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Att~,chmant 2
~9l.acuaaican of IInd?rs~-ter eratiana b
PKr@ Rio erto Fs~aa setts Preae~ted b,
e N'ation~. Research Coun~i'~, S~osium
~ 0ri3P~-tAr Sao
E~OTEs Mr. Rob?rto F~:~aettu~ as a lieaa~t~ant ix~. ther Tta].ian
Nau~ry was one of, the fear surv3e~o~.~ of an at'ck agai:Let
the British at l+sa7.ta in 191;].e ~eriou~l~ inured when
~he pressed home his explosive t~crtor-boat attactc on a
ba~.cAgeg Mr. Ft?aasettc: ;gas tals~ z~a?iaaner by the Roy~t
Naaya After ae~veral yeas~s in pti? aeT af' was hoa~pi~~,ata
~Mre I~aasetto served as sn advi~sos to tho Britisher Ha
is now employed- as a cc~nsstalt~t -~o the Qf'fice of Na~-l.
Research and is stationed with ~1~~sder~aater D~aolition
Unit TWO at Little Cr~aekF Vir~.z'tiaa
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The Warfare- by undes~ater men cen be conce~.ved differarttly
by various nationsp this warfare is mostly in chose relation
with the aqu+stic and ae~nan-like naiure of the g?esop7.es of each
nations and with the distinct ?~~s of pernonal. initiativ?
and individualitye fihj.a may be the r~s~.aan why f.;he Gera~as dial
not consider the importana+a of. the cont~al of the s~ sad never
sucoa~ed in the organisation of UDT grcup~d Ip?~ this resp~ trs
could em-tertain a doubt that the aia;~ paoplQ maybes ?~sel]. vera,ed
is this fieldo ... .
In addition the UDT warfare in ever nati.oa .depe~?da t*~ a
l.srge degree on th? particular problerG~ wbi~hh ttaeir navies ~
face in regards to geographical. locations and weak poixte~ caf aaaa9
haabora~ beach?s and -rivers of their pc~te3ltial c~nea~eao Re.esa
of the conception9 this sdarfara has beEs~~ giving him dividends to
c~c,*ery nation that-,used ito Italy mey ~:~~ considc=red the nation
that achieved the most out of its D,DTt r~ during World War ~4:
The daeniriation of the McJditerran.~~ai was of vital i~ao.nce
for ~ritain9 Italy .and Frances The co.~ained ~snch and Brl.tish
l~aviea were far stronger the the Stal~~.ata. ~avy? InaufficienG
oil (6 million gala a month for the whole Navy)t obsolete and
few airplanea,~ no radar et~cos serio~aaly hatidicai3peci the ]C9~,a13.an
Navy .Gompl+~t~ ae3f +sacrifioea indivL:se.7. g~~'nt~a nigh morels
and the elevated sense of duty were thtr oaxly ric:h+os off' that Navy?
Admiral Cavag~ari' Chiefs of Navel Operati~~ne on .tlpril. 9,
.19.0 wrote a memorandum to the Govern~F.~.1t sayin~;~ ; AIt is not ~aetified
to declare a war with the perspective a:# being forced to a defe3s~:ve
Ply also an the acs~~,S? - .
Well. aarara of the aitia,ation of a z ~r pata*iotio and ideoeSistic
officers formed a kind of secret club mid enthu~~iastic~.7l.2y dreamed
up a plan. trlth which few detercained m~Fa could a~csapletely change
the outcome- of a war by striping at tho core of the ~e~ tea
power in all of the enea~r harbors with. ~i.~aul.t~anc~ous surpt~iae attacks
by assault crafts on the very first da~rs of uaatr it was not a
fantastic dre~n or Surat wox~daa They '-fault the s~.ssa~~t craft8
with scrape taken out of salvages
One was a fast explosive motor ba~~t to be 1,aun~ched 5OQ feet
from the forgot; the other teas a two magi tarpada with a cl~stsschable
war head to b? faaten+sd to the bilge l~l of wa~~ships, and launche3
near ~~sbor entrances by mother eubmarr~,a~.aa~?
After all the idea Maas not ~ newo .~.~a World ~'sr 1 on October
31a 1938 a successful action had b+~ ~;ax~S.ed by t~n~ ltat ia~
which penetrated an Auetriaam harbor aira~3ng the bat1cleship Viribuc~
IInitis~
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Crafts and plans were sub~i.tted to the Davy Depa~rtmeat is
all secrecyq "The Department did not say no but did not e~y. ~,
The aid and the faith of the Navy ~Ltn,iartrg was likew~. se very
limd.ted due to the initial restriction which I~4usaolini had imposed
an strategic Planning, sinee~ in hie opinion, the~war would h~N'e
lasted only three moxtths, - ?
Sa the .Navy Assault group was at its eacperimenta7. ata-g~ in
Jhae 19I~4, equipped with hand-made oraftts and luedequat.Q squiprnent.
The group was campoeed of about 24 val:~citeere, officex~a .and
" ciliated mere who had been selected personsl;]?y bar the argaaizer
of the Unit an the basis o# character and determi.nationo
The men, erase seleoteds' had to disappear in the anoaymau~t,~
wear civilian cl dthea, live seclnded? in Drell conceal+?d planes
along de?erted shares near La Spezia, .and ~e-alaaxeely keep the sear+st
of their miasionQ Qae essential factor far. the success of UDT
actions-ie surpr3.se. Surprise can bo obtained only be keeping
secret - techniques, P~ and prepar,atioax... ~ Publicity ie fatal to
The great enthusiasm grad the strong W31.~. power of the ~n~
xhich had to train in pr3.roitive oanditiona9 facing gxt ditfiaulties,
parserveriag after many tragic Sai].ures of equipment and plans,
also at the cast of human 13.fea, was r~rded, only after the first"
success in March 19i~., when a 10,444 ton British cruiser, the
Yank, and three mare ships were sunk in Buda Bay, Candj.aa
By 'that time it was. apparent that the ear d be much
longer than 3 months. The Navy Department" was a~tare of the poaaibf-
litiea of the, ?'exigous sad nearly forgatte~i in the silence, assault
group. Funds and help were fins~.],y granted and were wel.ee~eed
by the fs~tr n~aY ready new to seccaed in one of the most daring
and ssr>ing navel actions in hiatoay. The great opportunity
of the first days of war had been missed. l?re~,ees and plans had
to be adapted to the new situation, and the xil~. to operate paid
dividends.
In approximately t,WO years of war a fatal cif 26~~~~2 tans
of British sad Raasian ahipe~ have been sunk or ~aerious]~r d~aaged
by Italians UDT~ s. ~ warships and 27 other shi~as ware atu~c in _
various harbors in the Maditerrarteara in'l2 eucccsaful actions,
? failures, by about 140 t1DTs of which appraxim.~.tel.y 24~ died
S0~ were taken pr3.aoner of mar. 1? explosive motorboats, twenty
of the 2-mara torpedo boats and about 140 limpc~tc~ of different
types were the oust of material for the sinkinU of 31. ships.
This unbeatable balance graved how a well ~.raia~ed UDT group,
with its precise operating method, its severe txDain3.rag and ito
high morale and.physieal endaxrnant, was able to reach the ob3ective
accurately' despite the ever increasin; defena?c3 and al~nesa
of the adversary. It i-e clear that the results are great],y out
of proportion to the means emplayedo
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The equipment is e~ctretaely inerxpensive .compared with the results
achieved, also compared with the greatly increased cost of the
ether-means xhich could have been taken to achieve the same result.
Techniques, equipment and ideas ail throw the war, wars
varied to fit the ever changing situations while the enat~y xsa
getting harder to be reached, in his harbors. The assault group
was no more a n~tsteriaus secret to the British?
The surface craft ryas soon considered obsolete and usalesa,
the breathing apparatus was redesigned in accordance xith the suggestions
of the senior UDTa and the txo man torpedo xaa redeaip~aed for mare
suggedneae and praciaion, it xas improved for range and operating
depth and the mother submarine xa,s brotaght to a high dagr~ee of
efficieczey by the most skilled dcippaate3 in the Navy.
When the approach to harbors became critical for the mother
submarine, the s~r3mmer Limpetaer vas created and launched from
land, generally fmm neutral harbors, irhi].a a firing delay limpa~t
vas tinted tQ sink the' ship out in the sea rather than inside the
neutral harbors
When the Mediterranean British harbors became _near7~y impeue-
trable, the decisi'oa vas made to etz'ike enemy ships in other seas
where the surprise xauld still be in the aaaaultera favor. The
offeaM.ve vas to be carried to the coast of North and South America
and South Africa as sae]1 as in neutral harbare of Spain and
Fortugato I,iabon offered several promising occasions of success.
A little 12 ton 2 man submarines the CA, was.mads ready for
cs~oasing the ocean to New York harbor, on ttie deck of a big oceanic
submarine stationed at Bardeauxp A successful .trial was conducted
at seas Tlhe mother submarine "Leonardo Da Vinci" +~ixbmerged sad
released the C,A tuideriaater, the CA came t4 the surface splaahiag
gailyy, tvo AD',~s went aboard, turned it around, and dove again to
the deck of the mother submarine for the return his. But the xar
eras over before the little CA-could prove his menacing possibilities.
Ahother midget submarine was alas beau eotperime~-ted xith.
It wotzZd c~`r`Y ,~ UDTs xith txo tone of li^~pQta P.nd mines. This
craft xas to be carried in a mother submarine.
Other ideas were also realized: A self supporting Motor
colutr~n was sent in Crimea xith fast motorboats and midget submarines
to sink Raaaian ships on the Hlack seas A 1S,OOO ton fixasian
ship and 2 submarines were sunk therep Another tautto ca].uam wa-
s~rg$niaed, in a4ri ca3 follawin,g the troops adgaxa~ing along the
share and a British destroyer of the class Jervis xas-souk,
while trying to bombard the coashP by a fast motorboats
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Camouf~.agacl fishd.iig boats of X00 tflna began to cross the Mediterraaean
carrs-ing small. fast torpedo boats to bs laiunched against ships an the
sea,
Parachuted awisrmnera limpeteers were beinb trained for further
employmeists but developments started tco near the end of the war,
to give a~ea~a].ts and prove their usefulness s They are Worth
mentioning as Potential employment or danger,in afuture veto
at -the same time a gaup of menu, trained at out shellac water
sc,~wols Were employed vn every ship for salvage work and defense
against .British limpetebra which xere trying noW to emu]ate our
actic~rts after they had leartysd their lessoz~+so
tTDTa s Were also Ord successfully in harbor, clearance of
shipsp mines end recovering secret documents from sunken ene~-
ships, I sreant to mention the case of a brilliant underraaEer survey
made on the v~eck of tt~e British destreryer "Mohaw~t" which Bank as
the ~Cerkenalc sar~.~banic near Tunisia4 Bisre~ard3ng the enen~ air
action and offenreee Ital ran UDTa itamedfic,atelYy succeed in finding
a complete stet of secret archieve Whi,cZ;~ permitted deciphering all
British codes and fallow the Dkvy movear~ent an the sea for sttiveral
aTeeks? .. .
?.nanediately after the war, while r,~ther military farces xere
going home, the UDTs had a big ebb to r~,ccompliaho The tough mei
were again underwater= in mudc~,, atrearr;y graters of the harbors
to clear mines and obstacles. I persaa~~31y directed dome of
these opea~atians an the Adriatic sea+ f"rte Ancan?~ to Venice- and
Qracb9 clearing in few months several c~~ngerous inland canals
and harbors for allied and Italian merc,~r~ant marine traffico --
Several big German magnetic mines a~rsd tombs were racovereda
Every foot of mtddy shallow xfter Was ix~.spected and alearede
In doing this ,fob the UDTs were jralking in groupffie underwater
searching in the dark with their hands ~}nd fps?t? loo electrenia
gear ~ available to usb
In thin general revie~r of the achi~~trementa of the jtalian T~s
during World War II f I mentioned the tar~~ad.sea and the results as
well as the nature of the gallant unde~~raAter men who work in
silence and unseen; but the results xa~:re obtained in spirit of
uns~urmountable situatfonso Hundreds of difficulties were
sur2nounted several times only xith a ~r:omplete self controlo -Some
attacks failed~ofOen with success in.sight9 due to equipment failure
and subsequ,eatt extenuation of the mangy,
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The prntotype of a tyro man torpedo, vas .called "N~iale" that means
"pig"s On a day of.deapair and no other name could have been more
proper for a salvage constructed crafto .The suits tare, the
e>ploaiona in3ur+ad, the or~ygen poisoned and ro_ ~~~., but the men
never gave yxp. Some times it was better try die trying thorn fail
to reach the targeto The only reward for .the DDTs yeas the aucceas .
of the action or the laaovledge the6r had done all that was humat>ay
possiblea Hongrs and medaa.e ware awarded only after the star because
the secret imposed no publicity during #~he xar. There xaa no
money reward for these mien who ysea~ proLid_ to be treated like
other military Wien and gl.ve much rare than the average. man to hie
The fulfillx~ent of exceptional duty was -the great thing that
fi],led their heart.
~ vent to er~-phoaiae Warr that the undertrater y~rld ~
appear safe, attractive, and fascinating in peacefull rorara and
clear wet?ra filled with curious fishes and marvelous landscapes
but in war operation the under~tater world and the sea outface
aa*e a constant danger and are very ungrateful to hummi bein,gad
the.water is murkye cold, three dimentional,r dark like ink at
night; the sense of direction and the mental clearneaa of the
avsrag+e man is easily lost. The raivirozament dose not forgive
a careless fearful or nervous. man or a failure of equipment.
Crafts, equipment, canfort and inatruanex~ta are vital indispeneabl?
means of the UDTa ~to survive. Thegr must be .rugged and of high
precision to permit such surviviagb
Aa you. sit comfortably in a Warm safe roozu gau moat resaeaber
these things and think about the mete who are going to use year
equipment. You have 3n ~r panda the rem onsibility fbr the lives
of these mcn.
The American UDT Off3cera and Wien: are ready to be highly
efficient and very successful if you grill give thin the opportunity
to fulfill their task and develop their ytarfare ~.n a field which
can return a dividend to the TJ.S.A. in a future possible warn
Let me also suggest that undue publicity moat be forbidden ,ens
of War . .
ca~~a~,t
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Diatribntiats
ADPC ,. SAO (retaia)
P ? PZ~/'PM (reta~i.a)
E~ ~ route end retain)
FE ? route axed r?taia)
WE -( ute and retain)
NEA ? (route ~d retain)
WH - (route and rataff.a)
ADSO a OPS .? PLAl~3 (retain)
FDiM ? (route and retain)
FTJ&T - (route and retain)
FDP - (route and retain]
FAS - route and retain]
FDZ - route and retain)
~~ a (rOiT~.e and Teta3.x3j
TR(C).- (reta3a)
TSS d (reta3.nj 2
File. - ~
Lirector og Training
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