POLICY CONCERNING NATIONALITY AND SECURITY OF PERSONNEL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-04007A000300040007-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 26, 2003
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: May 20, 1946
• Content Type: REGULATION

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SECRET 9l 0-
WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE A SSISTZ"NT SECRETARY OF WAR I 125X1
STRATEGIC SERVICES UNIT
Washington, D.C. - - L -~
25X1
GENERAL ORDER)
25X1A NO. C
POLICY CONCERN RSONNEL
1. DEFINITIONS:
The following definitions will apply in this and
succeeding directives on the same subject.
1. Staff Personnel
a. Any person employed by, or assigned
to, the SSU and detailed to do messenger, clerical, stenographic,
reception, switchboard, supervisory, administrative, executive,
liaison, or other office duties in the Washington Headquarters of the
SSU or any other establishment maintained by the SSTJ in the
United States or abroad;
b. Any person employed by the SSTJ and
assigned as Field Representative or Intelligence Officer
to operate overseas under complete or partial cover for
the purpose of organizing or operating intelligence net-
works and reporting the intelligence developed thereby.
2. Housekeeping Personnel
a. Any person assigned to do housekeeping,
service or guard duties in any SSU establishment in the United States
or overseas.;
b. Any person employed as cook, chauffeur,
housekeeper, maid, or in any other domestic capacity in
any private establishment maintained by any SSU staff
personnel overseas.
3. Operational Personnel
a. Any agent, sub-agent, II courier, 25X1
contact, informant or other person recruited into an,
network or chain or otherwise engaged in gathering information
for or relaying it to SSU staff personnel,
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4. Consultants
a.. Persons in the United States, whether
Americans or non-Americans, who are used on a consultative
basis by SSU staff members, this type will be known as
domestic consultants.
b. Persons overseas who may be used on a
consultative basis by SSU.staff members overseas or by SSt7
operational personnel; this type will be known as overseas
consultants*
II. POLICY:
1, a. The staff personnel of SSU shall be com-
posed of native born Americans of unquestionable loyalty.
In addition, no staff member should be married to other
than a native-American spouse, or have close blood or
in-law relatives subject to the control or influence of a
foreign power.
b. Housekeeping personnel will conform also
to the qualifications stated above except that for the time
being, housekeeping personnel abroad are exempt from these
restrictions.
c. Operational personnel may be employed
without regard to nationality subject to existing vetting
requirements.
d. Consultants may be employed under the
same conditions as operational personnel, except that
domestic consultants will be contacted only after clearance
by the Security Division, Headquarters, SSU.
2. The policy enunciated in this directive will
be deviated from only on the written authority of the
Director of SSU who will consider each individual case on
its merits. The only cases that will be considered for
exception are those involving persons considered to be of
the utmost importance to the organization for whom no
competent substitutes are available and those only after
a most thorough security check.
3. For the time being, personnel presently
assigned to overseas stations will be generally excepted
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from the provisions of this directive unless specific
instructions are issued to effect termination. All new
assignments will be governed by paragraphs 1 and 2 above.
25X1A9A
Colonel, ini-antry
Director
Dist: Special
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COPY SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR
STRATEGIC SERVICES UNIT
Washington, D.C.
STAFF' MEMORANDUM 20 May 1946
NO.
POLICY CONCERNING NATIONALITY AND SECURITY OF PERSONNEL
upp ement to General Order No. 171 1
GENERAL
1. The purpose of this directive is to interpret in
detail the policies and procedures to be followed in carr In
out the provisions of the basic order, General Order No.
This policy is laid down in order to insure that only persons
whose primary as well as superior and over-riding loyalty is
to the United States and to the United States alone will be
employed by the Strategic Services Unit in positions which
permit them to know details of plans, operations, or personr rel
of SSTT. It is unsafe to assume that SSU can depend indefi-
nitely on the whole-hearted cooperation and unswerving loyalty
of non-Americans or recently naturalized Americans, simply be-
cause their sympathies and interests are parallel with our own
at the present time. The policy as established in the basic
order and this supplement is laid down for the primary good of
the SSU. It follows a general pattern adopted by similar or-
ganizations of the United States government and other nations.
It is in no way aimed at any individual and is not to be con-
strued as a reflection on the services or loyalty of any indi-
vidual. It is the desire of the SSU to make maximum use of
the assistance of all types of persons who are in a position to
aid in accomplishing the mission of the SSU, but there will be
a clear distinction made between the employees who are a part
of the staff of the SSTT and those who are used as agents in
the collection of intelligence. It is necessary that the
latter type, who will be for the most part non-Americans, be so
handled that, in the event of any change in situation affecting
their attitude toward the United States, they may be re-
examined in the light of such change and their relations with
SSU altered in the manner best suited to the interests of SSU
and the United States. All Offices, Branches, Divisions,
Desks and Missions are expected to cooperate whole-heartedly in
the application of this policy, both in letter and in spirits
25X1A
25X1A
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STAFF PERSONNEL
2. As stated in reference order, all SSTJ staff
personnel, with the exceptions noted below, must be
native-born American citizens of unquestionable loyalty
who have no close blood or in-law relatives subject to the
control or influence of any foreign power. No person will
be employed by SSU in any staff capacity without prior
security clearance by the Security Division, ~ashing Eon,
D.C., which will conduct a complete investigation covering
all candidates for employment. No person will henceforth be
employed or commence his duties on the basis of provisional
security approval. These provisions apply to staff personnel
recruited, overseas as well as in the United States.
3. Where operational necessity compels, exception
may be made to the provisions of para. 2 above in the case
of a person not a native born American citizen who is held
to be uniquely qualified for a given position considered
to be of the utmost importance to the organization, and
for whom no adequate employable substitute can be found.
Such exception may be made only in strict conformity with
the provisions of paras. 4 and _,5 immediately below.
r'~3
4. Any Office, Branch, Division, Desk or Mission of
the SSt? desiring to employ in staff capacity a y person
deemed to fall within the provisions of para. 7 above will
present evidence to the Security Division, Was ington, DC.,
justifying the need for the services of the candidate for
employment and setting forth in detail his unique qualifi-
cations. If the Security Division is satisfied with the
justification presented, it will proceed immediately with
security investigation of the candidate. If the Security
Division is not satisfied that exception is warranted on
the basis of the evidence presented, the case will be re-
ferred to the Director of the SSU, who alone will have the
authority to recommend that the candidate be investigated
by the Security Division. On the basis of its investiga-
tion, the Security Division will recommend security approval
or disapproval to the Director, SSU, who alone will have
the authority to render final decision as to the employment
of the candidate.
5. The records of all personnel presently employed
by SSU in staff capacity will be reviewed by the Security
Division, Washington, D.C., and those persons who do not
be
conform exception to the hnotrobtained. from the Director, aSSTT, for
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separated from employment by SSU as soon as possible. Each
Office, Branch, Division, Desk or Mission will present to
the Security Division not later than forty-five (45) days
from the date of this order a list of those persons pre-
sently employed who do not conform to the provisions of
para. 2 above, and for whom. exception is desired. Evidence
supporting each request for exception will be presented to
the Security Division, Washington, D.C., which will then
review the case in detail, making additional investigation
if the Security Division considers it necessary. On the
basis of its findings, the Security Division will recommend
security approval or disapproval to the Director, SSU, who
alone will have the authority to render final decision
regarding the continued employment of the candidate for
exception. Requests for exceptions under the provisions
of paras. 4 and 5 should be kept to the minimum. Any
person affected by the provisions of this paragraph who was
on the roster of the SSU as of 1 April 1946 and for whom
exception is to be requested may continue in his present
duties until his case for exception is presented to the
Security Division and final decision rendered by the Director.
6. it is recognized that the SSU has a moral obli-
gation to employees who may have served faithfully and
loyally over a period of time. Every effort will be made
to cushion the severance of employees from the organization
and to render such friendly assistance as is practical in
meeting the problems of readjustment of such individuals.
HOUSEKEEPING PERSOENEL
7. All personnel to be employed by the ~SSTT and
assigned in any housekeeping or service capacity in any SS1T
establishment in the United States will be required to con-
form to the provisions of para. 2 above.
8. It is recognized that certain overseas stations
will be unable to obtain native born American citizens
for many of their housekeeping and service functions. Per-
mission may be obtained to employ non-American housekeeping
or service personnel at overseas stations and for the
private establishments or SSU staff personnel overseas by
obtaining clearance from the Security Officer of the station
or the X-2 representative in the area if no Security officer
is assigned. Investigation in all such cases will consist
of a positive local investigation as well as check of files
of the local X-2 office, the central X-2 files in Washington,
local Security Division files if any, and, if advisable,
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native police and security files. Investigation must in
all cases be made and clearance obtained prior to employ-
ment. Complete report of any such investigation will be
sent to the Security Division, Washington, D.C. Non-
American housekeeping personnelw ll be handled and control-
led so that they are unable to overhear conversations on
classified subjects, have no knowledge of operational per-
sonnel and no access to files, classified documents, or
classified trash.
9. Guards ftre considered as a special. category of
housekeeping personnel. It is appreciated that guards
should have the qualifications of staff personnel, but it
is also realized that for the time being it would be impos-
ible to carry this out at certain stations. Even at heau-
quarters, SSU is constrained to accept external guards over
whom it has little vetting control. In view of the above
facts, it is permissible temporarily for those stations,
which cannot provide themselves with native born Americans
for guard duty, to employ as guards, personnel native to
the area concerned. Such guards will be investigated,
handled, and controlled in conformity with the provisions of
paragraph 8 above. All concerned are enjoined not to
lapse into a false sense of security when guarded by men
Who do not measure up to staff personnel requirements, It
is not to be forgotten that the local police can exert
great pressure on native employees.
CONSULTANTS
10. Domestic consultants may be former SSIT or OSS
employees, foreign nationals, or others particularly suited
to give expert advice or assistance in matters of intellig-
gence interest. Contact with domestic consultants may be
made only after prior approval by the Security Division,
Washington, D.C. The Security Division will require all
available background on any prospective consultant prior
to his use, plus an indication of the extent of the use to
be made of him, plus information on method and location of
contact to be made. The Security Division will have the right to
require time to conduct an auequate investigation to determine
the security of a prospective consultant prior to his use.
11. Oversew consultants may be perjons particularly
suited to give assistance on matters of intelligence inter-
eot. They will be considereu in all respects "s Operational
Per?onnel, etnd subject to the same regulations.
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OPERATIONAL PERSONNEL
12. It is not desirable to place any limitation on
scarf personnel in the field regarding the type and
nationality of agents to be useu in active operations,
beyond the alreaay existing policy of prior vetting of all
such persons. Regarding the methodo of handling, however,
cer tain reotrietions must be clearly understooa and uni-
veroally applied.
A. Any peroon who does not conform ULrictly to
the definitions of staff or housekeeping personnel or
domestic consultants must be considered as operational per-
sonnel. Each operational employee must be handled in such
a way that he has no access to or knowledge of SSU offices,
files or documents. Each operational employee should be
permitted the minimum of knowledge of SSU plans and personnel
necessary to brief him in his mission and enable him to
maintain the necessary operational contacts. All recruit-
in g and handling of operational personnel must be done with
these basic provisions constantly in mind. Operational
personnel may not be quartered, rationed or received in SSU
establishments where they might come in contact with SSU
staff or operational personnel other than the staff member
or cutout by whom the contact is maintained, This is
designed to eliminate the use of the so-called "Joe ?douse"
which, whatever its value as a wartime expedient, is con-
sidered dangerous as a feature of operations under present
conditions.
B. Contacts with agents who are used by staff
members for organizing networks or for expert Information
should be limited to the staff member operating the given
case or his cutout. Such agents should be given information
only on those intelligence targets which are his own immedi-
ate assignment, Such agent organizers or consultants should
not be permitted access to SSU offices or installations.
TYE PROBLEM? OF SECURITY
10. During the war events proceeded at a rapid pace
and the missions assigned to the OSS were of such an urgent
nature that in many instances the basic requirements of
good security had to be sacrificed for what was felt to
be the more important consideration of producing results.
Due to the confusion that accompanies all wars and to the
fact that we were largely insulated from the main forces
of enemy intelligence, loose security proved to be less
costly than it might have. The OSS was not the only Allied
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agency which. considered itself lax in its security, but this
in itself was and is no excuse for laxness in our present
and future operations,
14. It is generally recognized that the advent of
peace, with the consequent opening of most closed areas to
general travel, has multiplied the problems involved in
establishing and maintaining a truly secure clandestine
intelligence organization. It is also evident that the
SSU will in the f uture.have to become more and more inde-
pendent, as we will be able to receive less assistance from
most of our former Allies, and will be more concerned with
keeping information on our operations strictly within the
SSU. The organization has already undergone two metamor-
phoses in its development since the close of hostilities,
and more changes may be experienced before we have reached
our ultimate goal of organization as a secret intelligence
agency. Staff members in the field will realize that the
only way in which present more or less open missions can
go completely under cover and still maintain continuity of
action is for each station to observe increasingly rigorous
standards of security, laying the groundwork for future
long term operations as carefully as possible.
15. The regulations outlined above will serve to
assure the organization insofar as possible of the basic
security of all employees remaining with the SSU or to be
employed in the future. Regulations in themselves, however,
no matter how strict, will never guarantee security. It
remains the individual responsibility of each person con-
nected with the SSU to endeavor at all times and under all
circumstances to carry out the provisions of existing
security regulations in good faith, and to improvise when
faced with new situations in order to provide good security
with the full realization that individual lapses from
secure practices may be of grave consequence to the organi-
zation and the United States Government.
FOR THE DIRECTOR:
25X1A9A
Dist: Special.
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant
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