LET'S CLEAR UP THE CONFUSION ABOUT NATIONAL DEFENSE NOW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000900030062-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 24, 2002
• Sequence Number: 62
• Publication Date: March 2, 1960
• Content Type: SPEECH

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Statement by
Senator Stuart Symington
Prepared for Delivery, Senate Floor
LET'S CLEAR UP THE CONFUSION ABOUT NATIONAL DEFENSE NOW
On February 19 last I presented to the Senate a set of
facts regarding our relative defense posture; and followed with
some recommendations for action.
Four days later, the Minority Leader commented at some
length on my statements, and made some of his own.
The Senator from Illinois did not refute any of the facts
which I presented.
No new facts were brought to light by him; and no disagree-
ment was expressed with my recommendations for action.
The Minority Leader said he wanted to do some "ventilating'
on the subject.
According to the dictionary, to "ventilate" means to let
air into a chamber. In this instance, the air was neither new
nor fresh, as his many allusions to past history made clear.
To me it seems.far more important to do now what is
necessary for the future instead of attempting to assess blame
for the past -- but the record should be accurate and consequentiv
a few clarifying comments are necessary.
I do not plan to take the time of the Senate to go over in
detail the at times entertaining speech of the Minority Leader;
but there are a few points in his talk which may have confused
those seriously interested in this grave problem. Therefore, I
address myself briefly to these points.
(EXECl`T1 '^_
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The Minority Leader called particular attention to the
following sentence from the broadcast of the President on
February 21:
"As for long-range ballistic missiles, from a
standing start only 5 years ago we have literally leaped
forward in accomplishments no less than remarkable."
The Senator from Illinois stressed the phrase "from a
standing start." He asserted that, so far as he had been able to'
discover, "in truth and in fact, it was an effort made from a
standing start in the missile field."
I now present some facts so that, at least inadvertently,
he does not make the same error again.
One should not overlook the fact that the present AdminiE-
tration had been in office for more than two years when it "leaped
forward" from a "standing start."
Nor should one overlook the fact that one of the first acts
of the present Administration was to cut $54 billion from the
previous Administration's last budget preparation; and that some
of the money thereby eliminated had been programmed for accelera-
tion of missile development.
And here are some more facts.
In 1955, there was no "standing start" as regards the
creation of a hydrogen weapon, essential to the current ICBM
weapons system.
Actually this basic development preceded 1953.
In 1955, there was no "standing start" as regards the
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development of the rocket engines now used in the ATLAS. They
were transferred from the NAVAHO missile system, which had been
under continuous development since 1946.
Nor was there any "standing start" in 1955 as regards the
research and testing of long-range ballistic missile components.
They had been started in 1946, and later sharply emphasized with
the MX-1593 project, otherwise known as the ATLAS.
Nor should one overlook the following statements made in
1957 by General Bernard Schriever, the able officer who has beet
in charge of the ATLAS program:
"By 1950, Air Force development agencies felt that
enough progress had been made in these areas Lrange-paylcad-
accuracy-re-entry problems . . . ' rthat7 by 1953, impending
solution of most of these problems allowed design and
initial construction of ATLAS vehicles."
In addition, attention should be directed to the following
testimony of Dr. Herbert York, Director of Defense Research and
Engineering of the Department of Defense, on January 13, 1960,
when appearing before the House Appropriations Committee:
"MR. MAHON. When we admit that we are behind in the
intercontinental ballistic missile . . . We have admitted
that; is that not true?
"DR. YORK. In terms of numbers of missiles only; not
in terms of development."
The same point was testified to by General Schriever before
the Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate on February 2, 1960.
Both these authorities stated that we are behind in the production
of numbers of missiles, but not behind in the development of said
missiles.
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What, therefore, is the primary reason for the current lag?
No one was producing ICBMs back in the 194.0s or early
1950s. The state of the art had not progressed to that point,
either here or in the Soviet Union.
The present relative disadvantage of this country in the
ICBM field arises from one cause and one cause only -- the refusal
of this Administration to put up the money for any real production
after the missile had been developed.
It is no secret that different decisions in recent years
could have put us in the position of having more ICBMs now, and
in coming years, than the Soviets are estimated to have for those
same periods.
It is not a question of a "standing start" in 1955; rather
a "slow down" in the years since then.
Now, I turn to another error in the Minority Leader's
presentation of February 23.
My floor statement of February 19 listed a number of
facts and identified them as such, with the labels FACT NUMBER 1,
FACT NUMBER 2, etc., through FACT NUMBER 10.
The Minority Leader apparently went through these listed
facts. When he came to FACT NUMBER 8, that one seemed to disturb
him.
In discussing the latter, he said:
"Now, Mr. President, with me a fact is an actuality-
A fact is a reality. A fact is an irresistible, stubborn
thing. And there is no qualification of a fact. Two and
two make four. That is a fact. Stand on your head - it
is still a fact. Go to Hongt Kong or Singapore, or the Fs_Ji
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Despite that exhibition of mathematics, calesthenics,
and world travel, the Senator discovered no error in my statement.
At this point, I read into the record all of FACT NUMBER 8,
not just the part read into the record by the senator from Lllino:_s:
c
"General Thomas Power, Commander of the Strate?icets
Air Command, stated on January 19, 1960,
could at that time destroy 95% of all the United States
retaliatory forces if they had 150 ICBMs and 150 IRBMs
and if we had no airborne alert.
"The Soviets already have large numbers of IRBMS and
soon will have large numbers of ICBMs."
The Minority Leader did not question that General Power
was the Commander of the Strategic Air Command.
He did not question the accuracy of General Power's
mathematical computations, or that the statement had been made
on January 19, 1960.
He did not question or even mention the significant fact
in the second sentence, namely, that the Soviets have large
numbers of ICBMs and soon will have large numbers of ICBMs.
Those are the facts I presented under the title FACT
NUMBER 8. He does not challenge them.
What then is his point?
The Minority Leader said there was more to the General's=
statement, and indicated some of it was in "fine print."
I agree there was more. All of it is well worth reading.
Therefore, I ask unanimous consent to have placed in the
record at this point the complete speech made by General Power
on January 19, 1960. ~~t ))
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There was no "fine print" in our copy of this speech.
According to the Minority Leader, the numbers used by the
General were the result of a "mathematical calculation."
What is wrong with that?
The Senator himself used mathematics when he stated: "T,ro
and two make four. That is a fact."
General Power was making an important analysis. He was
bringing out the reasons why he felt so strongly about an airborne
alert.
We do not have any air alert now -- and there are no
adequate provisions for one in the 1961 budget.
The Minority Leader then dwelt on a February 7 radio bread-
cast from Communist China, one that quoted various items which had
already appeared in U. S. newspapers.
It seems to me that it would be more constructive for the
Senator to support some of the recommendations for shoring up our
waning relative strength than lament the fact that people around
the world now know what most of us know here at home.
It is not the efforts of the six Senators mentioned in the
broadcast which are undermining our position abroad. Rather, :_t is
the fact, published voluntarily by this Administration, and
therefore only too well known to the Communists, that we are
deliberately letting them get ahead of us in long-range missile
and space control.
Without taking time to clarify some of the curious points
made in the Senator's speech, such as his assertion that in 195k
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"we had resolved the difficulties in Korea," I do feel it
necessary to correct a few more of the major errors.
The Senator from Illinois said:
"I think we should be cautious indeed how we drape
the Sun, the Moon, and the Stars with all the figures,
and even threaten to release the intelligence figures
unless we get an answer. The threat was later withdrawn."
Does the Senator know of someone who threatened to release
intelligence figures?
He should have known that ICBM ratios are not classified
information and that such ratios are not even a part of intelli-
gence information; because the intelligence community computes
only the data which goes into one side -- the Soviet side -- of
the ratios.
Any comparison with our ICBM picture does not become a
part of the intelligence estimates.
If he did not know about the non-classified nature of such
ratios, he must have been shocked when the Secretary of Defense
made his 3 to 1 pronouncement more than a year ago.
Moreover, he could have learned the facts about the non-
classified nature of these ratios had he taken the time to read
my talk on February 19, which talk he criticized on February 23.
The facts are brought out clearly in that address.
For the Senator's information, and for the information of
anyone else who might be inclined to rely upon such inaccurate
hearsay, I now quote from the record of the open hearing of the
Preparedness Subcommittee of February 8. Admiral Burke was the
witness.
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"SENATOR SYMINGTON. Admiral, I agree with you that
we ought to keep all information which would help the
possible enemy to ourselves. But in a democracy, the
people have the right to know all information which will
not help the possible enemy.
"Last January, a statement was made by an official
in high position that we were rapidly closing the missile
gap. I stated that that was not true and added that if
the erroneous statement were not corrected, I would give
the percentages showing how we planned to have the missile
gap widened. The Secretary of Defense corrected the other
high official's error shortly thereafter. He said we
planned to allow the Russians to get a lead of 3 to 1 in
ICBMs. * * *
"We get a lot of classified information here in the
Congress and to the best of my knowledge since I have been
on this committee, there has never been a leak out of this
committee. But public testimony by top officials has left
the incorrect impression that the Russians are doing less in
ICBMs according to national intelligence given to the
Congress this year, as against what was given to the Con-
gress by national intelligence last year.
"Therefore, as long as my friend, the distinguished
senior Senator from Connecticut, has raised the point, I
will state that the national intelligence estimate in
missiles available for launching against the United States
has increased considerably this year as against their
launching capability as given us last year.
"If that assertion is disputed, I em going to release
the percentage of increase for this year's estimates over
last year's estimates as given us by Mr. Dulles. I con-
sider it most important that, if any information is given
the people, it should be the correct information."
Further along in the talk of the Minority Leader last
February 23, he referred to a speech I made in Montclair, New
Jersey on March 14, 1952.
The Senator quoted from that talk. In so doing, he seem:
to have taken the part he quoted out of context. This was
probably done inadvertently, since he used a newspaper story
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as his source rather than the actual speech.
Consequently, at this point, I ask unanimous consent that
the full text of my talk on March 14+, 1952 appear in the reeor3.
(INSERT B)
The point I was making then, and consider at least as
valid today, was that we should check the costs of all government
operations carefully, in order to obtain maximum return for the
taxpayer's dollar.
I made no exception with respect to our defense establish-
ment; in fact, urged that military appropriations requests be
checked as carefully as other appropriations requests.
Not having the full text of the speech before him, the
Minority Leader apparently thought the word "checked" meant
"limited" or "held down," rather than what the full text shows --
namely, "examined."
My point was, and of course still is, that all government
budgets should be reviewed carefully; but the final decision
should be made on the basis of what is necessary for adequate
national security, and not on the basis of what will satisfy a
fiscal objective.
As previously stated, this is not being done today.
This Administration has placed fiscal consideration ahead
of our national security requirements -- and the record so proves.
Let's look at part of that record.
First there follows testimony from military witnesses before
the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee during the past few weeks:
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"MR. WEISL. . . Are you now proceeding with all the
ships and aircraft that were approved by the Congress in
the fiscal year budget 1960?
"ADMIRAL BURKE. No, sir. . . Due to the fact that -re
were short of money to pay for all of the ships in the
previous programs, we deferred five ships, three D.LG's, :1
research ship, and the conversion of a cruiser to a missile
cruiser." (February 8)
"MR. WEISL. In other words, you were given Zmoney7
guidelines as to what plateau you must not cross regardless
of how much you needed? . . . Those guidelines were money
limitations, isn't that right?
"ADMIRAL BURKE. Yes, sir.
"MR. WEISL. Not requirement presentations?
"ADMIRAL BURKE. They were money limitations, yes, sir.
"MR. WEISL. But the fact is that three fleet ballistic
missile submarines recommended were denied, long leadtime
requirement for six additional fleet ballistic missile
submarines were denied, and seven conversions were denied.
Is that correct?
"ADMIRAL BURIE. Yes, sir, I did that . . .
"MR. WEISL. But it wasn't because you thought it should
be done, but because of the guideline and the money limita-
tion. Is that correct?
"ADMIRAL BURKE. Yes, sir." (February 8)
"SENATOR JOHNSON. . . . Do you think the budget includes
all the money it should have for the Polaris submarines and
missiles?
"ADMIRAL BURL. Not now, sir, because we have completed
our tests on the Polaris submarine. . .
"SENATOR JOHNSON. The answer is 'no."
"ADMIRAL BURL. Yes, sir." (February 8)
* if * * * if
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"MR. WEISL. . . if you had used the money that you asked
Congress to give you and for which you pleaded so eloquently,
you wouldn't have had that gap, isn't that true?
"ADMIRAL BURKE. Yes, sir; that is correct.
"MR. WEISL. Obviously you cannot make up for that
leadtime now. Once leadtime is lost, it is lost forever, is
isn't it?
"ADMIRAL BURKE. Yes, sir.
"MR. WEISL. Are you fully satisfied with the funds in
the 1961 budget for the Polaris?
"ADMIRAL BURKE. No, sir. . ." (February 8)
"SENATOR SYMINGTON. Then the statement continues
general Maxwell Taylor': 'The speedup of the Atlas
intercontinental program during the past 2 years was
denied, although production could have been doubled.' Is
that correct?
"GENERAL TWINING. Production could have been greater
than it was, there is no question about that; yes.
"SENATOR SYMINGTON (Continuing to read): 'This would
have lessened the Soviet advantage in the missile gap
during the critical next few years.'
"GENERAL TWINING. We could have had more missiles."
(February 9)
"SENATOR JOHNSON. Is it not a fact that you, who bear
this responsibility, foresee a situation under present
programs where the forces you must lead would be inadequate?
"GENERAL POWER. In my opinion, yes." (February 2)
"SENATOR SALTONSTALL. Last year, if I remember right'-y,
or possibly the year before when you last testified, it
wasn't a question of money. It was a question of time and
manpower, was it not?
"GENERAL SCHRIEVER. No, it was a question also of
money, because you had to make commitments to go ahead,
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particularly on the base construction area, and in certain
production actions that would have been necessary. * * * I
have advocated for the past 2 years a larger missile program
it (February 2)
"MR. WEISL. As head of the SAC forces, are you satisfied
that the plans we have today are adequate to perform your
duty?
"GENERAL POWER. For the future?
"MR. WEISL. For the future.
"GENERAL POWER. No." (February 2)
"SENATOR JOHNSON. Is there money in the 1961 budget
to provide an adequate deterrent, in your opinion?
"GENERAL POWER. To the extent that I have described
the problem for an airborne alert; no.
"SENATOR STENNIS. As I understand it, you gentlemen
consider this C-707 is a necessary step, and no break
should be allowed, and this cutback should not stand; is
that correct?
"GENERAL POWER. That is correct." (February 2)
Now let us look at the testimony of a civilian expert,
Robert Sprague, before the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery.
In his testimony, Mr. Sprague, former Co-Chairman of the
Gaither Committee and Chairman of the Boston Federal Reserve Bank,
stated:
"We can see that the idea that an increase in spending
for survival will bankrupt us is, to put a plain word on it,
silly. The question is whether we are willing to use a
small fraction of our increased wealth for the defense of
our way of life.
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"All of us know how the total budget has always
been prepared - except in shooting wars. First, a budget
ceiling is determined. This rests upon a judgment about
national income, taxes, and Federal debt, and the most
recent levels of Government expenditures.
"Once the total budget ceiling is set, the more or less
fixed costs of domestic programs are subtracted. What is
left is available for national security. Only in time of
shooting war do we begin by asking: 'What do we need?'
The rest of the time we tailor the defense program to fit:
the budget. The ceiling is usually an arbitrary judgments
figure."
All this testimony, plus a great deal of additional test.rnon?r,
confirms my assertion that what this country will have to defenc
itself against possible Communist aggression is what the budget
officials want, not what the military requirements show we need.
And recently, not only have these fiscal experts acted to
impair our defense efforts, but they have joined forces with those
who continue to mislead the public about our relative strength.
As example, only a few days ago, the Director of the Bureau
of the Budget stated:
"There is some hysteria about the fact that we are
behind the Ruzssiane in some respects but if all the factors
of outer spa,2e activities are put together . . . we are
actually ahead."
This is an incredible statement. It is in direct conflict
with what Dr. T. Keith Glennan, Director of NASA and also one who
reports directly to the President, said on January 27:
"It is clear that the Soviet Union continues to hold
a substantial space lead in the eyes of the world. It is
eauall,r clear that this lead is based upon the possession by
the Stir? ets of one or more re] isrle :Launch vehicle systems
having perhr.-,)6 twice the thrust of our own first stage
booster rockets."
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The Director of the Bureau of the Budget's statement is
also in direct conflict with Dr. von Braun's testimony of
January 29. At that time the latter said:
"If the Soviet continues at its present pace, it
would require 5 years to catch up and then only if the
United States goes faster than present plans permit."
The Budget Director's statement also denies what Under
Secretary of State Merchant said last January 20:
"By being first to achieve success in space flight,
the Soviet Union has reaped great prestige. Continuing
achievements have made this gain an enduring one . . . "
In other words, the chief bookkeeper of this Administra-
tion now states that all these other top officials are wrong --
and his fiscal judgment reflects itself in the budget.
Under these circumstances, how can the American public be
anything but utterly confused?
It is tragic, and it is also very dangerous for this
misinformation to continue, because it affects the most vital
aspect of our defense picture -- namely, our relative position as
against the Communists in long-range ballistic missiles.
Let me remind the Senate again that on January 13, 1960,
the Secretary of Defense testified that Secretary McElroy last
year judged the coming missile gap as "3 to 1" against the Unitryd
States.
Secretary Gates went on to state that at the present time,
however, a new intelligence method was being used, and that as a
result the figures had changed. He said:
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"This new intelligence estimate has narrowed the
differences. * * * The great divergence based on
figures testified to in years past narrows . . . "
And a few days later, the Secretary of the Air Force
even went so far as to say that the new intelligence method had
adjusted the picture to such an extent that he wasn't sure
whether there would be any ICBM gap. He said, "If there is a
gap, . . . it will be considerably smaller."
Those were the statements made to the American people.
A few days after the statement by the Secretary of Defen,3e,
however, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency testified
before the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee.
His testimony was that the number of long-range ballistic
missiles the Soviets were expected to have ready to be launched
against the United States exceeded the comparable estimate basec
on last year's intelligence data.
Based on this year's figures, and this year's method of
analysis, the Soviets are expected to have a capability even
greater than the 3-1 lead Secretary McElroy forecast last year.
And until this matter of ratios has been officially cleared
up, the American people will continue to be confused.
On February 23, I suggested a method for dispelling this
confusion, namely, let the Administration publish now what it is
estimated the Soviets will have in coming years in ICBMs capable
of launching against this country, compared with our like
capability -- in ratios.
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I stated then and I repeat now that in this way, "without
divulging any classified information, and without telling the
possible enemy anything he doesn't already know, the American
people would have the truth."
I again ask that these new ratios be published now, as they
were last year.
In this way the American people will have the facts, and
then they can make their decision based on the truth.
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