WEEKLY INDOCHINA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000300190001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 6, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 14, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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,C 0 N T E N T S
SUMMARY .
. . . . . . . . Page 3
INDOCHINA . . . . . . r . , Page 6
GENEVA CONFERENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 11
The Communist Position
The French Position
The Vietnamese Position
The British Position
SOVIET BLOC POLICY . . . . . . . ... . . . Page 14
Communist China
Viet Minh
Soviet Union
FREE WORLD POLICIES . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 17
France
Great Britain
Australia and New Zealand
India
ru ma
Indonesia
e
Thailand
Japan
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SUMMARY
In'Vietnam the government was paralyzed and might soon
fall apart Bao
Dai and most of his cabinet were in Europe.' The sovere gn
intervened by remote control spasmodically--and with devas-
tating effect--in Vietnamese affairs back home. Among other
things, he turned over the national police to a semi-gangster
organization which has been providing him with half a million
dollars a year out of its annual take from Saigon gambling
concessions.
Meanwhile, political instability is increasing in Cam-
bodia and Laos as a result of recent Viet Minh military
operations in those two countries.
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It is against this background, somber for the West, that
the Geneva Conference has taken up the Indochina problem.
The Communists, who planned it that way, proposed a
settlement which seemed to reflect confidence and unity in
their ranks and whose end result, if it should be adopted,
appeared liable to be Communist control of all Indochina.
The Viet Minh put forward a plan calling for a cease-
fire throughout Indochina, to be followed by a general
political settlement calling for: (a) French recognition of
the sovereignty and independence of the "Democratic Republic
of Vietnam," Khmer (Cambodia) and Pathet Lao (Laos); (b)
eventual withdrawal of all foreign troops from the three
states; (c) formation of advisory committees to carry out
elections; and (d) the establishment of coalition govern-
ments in all three states.
This approach accords with other indications that the
Communists are trying to induce France to accept a simple
cease-fire agreement, without political guarantees. A
settlement on these terms would reduce the likelihood of
American or UN intervention in Indochina and would make it
easier for the Viet Minh to infiltrate Laos, Cambodia and
still-free areas of Vietnam and to gain control of the
central governments of all three Associated States.
The free nations sought a common ground for opposing
the Communists, but as the week ended had found none which
would support united action.
France held the Communist proposal unacceptable in the
form it was put forward but hinted it might serve as a basis
for negotiations.
Britain confined itself generally to seeking clarifica-
tion of the Viet Minh positions and to attempts to find a
basis for creating a Southeast Asian defense system.
The French delegation at Geneva was hampered if not
hamstrung by the weakness of the government it represented.
The French cabinet remained in office by a bare-squeak
National Assembly vote of 289 to 287 on 13 May, and was on
unmistakable notice from the Assembly that it must find a
way at Geneva to put an end to the Indochina conflict.
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Premier Laniel told Ambassador Dillon that without
American military help in Indochina France might be forced
to evacuate Laos and Cambodia and abandon both countries
to the Viet Minh in order to protect key areas in Vietnam.
Meanwhi e, eip ng
warned the United States that it i rzed a world war it
would thereby bring about the "total collapse" of the
capitalist system.
Ho Chi Minh called the victory at Dien Bien Phu a great
one but only a beginning and admonished his followers not
to underestimate the enemy.
Amid these clear and present dangers, most of the free
nations proceeded with care, and without committing them-
selves to any action which might prove irrevocable.
Only Thailand responded favorably and unequivocally to
the American call for united action, and even offered bases
from which the free world could resist further Communist
encroachments in Southeast Asia.
India's attitude resembled those of both Barkis and
Micawber: Nehru seemed "willing," in a general sort of way,
to play some sort of role in an Indochina settlement, but
he was "waiting for something to turn up" to which he
could subscribe.
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Political
Some qualified observers in Saigon said the Vietnamese
government was paralyzed and might soon disintegrate com-
pletely. They thought the situation might develop into an
intense, possibly violent, struggle for power among non-
Communist leaders.
Bao Dai and two thirds of his cabinet are in Europe.
Defense Minister Quat and the chief of staff, General Hinh,
the two senior members of the government still in Saigon,
are bitterly at odds.
Quat and several top French
officials in Saigon believe the Vietnam government might fold
up within ten days to three weeks unless Bao Dai returns and
asserts his authority. The governor of Tonkin, meanwhile,
has flatly stated that Vietnam no longer has a central
government.
Bao Dai himself has aggravated the situation by a decree
issued from Paris early this month turning over the national
police to a semi-gangster organization which has long exer-
cised extralegal control in Saigon. This group, the Binh
Xuyen, has been providing Bao Dai with about half a million
dollars a year out of its take from Saigon gambling conces-
sions. Bao Dai's total annual income is estimated at
$7,000,000 - $8,000,000.
The American embassy reports that the suret6 has been
demoralized by the granting of its police powers to the Binh
Xuyen. Some 200 agents have quit, taking their security
files with them. They have been recruited by General Hinh,
who reportedly intends to set up a sort of Gestapo.
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The Vietnamese labor minister, who lived in the Viet
Minh area until 1950, and became a cabinet minister only in
January, has told American officials that he has been com-
pletely disillusioned by the corrupt and unrepresentative
character of the Bao Dai government, He believes the people
under the Viet Minh are thoroughly opposed to that regime
but would revolt if they had to put up with the Bao Dai
government, He asked what the American reaction would be
to a move to set up a "revolutionary government" in Vietnam.
Marc Jacquet, secretary of the Ministry for Associated
States, told Ambassador Heath in Paris, on the other hand,
that Bao Dai is more essential than ever to France's plans,
and he urged that American officials not cause Bao Dai to
lose face by pressing him to repeal the "disastrous" Binh
Xuyen police appointment.
The government's encouragement of mass antipartition
demonstrations in the major cities, in addition to expressing
government policy, also provides a measure which ambitious
nationalists may seize on to overthrow the present unpopular
regime
In Laos and Cambodia political instability has in-
creased as a result of recent Viet Minh military action.
The recent incursion of two Viet Minh battalions into
Cambodia at a time when the Cambodian government is in the
process of establishing a genuinely independent regime has
severely taxed the security resources of the government. In
contrast to Vietnam, however, there is wide enthusiasm for
the present government, and the Viet Minh is a hated invader.
Cambodia has good soldiers, but it cannot cope with sizable
.Viet Minh forces until it unlearns French-inspired defense
concepts.
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The Communist delegations opened the Indochina phase of
the conference with a strong bid to extend the negotiations
to include Laos and Cambodia, as well as Vietnam. Viet Minh
vice president Pham Van Dong devoted virtually his entire
opening speech to a plea for invitations to the "resistance
governments" of Laos and Cambodia.
Chou En-lai supported this proposal, holding that the
conference had the right to determine its own composition.
Molotov followed with the allegation that these "governments"
controlled much of the territory of the two countries. He
proposed five-power talks on the Viet Minh proposal.
In the second session on Indochina, the Viet Minh
spokesman rejected the French proposal of 8 May for halting
the war and put forward a plan calling for a cease-fire
throughout Indochina to be followed by a general political
settlement which would include the following major points:
(a) French recognition of the sovereignty and independence
of the "Democratic Republic of Vietnam," Khmer (Cambodia),
and Pathet Lao (Laos); (b) eventual withdrawal of all
"foreign troops" from the three states; (c) formation of
advisory committees to carry out elections; and (d) the
establishment of unified governments in all three states.
These terms probably represent the Communists' maximum
demands for a political. settlement and were advanced pri-
marily for the record and for use as a bargaining counter.
The Viet Minh proposal concluded, however, with a provision
which appeared designed to keep the door open for serious
cease-fire negotiations. This was a suggestion that a
cease-fire might be arranged without complete agreement on
the shape of a political settlement. The proposal also
included a provision vaguely resembling Bidault's demand for
the grouping of regular units of both sides' forces in Indo-
china in zones of assembly.
This approach is consistent with other indications that
the Communists are seeking to induce France to accept a
simple cease-fire agreement without political guarantees.
Such an agreement would leave the Viet Minh in the most
advantageous position to continue infiltration into Laos,
Cambodia and non-Communist areas of Vietnam, and would also
reduce the risk of possible American or United Nations inter-
vention.
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60
There are indications that Molotov is directing the Viet
Minh delegation while Chou En-tai remains a bystander.
Molotov enters the plenary
sessions wltft a typewritten Russ an text of Viet Minh
speeches, but Chou relies on interpreter facilities during
the speeches.
On the other hand, Premier Laniel recently told the
American ambassador in Paris that he is convinced that the
French are dealing with an essentially Chinese adversary and
can make progress only by dealing with the Chinese Communists.
Along the same line, Molotov recently stated to General
Smith that he was getting his information on evacuating
the wounded from Dien Bien Phu from the Chinese Communists.
It is not clear whether Molotov's statement was a slip of
the tongue or whether he was deliberately trying to show
deference to the Chinese Communists.
The French Position
Initial French reaction to the Communist proposals for
withdrawal of foreign troops and for Communist-style elec-
tions was that they were "clever but specious," and would
lead to Communist control of Indochina. The French govern-
ment has not rejected them outright, however, and an offi-
cial spokesman has stated that they might be a starting
point for negotiations. The French internal political
situation increasingly restricts the government's maneuver-
ability at Geneva.
The Vietnamese Position
The Vietnam government's terms, presented on 12 May,
include a demand for: (a) international control of a cease-
fire; (b) the absorption of Viet Minh forces into the Vietnam
National Army; (c) elections under UN control; and (d) an
international guarantee of Vietnam's integrity.
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Among Vietnamese officials there is little hope of a
settlement at Geneva. Premier Buu Loc and Tran Van Tuyen,
an adviser to Bao Dai, have both stated they hope the con-
ference will fail, since any settlement along lines now
envisaged would mean a Communist take-over. These views are
widely held in Vietnam. Any proposal involving partition of
the country is almost universally abhorrent to the Vietnamese.
Buu Loc stated, however, that he would not attempt to sabotage
the conference.
The British delegation has thus far put forward no pro-
posals of its own on Indochina but has given general support
to the French armistice plan--mainly by attempting to elicit
clarification of the Viet Minh position. At no time has
Foreign Secretary Eden implied that Britain would reject the
Communist proposals. Presumably in order to speed the work
of the conference and end Communist propaganda harangues,
Eden on 12 May publicly presented a series of "urgent"
questions designed to test Communist willingness to agree
to an adequately supervised cease-fire.
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SOVIET BLOC POLICY
General Navarre is convinced that Peiping is prepared to
speed up its aid to the Viet Minh with supplies and weapons
of all types other than aircraft. Navarre thinks the Chinese
will intervene with air power only if the United States does
so first. He believes Peiping will not commit its aircraft
first because of fear of American retaliation.
In a conversation with American officials at Geneva on
8 May, the British charge at Peiping expressed the belief
that the establishment of a small Communist buffer state in
northern Indochina, headed by Ho Chi Minh, is a minimum
Chinese demand. The charge said the Communist regime
apparently believes that without such a state the Viet Minh
embassy in Peiping would have to be closed, the Communists
would thereby lose face, and the military security of south-
ern China would be threatened.
Chinese political and military sensitivity in this area
is undoubtedly great. Sino-Soviet prestige is heavily com-
mitted to maintaining the Viet Minh, and on the few occa-
sions Soviet officials have suggested to American and British
diplomats that partition might be a solution, they have
usually emphasized Communist China's concern over its
southern frontier.
The official Peiping People's Daily on 12 May concluded
an editorial with the warning t at ""t a American imperial-
ists" should not interpret Communist desire for peace as a
sign of weakness. The daily "reminded" Americans of their
"defeat" in Korea and of the French loss of Dien Bien Phu,
and warned that if the United States started a world war
it would thereby bring about the "total collapse" of the
capitalist system. The editorial closed with the statement
that the Communists stand for peace, but can never be
intimidated.
While this editorial is not more menacing than earlier
propaganda directed against the internationalization of the
Indochina war, it is a longer and more comprehensive comment
than previous Peiping pronouncements.
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Viet Minh
In a statement issued on the occasion of the capture of
Dien Bien Phu, Ho Chi Minh called the victory a great one,
but only a beginning. He cautioned against underestimating
the enemy and stated that only through a long-drawn-out and
arduous struggle could victory be attained.
This has been a fairly constant theme in Viet Minh
propaganda for several years. It does not indicate any
change in strategy or policy. Ho Chi Minh is aware of his
dependence on such unpredictable factors as the continued
flow of Chinese aid and American policy, and he is appar-
ently determined to prepare his troops for any eventuality.
Ho recently answered a series of questions addressed to
him by ANTARA, the Indonesian news agency, indicating Viet
Minh interest in keeping alive the considerable pro-Viet Minh
sentiment in Indonesia. His replies were standard except for
a few extra touches designed to appeal to nationalist and
neutralist sentiment in Indonesia.
A constant theme in Viet Minh propaganda has been that
the United States desires to obstruct any peace move on the
part of the French and intends eventually to replace the
French in Indochina. A variant on this theme is that the
United States is trying to replace General Navarre with
General O'Daniel. This theme is cleverly calculated to
strike a tender French nerve and to play on Navarre's
coolness toward O'Daniel.
Soviet Union
Soviet propaganda has generally avoided discussion of
the military consequences of the fall of Dien Bien Phu and
has stressed the political consequences instead.
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Moscow has tried to use the Viet Minh victory to
discredit French foreign minister Bidault and to drive a
wedge between France and the United States. The Communists
charge that Washington goaded the French into keeping up a
"useless" resistance at Dien Bien Phu, that loss of the
bastion shows Western efforts to stem the tide of "libera-
tion" in Asia are "futile," and that even all-out American
aid cannot save the French.
On the Geneva conference, Commentator Leontyev declares
that the American attempt to negotiate only from positions
of strength has suffered a major defeat. He warns, however,
that even in defeat "ruling circles" in the United States
are going on with their plans for expanding the war in
Southeast Asia and have no intention of agreeing to
peaceful settlements in either Korea or Indochina.
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France
In France, support for Laniel's Indochina policy fell
to a new low with the 289-287 vote the government achieved
on 13 May, but a belief that Geneva still offers the best
opportunity for a settlement will probably forestall the
overthrow of the government for the immediate future. On
the other hand, the debates leading to both recent votes
of confidence on Indochina policy have made it clear that
the assembly will accept no excuse if Geneva does not end
hostilities.
There are some indications that efforts will be made to
place the onus of the present situation in Indochina on the
United States. President Eisenhower's clarification of
American policy in Southeast Asia on 12 May is reported to
have satisfied French officials, but the French press was
quick to interpret Secretary Dulles' statements to the press
on 11 May as American abandonment of Indochina.
Laniel, in an apparent reversal of French strategy, told
Ambassador Dillon in Paris this week that without American
military help, the French might be forced to evacuate Laos
and Cambodia and abandon them to the Viet Minh in order to
protect key areas in Vietnam.
Britain appears-to be experimenting with several lines
of policy designed to encourage the Asian Commonwealth mem-
bers--India, Pakistan, and Ceylon--to form the nucleus of a
Southeast Asia defense system, the precise character of which
would be determined by the result of the Geneva conference.
The immediate British objective is to secure Commonwealth
agreement to a plan whereby India, Pakistan and Ceylon, as
well as Burma and Indonesia, would supervise and guarantee
a possible Indochina settlement at Geneva. The announce-.
ment of such a proposal would pay propaganda dividends and
perhaps strengthen French determination to maintain a strong
position in the Indochina negotiations, the British believe.
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Although British sources have given conflicting indica-
tions of the progress they have made toward securing agreement
to this proposal, British officials in New Delhi have had
."almost daily" consultations with Indian authorities since
Foreign Secretary Eden proposed the idea to Prime Minister
Nehru on 5 May.
The British evidently are giving thought to having one
of the Commonwealth prime ministers, presumably Nehru, call
a Southeast Asian defense conference following the Geneva
talks, This move presumably might be made whether or not a
settlement is arranged at Geneva, and apparently would depend
to a large extent on existing prospects for general Asian
participation, In any case, according to a member of the
British delegation at Geneva, Britain would "prefer" not to
participate in a Southeast Asia defense pact which did
not include Asian members.
Australia and New Zealand
Prime Minister Menzies of Australia has stated his
"personal, unalterable opposition" to any settlement in
Indochina based on territorial concessions to the Communists.
The present Australian government is prevented from making
any firm commitments in conjunction with the Western allies,
however, since its mandate extends only to 29 May, when a
general election will be held. At present, Canberra apparently
is supporting the British effort to obtain guarantees from the
Asian Commonwealth members for any settlement that may be
reached.
New Zealand also appears to be eager to follow any lead
provided by Britain.
India
Indian press comment on Geneva stresses the theme that
France has lost Indochina, but that American intransigence
is preventing a "realistic" settlement. There has been less
emphasis during the past week on symptoms of disunity in the
Western camp at Geneva.
Nehru's reply to Foreign Secretary Eden's request for
support from India, Pakistan and Ceylon in guaranteeing an
Indochina settlement was reported by the British to be ambig-
uous. Nehru agreed to give such support, but hedged his
agreement with qualifications, particularly regarding the
kind of settlement which might come out of Geneva.
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Some London officials interpreted this reply to mean
that India would not join in a guarantee directed against
Communist aggression. A member of the British delegation
at Geneva said, however,, that Nehru appeared interested in
an "Asian Locarno"--i.e., a settlement which both the West
and the Communists would guarantee. A settlement of this
type would be in tune with the Indochina peace plan Nehru
presented on 24 April, which envisaged a nonintervention
agreement among the United States, Britain, the USSR and
Communist China.
Burma
Burma has been closely following events in Indochina and
Geneva, and is skeptical on the chances that a satisfactory
settlement can be achieved. Although they continue to pro-
claim strict adherence to a neutral foreign policy, the
Burmese have taken a realistic view of the Indochinese prob-
lem. With the exception of a single pro-Communist newspaper,
the press has pointed out that Communist aggression in a
neighboring state is a threat to Burma. This is a striking
change from the general apathy displayed during the first
Viet Minh invasion of Laos in the spring of 1953.
Burmese policy calls for immediate independence for the
Associated States and a peaceful settlement of the current
struggle. At the same time, Burmese are privately fearful
of Communist control over Indochina and hope that something
will be done to prevent that area from "falling out of the
French frying pan into the Chinese fire." Although the
Burmese are reluctant to publicize this attitude for fear
of antagonizing Communist China, Premier Nu strongly supported
the Pakistan-Ceylon position at the recently concluded Colombo
conference of Asian prime ministers, which maintained that
Communist aggression constituted the chief threat to the
independent countries of Asia.
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Indonesia
conference failed. Other officials have stated in public
that developments in Indochina did not affect Indonesia's
The Indonesians have tended to be naive and anti-
Western in their assessment of the Indochina situation.
The press almost unanimously bases its pessimism regarding
the Geneva conference on American policy, and the chairman
of the foreign affairs section of the Indonesian parliament
has stated that the United States would be to blame if the
security
Although the Indonesians also favor an immediate cease-
fire and grant of independence to Indochina, they have been
more bitterly outspoken against the French than the Burmese
and are more willing to appease the Communists. For instance,
the Indonesians favor the seating of Peiping in the UN as a
means of speeding up an Indochina settlement. They have
further indicated a desire to see negotiations following a
cease-fire handled by the United Nations, with no outside
aid being sent to Indochina in the interim.
Ceylon
Prime Minister Kotelawala has thus far stood firm
against criticism from the press and opposition politicians
on the use of Colombo as a stop on the Indochina airlift.
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Although not directly involved, Thailand has shown
great interest in the Indochina negotiations at Geneva. It
was, moreover, the first country to respond favorably to
Secretary Dulles' proposal for "united action," a response
taken in the hope of obtaining additional American military
materiel and a guarantee of its national'independence. The
chief of Thailand's General Staff said on,11 May that Thai-
land could be used as a military base by anti-Communist
nations to oppose Communist expansion in Southeast' Asia.
Japan
The Tokyo'Shimbun expressed regret that the United States
and Britain had not a en "joint action" which could have
saved Dien Bien Phu and said that the only alternative was
to stand united in defense of Laos and Cambodia. Jiji Shimpo
said-the loss of Dien Bien Phu raised the question wheteFerr
the free nations could check the advance of communism in
Southeast Asia. The United States, as the world's foremost
military power, must bear the major responsibility for
checking Communist expansion in Asia, it declared.
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