COMMENT ON KHRUSHCHEV'S DENUNCIATION OF STALIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-02771R000200380004-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 28, 2003
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: REPORT

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COMMENT ON.KHRUSHCHEV' S. DENUNCIATION OF STALIN
Second Report
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Dail iron London, June 22
The political committee of the British Cbemuz st Party said yes-
terday that in the absence of a denial or an official-text the U.S.
version of the 1 rushchev report on Stalin must be taken as more or
less authentic. The British Oa manists protested to the Soviet moo'
mist Party nearly 3 months ago at the failure to publish the report.
The evil practices disclosed in the report have violated the Socialist
conceptions of democracy, said the poltical c senittee's statement.
the time has come for all countries to abolish the death penalty
in time of peace. Thezevised edition of the party's progrM, 'Ttie
British Road to Socialism," will pay special- attention to perbonal and
civil liberty. All conditions are present for a great united vorkiag-
class advance in Britain and throughout the world, said the stetemst
which is published in full below.
The political committee of the Owomlet Party has had wider con-
sideration the unofficial published version of Qoarede Bhrushev's
report to the private session of the 20th Congress of the (PBU, together
with the discussion in our party. At the private session of the 24th
national congress of our party on Apr. 1, a resolution was passed and
conveyed to the Ommnunist Party of the Soviet Won, regretting that
a public statement on this question had-not been made by the Central
Committee of the Oesmuaist Party of the Soviet Union, which Could have
enabled the members of all Ommmist Parties and the st a ch friends of
the Soviet Union to have under$tood fully the seriousness of the issues
and helped them to a better understanding of everything that is involved.
Our Party has not received any official version of the report of Co cadre
.
lQurushchev.
The continued absence of .an official report has led to the publica-
tion of unofficial versions through gradual leakages and by solaces
hostile to Soeielies. This has mode many Obnnmisti outside, the Soviet
Won dependent on such enemy sources for Information on these vital
matters and has thus added unnecessary difficulties to the estimation
and discussion of the-facts. In the light of the unofficial text ~ now
published, which in the absence of official denial may be regarded as
more or less authentic, we reaffirm tare.generbl lines. of the resolution
of our executive committee of May 13.
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We consider that the 20th Congress of the CPSU was correct in
cotdemning the cult of the individual and in Endorsing` the return tq
the Leninist principles of collective leadership and inner party
democracy. We consider that the 20th fbngress was correct in frankly
exposing all the evils which followed from the departure from the
Leninist principles, in order to put an end to these evils. All
Communists, in ccomon with all democratic and progressive people, are
deeply shocked by the'injustices and crimes which during the period
under review violated the essential principles of Socialist Democracy
and legality and dishonored the noble cause of Ooemisaa. We repeat
that such evil practices are totally alien to Socialism and islet..
At the same time, we recognize that these evils arose not as a
necessary accou eniment of working-class rule and Soviet democracy, as
the eremite of 8ocialia pretend, but as a result of the violation of
the Socialist principles and during a specific period of abnormal. strait
between 1934 and 1953. This was the period of the rise of taeciet abro d.,
the preparation of war, the Second World. War, and the Cold War. The
Soviet leaders have exposed the evils and abuses of this period in order
to correct then and make a decisive turn to the fulfillment of the
.principles of Lenini?,, collective leadership,, Socialist democracy
and, creative Marxist work in all fields of science, liter tune and
art.
We recognize that in spite of the grave harm caused by these abuses
the Soviet people achieved very great and historic successes. In the
face of terrible difficulties, they established Socialism, vithstodi
and defeated the Nazi onslaught, and reconstructed their country after
the unparalleled devastation of the war., This achievement deserves the
admiration of all and shows the superiority of the Socialist system over
capitalise and the creative possibilities It opens,i for the people.
The 2Utht Congress of the CPSU Itself recorded the historic fact that
Socialism has now become s world system. It mde major contributions
to )Karxist theory, and helped the working-class movement in all coieitries
by its declarations on the possibility of preventiv$ world war, the peace-
ful transition to Socialism, and the new opportunities for developing
working-class unity. The discussion arising from the 20th Congress and
from the revelations regarding the 1934-1953 period of the Soviet Uetion
is stimulating fresh' and fruitful thought and endeavor in every field of
Communist` work and practici.
.It Is clear that a fue0ter review and discussion of the questions
opened up by the report to the private session of the 20th Congress of
the ('SU is needed.
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We agree with the observations of On rade Togliatti and the French
Obmmunist Party that it will be necessary to make a profound Mkrxiet
analysis of the causes of the degeneration in the functioning of Soviet'
d cracy and party democracy; that it is not enough to attribute theses'..
developments solely to the character of one individual, and that a more
adequate 'estimate of the role of Stalin, both in its positive and nega-
tive aspects, will be necessary.
It is clear that the steps taken for strengthening the operation of
Socialist legality and safeguarding the rights of citizens will lead
to a further examination of all problems of the functioning of Socialist.
democracy and legality. ?hose responsible for past` violations of
Socialist democracy and for crimes against the people are being punished,.,
and this is just and necessary. At the same time, it is understandable
that concern has been expressed at the application of the death penalty
in a recent trial in the Soviet Won. We express the view
light of the present world situation and the strengthened po
the Socialist camp it should now be possible to bring about
of the death penalty in peacetime in all countries, and we
we have a special responsibility to work for the fulfillment
in Britain and in the colonial countries under British rule.
at in the
tion of
e abolition-
gnize that
this aim
Within our own party, we shall need to carry forward and 44courage.
the widest and most thorough discussion, as already begun, of
political and organizational methods, , the functioning of party ,emocracy,
and the-tackling of the problems before us, our relations with dther
sections of the labor movement and the aims of unity, as indicated in-.,,:
the executive committee's resolution. We shall also carry forward work
on a new edition of "The British Road to Socialism," in which,?among
the many questions which will come up for review, we shall need to ex-
pand that section which shows how the democratic liberties won by.the
people can'be maintained and extended, and how Socialist legality will
be guaranteed.
The enemies of our party hope that this discussion will weaken the.
party and open the way for attempts to smuggle anti-Marxist, anti-moist
bourgeois conceptions into the Party, str{k at the roots of the Uommu-.
nist principles and organization. On the contrary, our party members and
organizations will know how to conduct the discussion so as to strengthen.
every aspect of our party's work and activity. The democracy of our panty
is the widest democracy of any party in Britain. The freedom of discussion
and democratic functioning which is possible in our party, and which the
leaders of other parties fear to permit in theirs, is possible because...'i
of the essential unity of our party's Marxist outlook and our determine-:
'tion to reach, in the light of Marxism, unity on the policy which is in.-
the best interests of the British working class.
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0 Let us never forget, throughout this discussion,. that the cause of
Oosmnmism, of national independence, of freedom and peace, is advancing
with giant strides throughout the world. All conditions =are present'
.here in. Britain fora great advance of the labor movement, Given the
correct policy and leadership,, the British people will defeat ?bryism
and move forward to Socialism. It is the mission of our O mamist Party
to help achieve these aims, and it is in this spirit that, while dis-
cussing the urgent and.inportant issues raised by the ?nth congress of
the (PSU, we work to develop the greatest united movemat of the people
for the policy put forward by our 24th national congress.
k
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rlf8 a00YtOtYttST, NNE 16,
1' ~egui im :Latin ThroM . '
C ommuNisr, editors in' the West were placed' in a most
awkward-. situation when Mr Ktuushchevs. "?seciet'-
speech " was released by the State Department. With no
censorship at their disposal,. they could not prevent Qtbct
newspapers from. splashing it on their front. pages.. Were.
they to follow, suit and'reveal what was still .. secret. in-
Moscow, or should ? their' readers be left to learn the horrid
troth from a ; nonparty "-source, without any - witigating,
comment? Paradoxically, the Anglo-Saxon Daily Worhera -
have chosen to brave it. out, . while their usually vigorous
Latin counterparts--.Unicd. rind L'Hun ,etc --h vc :1C=
prudently silent.
The New York Daily Worker actually blamed the Russiaifs
for failing to break the jrews themselves, and thus: albttiing :: .
the State Department to exploit the situation. It tri[idscd
Mr Khrush?chev for' note mentioning the persecution . of
the Jews in his catalogue of crimes, and firmlyconcluded :
that the record- was situ.far.from complete. This; language;'
mixed with a .fair measure of self-criticism, is certainly .an
important novelty .and a symptom of the new :mood.'.
Admittedly the Anglo-Saxon parties are only poor' relati...
in the communist. family. Signs of ferment can also be
seen, however, :iii the big Communist parties''of Prince and: ? .
Italy. If their., newspapers .manage to clear their thtoAs
and speak up, there will.bc something really iww .on the
western rroru
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P W ScONOMIST, JUNG 23, f )56
Defence is Not Expendable''
N O apology is needed for returning yet again with a warning
note to the subject of defence economics which is at present
capturing public attention and engrossing Cabinet time. It
has taken the near-disasters of twenty years of war and cold war to
teach the democracies that they must stand ready and equipped to
defend themselves against any threat to the balance of power. Much
blood and treasure have been paid to learn the lesson. We must not
decide now without the most searching debate and exhaustive public
explanation. to go back on these painfully trodden tracks;. and we
must never for an instant forget the effect of our decisions (whether on
economy or conscription) upon our friends, across the Atlantic. and
in Europe.
There is no need to suppose yet that the primrose path is likely
to be taken ; the first batch of savings when they are announced may
in themselves be sensible enough ; in fact, the doubt has rather
been whether they would be real. But in the mood of today the danger
of penny-wise, pound-foolish is ever present. There arc persuasive
arguments for new thoughts on defence. The least persuasive is the
argument which simply says that because an essential component of
defence strength is economic strength-as indeed it is-defence must
give way (against even the counsel of Adam Smith) to opulence. There
are other candidates for savings, if the devil drives, in the welfare
state ; and our economic ills can be cured only by policy, not by
short-sighted short cuts. The most persuasive argument is that too
much of the present defence apparatus is out of date ; but the answer
must take due heed of the high cost and long incubation of up-to-
date replacements. The most difficult and deceptive argument lathe
one which says that, fearful of " the bomb," the Russians and their
allies have now sworn off war and turned over to economic . and"
political warfare instead
No doubt the communists, like the rest of us, fear destruction and
will not court it. No doubt they are beginning, with high hopes of
success, on a campaign across the world of. trade and propaganda.
No doubt we and our allies have now to turn with fresh competitive
zest to this rivalry of wits and resources ; and no doubt what we can
fairly and safely subtract from the claims of defence should go. first
of all to. aid us in this other effort. But these are not options
between which we can now choose : defence or "competitive
coexistence." Both have to be faced.
Two questions must be asked before the wrong conclusions are
drawn from the apparent shift of emphasis in communist policy. To
the first question-why the shift ?-the. answer is obvious : the
communists do not want war, whether all-out or limited, because they
cannot reckon upon winning it ; and they cannot reckon upon winning
it because the western powers have, haltingly enough, made them-
selves too strong. The conclusion is as obvious as the answer:. the
western powers must stay strong if the communist powers are not to
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Phift back again to the threat of war-or, more probably
and insidiously, of blackmail short of war. The second
question is whether the Russians and their allies them-
iclves have suited their deeds to their more peaceful
words. The answer is that, in spite of (or indeed because
of) what seems to be a large and belated revision of their
defence arrangements which has reduced their wasteful
and eld-fashioned standing armies an overload that we
do not possess), they may by all accounts present, if we
falter; a greater military threat in numbers and in quality
than ever, with possibly an advantage in many modern
weap*ns. The conclusion, again, is obvious.
The Cabinet should not weary in well-doing, but
Ministers must be sure that it is well done. The case
has been stated more than once in these columns for a
Minister of Defence with a will of his own and teeth.
The state of affairs which has seen such vast defence
expenditure with such disappointingly small results is
clearly capable of reform. The much talked-of savings
of stocks which in modern war may be otiose can
possibly be justified. The service passion for clinging
on to out-moded things, at high expense, can usefully
be curbed. But there are' three prescriptions which, in
reefing out duplication and waste, Ministers will igncre
at their, and the country's, peril. .
The first prescription is that any cuts must make
military sense : they must be related to the balance of
power and not simply to the balance of payments, life-
and-death matter though that is as well. The second,
which springs equally from our military and tzar
economic necessities, is that no cuts shall be made
except in concert with our allies : those who talk of
fresh positive tasks for Nato would do well to start by
making the existing concert of policies and arms and
the dovetailing of defence programmes and burdens
the realities which at present they are not. The third
prescription, which is at the core of the first and the
second, is that this essential process of getting the
largest effectiveness in up-to-date joint defence out of
the lowest expenditure of money and resources must
be conducted hand-in-band and step-by-step with the
United States. Defence economies are possible, indeed
indispensable, in this " long haul" ; and the progressive
refashioning of the forces offers more savings than any
reasonable catch-crop this year. But if the
haul itself slackens, then the most hopeful feature of
our times by contrast with a more myopic past is
clouded, and we stand again in an old danger.
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Tog NEW YORK T1M8$. TUESDAY, JUNE 26, 19.SL
Excerpts. From .:...Togliatti's Re
------------
to the'._-' r uses
I "MR, J mf ? (1L01ers)-] Ibis sod
If hound flies there ehouid have enema shoat t6itt are is Test fe not true."
K been created at atmosphere of ? ' course to the wol The nall an wav 1
tTOff, consent and acceptgnce which And here that arises the development toetaM
Met night to the Central Corn-: almost Imply co-responsibility, question of the esistenob of that takes tats eoant the t
mates of the Ifaltoa Commwnist' on the part of those who today different peruse in a Sochiist, ditions already, Oshi
Party~ denounce the errors. society and of the contrlbntten the vtotorieS wbf.
Sine these Victories have era-
Rb
b
1
ev
Sepot#
mbtl
raised here the question of the
manner in which our party was
informed of the criticisms and.
In -particntar. of the precise
Comrade IlIkita 8.1 Khru-
shchev.
We roe ise that the manner.
was bad, but on the other hand,
we ask .that It be recognised
? that we were in no way re-
spensible.
P'or obivous reasons of cor-
oomtadea we could not act in
an$' other than we did.
There has been expressed In
our patty s certain critical mil-
content with regard to certain
A&PPcts and the form of the
I wish to recall to our com-
rades that the report cannot be
=constdered as something iso-
lated. It must be considered in
relationship With all that has
been said and that provides a
framework for it,
We may not be pleased with
the manner In which the de-
nunciation ? l of errors) was
brought to the knowledge of
the Communist movement in
capitalist countries;
t we must recognize that
the denunciation of the errors
send the action energetically un-
dertaken to correct them are
eminently positive acts. The
correction had to be made and
It ought to be salutary.
It will constitute a reaffirms-
tion and will have as its con-
sequence the reinforcement of
the democratic character of the
Socialist society tot the Soviet,
Unlon j.
? : The report itself does not
lve an exhaustive *Ad satts-
acMry answer to all the ques-
Uoais !bat .ripe to the mind of
Ceti who 'eaoamines it.
not only of the necessary car- make to the advance sowaru
ractions but of guarantees socialisge
-
against the repetition of simiiar : It is ttseteu, shed indeed
errors- idiotic, for pp{s to tall us
Dl rsb p of ire ! that our so poolidarity over the
per" decades with the C3onrirUu
h
The construction of Socialist
society constitutes a transitory
period between the revolution
that strikes down capitalism
lend the triumph of socialism
and the passage to communise.
There can be discussion about
hew long could and should this
transition period lastt, and It I.
equally evident that in the
course; of it there may be dif-
ferent phases and therefore
different forms of democratic
development.
to the Sooist Union them
have been different phases.
We cannot exclude. Indeed
we consider very likely. that In
the Soviet Union, while politi-
cal direction remains In the
bands of the working class and
its allies, democracy may and
should be developed in a new
way, but keeping its original
characteristics.
First Mars and Engels and
later Lenin, In developing the
theory tot the dictatorship of
the proletariat]. affirm that
the apparatus of the bourbeois
state cannot servo to build a
Socialist society. _
ken up and destroyed by the
working elms and replaced by
the apparatus of the proletar-
iat atate, that is of the .gilts
directed by the working deal
itself.
Does this position remain
fully valid today?
Who nwe in fact affirm that
progress. toirard socialism is
not only possible by democratic
means but also by using par-
Ildmentary forms, it Il evident
party of the Bov
means that we hold that every-
where in the world and in as
situations the dame things
must be done as are. dons in
Russia..
What has been done in the
Soviet Union Is not the model
of what may and can be done
In other countries.
We admit without difflwl*
that a society where socialism
is being ballt there may be
several parties, of which some
collaborate in this coastrurtlen.
we
toward amt two profound ! transforms.
tions of a Socialist mature may
cams -f=rom differ a~ _~e~rtte~e~.,
which succeed to adr rig with
geeh other in odder to bring
these transforenatiens about.
The point can be reached
and, it r am not mistaken, is
onw being discussed between
the leaders of a great country
today ruled by the C3ormnynf8ts
where parties themselves are
extinguished as a result of the
attainment of a caner" Bodal-
ist society .
Tile Italian Way Toward
Secatene
We must continue in tine
search for and execution of
our own way, of set Italian way
pf development toward sontal-
lew. Put I would like to cor-
rect those comrades who have
said as if It were solnett#In!
,nut aneatio and Segal ,
an Italian way of d
tal
pparrliadmenttairywwsy and Aoth!"
sled a wide baste of demotrox-
develapinent, the = r
way wTtigh envisages develop-
s
meet on the democratic terrain,
eaforeement of dookoeraay and
as evolution toward certain pro-
found Social refbrma.
The use of ddparliament IN an*
ovele" demo
of the wears
erotic action to obtain profound
structural rdlems? out to
realise this posribilitf eettsia
conditions must be realized.
There must be a padlament
that is truly a mirror of the
country. There must be a par-
Hawn that tuocttons, and
there must be a great popular
movement that enables the
whWthan expcan be sat Waned by
a parllsirwtit In which the pop-
Aw teems have obtained a ~Tou~f-
ticlenttYefro off ca to is at
~
~
t
~ t~ thleallpw~o+y Itt
a tl tla and to achieve d Cora so.
cialist rearWal. there must be a
great popular mesa movemosi
that produces ate the wonting masses Of d~
wonting masws.
mending from tsmeet tin
satisfaction of a peoplees' queste
are thdemands.
What and
e ebleetives that
today we should aft in car-
"IV",! -
We Intend, on the detaeceatle
and the mat dr it TM wi
tall nlalera !O ~'' .
I the eesnsatle mail of
Italian socirRy-
ilatlaa M" Arai 1
That I~, , is* inte*d' 1 arias-
tits itatisAa Society toirerd Sa
economy leer on .a gUMN
C~uueetee of the miff,, rtalli
Hein of the wet en the
natift Of I 419t
t t_.
a
t
1n Pw
Tssoobtatn s. great ititi ell
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pa, 1fi"uwa- & .!'
we denounce men a cap-
ItaUwn because. It here and
here it guarantee. was Ids"
of progress and reaps treat
advantage from it, It does not
guarantee the general progress
of the whole oatfon-~te_ohhnalucel,
We Must discuss whether
there Is not something to be
w should bathe su lk of the
aeas"
working class la- , whether
we should not extend this con-
cept not " to the
mamse of the Pouth Me=
rat of Italy, but also the
maps of the working and
middle Glass in the cities.
spsHof tmiluing but of? a~tteaavre--
ly Baking out an
soutons that Will programs
rthe
fears that these masses may
have of an alliance with the
part~r that aims at socialism.
To mate them understand that
in our country, given Its strue-
ture, the working mtdd's ofessa
of _ the antes can and d MM
make their contribution to the
building of the Socialist so-
ciety and that they will In no
way be the v tottms of D~thhe build-this boolfi
llst w lMt~ they Will couaborate but
Its ooaaagement.
Rsb"M With the I$,sam
SsdsI t Patty
With the locWat party we
bane achieved a -Vey do
VeAb
the& re~eetba a iii
aantal eonquat of ft Dallas
wortLil std the isborltt
gleam
To twis sagest we attasb
the value it a pftdpk.
The wools moe~sscMt lswppa~~rrrsed.-
ibun the of ashes
rgold be- I wont too. but
attlewd" or Vvesksbac
shoo eld not o me 'about
CM 1, 1 ft"Y
The am of the arg sotasttsa
alo the party Party Mat be the mm d to the
w
pocky to make court with an
levels it the work" pepude-
tieeK'herefore. the ertaatsat on
should be soch as to make pos-
sible and to stipulate-the sati -
at all mbto of
to .
to curable them to wer
new Unka with the nartsaa
gvas of the scuelsee. . .
ordering of Its inta~#na1',~p s
as that? It he s- reds get d e-
maaraWmed of constant sdlve
of on to t e solution re.dasci all
Greater democracy and free-
dom mean and must mean
am greater activi uson the
part of 11 m - belon to party, not only In obedience the
is diaouwioo but is serious
work, undertaken with
and Initiative, for the
tbq party to sIntroductory o Heide. "TO,
!Ott aawnt 0
I =MW
of the TWOMM" COMMON Of
the ft"tt Communist parr
With afthode wand the to tk
dtsres of .
ways toward sodaWm.l
garnet reryr is Ptsbed
There is no doubt for us the
the irst a llm"el of
f
we-M-M&B"t- ?rt_luewee w the
off~t~phls pow lie MW #sut am-
getlo and etlrodve VW' to
Wig* !way the raisbuass of
neou wort' etYsss. the ORbeT
The esperieess thus assom-
pitched Is on expo isna with-
out limits which b" Its gnat t, ants 'alas 149negatte
The strdy-at e thi!e
be a bow *M WS for . patties, to,
we ft ft.
Understand the "do" Se *
eoantrim that an M 4 ton
weetft elan and the Cseutur
am Paeffes or, coos 'has, the
r'e -made melees Of the
geestoas that arias to
cope.
wheetpatrhge~ Communist
ftruft or
toward socialism are is o
tis. .
the
courbuctim of ma 5of i t
cannot comta
the solution *ran the problems
Oat now, ft" us A"
awmisb other eswWia. ho
they in power or net.
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THE NEW YG t C TIMRS, SUNDAY1 JUNE 24, 1956. _ _. _.......,
mails Criticism 0 Khruthh
ROlf[8, Jec+ts I.t : (Fetter.)- tails outside the U. S S. R., Let us ~ od ...,...
Poflowfng are excewpts from an but which the official bistorl- meat what ask?a the s~~ons flea-
nth can-
articie in Italian by Pietro No*- ans of the Soviet Velon had grew of the U. a.-& R. Comml.-
of, leader of the .Lett-Wing So- passed over for thirty years, alit party was. It was the con-
claTlat party: as It the testament of Lenin cress of the "victors." It was
"Thus, comrades, the facts had not even existed. held in Moscow at the end of
stand. We ought to tell the Dramatic Phase of Report January, 1934. It opened with
shameful facts." with thew The report enters its most '"tempestuoua" applause for the
words Nlkita Kbruahehev con- dramatic phase when it given central committee and for
details of the purges; trials and statin.
eluded on the night of Feb. 14 executions from 1936 to 1988. It one considers that the
last the part devoted to "the From that tragic period of power of Stalin was not at that
errors" of Stalin In ttbe secret the Soviet Revolution we ai- time what It became later with
report presentk to the del.- ready knew the four trials that the war, it is evident that the
tea of the Twentieth Con- ended with a series of death massacres disclosed by Khruab-
sentences: the trial of the 111!31- obey Involve respotialbUltlss
grass of the Communist party teen" (10 R,) that were not Stalin's alone but
of the Soviet Union. (Lev B.) Kamenev, Smirnov. of the whole directive appara-
The peeessity, for thereport etc.) in August. 1836. tus. Terror, inconditlonp of time
and for the extraordinary and The trial of the "seventeen" and place not Justified by nee-
paid to
secret session of 'the congress (Gregory Ptatakov, Karl Ra- a city. was the price
was the ooaagquence of the de>s. Sokolnikov, etc.) in Jan- the Suppression of all Dam.
amazement by which the dele- uar,, 1837. ocratio life Inside the party and
gates to the Congress had been . The trial of Marshal Tuka- the State.
seized when they beard, In the tsshevsky and of a group of some of HIS LMr. Krush-
ten preceding Qsys. raining generals and nod Army open- ebev'a) heavy Ironies must
down from the cangtear plat- mandants in June, 1987. The have sent a current of we
form a whole series of critt- trLai of the "twenty-one" (Alexei through the congress delegates.
clemeQfLtbe cult of personality Rykov. Bukbarln. Krootinsky, For exam le, the phrase attr)-
and of the Stalin myth; exit- Henryk G. Yagoda. etc.) in hued to Bulg6nin: "It some-
kisses that culminated in the March, 1986. times happens that a person
Is d
nd when by hei beef as a imet-e
dr stlo affirmation of Anastss With regard to. these trials. a
J. mikeyie according to which himh
with the exception V Tnka- has no idea *here oeeS Vol end
for twenty years In Russia t t._avskv's. _!rldeh ',._M!M1 kejt. up. whether at home or In
there had not In fact..tdsted a prison.
,eollsgiats direction of the'party secret for seasons of toillptry
and of the state but Instead security, there etd.ti an aban- Saspkiion of VoreshUov
there had been diffused the dent literature, Including a Or "Stalin occupied himself
cult of the personality of Stallfi, shorthand summary of the with the absurd and ridiculous
Publication by V. a. lilted hearings. suspieton that Voroshilav was
It Is neither the last nor the it was evident from that time a British agent. A a. A -L.i mn-
!n
as
o
o
t
u
ai
least of these surprises of the on that Soviet public life had
r
V
hil
v
e ho
se to
r
Twentieth Congress that the undergone in the previous tan everything that was said."
report
d Khrushchev
socrot b
ts yews a doubts process of de- Again (after a reference to
h
1
St
b
St
l
i
i
f M
l
'
s
e
e
as
een
V. Y
Department, which on June 4 generation On the one hand,
put out a version that Moscow of the party and state machine
has not denied. It Is therefore toward forms of bureaucratisze-
through the medium of the tioa and terrorism, and on the
pros section of U. S. I. S. other kW. of the internal
(United states information opposition toward forms of
Service) that the Communist conspiracy and palace revolu-
parties themselves, represented
at the Moscow congress, have tlon.
come to know one of the most What was known at that time
serious and dramatic docu? was only a part of the truth.
ments In the Communist liters- Not even Trotsky in his vebe-
tore of the world. men
,. t accusations of Stalin, not
Yet us see In what the
even Victor Merge in his "Pam-
Met facts" revealed by y
party of the Soviet Union phlets," not even Boris Setvarin
consist. in his slashingly critical blog-
The Efret part of the report raphy of Stalin, were in comm-
is devoted to the re-evoeatloh plats possession of the whole
4f an old polemic, of the en- truth, as it is now being re-ism
the Leniasn and Sso to talin. An antagoh- ors of Stalin. vies and !uo-
:eeih'eil Qtige4lNle lsool
Committee on the Borilhrvl i`
sky. It Is not Valid for the
Politburo. -There to no doubht
that the facts cited by Khrush?
chev, and on which world opin-
ion now awaits proper deetimen--
tatlon, must have pplaced' the
members of the political office
fn's very difficult situation. out
they had been placed in posts
of responsibility precisely for
this purpose, .precisely to face
difficult aitttationo.
From the vevelatidtis of K.we
learn 'that As "guest of the
Kremlin appears to have base)
practically a manldo who, like
the hich figure aofathe dictator In
wplin trayed Hitter, "drreew p ns on
a map of the world."
K cannot contain his laugh-. ;
ter at and contempt for Stalin's
tary, genius. Of the histeri-
said military films of Stalin
he says that "they make us
sick." The snag is that des those
films, on those books, on these
~ vathere st was aC~han p
the memory of a, world.
One of tbi mein' results or
the poipde K re IN the 'fact that
the n the Cult of per.
senility no longeir makes sines,
and the fact that it was Stalin
isImpoown sed boa ore swnn
ttnely secondary
as does the
,
s cr
a
in
tic
sms o
e
otov fact that he. hinssel'f wrote the
and Mlkoyan at the nineteenth most loudatory phrases is his
Co~nng*freew). "It cannot be ex- biogra8pJfhy. as ich the t7etn-
cladedthat Ctlherfdu llolotov munists of the whole. world
and Mikoyan would have pro- hav.fed, and the fact that he
nounced no speeches at this was. never sited ? by hyper
congress if titans had remained laudatory adjeoivar. aDt su g,
alive a few mmfths more." and gifts
At last the frees! rally. _which The Rappottetar has pointed
was intended to boa 7 oa- out the difffAt31o0 bijiyjyaIs the
tion for K and the ethermeen- premis*--the aelliftisrr~et tb.-
bers of the Politburo: "Stalin
obviously had a plan to elim-
suit of the deemotld tbi eon-
inate the old members of the n
rolitburo." ettorf a d the
tbirtp
At this point K answers the action o of a nsaei who
rd,
questions that must have beenro personlffett the L'eoae
is the air: "Where were the atton id s been~t. Alydsitltt blued
o.
members of the political off toe s"~ at tw M
of the Control Committed? Why his eams report: gut !base as
did not they react id time to all they 4 oflbh the 9taitn war, et
the loss of the aof
the cult of the personality? the 00 the
do they only resat new! an lb for th f 74"111110-
Why f The answer is "the membots of and ill the course of
the poiitleal }lfnee saw these malty little have lieu
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e17- `' " writ: wnfiii l~N he
degy people y the c ef'
and vt lvedl ban eti~ts of h city,
eR sa
HS-kaows, better the&NVS dOb :tae doctrine in the decisive
the progrem that dw- Novi function of tike Marais! party:
Union bad made In the pat In the revolutionary Struggle
thirty yyeeaarns.. whining bitter for the tragrtoematfos of sect'
f
'
of IndustrWhation, win
tee', batW of education,
ning the war, becoming the
second country In the world in
ppro~dduction, cad equaling the
United state to the field of .01-
entlflo experiment mad espe-
otallyy of molar physics.
"The.ociWat?revotuuon,' he
declares, "begs been realised by
the working dam and by the
ppoooor peasant with the partial
help of the middl*ccl . of
pwant. It ha been a con.
the of the people guided by
the Bolshevik.." After this.
evidently, we can return to the
original question: Who then
guided the Boisbevlks, in view
of the tact that their con-
greases, their Central Commit-
tee, their Politburo, the eovf-
eta, little by M U9, had allowed
themselves to be stripped over
twenty years of their prerogs-
thisw of control, and of their
right of initiative?
The X report lacks say kind
of Xsaatst analysis of Soviet
uoolety, any hietorleal Temap
stsualton of the moment in
which, under the influence of
detes.nlaate objective or ssdw
Jecfw relation ail power was
transferred Into the bands of
Stalin. There 1 a Hot of !Nets,
of "shamdul facts as K es1U
An attempt Is not even mad.
to answer the question: "How
and why could then 4hinge
comme to PONT" It Was known
that the dictatorship of. the
Proletariat had been changed
into a dictatorship of the Com-
munist party.
We learn that tie dictator-
ship qI the CDmmunl.t 101:9
I had become the peHbaaf dketi.-
torahip told eithershow or We are why this
amid happen. We do net even
know bow the Soviet ruling
group boa arrived at its e010-
elusion. whether It In In agree.
went, or divided, and K.so on
what, sod why.
Vaoerhbaty ft ?eraledies
A similar uncertainty ekanl-
teats Itself in the K report as
soon as the Rapportefrr dub
with the question at temetlas.
I
l
0018-
Sty and of
0e'*10,7 o
muntsm.
f. Contfnsse~
offsatively the work cabled out
by the Cental; *=NWI00 In ..
the last few ye*re.. - 'd-'
S. Restore in ft* O* Lenfnit._
Principles of $Oo $IItet SoVNt
'democracy with the Object , of
combating the arbitrary ass=
duct of individuals who oboe
their power..
pins deostioar which, when
Stalin was alive, were madee a
hundred times by Stun and
Other Soviet leaders. Tb. aoi-
hotit~a direction- of the Path-
bum or of the Genital Coamis?
tee would certainly be prehi-
able to the direction of me but direction of throe Politbu o or of
the Central Committee there to
direction. compared to. pqrsond
or n-
nioal as It may be, thdere bask
artheless no guarantee of diem-
ocratle life.
lead LbeeR1- Siaessed
Now the whole probleaa Of
Soviet soclsty-tee
lees of the'
that blMa .ha his test.
dnoed to tea .gore for !m.
tonal demoarbtistb*i, for lpp
circulation of teeas ^ to a wit l
for politleal, liberty, a P oes+
surface of hSoviet~ .ec'M
n atnyb substianu y ? sq~at~,q, pt~~
of 01
the low labors doa?
tMAW the
:1u0v Orthe fbrmafbon of
Oft polideal initiative of
eftben, without there
over his head the aoeuotiea
being an enemy o the people,
time he tries to gee
In dealings with public
ity, to his own personal apd
independent evaluation of
path -to be followed. to m
renal the Soviet arleW
not_ only the So-called ovens
90 pe
mb US% tease: a. it -bas been taken AsO af-
L Condemn and.uprost to the der no influence of firotot
Bolshevist naamay, of which are In process of
reg#d
personality an an ' SIOX"M ego- . transformation , rata prey
traneous eo gtare~ falsm. aprrr
r QevesaO espeot to they;=
~.aa . efiom.
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Ay_, ant 1 - 14 June
Our italicized article of yesterday ?[I3 June artiola'
in Avantij "From the shock to the comic strips," dealing
wit Me Khrushchev secret report, and the-:true or false
"top secret" reports has provoked-many, and completely con-
trary, reactions from the reas. We can .forget 1 Messy ero
ro-aoverr.ent Rome Bail , and ai aiornale d' 11 A ro-
Movernment daily publishe in Ronr', who interpret our piece
as a defense of Stalin, or a solicitation to bury the ;past-.
Either they haven't understood anything, - or they have su e-
lated ignorance. It surprises us (but not too greatly)
that the Messa ero interpretation is echoed in full by
La Glustizia BaragAt Socialist daily of Rcm ?, while La
oce 'R 5 e u icana cme daily of the Italian 40 publican
'art bluntly views our article as "without scruples," and
of a.party Which places itself in the psychological position
of being led by the Italian Communist Party in the interpre?
tation of the Soviet events."
The fact is, we do not wish to defend Stalin nor cover
up his.mistakes and faults with a compassionate veil. On
the contrary, the first secret report of Khrushchev leaves
us perplexed by a basic imbalance, between the portion
which criticizes the man, the personality cult, power abuse,
the political and military errors of Stalin (a courageous
and just critique in many aspects); and the part concerning
the environment, the historical moment, the objective and
subJeotive'.conditions of the class struggle,which'.s com-
pletely inadequate or even lacking. Vainly, in the'lengthy
report the reader seeks an answer to why and how eo many.
errors and crimes were ccnmitted, An unclear distinction,
between the communist system and its practical-' operations..
results in Stalin being raised to the symbolic.value',which
Malign has in certain mystic works, in which the author
provides the words and the reader construes the meaning.
An act of courage. and clarification cannot halt .inidway;
critical analysis. cannot be one aided it one wishes to be.
politically constructive and pedagogically , correct. I
should net leave doubts as to the motivation and the .as
that one preestablishes. And the Khrushchev report (at
least the version we know), is inadequate, precisely. because
it lacks a full assumption of responsibility fbr the criti-
cism," even it the report is considered as an integral-
.part-of the overall happenings and debates at the 20th Congres*.
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As to the "top secret", report, be it true or false, we can
do no Fiore than repeat what was said yesterday. Either
France Soir and the journalistic agencies are overstepping
.the Dunes, or whoever prepared and distributed the report
is;pasaing the limits I.e. of common decent . In the long
run the only one to profit from such material would be
Stalin, the idol whom they wish to demolish: and this does
not help the presumed manipulators, or the presumed authors
of the 'top secret"? report.
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FRANCE
mite, Statesr-nt. of the Politburo of the French Com-
muaist Party on Chrushchev Report, 19 June
The bourgeois press has published a report attributed
to Comrade Khrushehev. This report, Which adds to Stalinve
already known errors, statements of other grave mistakes
committed by him, justifiably provokes high feelings along
the members of the French Ccm>aunist Party.
The French Communists, as do the Communists of all
countries, denounce the arbitrary acts of which Stalin is
accused and which are contrary to the principles of Marxism..
Leninism.
The effort of the leaders of the CPSU to undertake the
correction of the errors connected with the cult of the
individual emphasizes the strength and unity of the great
party of Lenin, the confidence which it enjoys among the
Soviet peoples, and its authority in the international labor
movement.
However, the Politburo regrets that because of the con-
ditions under which Comrade Khrushchev's report was pre.
rented,. the bourgeois press was in a position to publish
facts. of which the French Communists had been unaware. Such
a situation is not favorable to normal discussion of these
problems within the party. It facilitates, on the contrary,
speculations and maneuvers on the part of the enemies of
Communion. .
The explanations given up to now of Stalin's errors,; .
their origin, and the conditions under Which they developed,
are not satisfactory. A thorough Marxist analysis to deter`
mine all the circumstances under which Stalin was,able to
exercise his personal power is indispensable.
It was wrong, while Stalin was still living, to shower
him with dithyrambic praise and to give him the exclusive
credit for all the successes in the Soviet Union which were
due to a correct general policy in the construction of
Socialism. This attitude contributed to the development of
the cult of,.th individual and negatively influenced the
internaticngl labor' movement. .Today, It is wrong to blaz
Stalin alone for every-negative act of-the CPSU.
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Stalin played a positivl role.in a whole historic
period. With the other leaders of the party, he took an
active part in the October Socialist Revolution, then in
the victorious struggle against foreign intervention and
counterrevolution. After the death of Lenin, he fought
against the adversaries of Marxism-Leninism and for the
application of the Leninist plan for the edification of
Socialism. He contributed in great measure to the forma-
tion of all the Communist Parties.
Stalin acquired a deserved prestige which he allowed
to develop into the cult of the individual. The develop-
ment of this cult was facilitated by the position of the
Soviet Union, for a long time exposed alone to the under-
takings of a world of enemies. This necessitated an ex-
treme test of the people's strength, an iron discipline,
and strict centralization of power of the proletarian State.
These circumstances help to explain the enormous difflcultie
which the Soviet Union had to face, without justifying,"
Stalin's activities, however. He committed a number of
violations of Soviet law; he carried out arbitrary represpiv
measures against militant Comnmunistss he transgressed the
party principles, and, using condemnable methods, he did
great harm to the Soviet Union and to the international:
Communist movement.
The 20th Congress of the CPSU, during which Stalin's
errors were justifiably denounced, was the congress of the
brilliant balance sheet of the Soviet Union, which, having
achieved the construction of Socialism, has started on the
road to a Communist society. It was the congress of great
victories on the part of the countries in the socialist
camp. Ib emphasized the possibility of avoiding wars in
our lifetime and of achieving Socialism by new means. It.
brightened the prospects of the working class's march to
unity.
In order that all militants, in preparation for the
14th Congress of the French Communist Party, can profitably
discuss the problems raised by Comrad Khrushchev's report,
the Politburo has asked the Central Committee of the CPSU
for the text of this report with which the members of certai
Communist and workers parties are already familiar.
Faithful to the principles of Marxism-Leninism, aware
of the prominent role-of the Soviet people, pioneers. of
Socialism, and in close solidarity with the CPSU , the Fren6l
Communist Party will.do everything in its power to make un,
of action of the working class a reality, in order to advahc
toward a new Popular Front and a socialistic France.
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Mond" 19-14UM
"Le Monde today coz iudes thh publication of'Zhruehohev'
secret ep on the cult of the individual. The document
is, as our readers will have determined, a most important
one for understanding of these times, and, without doubt,
one of the most extraordinary texts in the history of humani't
Certainly, many of the facts that it contains were
already known in the West. It was known that Stalin had
massacred hundreds of Bolsheviks from his first hour, and
tens of thousands of adversaries of the Revolution, that he
had ignored the warnings of those who announced Nazi aggres-
sion, that during the war he deported entire populations be-
cause they could have helped the invader. No free mind
.could have accepted the fables invented to justify the de-
nunciation of Tito, the trials of Rajk, Kostov, or Slansky,
or the "doctors. plot." But, throughout the world, the Com-
munist leaders had denied the evidence en masse and heaped
abuses on everyone who questioned the profound goodness
and infallibility of the "genial father of the.people."
Millions of credulous militants, believing in the words of
their leaders, remained impervious to the slightest doubt.
Today'it is Khhrushchev himself, in a document whose
authenticity has been questioned by no:one to date, who pre-
Bents the monstrous account of the crimes and madness of
his predecessor. The minimum effect of the reading of the
report on men who yesterday fought with simple faith, should
be to lessen the attention they pay in the future to the
objections and reports of those who do not share their con-
viction..
But is it not their entire "credo" which ie shakent
Marxism was to free man from all dissensions; it has re-
salted In the tyranny of:a new peter the Great, more worried,
as are so many dictators; about the power' of the State and
his own glory than about the good of his people. Is_not
Khrushehev attaching to the individual an importance Which
the classics of scientific socialism dispute when he so
vehemently denounces the cult of the individual?
To. the extreme uneasiness of the. Communists,' of whicih
Togliatti's interview,and Thorez's silence are examples,
there must be a corresponding uneasiness on the part of
those who are not Communists, 'those who hoped that, with
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the elimination of Stalin and with his posthumous denuncia-,
tion, the era of arbitrary actions and terror would come
to an end, cannot, after reading the report, feel at all
reassured. What is denounced in the report is the abuse of
violence, not the principle of its use. And theconstant
references to Lenin, the use of the word "enemy" to refer
to the outside world, remind us that the Kremlints present
leaders have given up no part.of their dream of world
revolution. The isuccesses achieved by the USSR during the
past 20 years, often thanks to war, and thanks, in any. case,
to a superior efficiency in totalitarian methods, are of
such a magnitude that they easily hide, In the eyes of the
Soviet leaders, the Important philosophical failure that
the Khrushchev report reveals.
But whatever one thinks of this failure and of the
dreams of the new masters of old Russia,. the fact remains
that they have in their control, whether directly or.iAdirectly,
abillion human beings, and that their influence, little by
little,,is reaching into Asia and the Middle East, The
western leaders, who formerly hoped to win out over this
vast empire by their superior numbers alone, now realize
the futility of their dreams. We are sentenced to live
side by side. .
Above and beyond the Ideological considerations, the
evolution which everyone can see in the Soviet system al
ready has led to a certain interpenetration of the two
worlds. The development of this interpenetration is the
only,chance of a real liberalization of the Moscow regime,,
and in the long run, of a reconciliation of the two systems
over which humanity Is quarreling. It is for this reason
that man,. whatever his opinions and whatever distrust he.
has the right to feel, must play the game of relaxation to
the utmost. -
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Land Folk (Communist), 7 June
The other day, Land og Folk printed the version of
of Khrushchev's spe~ect o4hie c osed meeting of the 20th
congress published-by the American State Department. It
contained nothing new of significance beyond what had been
already learned from various Soviet sources. But the
Interest of American propaganda in stressing this LEhe
contents of the State Department version is not surprising.
We can,. of course, not guarantee the reliability of
the details thus made known, butthis much is incontrover-
tible--that under the strain of the Soviet people's struggle
to gain victory for socialism, very seriou s,mistakea'hav'e
been made. We regard it as' coidpletely correct, however,
that these mistakes are brought into the. open.
As the central committee of our party has already said,
the occurrence of serious errors of judgment can only be a
very painful thing for all Communists. In the truly Com-
munist view, such occurrences must without reservation be
condemned` as ,foreign to socialism.
All this, however, is only one side of the truth. The
professional blackeners of the Soviet Union and of-;socialism
who now beat their drums, do so without the :lightest justi-
fication. In the first place, what is taking place le'that
the errors are being dealt with. And in the second place,
a cons an y becoming c ear to more people that the
stu`id and unrestrained smear campaign a ainst the Sov.~et
n on which for year , has been comtme 11 au s untenable
and untrue. ----- ---, ?------ -.~..
Why., for example, was the Polketing delegation so po.ei.
tively astonished at many of the things they. saw in the.LTSSR?
Why did their natural approval of incontrovertible facts
give rise to such angry condemnation in the reactionary
press? Why does the I~AIb council Itself acknowledge the
tenability or Soviet development plans?, Church ll even says,
that the econofiic progress in the Soviet union is ors.
ward at a greater golf. far-.
bees than claimed by the USSR itself.
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Despite desperate- site. , to, wive the cold war,
rel tiow OP teriei nti i , 1r g 9d. At the present,
the cialietiq discussion in the Labor movement is becom-
ing more lively. Under -these conditions., is it not neces-
sary to discuss the socialistic experiences of the Soviet
Union in a more calm and judicial manner?
We do not doubt that such a discussion, in which both
positive and negative factors are taken into consideration
and seen in their true relationships, will strengthen the.
cause of both peace and socialism. Is thi>, perhaps, why
others wish to avoid this discussion?
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NORWAY
Fries en (Communist) 8 June
The American State Department has during the past few
days started a violent campaign in connection with the pub-
lication of the speech made by Khrushchev to a closed meet-
ing of the Congress of the CPSU.
In one way or another, the Americans?have obtained
the text, or rather parts of the text, of the speech.
And now this text is published all over the world in
the most sensational forms. The intention is obvious.
The US government is attempting in every conceivable way
to stiffen the hard front against the socialist world, 'whioh
front was built up during the days of the cold war.
This attitude is necessary in order to maintain NARY},
SEATO, and the other aggressive alliances in their old,
rigid forms. This is necessary so. that the US will be able
to maintain its "leading role,' i.e., maintain its sway
over the capitalistic world, and held this world together
under American leadership. And since arguments no longer
serve the purpose, fear is employed. The atmosphere of fear
is the condition in which the rulers of the US feel most at
home
It is clear that the text of Khrushchevts speech will,
both frighten and shock those who read' it. The speech was
made on the next to the last day of the Congress. In the
previousnine days, the Congress had dealt with a number of
problems essential to the development of the Soviet Union.
The Congress asserted that the transition process from
capitalism to socialism had been completed, and that the
country had advanced a long way toward-the next stage, Com-
munism. This had been accomplished thanks to the fact that=
in these basic problems, a correct political line hatd?been
followed, that the problems had been correctly solved, and
that the incorrect political offensives of the groups of the'-..-
Right
,, and of the Left had been repulsed..
During the whole period since 1917, including the time
when Stalin played such a dominating role In the Party and
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the government, this program has been carded fo sard by
the CPSU. And during all this time, the great efforts of
Soviet workers and peasants in the cause of sooialieollt have
guaranteed the realization of this program.
The Congress also spent several days planning the solu-
tion of future tasks. It set goals greater and more epoch-
making than ever before, goals which mean anew era for
the whole socialist development.
But at the same time, the Congress was faced with the
task of settling with the past, settling with grave errors
and shortcomings. And if the great results and achievements
made in the Soviet Union are closely connected with the
person of Stalin, so are the errors and shortcomings,. to
a high degree. The contents of Khrushchev's speech is a
complete demonstration of this.
Shocking things have occurred in'the Soviet Union.
For years they have been hidden, both from the Soviet public,.
and from the international public. Conditions which entailed
the most manffest breaches of the principles obtaining for
a socialist state, and which carried with them breaches of
the laws and rules of this state, had gradually arisen.
These conditions hit primarily the leading cadre of t1ze:Corn
ntunist Party, and therefore prevented the development of
important, positive forces in.the country.
Stalin, with his willful practices, must assume much
of the guilt for the development of these conditions. But
it is plainly indicated in Khrushcheves speech that these
conditions were exploited by elements which had entrenched
themselves in important positions, and who in their whole
attitude and work showed that they were bitter enemies.of
socialistic development.
In his speech, Khrushchev painted a rough picture of
these dark events in the history of the Soviet Union. But
the manner in which these things were presented shows that.
the Congress was an,effort to finally and definitely put an
end to these conditions.
We have previously discussed the reasons why such things
did happen, or could happen, These were the complex of cir-
cumstances arising from the heritage of tsarism and from the,
strained situation in which the Soviet Union found itself
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to 'the whole Soviet state and the building up of socialism*
when it had to solve problems which meant life or death
report by Khrushchev at the closed meetings shows the things
which at any cost must be avoided in the building and the
,struggle for socialism. Together,. these reports and the
been gained by following the road of socialism. The last
fleas or . breaches of Party principles concerning democracy
and collective leadership.
.,The great results Khrushchev was able to present to.
the ?C'ongress in his first report, and Bulganin's speech
concerning the new Five-Year Plan, show what can and has
It teaches us., first and foremost, that during future'
work in the cause-of socialism, some facets of political
development in the socialist state must be watched and
guarded in-a far different manner from that which has
hitherto been in use. Further, it teaches us that in the
Conuiinist party it is the duty of all members always to be
ow guard against even the slightest tendency toward slack-
could last as long as it did.
blow that these things could happen, and that the. condition.
For Communists all over the world it comes as a severe
way the Congress dealt with them are a basic settlement with
one period of'`development and a transition to a new period.
In sum, they mean a new era for the whole' socialistic wori~d,
and thus also for all of humanity.
The supporters of 'capitalism who are now seeking to
exploit the settlement with the past which the Communists
Of the Soviet Union have undertaken, do so in order too main-
'fain and make more severe the conflicts in the world, and
`th maintain the "iron curtain" and the atmosphere of the
cold war and the hot war.
In the long run, they will not succeed. The forces of
socialism are 80 superior that the socialist world will our-
mount the painful process which the settlement has been,'
and, sounder and stronger, proceed to the solution of its_
new tacks.
22
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BELGIUM
Le Drs eau RoLi&e .(Communist), 19 June
The criticisms. addressed to Stalin by the 20th Congree8
of,the_CPSU have deeply moved Communists in the entire-world,
We have already said that.
At the time of the 20th Congress, our newspaper dedi-
-cated a series of articles to the problems raised.
However, they did not encompass all the issues.
That was impossible because we were ignorant of a num-
ber of fact.
But even without awaiting these `act~s , the reactid>nary
press has Joyfully devoted itself to printing all. kinds off',,, .
slander and insults with the obvious aim of concealing the
Victories gained by the Soviet peoples on the path ofCom-
munist enlightenment.
Going even further, they have now begun predicting--
particularly concerning Belgium--the decline and disappear-
ance of Communism....
However the fact that 10,000 Borinage miners went on
strike two weeks ago against the closing of their coal, mines
has sufficed for these same persons to demand that the Com
etunists admit they are the organizers of.th.is labor action.
Por rsone "reduced to the simplest expression,'" as
Le Soir nde,~ndent Brussels loll labeled the Communists
a"s un y Lj
7 June the least t t can be said is that
their enemies acknowledge they have a little bit" of influ
Once left in certain fields.
As for the gossip writer of Le Peuple official Belgian
Socialist orga7, he ventured to say last S nday, "When we
denounced the granny of Stalin several years ago, the Belgian .
Communists accused us.of spreading 'anti-labor' slander."
However, several years ago this gossip writer actual3,Y
wrote a pamphlet glorifying Stalih,:whom he oompared with
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t :#a a ' pMi~AI sail y, hone ver
gre the persona hat b en.. d ire the victories
gained in the past will now multiply in an 3apetuous tempo.,
It has been written in the annals of history that ambient ,
Russia, feudal and tragically, backward, will be the greatest
power in the world, in all its dominions.
In the still-capitalist world also, where such onestly,-
conducted discussions will raise the level of the political
conscience of the workers, the confidence in their strength
and in their potentials will be affirmed.
Decline of Communism, especially in Belgium? Let us
seal Has capitalism been destroyed here? Do the Societe
Generale and other trusts no longer spread their monstrous
tentacles into the entire economic life of the nation?, Does
the owner, in all branches of industry, not push more fever-
ishly to accentuate the tempo of exploitation of the workers?
Does he no longer refuse to improve social security decisively?
,,,Has he agreed to support the expenses of the old-age pensions
better?
No:
Then Communism will remain in the soul of just and good
men, who are revolted by arbitrary actions. It will above
all remain in the soul of those whom capitalism exploits
most ferociously, the workers.
Moreover, it is not the first time in history that our
party has been declared dead, if not already buried.
However, it will alwaya be there, because the working
class--without which it cannot live--will always,be.;.there.
And it needs men who are completely devoted to its Cause.
The Communists are not the only ones? That is possible.
But they are. And their contribution to the common cause.js
not small: they are the only ones to have led'several working
classes to victory already.
Errors and'mistakes, grave, errors and great niistakes?have
been committed o the victorious path, but. the path; has bean
surmounted despite them, For' it must not be forgotten that
in the USSR there are no longer persons who wnasa fabulous
wealth by exploiting the work of bthers:
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Antaeus, hero of Greek mythology.' In fact, he only denounced
one thing: the rule in our Communist party which provides
that a militant paid by the party never may receive higher
compensation than the average salary of a worker. That is,
why-the Communists had to part company.with him, and for
no. other reason.
That it was believed that a militant worker could re-
main a militant completely devoted to the interests of the
workers while enjoying material advantages incomparably
superior to those of the workers, is obviously his business
as well as that of his new employers.
But this does not give him the right to judge the Com-
munists, nor the mistakes which they can make, nor the way
in which they correct these mistakes, nor the lessons which
such mistakes entail, nor, above all, of presenting himself
as a person seeing more clearly than the others. ,
Let us therefore leave the reactionary enemy to his
anti-Communist worries. And let us also leave the turncoats
to their throbbing desire of finding more honorable justifi-
cations for abandoning the cause than the real. reasons which
are infinitely less pretty.
If then the Communists cannot count on their enemies
to enlighten them it is not less true that they have the
worry of being clear-sighted themselves. And of being
clear-sighted in a situation which allowed three great
mistakes to have been made by a man who-symbolized his
country--the USSR--and his ideology--Cosmaunism.
This means that in order to be clear.-sighted, the Com-
munists cannot count on any but their own efforts. And
on those of workers whose only reason for existence is
to serve . the. common. interest
In this sense the interview of Comrade To liatti,
secretary general: of the Italian Communist Party, which
Dra eau Roou e begins . publishing today, constitutes a reek '
contribution to an understanding of the. problems poled.
There, is no doubt that there will be' others, on our
part as well as on the part of our friends throughout the
world.
During these discussions and at their end, great vic-
tories will be gained. Not only in the field of revolutionary'
theory, but in every-day events
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THE NETHERLANDS
De Waarheid (Communist), 7 June
Foster Dulles certainly does not hesitate to prove that
his "version" of Khrushchev's speech is a falsification and
that the publication of the speech in the US is merely con-
tributing to the Cold War.
The first incident which proves that the report is a
falsification occurred when the US State Department.indi
cated in a diffident statement that it did not vouch for
the report's reliability; the second, when London refused
to publish the fabricated report; and the third, when it
was announced that the falsified report is being broadcast
to the USSR over 130 transmitters.
The latter tops them all. The actual speech delivered
by Khrushchev is known in the entire USSR and has beer; die-
cussed by Communist and non-Communist Party members in
thousands of meetings At present, the Soviet people need
Mr. Dulles even less than before for their enlightenment,
The objective of. broadcasting falsified statements
can, therefore, merely be for the purpose-of creating con-
fusion and distrust, increasing the Cold War, and straining
.relations between the USSR and'the US. Indeed, when'the
US peacemakers show their real characters,-there are not so
.many nice things to see.
And to think that they are the ones that lay down the
law here and at whose command all kinds of party leaders,
journalists, and important people jump to attention! Is It
any wonder that many people are turning to the Communist
Party because they believe that.some things must change?
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I,U7MBOUAo
Ze ltung (Communist) 6 June
Washington -- Press reports announce that the speech,
which the First Secretary allegedly made at a secret-neet-
ing of the CPSU, ?is in the hands of the US State Depart-
ment. The speech is said to be stronger than originally
had been thought. The State Department, however, allows
that it is not quite sure whether this is Khrushchev's
authentic speech. It is not impossible, therefore, that
it is a doctored text which was published just at a time
when the eyes of the whole world are directed toward Moscow
because of Tito's visit to the USSR,
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UNITED STATES
N.Y. Time ~,
JUN z 5 1956
Foilowtnp 1o- the text of e:
statement dsaaed by CAs Commu-
yes y oa the new policy
of the Soviet Union toward
Stalls:
The publication of the State
Department's text of Khru-
ebehov's speech to a closed see-
slob of the twentieth Congress
of the C. P. S. U. [Communist
Party of the Soviet Union] has
.given a fresh impetus to the
already widespread discussions
In . our country about" the
changes taking place in the So-
viet Union.
The State Department would
like Americans to, believe that
nothing has changed in the $o-
viet Union. It hopes to cancel
out the positive impact of the
Twentieth Congress, which reg-
istered, among, other things, a
new relationship of world
forces, opening up for the first
time In history th real prospect
for a lasting peace. It hopes In
this way to keep alive the dis.
integrating remnants of the
.
cold war. share the view that the ques-
Howerer the people of our Lions dealt with, no matter how
country' who dears peaceful coo- painful and abhorrent, are ex-
existence cannot but welcome elusively the Internal affair of
the actions taken by the Soviet the CPSU. The role ,Which the
Government since Stalin's death Soviet Union has played. In
as well as the determination ex world affafte for the last forty
prsped In Khrushehev's speech years, and the defense of its
to end the brutalities and injus- socialist s~eblevemonto bay work
likes which marred a period of ors in the U. S. and other
Soviet life. countries hays made these-
The State Department wants matters puhhe . Issues every-
the American people to believe where.
that the tragedies, crimes and A basis s of bow such
injustices which took place due. uervrrdros i t detno~
Ins' the Stalin era are evils racy, justice and international-
-lam are Inherent In socialism. , ism were permitted to develop
I aft the Odmes against lino- and continue 'gaebesked for
cant p~sop~e ysrp~tta under twenty years must stilt be
SWia s l~ad~erp aIa tests; _ made by the leadership of the
I Wee t0 sosiatWfr. were ( CPSU, ft 'needs also to be made
! an intolerable hindrance to the by Marxists eererywhere. Kb-
advance of socia istn. Socialism rushchev's contribution to the
i ~( to t tF# I tlor of exposure ,of Mistakes and to
going on, MA K" OW a be-
ginning in this direction.
Asisct Soviet .Analysis
We cannot accept an analy
sin of such profound mistakes
which attributes them sgieiy to,
the capricious aberrations of a
single individual, no matter
how much arbitrary power he
was wrongly permitted to
usurp. It is just as wrong to
ascribe all the miatwkse aak
and to the full capac-
ides for the ring of ho-
manlty. It-lsqgltes an ever-ex ;
=smaimPAW, man and peerrso~
liberties, the development of
conditions which will ultimately
eliminate aithogether the use of
force in the relations between
people.
'Proud dupperier,' of Soviet
W have been and will con-
tinue to be the proud support-
ere of socialism everywhere.
We have fought and will con-
tinue to fight against the of
forts of big business to calum-
niate and vaulty the Soviet Us-
ion and other socialist coun-
. We Communists know that
socialism mud, eradicate the
inhumanity of capitalist so-
ciety. 'That is why we, above
all, are deeply shocked by the
revelations contained In Kh-
rushchev's speech.
In our opinion this speech
should have been made public
by the CPBU itself
We do not
s .~ng.e inumauai as it. was
dons wpicA should exist be.
achievements ascribe t and him all
grandeur the of tween the Marxists of various
acm
socialist progress in the U. S.
a' P_
In our oplilion the mistakes
made were pt'Imarily a result
of wrong policies and concept
arising, in part, out of the fact
that the Soviet Union was the
pioneering land of socialism
and was surrounded for dec.
ades by a hostile capitalist
world. Some of these policies
and concepts have already been
repudiated.. But the historic
objective factors associated
with these errors need to be
more fully assessed. Also re-
quired Is a further and deeper
examination of such questions
as the structure and owration
of socialist democracy is the
Soviet Union and other social-
ist countries as well an of the
new problems and perspectives
arising as the workers of other
lands move toward socialism.
This will illuminate the source
of past errors and help avoid
future ones.
We are deeply disturbed by
facts revealed In information
coming from Poland that or-
gans and media of .Jewish cul-
ture were summarily dissolved
and a number of their leaders
s Statein
conuing silence jet
leaders, requires an s$p[anatloa.
The Commugyrt party of the
U. S. has horns ear eqa ilesdp.
sions to draw from all this. Par
we are respodeible to the work-
ing clan and people of one own
country. And to them we admit
frankly that we unerlticaliy$as.
titled many foreign. and deame-
tic policies of'the Soste! Union
which are now shown to be
wrong.
We have begun to re"etamiee
countries, Including the scold-
must be based on the principles
of serving the best national Is-
tereste of. each people and the
common Interests of all pro..,
gressive humanfly; ofthequal-
fty of Parties; of the right and,
duty oft the Marxists of ail L'oun- ,
trit>deto engage In
IC of of the Marxists oiny country,
whenever they feel this is nec-
essary. Far from weakening,
this will strengthen Intonation.
al workft now a proachh w reflected g in
the DW (.The Daily Worker] as
early as last March, as well as
IF' the position adopted by the
national committee at the end
of April.
Our stand Is rooted in the pro-
Mary concern of our party for
the present and future wsltan
of the American People. As en :
Independent Marxist party of
American workers dedicated to
socialism, we seek to add our
Influence to ensuring friendship
of peoples and world peace. We
Shall continue to work fee
greater economic security, de-
mocracy, and civil rights is our
executed. This to contra rir to__y Own country, and for unity
the Soviet Union's histor c con- with all socialist-minded groups
pews.
tributfons an 'the Jewish ques- to tinsel. ppeeaccefe ful m irre ulia by ns, pe osp-ess-
Lion. Khrushohev's failures to Drop the free choice of the me.
deal with these outrases, and Jorlty of the American people.
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ljiI?3}esAa+r..Tsik._'l~erii._..ur. ils6...
AN HISTORIC. `STATEMEN'T
WE AAE CONFIDENT the overwhelsning.?ntajorlty
of our readers join us in greeting the statement of the Na-
tional Committee of the Communist Party ,on the Khrush-
chev speech.
In.ouy opinion this is an historic statement in .tie we
not only of the Communist Party of the United States but
of the 'general socialist movement in our country.
The National Committee, in its statement, outlines
Its attitude to the basic .task of building an 'independent
American socialist. movement, its attitude to the existing
socialist countries &Q 'Its attitude to Communist parties
throughout the world. Such t; statement is impor-
tant not duly for American Communists and, friends of the
Communist Party. It is important too for all Americans,
for whom the issue of co-existence and peaceful competi-
tin between capitalist and socialist countrires is an urgent
one right now, and for whom the question of changes in
American society will become more and more tnrgent in
the future. .
Many newspapers are aware of the impact the state
meat is bound to make and they ,are -already trying- to
sxnrlere'ut it. One line of attack is. that the Communist
Party is adding its voice,' as the New York Timei puts it,
to ,tlj se of other ,parties. 'But as the statement itself points
out. and as the Tines itself says elsewhere, Marxists began
to outline in the Daily Worker a new approach as far back
as the middle of March, and at its four-day meeting 'at the
end of April the National Commhte of the Communist.
Party caller! fora new look at its relations with the coun-
tries of socialism and with other `Communist parties.
The main line of attack, however, upon the American
and other Communist parties goes like -this: Their state
meats "must he regarded as hypocritical and unacceptable"
(N. Y.. Times) because they "have not given up their goal of
dictatorship, the root institution from which Stalin's and his
colleagues' crimes arose"; and that the Communists have
not'"understood that.fuill democracy and right of dissent
are eavotials for any toleiable human society."
Let's leave aside just how hull is "full democracyy"
under ca~ t llstn. and just -how sacred it the ri t of d1s .
sent. - Let's leave aside the sharRef it they
spoke out Ors the aoptary. they
lived to fret aootatlss where the
truth was abundantly availsbt, and
set they lad the char s d di" attlen
foe the monster.
It is against this background that
the present Indignation and ques-
tioning of free world Communist
leaders must be Jtadged, Each is
apparently trying to save his own
position and to prr"rve both his
power and his movement. It Is for
this purpose that they on on
Khrushchev to explain his own and
its colleague's role in StaHn'*
crimes, Even more ludicrous Is their
demand for a "Marxist explaatioa"
at what happened.
While Stalin lived these same
leaders' made a mockery of their
own Marxism by groveling before
Stalin and paying no attention to
the economic and political realities
of the Soviet Union. When, two
decades ago, Trotsky offered them a
Marxist explanation in terms of the
bureaucratic perversfas of the So-
viet Union Into a new differentiated,
daft state, these leaders paid no
attention. Today they want a
"Marxi t explanation," as Wugh
the reality were not plain to any
Person with common 800% M
alone
a kovaledge of dialectical material-
The danger, of course, is that the
Communist leaders and their parties
may be able to rescue themselves
from the obvla" political and moral
bankruptcy in which they now find
themselves.. By pretending to torn
on Stalin and Khrushchev, they may
ca IkKal some that they are no
tonne taftit Pres-
ent breast-beatige vol cries of hi-
didnatioR may. In fact, turh out to
be nothing more than, a miWwrwer
Ito f id het. t e t'
united front teens. That tastfe. we
May .real was wpd Abe i e, .
Stalin two decades ago, am Is a
standard, weapon in the Stasisiat
armory.
The tact is that Stalin vft of
much a product as a . it as
Soviet system. Once an eslbeMw
thi doctrine of dktatsssaldi , Me
can believ s we knows the, ?hdlA-
table" path of history and has ties
right to destroy all who hold ere-
Crary Mews, the kind of oerruptlee
that was Mauntsta beeohree inevi-
table. As Secretary Dine MM
Thursday, the Soviet festered has
now peosed that It Is a system at
lasvUbie abuses which paavldeo no
depwdabia means for the esmacf
of those abases." Not nnW Fria.
mVaists have understood that *41
damocrary and right of dusei~t are
essoodaia for any tolerable 4m 1p
society can it be said that they have
Named the real boa of fire W14?
rnous Stalin as.
1w as of ebb tree wand the task
is now to we the lhathehew rend,
latices as e weapon with MWO to
1
desRsey the ON"* exact null rec. s t
the vommun>rhk asovemsit and to
least the legitimate so" put",
which It hsa' captured in seas hints-
tries Into 00=tnftttVI6 democratic
fibann?is. Rhrwhckev did not want
his speech printed because "We
should lint give ammunition to the
enemy." Now that the free world
has this amnuanitia4 we most use
It. and omit welL
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T~+ 5 1956
FLxzmIT$6LLfl.
An unprecedented "agonizing re-
apPrainP". is sow VAX on every-
where within the Communist parties
of the free world and among than
who have sympathised and worked
with them. In the letter category
no figure has, been more important
this past decade than Platte Nenal.
leader of the Italian Socialist party,
which has worked hand in glove
with the Italian Communist party,
Now, basing himself upon the par-
tial text of Ifhruehebev's anti-Stalin
speech released by the State Depart-
ment, Mr. Nenni has belatedly Joined
the world call for an honest explana-
tion from Staln'# former colleagues
and present eacceasors. And be
Calls for "political Itbertr to the
Soviet Union, a truly rwvintfonary
demand to pose. balers a naked
dictatorhip,
The need for the pnseat Painful
Communist and fellow-traveler soul
searching arises from a cardinal
Out Over the past several decades
the factor Which distinguished Cam-
munvt parties from all other move-
ments was their primary allegiance
to the Soviet Union and to Stalin as
the Soviet dictator. The needs of.
Soviet foreign policy dictated the
Communist position in each country
of the world. For the sake of the
Soviet Union Communists of the free .
7attlons bee me trailers, spies. and
mabotsum They did not hesitate
awn to embrace BMW when Stalin
and Molotov embraced lint In 1539.
? In all this Ceamemnis operated
wider the delusion that they were
serving the "hlglhle" inte ets of hu-
manity. Now they most it" with
the aMttertof.kn whedge that they
r~y eeind onbr a homicidal top is 14111, p
maniac. Could their coral aad poilti- k The ass 70! the So.
cal bankruptcy be meea:.pIa n?, 1000100 for 4 'ills is sills
It is charaaterhtio of the Com.. bNd aeoondary b
may" t
munlsts' aafvetd that they now do. Claim the! >1Mtvy. . 40011.
mind a Marxist explanation at bowl aeioell-at INE.
stews orb=" could have happened, ( noun for `.tie futtms, the srsom is
Democratic forms ii the free world I being laid for ilia prsa bsi mo-
long we ft" and broadcast what racy to pass its pow* sad its pdM-
was happening In the Soviet Vnlea.I IV" ea is its children through the
A dictatorship had been set up am g, institutieai of new boarding seboeii
with >mhlmfted powers of aseerto; to train the "dins'' of tomorrow.
and a nenopdy at Wormatios and Today Communists the world ewe
political power; This dktatorddp are trying to convince us that they
fm
d
poa
span the Soviet people at have area the error of their W*yk.
enormous cost a rigantie trandbr. Tftey. metalled the ham of nd,
iiiation to wane sphere of life. ship and cooperation nil d* So.
Unebecksd by a free prosy by op-' tdaiieis but to every senate Opg.
position polltksi parties er by the " dissent is "&!!+M nj.
other mechanisms -of a denhoctatic; tI.. !et rah the rOOWM so 6% thM
0dsty. the bursssoeacy wish Tan Wwab meet to regarded as hype-
Wee dictatorship under. Stalin be- eeltloal ant unaooIptabh,
arms eeesupt In every way, tuthar- The etar al haver
lag its own we at the expense of nail given tea their goal of dictator.
as People and engaging in fnter. ! gyp, tie root hoUtutian !rem wlileh
Melee aevahy leer power, Rhea- .Slaps' and No eel gems' eehpea
shelter and Company were simply 'Ueu- They have not raoephused
the mast sucoesshhl members oCthi 'got BMWs font deeds emended Per
bureanoraay. their own personal rim W,eeht the gevust boedei cwt em
under Stalls being the rewhuts of the Soviet Union was rsspenl le end
their talents as boottldnty and eon- is 6M for the internetfonal
Odesoela$ a scutore of the despot's tmd= tifrhes World War U. They
oil. ban not. l ,4 tba eerleresoint
WW to perhaps the mc$ revel- by Stalin of illiiieen X*rWL :tj
fag about the eta. ant dtthatieeh Mr. Nand now, illy is het cam toe
within the Soviet Union is the aabrt seonartsfs 'am poLRieat 4UNOW
at tie bursaucraay to preserva its w t the Sweet Union.
Dowses end pt'iviiegi, 'Pb mate tbrr TbW AM
diet storshtp still viable the add at
Loafs is being substituted for the
Cult of Stalin. hen pe8tical .' ..t,
Is atilt auuawed, and those dsiteg to
tame before trees Of as liters.
doss! Coammaelst
3A do". they we so *namw*
Wets tarred b
th
y
e sass mum as
to outside
ar00 permitted limits m in Stem's time. but pretsa~og that
~1'totten elements.? eaM r , t o as ye desgh of that one man has somas-
? Bar all the sham show of a new changed the
tannin spirit, the "general lies 3'
specimim r at twir:seasoei ,
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The New Leader
June 25 1956
TEN YEARS OF INFIGHTING
By Franz Borkenau
T WAS Stalin's habit not to let any But what about-pia arTAbaku- and his Merida, who were not to
I of his crimes go unpunished: In mov? There is no doubt that these thus honored. The eupposediy'thrat-
each case, one of his aides had to top functionaries of the Russian Ges- ened marshals had all been close to
confess to Stalin's crime. Khrush- tapo were also guilty of countless Stalin personally and 'to Zkdanov;
chev's celebrated, speech closely fol. bloody crimes. But of these real they continue to be the manielukes of
lows this example with only one crimes Khrushchev says nothing; and the Army. Both the choice of the tor?
variation: Khrushchev cannot, how. of the innumerable crimes for which turers and the selection of the alleged
ever much, he would like to, accuse he blames them, they are guilty of victims point to Khrushchev as the
living men like Malenkov; they might only one, the torture and liquidation most important survivor, nest to Bal. .
be able to retaliate. Hence lie puts the of the "Leningrad group" led by ganin, of the group which authored
blame for his own crimes on three Voznesensky in 1949-50. Apart from this affair.
dead men, Stalin, Beria and Abe. the dubious stories regarding random Until the publication of Khrush-..
kumov. intrigues of Beria's in the Thirties, chev's slicech, there were stilt people.
The speech is one of the most out. most of Khrushchev's accusations who would not recognise theme con-
rageous falsifications of history we against Beria concern crimes not nections. But now Khrushchev expf
have yet seen, a falsification of the only in which Beria took no part itly mentions the Zhdanovites who
purest Stalinist type. Nothing could but which actually aimed at his were shot (Voanesertt y, Knasaetsoer,
demonstrate more clearly how little destruction. etc.) and expressly idantlAes himself
is actually behind the propaganda of This is true, first of all, of the with them, as he had already dome in
de-Stalinization in Russia-at least, scabrous affair of the Kremlin doe- his public speech at the Congress. At
in contrast to one or two satellite tore. Khrushchev baldly omits the the time, the opponents of-that group
capitals. two decisive factors which make this were Berta, now blamed for every-
Stalin was, of course, the main cut. affair comprehensible. One is the thing by Khrushchev, and Maienkov,
prit in all the crimes mentioned by choice of the Jersons who condom ., who until the early Fifties was closely
Khrushchev; what is strange is the "doctors' plot" investigation. They allied with Beris. For the time being,
how long it took Khrushchev to admit were Ryumin, that after Stalin's Khrushchev cannot openly attack
this. For during his visit to Belgrade death, and his boss Ignatiev, saved Malenkov, but his speech is full of
last year he provoked Tito's displeas. and reinstated with all honors by threatening innuendoes.
ure by his refusal to acknowl- Khruehchev--Ignatiev, head of the The political significance of
edge Stalin's role in the mass mur? Ministry of State Security, which Khrushchev's speech most be seen in
tiers of Communist party leaders; Stalin had wrested from Beria's con- the fact that he defends his old ex-
it was he who turned Stalin's 76th trot early in 1952 and handed over tremist friends of the Cominform pe.
birthday iast December into a aped' to Reria's bitterest enemies. It was rive while heaping opprobrium on his
tacular homage to the, dead dictator; not fat nothing that Beria saw to it moderate opponents of those " days,
and it was he who at the beginning of immediately ; after Stalin's death that that is, Beria and Malenkov. His
the Party 'Congress came out against these people were dismissed and version,` in the best -style of intra-
the cult of personality with out a Party conflicts, assigns all crimes to
arrested. The second factor sup-
word against Stalin! Only Mikoyan's pressed by. Khtu~hev eoncesns the his enemies, however, nobldeed
toss-saw
open disclosure of Stalin's real role, doctor& etleged victims--those Mar- self. In n (`actwant, on in the cc bee
of
on the third day of the Party Con, slial`8 Konev, Vesilievsky, ett?. wl%p whit h the Warring factions eo irlr ex?
greys, forced Khruehchev to denounce were to have appeared as special terminated each other.
Stalin on the last day. Soviet patriots, in Contrast to 2~hukov
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After World War 11.E a ov is mi 7nt of all those responsiLle. 'Phis
fought his Party enemies to his last propaganda now aims primarily at
breath. When they gained the upper the Slansky trial of 1952 in Prague,
hand, they tortured. and liquidated his which was based on the same and.
followers. The "doctors' plot" hoax Titolst and especially anti-Zionist
was the counter-move of the Party's inventions as the affair of the Krern-
estrecne left, Kbrushchev. Bulganin, lin doctors a few months later. These
Vasilievsky, later joined by Shepilov two affairs are not only identical in
et a!. R'his was to be the overture for'
origin and aim; it seems that the
a massacre of the moderates: Propa- Slansky people were even brought to
ganda attacks en masse began against Moscow for "treatment" to be worked
Beria, a somewhat more restrained over by the same Ryumin who later
campaign was Initiated against Mal? conducted the torture of the Kremlin
enkov, while new clouds gathered doctors. This action, Initiated by Sta.
around the head of Zhukov. who had lin, was supported by Khrushchey
been in trouble since 1946. and Bulganin. Should the revision of
At that moment .Stalin died, amid the show trials extend too far, those
the most astonishing circumstances. two would soon be sitting in the
At once the moderate wing gained dock. Hence Khrushchev's sudden do.
the upper hand for a few months, to cfsion to air these matters himself,
be defeated again through and after to shift the guilt from himself to the
Beria's fall. Finally, today, Khrush- dead, especially Beria, whose death
ehev, under the slogan of punishing he had caused!
the Beria men, seeks to obtain con- But there are other signs of rapid.
fessions from his Imprisoned oppo? ly mounting resistance to further re-
nents by torture, in order to have visions of the show trt '~" ~
them shot (like the group In Baku Albanian Party Congress and the
recently) on the strength of these Caech Party Conference are telling
confessions. eXamples: The number of confusing
Undoubtedly, to some degree R,64- rumors intended to undermine
fling of accounts is involved here be. Khrushchev's "revelations" is also on
tween various Party leaders. But the increase. One wonders at so much
these events cannot be understood as effort.
It Irhrushchev cannot resist the
to Khruahchev's secret speech must pressures of Mikoyan and Tito for
be sought in the Yugoslav props- further revisions of the legal mur-
ganda for the express annulment of circa, it is because he cannot do with.
the verdicts of all big show trials, at out them. Both, especially Tito, are
least all those after the war, and in guarantors of the good faith of the
the simultaneous demand for the pun? coexistence campaign. If Khrushchey
now openly started shooting his op.
portents, if he decisively said "No'
to Tito, he would destroy the world's.
budding faith In a change in the.
Communist world--it would be the
and of cooperation with Belgrade,
Delhi and Rangoon, of the increased
efforts in Paris and Rome, the wooing
of Asian Socialists and Western Left
Socialists.
The compromise of early 1955.
which confirmed Khrushchey's leead.
ership, rigidly limited his chances of
carrying out his revolutionary do-
mestio plans, especially with regard
to the farmers. The only field where
he could give full play to hip aggres-
sive tendencies was foreign policy. He
thus bases his prestige and power on
successes in foreign policy. For this
Tito is indispensable--and Tito ruth-
lessly insists on redemption of his
pledge, namely the revision of the
show trial, which was apparently
promised in Belgrade and which is
such a terrible threat to Khrusltch?.
How will Khrushchev escape from
this dilemma? We do not know. What
he attempted toward the end of the
Party Congress may make an ita-
pression for a while. But it is so obvi.
ouslh a with of lies that it can hardly
be maintained for any length of time.
The dead will continue to speak and
the living will continue to tremble
at their words. and even more at the
words of those who will give voice to
(hen). One may wonder bow long it
will be possible under these circum.
stances for Moscow to maintain the
facade of unshaken leadership.
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The New Leader
June 25 1956
BEHIND THE. GREAT PURGE
S TATS DEPARTMENT publication Of
Nikita Khrushchev's secret re-
port on Stalin's crimes is an event of
tremendous importance.
Though Moscow does not deny the
document's authenticity, the pob.
lisped text evidently omits a number
of passages containing revelations
particularly inconvenient for Stalin's
successors. The State Department got
the report from non-Soviet Com-
munists in an edited form which had
been circulated by the Soviet Party
for the information of the "fraternal"
foreign parties. Moscow's lack of con-
fidence in :Communists abroad is well
known, and the document was.doubt-
less heavily censored.
Significant omissions occur in the
sections dealing with Soviet foreign
policy. The document lacks details on
Stalin's relations not only with Com-
munist China but even with Yugosla-
via, although Khrushchev could
hardly have overlooked these in his
report. It is completely silent on
Stalin's bloody repressions against
foreign Communists living in Russia
in the 1930s, although at the time of
the report various liquidated Polish,
Hungarian and other Communists
were being rehabilitated. At the same
time, there .are unquestionably dele-
tions in some sections dealing with
domestic affairs. Thus, in speaking of
the Army purge Khrushchev must
have mentioned, if not Marshal
By Boris 1. Nicolaeosky
Tukhachevsky, at least Generals
Blusher and Yegorov, who have now,
judging from the Soviet magazine
Questions of History, been posthu-
mously rehabilitated.
Though we lack the full picture,
what has already, been released Is of.
.tremendous significance not only for
the history of the Stalin era but also
'for an understanding of the con-
temporary Soviet scene. In recounting
Stalin's deeds, Khrushchev, even
when he names no names, illuminates
many acts of his colleagues, Stalin's
erstwhile "close comrades-in-arms,"
who were the late dictator's aides in
various spheres. '
The style of the report is typical of
Khrushchev's major speeches. The
uninformed observer gets an impres-
sion of great candor:, At first glance,
Khrushchev seems to be unburdening
himself of everything on his mind,
revealing even those facts that are
personally disagreeable for him. But
the' apparent candor and simplicity
conceal a shrewd, calculating man
who knows his listeners and how to
influence them, twisting facts and
presenting them in a light favorable
to himself.
Khrushchev's aims in this report
imply a deep contradiction. He is try'
ing to unload on Stalin personalty sole
responsibility fol. the most unsavory
aspects of the Stalin era, especii lly.
the terror and the early defeats of
the war. At the same time, hoMerer,
he is trying to justify all of the r }sr
policies of Stalinism.
Khrushchev does not attack the
criminal nature of Stalin's major
policies, or even his criminal enedrode
in achieving them. He hits instead at
personality disorders, at Stalin's per-
secution complex. and megalomania
in the last two decades of his lfe.
These qualities, according to Khrrsh-
chev, transformed Stalin, who had
.previously rendered the Patty greaf*
services, into a half-mad despot who
ignored the views of the "collective
leadership" and began to d stroy the
most faithful Party leaders..
Khrushchev says not a word about
the terror which Stalin directed
against the Russian people and sgeinst
non-Communists. He is interested only'
in the persecution of Communists, in
Stalin's departure front "Leninist
principles" of "collective leader-
ship." Khrushchev ignores the fact
that the unbridled terror of the .1929-
33 collectivization drive, which killed
millions of innocent people, created
the atmosphere which made the, later
Stalinist terror against Communists::
psychologically possible. Khrushchev
refuses to we that the "Industrial
party," Menshevik: and other trials
of 1930-31 prepared the way for the'
"big trials" of 1936-38, and that the
torture in, GPU prisons of agrono'
foists, engineers, ochnicians, doctors
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and fishery experts was a necessary
prologue to Stalin's terrorist measures
against the "Leningrad center" of
Bukharinites, the Sverdl9vsk "insur-
rectionary staff" of Kabakov, etc.
All the facts which Khrushchev
cites deal with Stalin's persecution of
Communists (or, in the sole excep-
tion of the 1953 "doctors' plot," of
non-Communists whose patients were
top I'arly leaders). And this is the key
to his whole position: lie would like
to turn the downgrading of Stalin
into an internal affair of the Comn-un-
ist' party, admitting no "outsiders."
Judging from Moscow reports, this
effort is proving difficult: Khrush-
ehev's revelations have already gone
beyond the Communist party celh
and'beeome widely known at All levels
of the population-in Moscow, at any
rate. The facts he cited are so vivid
and convincing that no amount of
Party "commentary" can prevent peo-
ple froth drawing their own condu-
siort_~.
Khrushchev wished to strike at
'.Stalin for his persecution of Com-
`munists: in reality, the struck a severe
Wow at the terrorist basis of the
Soviet regime. Khrushchev was trying
to prove that Party "collective leader-
ship" is a sufficient antidote to the
terrurs.. unleashed under Stalin; in'
reality, he provided more than ample
justification for the conclusion that
Party dictatorship is the root of the
evil, and that it is necessary to create
representative government based on
,fundamental political liberties. .
Most important in Khrushchev's
report were the factual revelations
.about Stalin's crimes. Though a great
tfeal is distorted, nevertheless these
revelations -correctly interpreted-
call furnish the basis for a serious
history of the Stalin era.
Khrushchev revealed various as-
pects of Stalin's career from 1922.
23, when be was sharply at odds with
the stricken Levin, to 1953, when he
personally ordered the Kremlin doe--
tors arrested, tortured and forced to
confess that they were "poisoners."
But the most crucial revelations. un-
questionably, concerned Stalin's ac-
tivity during the "Yez-hovshchina,"
the Great Purge of 1936-38.
In my opinion, Khrushcleev's most
important disclosure was his publica.
tion of the telegram sent by Stalin
and Andrei Zhdanov on September
25. 1936 from Sochi oil the. necessit%
of replacing NKVD chief Henry
'Yagoda, who had "proved himself in-
capable of unmasking the Trotakyite-
Zinovievite bloc," with Nikolai
Yezhov. The telegram stressed that
the NKVD "is four years behind in
this matter" and added that "this is
noted by all Party workers and by the
majority of the representatives of the
NKVD." This telegram is a funda-
mental document which illuminates
the entire history of the Yezhovsh-
China.
The day after the telegram was
sent. Yeahov's appointment was an-
nounced in a decree of the Presidium
of the All-Union Central Executive
Committee (published in Pravda and
Izvestia, September 27, 19.36), and
the Yezhovs"na had begun. But
Stalin's role in this is less important
than the telegram's words that a
purge was four years overdue.
Why lour years, in Stalin's opin-
ion? What happened four years be-
fore the telegram was sent, in the
fall of 1932? There was a Central
Committee plenum from September
28 to October 2, 1932. The official
accounts spoke of reports on Soviet
trade, the production of consuntdts'
goods and the development of heavy
industry. The question around which
bitter struggle developed, however,
was Stalin's proposal to execute the
leaders of the Ryutin opposition
group, who had been arrested shortly
before.
'['his group! was discussed in great
detail .in the famous Letter of an Old
llol41ecik, first published in Decent.
her 1936. The Ryutin group was ac-
cused of drawing up a program.
which. wrote the "Old Bolshevik,"
"occupied altogether slightly less
than 200 pages; of these, more than
50 were devoted to a personal char-
acterization of Stalin,' an appraisal
of his role in the Party, and an expe.
sition of the thesis that without Sta-
lin's -removal neither the Party nor
the country could regain a state of
health. These pages were written very
forcefully and pungently, depicting
Stalin as a kind of evil genius of the
Russian Revolution who, motivated
by personal love of power and venge-
fulness, had led the Revolution to the,
brink of the abyss."
Stalin declared that this document
was a call for his murder and de.
manded the execution of Ryutin and
other leaden of the group as terror-
ists. But the collegium of the NKVD
asserted that it lacked the power to
do this, and Stalin could not obtain
a majority in the Politburo, where
Sergei Kirov and Sergo Ordzhoni.
kidze led the opposition to execution.
At the September 28-October 2 ple-
num, the question of execution was
laid aside. A week later, the Pre-
sidium of the Party's Central Con-
trol Commission (then headed by
Yan Rudzutak, who also opposed ex.
ecution) expelled the leaden of the
Ryutin group and a number of per-
sons connected with them (including
Zinoviev and Kamenev) but sent
them for various terms to concentra-
tion camps and isolators. '
Stalin again raised the question
of the death penalty for Tatra-Party
oppositionists at the next lalouunp
(January 7-12, 1933) in connection
with the case of Eismout, A. P.
Smirnuv and others. Again, both in-
the Politburo and at the plenum. a
solid majority was against him, led
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bY WoV. r X on3Eidlie-and Kuihy-
slieve, supported by Mikhail Kalinin
and Stanislav Kossior. Andrei
Andre%ev. Kliment Voroshilov and
even \lolotov took a vacillating posi-
tion Only Lazar Kaganovich sto-nd
by. Stalin to the end.
Thus Stalin and Zhdanov, when
they spoke in their 1936 telegram of
a four-year lag, were referring to this
1932-33 dispute and were in effect
demanding that executions of their
intro-Party opponents begin at once.
Stalin had not been idle between
October 1932 and October 1936. lie
fiat]: been systematically preparing
the Yezht vshchina since the spring of
193.3. when he set up a special
"Secret Commission of State Secur-
ity" in his personal secretariat. This
commission, kept secret even from
Politburo members, was headed by
Alexander N. Poskreby shev, whom
Khrushchev brushes off as Stalin'sal shield-bearer," but whose real
role was enormous. It included
Yeshov. Agranov and ushers. Its ac-
tual chief at all times was Stalin.
closely advised in theme matters .b`
Kaganovich, who, under his guid-
ad6e, wurkud out a new Party con-
alituliu&for the 17th Party Congress.
1716 new ax-artitution (Khrushchev
cites several of its secret points for
the first time) eliminated the Central
Control Commission, which had been
formally independent of the Central
Committee and had special rights,
.the Central . Committee apparatus,
'which legally assumed much of the
work of Poskrebyshrv's "Secret Com-
mission of State Security."
Meanwhile,- the famine of 11132-33
and Hitler's triumph in Germany led
inside the Party to demands for it
change not only in Stalin's intra-
Party regime but in the major politi=
eat tine he had followed from I928.
.2') on. At the 17th Party Con s,
advocates of such a change be( a
majority=--me the composition of the
new Central Committee revealed. The
reforms carried out in 1934x35 (the
abolition o bread-rail ling cards,
the elimination of "political sections"
at the machine-tractor stations, and,
somewhat later, the new Soviet Con-
4itution, whose real author was
Bukharin) indicate the program of
this new majority, which was headed
`by Kirov.
Though this group had. a majority
in the Central. Committee plenums'
a-d in the Politburo, it was hobbled
by fear of a sharp conflict within the
Party. Many were convinced that it
split in the Party would bring it
crisis which the Soviet regime could
nest survive. Their strategy was there.
fore to assume power peacefully in
the Party apparatus. The key role in
this was assigned to Kirov, who was
to move from Leningrad to Moscow
and take over the leadership of the
most important sections of the Party
apparatus.
Kirov was murdered in December
19,34, on the eve of his departure for
Moscow; the murder was organized
by the "Secret Commission of State
Security."
Khrushchev's remarks on the Kirov
murder offer little new in content but
they are important because. Khrush.
chew said them. He confirms the im.-
terious circumstances surrounding
the death of Borisov,'- Kirov's per.
sonal bodyguard (who was killed by
Chekists acting on orders, from Sta-
lin's secretariat). He openly admits
the existence of a number of mysteri,
ous elements in this affair and an-
nounces that a special commission
has now been set up to investigate
them. He leaves no doubt that the
Presidium of the Central Committee.
which organized this investigation.-
regards Stalin as responsible for Ki-
rov's murder.
Finding himself.in a minority in
1932, Stalin organized a plot against
the Party' majority In his personal
secretariat. The murder of Kirov, "or-
gAnlzed bn his orders, eliminated the
most important of his foes. The.
i'ezhovahchi-ia, carried, out on hi'
orders, destroyed At those who in
olce way or another were to -WA T4
the advocates of a change in the.
major Stalinist polio .line.
The terror, of course,'was not lim.
ited to the perIod of ths= Yezlson-
shchina. When Yerhov had completed
his aesignnsast, he too was sent to
his doom, and the Boris period be.
gan. Its history is even less known.
than that - of the Yezhov period.
l+l'ruehcbev's reporton proavidedtsome
vbaaluable informati 'bou- rtes -
didmi the-somas aspects of thin pe.
riod, but it requires extensive ands
sis. Then came the last years +tf
Stalin's life, characterized by .bite'
squabbles between Boris, iAra
end lost Stalin's conftdea ,
Beria's foes, headed by Poakrebp
stet. Khruehebev'gives valuer In-
formation about this period, boo,
especially concerning the soiled
"Mingrelian affair" in 1952 sad. the
"doctors' plot" in I953. Bth three
parts of Khrushchev's account essty.-_
be approached with special eaufisdt
for Khrushchev himself,. in his
was completely in Poskrebyshev'a
Camp and the torture of the wrested
doctors was applied by Ignatiev,
whom Khrushchev supports even now.
. Khruahchev'a tarpon, taken as a
whole, marks a ; vital stage in the
development o the atru gle- within
the Communist patty aid is a highly
valuable source for wading the
history of the Stalin erg. Though
Khrushchev distorts then truth in
many respects and, deliberately lies
in a number of . cases, historical
analysis enables up to uncover many
of his distort ores. And correct under.
standing of the history of the Stalin
era can be a very important weapon
in the struggle against all attempts to
preserve the regime which has given
bueh murderous proof of its inner
viciousness.
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