide variations in intelli-
gence, educational background, and social and economic
levels oZ' sources were encountered. Sources varied also
in age but the largest number were young adults. That
this is the group to which RFE appeals most strongly is
suggested by the fact that a number of sources stated that
while R was their own preference, their parents preferred
the BBC, a choice influenced by their wartime listening.
No significant differences were evident in the reports
types of sources. Although certain groups commeited on
specific programs broadcast only to their area, the type
similar for all-national grouPa. The limited -
i aitedA size `of - the
t and the lack of biographic data concerning the
sources has made it impossible to break the reports down in-
to any useful sub-divisione.
25X1X6 u The reports surveyed Include interview
25X1X6
here were no substantial differences in
the kind of criticism contained In the "intelligence reports"
from that appearing in , RP interviews. For these reasons
all reports have been considered without reference to origin
or type of source.
The vlidity of the criticism expressed by US officials,
correspondents, and listeners is subject to Qualification,
The views of US officials may sometimes be colored by the various
objectives which they seek to achieve. Their objectives also
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may be partially vitiated by the repercussions cau ed by
o Some correspondents are superficially informed on
1 t
enor tives and modus operandi of Communist
vsi?s. s Ivvi rk ' opinions May be influenced by
occ ,Oioned simply by their being outside tie Iron Curtain,
The very fact of their detection often classes them as
unusual, atypical group whose attitudes and Opinions
n Curtain.
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Views of US and Foreign Ofd':
US officials have criticized RFE for its counterpro-
d`1.1ctiVene ,t, unreliability, and for use of a strident or
Inappropriate tone in its propaganda. Foreign officials
have expressed the opinion that RYE is ineffective.
The criticism of US officials is unanimous in chars.
tert jng, RPE propaganda as counterproductive, a term
which means that RFE negates the liberalization develop-
ments taking place, or hampers Embassy informational or
propaganda activities (presumably USIS dis aya, exchange
of publications, US visitors, and the like). Irritated
arid. antagonized by R broadcasts (and/or balloon leaflets),
the regimes in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Rumania register
strong, complaints with the US missions and, place restrictions
on their informational activities. officials of US and
foreign missions emphasize that harassment of the regime is
not necessarily a measure of successful program sing.
.The.. recurrent criticism that RIME is unreliable means
or outdated. Available information offers the following
Ingle example: An envoy studied several I scripts and
ited three instances in which lYt s description of a par-
ticular situation differed from that of the Embassy. The
Communist Party of the country was described as being in
a state of "hysteria" and "disintegration," a character-
ization
ser?pt a
arronous
is cited as describing a situation (allegedly
"
.tort' but ins:
throwing the government. In addition, the official also
uses these eaami les to demonstrate the discrepancy between
RYE propaganda quid nee and practice.
In two inmtsnces, US officials suggest that the strident
tone of RYE propaganda broadcasts is inappropriate and un-
desirable.
One US official reported that the embassies of friendly
powers regard as useless. British Embassy officials
are said to compare R; in one instance to the London
Daily Mir, implying that F' is unreliable and sensation.
1ch seemed unwarranted by the facts. An RYE
a revolt
and another as containing Inflame
tive slogans urging action toward over-
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IV. US Newspaper Correspondents
the nine evaluations b correspondents containing
criticism of RM, five are extensive: One b Sulzberger
(published in the New York Times, 1k May 1956), two by
Sy faurgin (unpub1T Ee , oneTheodore Andrica of the
Cle '; nd esthe (unpub hed), and one by Joseph { eehsberg
(published in x u.rd - 1,7venin Post-,, 23 July 1956).
Two additional pub s e comments a.rrief and indirect
in their criticism Raymond of the New York TIM,
and John
Freeman of the Newtatesran and 9ar). -The remaining
two of the vamp o nine are-'? e unpublished remarks by
MacCormac of theme York Times and Russell Jones of the
All correspondents but ; 1eohsberg believe that BYE has
a significant number of listeners,., This agreement; suggests
that these correspondents do not hold the view that RPE is
ineffective for lack of an audience, e.heberg's remark
that most people don't listen to them /VOA and RF _._ any
more," seems an exaggeration of the view found in The reports
of some correspondents and officials that there is decreasing
interest in American propaganda broadcasts.
from commentary clearly keyed to the news, the
correspondents seem to mean by the term propaganda one or
more of the following: any form of affirmation of the
idea of liberation; incitation or exhortation to resistance
(passive, active, or sabotage); advice on how to deal with
various recurrent situations or conditions under Communism,
collective farms, price changes, rationing); and attacks
on individuals.
On the issue of the desirability of propaganda compared
with news and information in broadcasts, almost all, the
correspondents feel that RFE (and/or VOA) broadcasts should.
carry more news and less propaganda (as defined above).
However, Raymond (in the New York Times, 15 January 1956),
ttemptin to evaluate VOA an "'E propaganda on the issue
of ltberaion, states that people do listen to the broad-
cast and collect the leaflets sent across the Iron Curtain
boundaries. ourgin concedes that the propaganda tone of
the ' e Accuse" pro ram, which he finds irritates the
vtment and inte lectuala (the latter call it childish),
deli td the lain "
plain people the most."
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With these exceptions, all correspondents express the
opinion that more news and less propaganda is desired by
the satellite audiences. They recommend that primary
e haste in broadcasts be placed on news, followed by
a entifi.c and technical Information, cultural entertain-
ment, and jazz programs.
The correspondents feel that the least desirable forms
propaganda are the attacks on regime personalities
propaganda Dourgin, Andrica, Freeman). They object to
attacks on regime personalities because they feel it is
petty or that people are mistakenly accused. Objections
to liberation propaganda are alleged disappointment in
past promises, and a consequent disbelief and cynical dis-
missal of hopes currently voiced, by propaganda. In the
(Sulzberger Bourgin, Andrica, Wechaberg) and liberation*
se of liberation propa.a.nda, Raymond presented both favor-
i
ence reception.
,e and unfavorable aud
Similarly judged are the propaganda exhortation
advice on action such as resistance or response to con-
ions (Sulzberger, Bourgin, Andrica). The reason advanced
the lack of effectiveness of this aspect of propaganda
kt the home audience feels it knows conditions better
than the emigres broadcasting such advice, and that it there-
fore insults the intelligence of the listeners and occasions
resentment.
With the exception of those mentioned above; not all
correspondent named the specific aspects of propaganda
they thought undesirable. All., however, feel that "propa-
andao is more or less undesirable. None of the corre-
spondents find approval for such propaganda among those
whom they interviewed (with the exception of Raymond and
l ourgin noted above).
On. the desirability of propaganda in the form of com-
mentary on the news, a similar unanimity does not prevail.
Though some reiterate the belief that the satellite audience
is.not interested in political commentary or political
affairs generally,. a smaller number recommend it.
Newspaper articles dealin generally with liberation or
the satellite populations views of liberation without
c.fic reference to R have been disregarded in this
is not possible to infer that such discussions
are intended as criticism of R" since the idea of libera
ti.aan is not held exclusively by 111PE; also, It has not been
determined how significant a role the liberation theme
plays in E output.
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On the Issue of RFE unreliabtlitys only two correspond-
ants noted that American propaganda is "wrong's or "1ate.11
zberger reiterated this charge in his l4 May column
(without distinguishing VOA and ). Jones, considered
sympathetic to I i, remarked briefly .that Hun ariane had
told him that evene are moving so i`ast that Ham. is not
able to keep u ...' The comments of the Polish writers
support this observation. fechsberg cited Czechs as sayings
"The radio people seem to think we've become a nation of
tools.... We knew of the workers' riots in Ostrava and
Pilsen long before the radio broadcasts.' In addition, the
view that the American radio and the emigre broadcasters have
list touch with the realities behind the Iron Curtain also
has been expressed by Sulzberger, Bourgin, Andrica, and
Wechsberg.
Such a variety of reactions to broadcast programming
encountered among those interviewed by the corre-
spondent tat no pattern of audience preference emerges.
Some say more entertainment is wanted; others say less or
no entertainment. Intellectuals allegedly are irritated
by the "We Accuse" program; the plain people are "delighted"
by it. Economic statistics are ridiculous" and of interest
only to "mathematics professors" {Sulzberger); yet ~-.echsberg
finds that information on America s strength is generally
wanted. No single program can be expected to be universally
popular, and all will be criticized by one group of listeners
or another.
In the case of the Polish writers, the r bona Ludu cor-
respondent stated that RFE news is too objectlye nS"Mt
Its effectiveness would be enhanced by giving "political
comment" on the news, since not everyone can draw his own
"
ns.
This view may be a reflection of his profee--
ional outlook as a Communist propagandist committed by
doctrine and conviction to the necessity of propaganda and
not merely news reporting. He also asserts that the greatest
importance is attached by Polish newspaper editors to moni-
toring R 'E. recommends that R pursue the objective of
out its "real causes- and solutions."" However, he cautions
inst commentaries "claaaaityirg various personalities. st
This may be a reference to the rr=,e Accuse" program to which
Western correspondents found adverse reaction in some
quarters
The other Polish writers indirectly support his recon
ndation on liberalization news and commentary by c
10
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R material for being outdated. They indicate that criticism
of the domestic soene currently is so prolific in Polish
media that FF,, in its criticism of conditions in Poland,
is in danger of losing its previously large audience.
They praise Rd2 for its effectiveness in convincing
the Communists that Poland cannot be :aealed off from infor-
mation from the hest and for its "vital" role in countering
Communist propaganda. They warn against an " tant1- extern
radio propaganda" campaign of deception carried out among
foreign diplomats and touring journalists in zi"arsaw by Com-
munists pretending to be spokesmen of the apposition. They
also strongly emphasize the desire of Pales for information,
and caution against propaganda on the internal situation
without the inclusion of new information or cross-reporting.
The accusation that R is promoting Communist causee
and is Infiltrated by Communists appeared in four news-
pa or reports at the end, of May and the beginning of Tune
195 , Most were news reports traceable to a West German
Sudeten anti- ',E campaign. They were largely restricted
t
hi
t
o c
n,
he public accusation made by the chairman of
the Sudeten German Expellees Association, Dr. Rudolf
Lodgan on Auen. The only comment at the time sup-port"
,.(.,
the allegation was by columnist Ray Tucker in the Oroville,
California r . . later, 22 June 1956, who quoted from
the rri.tinga o eran eroutka described as head of
the NF Czech desk, apparently to ?tprove`t Peroutkars
Communist leanings, All other artlQles reported the
t a
or in discussing growing % est German concern with ' P
,
activity on sovereign German territory.
Two Other articles,, independent of the Von Auen episode,
supported the charge concerning RPL+s pro-Communism. John B.
Crane's col=n., 21 March 1956, in the Fort Wayne, Indiana
e s-$enti. 1, accorupanied by an editorial in the same vein,
aeev*n-ced to accept charges made by a Jiri Brads,
Boa Czech refugee journalist, that RFE Is infiltrated by
Communists and that R "preaches Socialism."
Twelve additional newspaper articles dating from December
955 to July 1956 made little of the infiltration charge,
erasing Instead West German official or 1 (refugee
?"
tical party) hoatil1ty toward fl . There is no evident
'
.nation in thews articles to report R1 in an unfavorable
ht.
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in late 1955, official US despatches from the American
Embassy and UI> in Bonn and the American Consulate
General in Munich detail the political maneuverings of
the Sudeten Oerman refugees to gain a measure of control
or influence in R FE, but contain no references that could
construed as discrediting RFE.
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V. Views of the Satellite Audience
definitive Conclusions c
b
d
an
e
rawn from the avail-
able material concerning the reactions of the satellite
population to f"E broadcasts because of the limited number
Of reports and the fact that the sources cannot be con-
eeidered typical of the population as a whole.
eXaminatjo.n of available reports indicates that RP has3ess,
an a tenalve listening audience behind the Iron Curtain.
All sources stated =that members of their family, acquaint-
ances, and fellow workers did likewise.
audiences appear to i
l
nc
ude both city and rural
dwellers, although the more effective
tiori jamming of city recap-
proba,bl had some dete
rrent effect. The majority
Of s urces stated that R 'E
ro
p
grams are subject to almost
co atintta 7; mming, although most of them said that they
managed to hear programs in which they were interested
despite the interference. That jamming is less effective
in r1ra , areas is confirmed by several listeners and by
the fact that agricultural programs were singled out by
at least four sources as particularly enjoyable.
The criticism most frequently expressed by the satellite
audience is that RFF broadcasts contain too much propaganda.
This comment is made specifically 29 times, more than twice
the number of time that any other one criticism is ex-
pressed. In addition, the same opinion is implied by a
number of sources who express a desire for "more news,"
"straight news," or "objective news." Sources who complain
about the propaganda content of the programs do not in most
cases define what they mean by the term.
of qualifying phrases such as "too inflammatory," ":exa use
aced," "inflammatory broadcasts," "pro a td gger-
irresponsible political line" suggests p that llii;sst tcten ers
identify as pre a ands, rs
to incite hatred and resentment against the regime. Oneas
source believed that some program material was so incen..
diary in nature that some people might be aroused to active
resistance against the regime as a result of listening to
it.
Some listeners also find the content of certain programs
either dangerous or potentially so. One source stated he
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believed that rogrs calling attention to the misdemeanors
or minor offic eie only served to make such officials more
fanatically attached to the regime and, more severe toward
anti-?Co m nists, Another said that information broadcast
concerning border conditions and possible escape routes
-11 Almost as many reports, however, spoke in favor of certain
programs as helpful to the satellite audience. Singled out
for praise were programs which gave practical advice on how
to deal with the regime and Its officials. One of the most
n roux affir ,tine comments which sources gave was that
I broadcasts kept up morale among its satellite hearers.
This was said In some cases by persons who made derogatory
eoMments on specific programs or other aspects of Rl broad-
a ting.
A number of listeners, while disapproving "propaganda,"
do s that they like anti-regime broadcasts, which would
seem to imply approval of unspecified types of propaganda.
It does not appear that listeners who comment disapprovi
ngl
:y
.
about propaganda intend to censure the use of news commentators.
Commentary programs, particularly political and military,
were ntioned by 17 sources as particularly helpful and
interesting.
The second most frequent criticism which the satellite
aey convey is often not true. Several sources expressed
the conviction that the broadcaster was not sufficiently
knowledgeable on events taking place within the satellite
or that he had "lost touch's with the people there. Others
false. A number of listeners preferred BBC or VOA on the
grounds that their broadcasts were more accurate or more
objective.
ers,, however, are not unanimously convinced that
RPE is untrustworthy. The greatest number of approving
comments recorded (29) were for RPE news broadcasts, and
aource stated that they believed them to be "objective,"
"liable," "up to date and "frank." News broadcasts
were enjoyed because listeners felt that they were their
best source of information about domestic developments,
other Communist countries, and the international situation.
Almost as many reports criticized the tone of R?R broad-
s as found the content unreliable. The greatest number
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f these coents were directed to material which listeners
characterized as 11vu.1gar" or containing "rough and vulgar
talk." One program was said to be "in bad taste and harm-
ful." Other oGMents declared the tone of the broadcasts
to be "too strident" or "too sarcastic" and decried the
Use of "inaultjng epithets and. Nazi-like tone." Still other
11
r
#
listener's Pound the programs dr,y
+ and "boring" and
delivered in a bad accent.
Sot a eouroes, however, characterize RFE broac.caats
"lively" and. "Interesting." Others comment that the
rnouncer's accent and attitude Seems typical of the national
audience to which he is speaking.
ng on what RE should feature in its programs
few sQurces Specified that they wished to~hear Tmore ~*internal
. 1o
d
f
ca new an
a
ew asked for forei ittil
,gn ornernaona
Ziewe comments orsum rtesl wt
*l asoere menioned, as
abl.e, Next most frequently stated was the desire for
on conditions in which recent emigres find themselves in
the West; scientific and medical programs; and programs for
agricultural workers. A number of sources asked for more
information about life in the West, and specifically in
the V SA. About an equal number asks to be spared comparisons
between cohdltjons in the satellites and the high standard
`
a
living in America.
Entertainment is mentioned as desirable by several
source, especially plays, humorous programs, and jazz.
Source vote consistently, however, against programs of
mi-ciaasjca1a a;asjcai and folk music because they are
broadcast over the regime radio and can be heard thus more
leariy anditht d f
wouangerrom regime informers.
Religious programs please some listeners and Irritate
others in about equal proportions. Listeners who object
to them do so on the grounds that the practice.of religion
is not forbidden in the satellites and that they feel that
RPE is patronizing 1.-hem with such programs.
Other co nts ask for more programs for women
youth
,
,
intellectuals, and programs which emphasize sports, the
shortcomings of the regime, and the accomplishments of
famous national heroes. Sources detailing programs they
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not enjoy mention long talks, too much oratory, or too
superior a tone. A considerable number of sources went
on record as approving the variety of RPE programs and
the feat that they were planned to include material for
different social and intellectual levels.
A number of sources spoke approvingly of RP's continuous
broadcasting schedule and noted that if they missed a pro-
gram because of severe jamming they could very often listen
to a re-broadcaot later when the jamming was 1e5s effective.
One source advocated arranging VOA and RFE schedules so
that they did not conflict.
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1 P78
"
V1. PEP Balloon Leaflets
Three articles in the ew York Times (Sidney Oruson,
30 January and February 19361 d ison Salisbury,,
12 February 1956) represent the main criticisms of Free
Europe Press balloon leaflets available from ne spapere.
&ulzberger1a 14 May 156 article cites a "friendly ambassa-
dor in Czechoslovakia." as describing leaflets containing 10
popular demands for freedom as bein "foolish." The New
York I d Tribune, 25 January 1959, cites Russian propa-
ganda st pporech protests on the balloons.
on.ts .first article describes a Prague exhibit of
balloon propaganda, which portrays the balloons as a physical
danger to air flight and to the population, some of whom are
claimed In the exhibit to have been injured by the explosion
of balloons. His article stresses the Communist origins of
the charges. He paraphrases a Czech guide at the exhibition
Ing that the pamphlets distributed have lost whatever
veness they may have had.
lru,eon's second article eu narizes the opinion of "many
tern diplomats" that the leaflets have "long outlived
whatever usefulness they may have had," and that they are
"bad ropaganda" because they raise internal tension, whereas
the aim ehould be to lessen Internal tension with the ulti-
mate effect of loosening ties with the Soviet Union. Ad-
mittin the difficulty of measuring the "ordinary Czecho-
slovak a reaction to his government! s campaign against the
balloons," he does cite one ,non-Communist white collar
worker" to the effect that If a balloon killed a Czech, It
would create more ill will than 10 years of Communist propa-
ganda have done.
ebury' s article also cites "some western quartera
some American observers behind the Iron Curtain'
as being critical of the balloon propaganda effort. Other
than this attribution, Salisbury notes the coordinated.,
Soviet-directed campaign against the balloons.
Satellite audience reaction to Free Europe Press leaflets
contained in 19 of the 78 reports available on satellite
audience reactions to propaganda. All reports considered
are of recent (1956) date. A few sources state-dthat they
had heard of the leaflets but had never seen one and had
no opinion As to their effectiveness. (These sources are
i
ncluded in this survey.)
t
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As in the sampling of opinion concerning PF broadcasts,
reports Come from defectors, legal emigrants, legal travelers,
and residents of the satellite area. Geographically, only
three satellites are represented: Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
and Poland, Of the 19 reports, 3 sources are Czech, 5 Hun-
garian, and 3 Polish.
In all, 24 opinions concerning the leaflets were expressed,
sin
ce core sources went on record as favoring some aspect a
th
e operation while being opposed to another. The majority
of opinions express approval of the leaflets
enerall
(16
g
y
in favor, 8 against), Reasons which sources gave for liking
the leaflets were similar to those expressed concering RFE
broadcasts. Six responses stated that the leaflets kept
up morale and five stated that the leaflets were desirable
because they brought information otherwise unavailable to
the reader. Other opinions were that they harassed the
broadcasts because they were more tangible, and could be
read over and passed on.
Derogatory opinions were based on the fact that sources
did not believe that the Iea.flete were effective (four) or
considered them dangerous because possession might lead, to
One). 'Other sources found hem ttt~nint e3r?eastj ngti
as
d "
u
an
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