INTERNAL TELEPHONE SYSTEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-04007A001100030008-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 2003
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: July 30, 1956
• Content Type: REPORT

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Iwo,
BPS Memorandum to OS 30 July 1956
Requests OS to make position known relative to a secure
telephone system.
Building Security Branch Memorandum to DD/PPS
6 September 1956
Four methods of telephone installation which might be used
in a secure system are discussed. From a security stand-
point alone, tubing in concrete is the preferred method.
,#3 DD/PPS Covering Memorandum to OS 30 November 1956
Covering memorandum for a draft (not sent) setting forth
OS requirements for an internal telephone system based
on a Staff Study dated 16 November 1956
#4 BPS Memorandum for the Record 3 January 1957
An account of a meeting with BPS personnel and C&P Telephone
Company officials in which is discussed the Telephone
Company's position toward an Agency supervised system.
#5 OS Memorandum to BPS 12 February 1957
The general (as opposed to specific) security requirements
for an internal telephone system are:
1. The system must be entirely within the exclusive
control of the Agency.
2. All parts of it must be available to technical inspection.
3. The systern should be owned and maintained by the Agency.
4. If necessary to lease from a commercial organization,
then the Agency must have unlimited control of and
access to the system for whatever purpose desirable.
All employees of such commercial firm who may have
access to the system must have been cleared by.the
Agency.
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STATINTL
#6
6. The system must be mechanically, physically, and
electrically separated from all other communications
systems. I
The system must have automatic switching equipment.
8. Records of terminal allocations must be handled
as classified material and kept within the exclusive
custody of the Agency.'
9. Preliminary and tentative requirements for minimum
physical security are also included.
These notes cover a meeting with BPS personnel in regard
to an internal telephone system. Mentioned are various
figures on estimated number of lines and hand sets, cost
there-of and the method of arriving at the figure. Some
discussion is also made re the validity of such estimates.
STATINTL #7
Survey Branch Memorandum to DDS 15 March 1957
(Attached - Memorandum for the Record, dated
21 February
Status report on developments to date concerning the internal
telephone system. OS position is that of an Agency owned
and controlled system is preferable. The NES has taken the
initiative in research on systems other than that which
could be provided by the C&P Telephone Company on a rental
basis. Paragraph 12 states that the BPS will provide for
cables to be laid for a dual system taking normal expansion
int.n nnnsirirarrttinn. Tn addition to outside service comparable
STATINTL
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TATINTL
Memorandum . 3 May 1957
An account of a meeting with OC personnel in which was
discussed security requirements for an internal telephone
system. OC concurred in OS roco=endations (see item #5).
The discussion then covered the matter of the OC recommenda-
tion of exposed wires and securing instruments when not in
use. Because of the unsightly appearance of exposed wires;
the additional wear on the hand sets; the room in safes
required; and the debatable added security obtained in
locking up hand sets when not in use, OS and BPS does not
concur with OCVs recommendations. OS recommended that
installation be made by moans of concealed ducts in the
floor.
#9 BPS Letter to C&P Telephone Company 8 May 1957
States that the Agency must have exclusive control of the
internal telephone system; that the system riot be connected
in anyway with any other telephone system; the Agency can
inspect or modify the system at will and without the know-
ledge of or participation in by the company; all telephone
company employees who have access to the system must be
Agency cleared; and terminal allocation records will be in
Agency custody.
#10 OC Letter to OS 17 Ma 1957
(Attached OS-Letter to BPS for OC concurrences
OC maintains that it cannot properly concur or not concur
in the attached letter which gives-03 approval of installing
wiring for an internal telephone system in floor'ducts.
#11 C&P Telephone Company Lett?i to BPS- 2 July 1957
A reply to BPS letter (item #9) accepting the mentioned
security considerations for an internal telephone system.
BPS Memorandum for the Record 16 August 1957
A brief account of a meeting in which it was decided by the
DD/S that a leased internal telephone system from the C&P
Telephone Company would be preferable to equipment purchased
by the Agency. It was also decided that the wiring would
be installed in floor ducts rather than exposed as recommended
by OC.
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?NITEtlD STATES GOVERNMENT
FROM Deputy Dir.detog of Security (PPS), 03
SU ECT: Secure Internal Telephone System
Director of Security DA' ^ 30 Novembpx? 1956
1. The attached draft sets forth our proposed position
and specifications covering the installation of the Secure.
Internal Telephone System for the new Headquarters building.
2. It is,b?ing forwarded in draft form in the event you
are called by other offices to whom the draft has been sent for
coordination.
Please return if it I- aeets your informal okay.
25X1A9A
.Enclosures:
1. Draft, as stated above,
2. Working papers wler
thereto.
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TO Chief, Building Planning Staff, OL DAT&
FROM Director of Security
suBJECf: New Headquarters Building
Secure Internal Telephone System
1. The Office of Security will approve the installation
of an internal telephone system in the new Headquarters build-
ing, over yrhich classified material through SECRET may be
transmitted, providing that the system complies with the
following security criteria;
a. The system must be entirely and exclusively
within Agency control. It must be physically, mechan-
ically, and electrically separated from any other com-
munications system of any kind; its wire circuits must
be in cable sheaths which contain no wires used for any
other purpose; its cables must be in conduits which con-
tain no other cables, wires, or other items used for any
other purpose; its source of power must be securely sep-
arated from that used for any other purpose.
b. The system must be physically entirely within
the guarded and controlled area of the building. No .
telephones connected to it should be installed in, and
no wires or other parts of it should pass through, the
areas of the building where uncleared persons are per-
mitted access, such as the contemplated ground floor
public corridors, uncleared pool, uncleared training
area, custodial force rooms, cafeterias, or detention
rooms. No connections to it should be installed in any
snack bar or other non-Agency activity which may be
permitted to be located within the guarded area. No
connections to it should be installed in any reception
area to which outside persons come for any purpose;
necessary calls from such reception areas must be by the
standard (or ordinary, or other) telephone system to
points whore, if necessary, the messages can be relayed
to other points.
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c. The system must be protected from any possibility
,of tampering by unauthorized persons. Terminal boxes,
openings in the conduits, and any similarly sensitive
points in the system must be protected by adequately con-
structed metal coverings equipped either with locks or
with a positive alarm system.
d. The main distribution frame and switching
equipment must be located within the guarded area irk
a room constructed as a Secure Area and established as
a Restricted Area with Agency guards controlling access
to specially identified authorized personnel.
e. The system should be the automatic dial types
with no manual operators.
f. The maintenance, servicing, and repair work on
the system should be either by fully cleared Agency per-
sonnel, or by such necessary outside workmen who have
been security cleared on the same basis as Agency per-
sonnel. Should emergency service or repair work be
necessary by other than fully cleared personnel, such
personnel should be under continuous surveillance by
Agency personnel, who are familiar with the operation
of the system.
g. The system should be equipped with devices which.
give audible notice to the users whenever authorized
repair workers, or amy other persons, are, working on,
or have out into a line for any purposeo
h. The telephone instruments for users of the
system should be clearly distinguishable from other
telephone instruments by means of different color
and design, and should be located apart from and out-
.bide the normal hearing range of the location of other
telephone instruments.
i. The system must be so installed to allow
..technical security inspections of all parts at ary time.
3. Regulatory procedures for the use of the
telephones of the system should include a means of
satisfactory identification of the users to` each other,
and also should include instructions that, although
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conversations up to'and including SECRET are permitted,
no names, information, or data greater than ordinary
sensitivity will be mentioned in such conversations, and
that it will not be used for any material or data for
which any type of clearance other than, or in addition
to, the regular Agency clearance is necessary.
2. It is understood that equipment is available for
acquisition, and that the planned design of the building will
permit an arrangement, which will meet security requirements.
If any of the security, factors mentioned herein affect the
possible use or adoption of the system, it is requested that
these features be directed to the Office of Security for re-
solution.
.Sheffield Edwards
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 STATI
STATINTL
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Bys lit) ovan er
STATINTL
STAFF STUDY
TELEPHONES, INTIRNAL SI=RE SYSTEM
FOR NEW HEAPr 1JART IRS BUILDING
An internal non-cryptographic telephone -system for the
new Headquarters Building that will meet the requirements of
EO 10501 and the security standards of the Agency for trans-
mission of classified ,information.
ASSUMPTION
Access to specified areas of the new building will be
rigidly controlled and restricted to fully cleared personnel
with all visitors physically identified and constantly under
escort.
FACTS BEARING CN THE PROBLEM
HO 10501 provides that intra-Agency transmission of classi-
fied material shall be governed by regulations issued by the
department or Agency insuring a degree of security equivalent
to that outlined for inter al,ency or department transmission.
With re to this outside transmission, the ~:cecutive Order
provides that Top Secret material shall be transmitted preferably
by direct contact of officials, or alternatively by specifically
designated personnel, by State Department diplomatic pouch, by
messenger-courier system especially created for the purpose or
by electric means in encrypted form.
With reference to transmission of Secret material, the
Executive Order provides that this may be transmitted within
the United States by registered mail or protected commercial
express.
An independent internal telephone system is available
through outright purchase of equipment or possibly through
leasing.
the Communications Assistant, Building
Planning a a , a vises that a survey recently completed indicates
that the number of instruments necessary for a dual system is
approximately instruments; 40 per cent in the conventional
system, 60 per cen in the internal system.
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DISCUSSION
In the course of this survey, it was the opinion of alb.
interviewed that an internal telephone system does afford a
measure of protection to conversations not available under
the conventional telephone system. There was a groat divergence
of opinion, however, on whether this additional protection is
enough to warrant transmission of classified information, the
extent of additional safety features necessary to make an
internal telephone oystem,adequately secure for' transmission
of classified information, and the extent of disclosure that
could be justified.
It was the concensus that a safe telephone aystem.must
meet the following requirements:
a. Be electrically, mechanically, and physically
separated from any other communications system of any kind.
_ ..b. Have no circuits in the same cable sheath with
any other communications system.
c. Have terminal boxes and other sensitive points
adequately protected.
d. Have main distribution frame and switching
equipment located in a secure area and completely isolated
from any other wiring terminal points,
e. Have no instruments outside guarded areas or
accessible to uncleared personnel.
f. Be serviced only by fully cleared personnel.
g. Receive frequent-inspection and periodic spot
checks by technical personnel.
h. Have the instruments distinctively colored for
ready identification.
The type of system, installation, and operation to justify
approval for transmission of classified information is an
extremely controversial subject.
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I STATINTL
STATINTL
STATINTL
STATINTL
Visible lines and cables have the advantage. of ease of
visual inspection, but the disadvantage of being easily
identified, located, and tapped. Concealed linen with cables
and conduits are difficult to inspect:; however, the disadvantage
is compensated for by the difficulty of uncleared personnel areas
fic4t them
locatingdbpt It would be tampering with
tamper
guarded d and patrolled.
with such lines without?leaving evidence.
Security/AEC, stated that at one time considera-
tion-was given o- a very limited safe telephone system in the
new building for communication between the directors, but had
vigorously and successfully been opposed by Security as not being
desireable. He added that no detailed study of such a system
had been made.
I r, ommo Security/NSA, stated that his conclu-
sion that NSA had a safe telephone system was based primarily
on the fact that it was an independent system accessible only
to cleared personnel, was operated in a guarded area,, and that
there was a rigid control of visitors to areas where the lines
and phones are installed. He indicated the isolation of the
system from other communication systems and control of personnel.
for access to and servicing the system were the prime considera-.
tion, not the type of equipment. He indicated their experience
with exposed cables, which theoretically are desirable because
of alleged ease of inspection, was unsatisfactory. Exposed
wiring soon led to -a "spider web" of wires which were impossible
to monitor. He cited an incident where some radio equipment
with a pair of rabbit ears was accidentally deposited in a
hallway with the rabbit ears straddling the exposed line which
picked up and broadcast a telephone conversation. In his
opinion, the difficulty encountered in tampering with cables
.in conduits compensated for the frequent periodic inspection of
exposed lines. NSA safe telephones have been approved. only
for information through Secret. Because lines connecting to
the outside are to be in the minority, they are the ones to be a
distinctively colored to warn the employee he is not using of the
cleared line* tated as the Signal Corps Army installs safe telephones, they have no
personnel problem regarding the use of cleared personnel or
personnel. costs.
Comoro, has submitted specifications for a STATINTL
secure a ep one system (see Tab A). He recommends exposed
wiring for ease of visual checks. He stated that in engineering
being comps
also advocates jacks for all telephones so the instrument can be
stored in a safe when not in use. This latter recommendation is
based on the fact that microphones and transmitters can easily be
placed in a telephone instrument and have even been'built into
the instrument? 5j"'1
an independent system, consideration should be given o
tible with the cryptographic telephone device.
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STATINTL
1STATINTL
STATINTL
STATINTL
STATINTL
9
I __J
submitted a prospectus see Tab b), on a comp -Le cLLa-L elephone
system that incorporates security cable (see Exhibit A), and
which is protected by an-alarm system from and including instru-
ment to main frame and switchboard. He averred that this system
is practically tamper proof.
nnrh of
th Frere dis-
cussed with a was f ar with the
system an avora y prosse with it, but felt that
s cost was not justified. He felt that probably some type
of cable protection would be necessary where lines passed
through unrestricted areas or through areas where access to the
cables could be had without being observed, such as washrooms,
closets, etc. agreed with of STATINTL
NSA that as long as tie system was totally independent of any
outside system, was wholly confined to guarded and controlled
areas, and was frequently inspected, it mattered little what
type of equipment was used. In his judgment, no system was
100 per cent tamper proof and most effective protection was
the restriction of access to areas served by the installation,
Mr. Stanley E. Holden, Physical Security, Department of
State, advised that they have approved the installation of a
50 instrument Stromberg-Carlson Dial X system with alarm cable
for the offices of the various directors. However, because
access to the proposed new Department of State building is not
to be restricted or controlled, the system has no approval fsx
transmission of classified information. The same type system
has been installed in field installations and where access to
the area is restricted, they have approved the phone transmission
of classified information through Confidential.
The problem of a secure telephone system was coordinated
with 0SI through .the Security Officer, OSI, who
submitted recommendations for an entirely independent system.,
with no outside connections, and confined exclusively to the
guarded area of the now building.
A survey by Mro , Building Security
Branch, Physical Security Division, is attached hereto,,.(see
Tab C), which along with other matters recommends the use of
conduits in concrete or Q-floor as preferable to visual wiring,
because the difficulty of tapping vi res in conduits more than
compensates for ease of visual inspection of exposed lines,
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]STATINTL
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Frank Knight, C&P Telephone Company, was interviewed and
stated that he could make no commitments for the DO Telephone
Company with respect to installation and maintenance of ar3
internal system for the Agency until the Agency was ready to set
up requirements. He indicated an understanding of security
factors and a.desire to cooperate in the development and installa-
tion of any security safeguards. (Note: Costs of installations
and maintenance would depend upon a determination of the number
of instruments required?)
STATINTL Mr. Office of Logistics, believed that the
C&P Telephone Company would favorably consider installing and
operating an independent telephone system to avoid jurisdictional
labor disputes.
STATINTL
STATI NTL .
STATINTL
indicated that
his company is equipped to sell and install a complete dial
telephone system utilizing phone equipment manufactured by
Stromberg-Carlson and incorporating a security alarm system
manufactured by his company. He also indicated that his company
had expressed an interest in a leasing arrangement if an
acceptably contract for a sufficient period of time to amortize
the equipment could legally be drawn up. He indicated that
his company would be interested in installation with or without
maintenance control.
Mr. f OSI indicated the General Telephone of
Chicago s prepared to install and lease telephone equipment.
The possibility of Agency negotiating with the Signal
Corps of the Army for installation and/or maintenance of an
independent telephone system similar to the system used by NSA
was not pursued.
Mr. stated that he believed the C&P Telephone
Company, selected to install and maintain an internal system,
would require a proportionately higher rental on the equipment
used on the internal system as it would not be producing any
toll revenue. Any special safety features would also entail
extra installation and maintenance charges.
Using a loose estimate per instrument including installa-
tion costs,,, supplied by
reveal that the cost alone of installing aI-I~instrument
telephone system with security alarm would` eeaap'proximately
$19200,000. Because of alarm features, the maintenance charges
would be greater than on a conventional telephone system.
2J "3
STATINTL
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Dual telephone systems Would necessitate additional expenses
in building construction to allow for duplicate ducts, separate
frame rooms, etc. Operating costs would also be higher because
of additional personnel necessary to service two systems.
Gas tubing, alarm cables, alarmed equipment and instruments
from a security standpoint would be highly desireable; hth ever,
in a large system., the cost of^operation-and installation would
be extremely high. In addition, alarm systems probably would
not be practical as there certainly would be frequent phone
changes which would. activate the alarm system and render it
ineffective. Even if zoned, there probably would be large areas
a good portion of the time where the alarm system would be
inoperative.
It has been proposed that the secure phones use jacks in
order that the instrument can be removed and locked in a safe
when not in use. This suggestion apparently is predicated on
the fact that a telephone instrument is vulnerable to a third
wire tap and also is adaptable to concealing a microphone and
transmitter. With respect to the third wire tap, this hazard
is greatly diminished because the instrument will have no outw
side connections. Regarding the threat of compromise by use
of microphone and transmitter, this is a security hazard not
unique to a telephone, but a potential source of compromise
in any area where classified information is discussed. From
an operating standpoint the universal use of jacks on the tele-
phone undoubtedly rev uld not be practical.. Such a system would
mean that any calls to an employee while he was on leave would
not be answered and would result in numerous complaints to the
telephone office.
CONCLUSIONS
A telephone system having connection with outside lines
will not meet Agency security standards or the requirements of
EO 10501 for transmission of classified information..
No telephone system appears to have the degree of security
equivalent to that required by EO 10501 for transmission of Top
Secret information.
An internal telephone system completely independent and
isolated from outside lines operating entirely in contro~led
areas and accessible only to cleared personnel wouldafford
protection equivalent to that required for the transmission of
Secret information as required by E0 105019
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STATINTL
The system should be large enough to handle the major
portion of internal calls.
An internal system of a limited number of phones would
result in a considerable saving; however, from a security
standpoint a general system large enough to handle all
internal telephone requirements has advantages.
Unless safe telephones are generally available, employees
will be tempted to discuss classified information over the
regular telephone system by use of "double talk" paraphrasing
and, as one person commented, using "pig latin.11 Many phrases
currently in use over our present telephone system would fool
no one remotely interested in the Agency as, for example, the
terms ' A safe internal telephone
system would greatly diminish the hazf4rd of compromise through
inadvertent disclosures in telephone conversations, also the
mixture of unclassified information with classified information
would be desireable.
A reduction in toll charges will result through limitation
of telephones having outside connections; however, it is believed
that the sum so saved will not be substantial.
There undoubtedly will be a saving in processing time and
a reduction in the man hours in personal trips or preparing
memorandum involving classified matters. This saving should be
substantial.
The expense of an entirely alarmed telephone system would
be neither justified nor practical,
RECOi1 ,1DNDATION
It is recommended that the Office of Security approve an
internal telephone system for transmission of classified
information through Secret, provided the system is electrically,
mechanically, and physically separated from all other communica-
tions systems; that it has no circuits in the same sheath with
.any other communications systems; that it has terminal boxes
and other sensitive points adequately protected either through
an alarm system or locks; that it has its main distribution frame
and switching equipment located in a Secure and Restricted Area
which is adequately guarded; that it has no telephone instruments
outside guarded areas or accessible to uncleared personnel; and
is serviced only by fully cleared personnel; that, even though
classified as Secret or below, it will not be used to discuss
the names of Agents, penetrations, highly sensitive operations,
and related matters; and, further, provided that it is technically
equipped to give notice to the users when workmen, repairmen, or
others "cut in" on the lined
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no i~,; nC31;i.L'w . kv~:l'i s r3iJC`':r:~`l';s Ga3G':~ b'#'4 CX+,m
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 Approved For Release 2003/05/15 CIA-RDP78-04007AQW 100030008-9
o. 12ox-.:lna,l block uLLocation rccordc bout be kept
11ritixin the c,.c ! n vcs c:u tccd anti control of the A erlcy, and.
zuz,t be Ilcuidlo 1. au clariaifiu(t material.
3. Piiycical rlocllrity xcc~ttlxtia is Ys'ur> xo1aUin to the buil(ir1
co,'1.,,trruction are an folowsc
a. The main and a.ritclanC ccu.ipuerrt,
curd all aub-,Ormc ra; i.;,J',rcr1t, rcUOt bo loc?ilteru in rOO: 3 coz:z)lctely
1;C paste front theoc uocii for e'Inilaar? cgllip'L:CnC; of the r:or=1
tclcp'houcs oyotdm, wad f oa rooc3 u3Gr1 foz rely other jaurpose.
Such ara In alloulu be eonct.1'ucted as : ec~ure Arcae.
b. The :nth-fire^w roonn (9.t bcitlg; under; tooc- that
two will be snccesrary on each floor) should be in a ver-
tical line conrtituLing, in cf ect, tut Secure Arocu rising;
from Groune, Floor to i'JA7 Floor, '.with s:l.eoves provicl.cci to
;ms-3 the vertical run of cebiea from floor to floor.
AU cables cn. rrirc of the syctcu nuot be in
Cable chcatllo which con ain no Ifirc3 u.ced for any othor
paxl)o:fc. The run of such cables: from L,'a-in distribution
3'r-n;:. o and owitiCiaLi4 f LII,puc)Y7~ ro :1, to the nub-frwne
xoo s, to corridor torr,Linca boxco, and to orgy t:ozuinoi
bole . wit :in off ice 7raoriz , :sllatirl r1 be Vu=j-Z cozmlotrly
cep ata%a (f:Mz- ::or. xl telephone crvico or other 1r.~xoo)
conllu]:t d or ducto entirely vlt'ain the controlled area of
the builclinu, anti prcfcrably in metal conduits bur-loa in
the concrete of the C"aor.
i AU 1)%Z2-hole.' o or other nano of acco of to to
conduits; or ciucto either cliould be provided with locked,
cover n, or iirov1 ion vaao for tacks, vcl d:in. the covers in
I'lnco.
e. AU ter.:rinail bo:cca nu,--t be r;oparrate from the
terminal boxes of t 1w, nor:-.a t.^Iophonno systom, WA mist
be of mot al and a< t+a;Prcl with epprevocl lockin eciu3.l~ n .
4. The fe eColnt; ,)liyol,cal security rec. .11romonta are not
all inc3.usaiva. There uUU. voi:,la,ia to be worlcoci out the manner
is wh.1.ch individual nct1?'1;,cute are to be connec4od to the room
ucratllal, bo:lcu, end the 1.;u nncr in which the 1rlree in? the office
roo e, and the inetru n en t s t;lw,s: el ve s, can b o made necure ? It
is not conty )laced, however, that the wires arithin irZlviau l
office roorne Will ru W,3,?.-0u a ar y floor tiuct:e.
~. :security I"'e6 ors relating to the use of the C. fut ly
or to tho installocion. Of ;;tatiotu . or. c 4ceiona. on the syrtcm,,
35-f.
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 Approved For - eF lase 2003/.05/15.:, CIA:7j:ZDP78-04O07AJ1100030008-9
cannot yet be stated ceniplotoly, HoMver, the following pro..
lininary reguirononte cnn be seta
a# No telephone Instnunents cnn be inatalled in, nor
can wires lending to them pass through, tiny part of the
building whore uncleared persons any have uncontrolled
r,.ccoes, such as the ground floor public corridors, the un-
cloarod pool and traini.n area, the roots of the custodial
force, guard posts,,'cafctorir+ss snack brut, or receptionist
rooms,
be Extensions on nay individual lira must be limited
to the extent that whore they axe other than irithin lino of
sight in an indivIdanl office room, they aunt be equipped
With an exclusion key device to enable the principal uoor
to cut off any extension in any outer or ceparato room,
That is, a line cnn run into a p:.incipalas office, and be
extendod. frost there to. the office of a secrotary in an
ndjoining room, so that the secretary can nnswacr the call
for her principal; but when the principal is notified of
the call, he must be able to cut off the extension into his
se cretary a off icon
OSsPhySD/SB:JFMCT/frg
Distributions
Origo & .+ Addressee
1 ., NB File
3 1 y7 ng
For Director, Ciifico of Coin iunicatiouu
3 ;b
ppro\jed? For Release 2003/05/15: CIA-RDP 78-04007A001100030008-9
 Approved For el ease 2003/05/15 :CIA-RDP78-0 97A#W 100030008, ~,
MEMORANDUM FO ' M, : 'z;r~
SU ?j'CT t NOW Ffe adq'Uat QIrS Buiici,.riang
Secure a.rttera3ral a'o- lepltc~aas; Syatv.ia
3MY
On 3 ?la 19574 Acting C . 25X1A9A
u
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 STAT Approved For Release 2003/05/15 : CIA-RDP78-04007AO01100030008-9
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
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 Approved For R 9ase 2003/05/15 : CIA-RDP78-04007AQp4100030008-9
8 MAY 1957
Colonel E. Coring Bliss
Assistant Vice President
Security Control Officer
Checsapcslkc & Potomac Telephone Co.
Washing;ton 25, D. C.
On several occasions during. the past few months we have
consulted with you and some of your people in connection with.
telephone matters which we must take into account in planning
for our now building.
You will recall our interest in a completely isolated in-
tornel telephone system r3.csi;ncd to moot the needs of this ;envy.
L 'a have not yet been able to rases a final decision on to the in-
clusion of such a system, and it will be come time before we have
sufficient Information as to the need for end the use of the
facility.
In the meantime we feel that certain policy considerations
of particular importance to us should be clearly defined and their
acceptance by your Company indicated in the event on internal tele-
phone system is Installed by and rented from your Company. The
policy considerations out which we are concerned are as followst
The internal telephone system :rust be entirely
within the exclusive control of the AUcncy and . must
not be in any way connected with any other telephone
communication system. The Agency must control access
to the syatez,, can inspect or modify the system or
any part of it at any time without participation by
or the necessity for disclosure to the Company. All
employees of the Company who work on or have access
to the system must be subject to,Agency security
clearance procedures. Terminal block allocation rea-
orda must be kept within the exclusive custody and
control of the A ency and handled as elacsii'ied, In-
fornmtion. }
31.
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