PERSONNEL SECURITY SURVEY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP96M01138R001200020003-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 134
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 17, 2005
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 28, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

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DIRECTOR
OF
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
Investigative Standards
Working Group
PERSONNEL SECURITY SURVEY
Investigative Scope And Adjudicative
Procedures Among Intelligence
Community Agencies
SECOM-D-135
May 1980
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Investigative Scope and
Adjudicative Procedures
Among Intelligence
Community Agencies
Personnel Security Survey
Report of Investigative Standards
Working Group
DCI Security Committee
May 1980
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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee
SECOM-D-194
April 28, 1980
MEMORANDUM TO : Chairman, DCI Security Committee
FROM
Acting Chairman
Investigative Standards Working Group
SUBJECT Personnel Security Survey
1. As instructed by the Security Committee in 1978, the Investigative Standards Working Group
conducted a survey of background investigations used to make clearance decisions by the Intelligence
Community's member agencies. More than 5,000 cases were carefully examined in an effort to
evaluate the productivity of sources and various periods of coverage in the background investigations.
2. Under the direction and leadership of I the Working Group has now STAT
completed its work on that task and our report is attached to this letter of transmittal. Conclusions in
the report should serve as the factual basis for some important changes to investigative and
adjudicative standards for the entire Intelligence Community.
3. With these conclusions in mind, the Working Group has unanimously approved a number of
specific recommendations which will be transmitted to you separately.
6 May 1980
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Section
Page
Objectives
General Nomenclature
2
Productivity Index
2
Correction of Errors
4
Assumptions and Parameters
4
9
9
Categories of Information
14
Observations Involving Selected Sources
15
Productivity According to Purpose of Investigation
24
Investigative Agencies
26
Correlation Between Period of Coverage and Age of Data
27
Periods of Coverage Risking Loss of Data
33
Sources and Age of Data
34
Previous Investigations
36
Effects of Overall Increase in Period of Coverage
37
IV. Effects of Previous Investigations
39
Types of Previous Inquiries
39
Relationship of Scope and Productivity
39
Sources and Categories of Information
39
V. Source Analysis
43
Types of Sources
43
Productivity of Sources
43
Value of National Agency Check (NAC)
51
Sources and Categories of Information
51
VI. Effects of Screening Procedures
55
Review of Subject Responses in Interviews
55
Productivity of Screening Procedures
55
VII. Conclusions
59
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A.
Report of Pilot Study
63
97
107
I-1.
Scope of Investigations
II-1.
General Data by Agency
10
11-2.
Adverse Data by Agency
11
11-3.
Scattergram Correlating the Percentage of Adverse and Resolved
Against Data by Mean Period of Coverage
13
11-4.
Table of Categories by Agency-Adverse Data
14
11-5.
Table of Categories by Agency-Resolved Against Data
15
11-6.
Observations Involving Selected Sources of Adverse Data (By
Agency)
16
11-7.
Categories of Information (1,730 Adverse Factors)
18
11-8.
Categories of Information (409 Resolved Against Factors)
20
II-9.
Ratios of Resolved Against to Adverse Categories
22
11-10.
Productivity Indices According to Purpose of Investigation
24
11-11.
Productivity Indices According to Purpose of Investigation
(Omitting CIA Polygraph and FBI.Cases)
25
11-12.
Comparison of SBI and BI Cases with Others
25
11-13.
General Data Grouped by Investigative Agency
26
III-1.
Frequency of Cases According to Target Period of Coverage vs.
Age of Adverse Data
111-2.
Mean Period of Coverage by Mean Age of Data
29
111-3.
Period of Coverage Required to Capture Adverse Data
30
111-4.
Period of Coverage Required to Capture Resolved Against Data
31
111-5.
Percentage of Data Acquired by Age (Years Ago) of Data
32
111-6.
Loss of Adverse and Resolved Against Data According to
Period of Coverage
33
111-7.
Productivity Indices According to Target Periods of Coverage
33
111-8.
Graph: Productivity Indices According to Target Periods of Cover-
age
35
111-9.
Productivity Indices: Older Data
36
III-10.
Older Adverse Data After Previous Investigation
37
111-11.
Effect of Change in Periods of Coverage Compared to
Mean for This Survey
37
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IV-1. Type of Previous Investigation Compared to Purpose of
This Investigation
IV-2. Productivity Index According to Previous Type of Investigation:
Adverse Cases
V-1. Percentage of Cases in Which Specific Types of
Sources were Checked
V-2. Percentage of Total Cases in Which a Source was Cited
in any Factor 45
V-3. Productivity of Sources: Indices of Adverse and Resolved
Against Data 46
V-4. Table of Sources by Agency (Resolved Against Data) 47
V-5. Tables of Record Sources by Interview Sources:
Adverse and Resolved Against Data
V-7. Matrix of Resolved Against Data: Education, Employment,
Residence, Listed References, and Developed Sources by NAC,
Personal Interview, Police, and Credit Sources
V-8. Matrix of Resolved Against Data: Education, Residence,
Listed References, and Developed Sources by Employment, NAC,
Personal Interview, Police, and Credit Sources
V-9. Matrix of Resolved Against Data: Same as V-8 but with
Polygraph Results Added to Employment, NAC, Personal Inter-
view, Police, and Credit Sources
V-11. Matrix of Resolved Against Data: Police Sources by
FBI Fingerprint Sources 51
V-12. Matrix of Resolved Against Data: NAC by All Other Sources 51
V-13. Source Citations (Grouped) by Categories of Information:
Resolved Against Data 52
V-14. Source Citations (Grouped): Resolved Against Data 53
VI_ 1. Effectiveness Index of Screening Procedures (Adverse Data) 56
VI-2. Effectiveness Index of Screening Procedures
(Resolved Against Data) 56
VI-3. Indices: Adverse Data by Type of Screening Procedures
(No Previous Investigation-787 Cases) 57
VI-4. Productivity Indices and Subject Admission by Category
(Adverse Data: No Previous Investigation)
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Investigative Scope and
Adjudicative Procedures
Among Intelligence
Community Agencies
Under the aegis of the DCI Security Committee, the
Investigative Standards Working Group has compiled
and analyzed a considerable amount of data on
background investigations used in making clearance
decisions for access to sensitive compartmented infor-
mation (SCI) and other sensitive information by the
Security Committee's member agencies.
Objectives
This project is based on a survey of background
investigations adjudicated between October 1, 1978
and January 31, 1979 and is a continuation of an
earlier pilot study initiated in the Spring of 1977 to
analyze the effectiveness of background investigations.
The program's primary objective is to determine the
productivity of sources or groups of sources; the second
objective is to assess the productivity of various periods
of coverage in the background investigations.
It is recognized that the quality of information
produced by a background investigation, whether
adverse data or positive information, will depend on a
variety of factors including the following:
1. the general quality of the particular group of
applicants;
2. the scope of the investigation including:
a. the period of coverage in terms of years; and,
b. the number of contacts made;
3. the quality of the investigation including:
a. the nature of the sources contacted;
b. the mode of contact;
c. the quality or thoroughness of the contact
including:
Should it be possible to quantify these factors, even
relatively, they should be amenable to analytical
techniques such as regression analysis to identify areas
for improvement in the program. It is important,
however, to recognize the narrow focus of this particu-
lar phase of the validation project. It is limited to an
examination of two factors only, the period of coverage
and the types of sources producing adverse informa-
tion.
Neither the pilot project nor the current study ad-
dresses other aspects of the background investigation
such as relative costs or some of the more subtle
qualitative features such as the need to establish
continuity of identity or the need to detect fraudulent
identity. Moreover, this study does not address the
merits of positive reporting which, together with the
quantitative and qualitative factors enumerated above,
would contribute to the general level of assurance
available in a program of this nature.
The pilot project was conducted in the Spring of 1977
by five participating member agencies. That report is
shown in full at Appendix A. Briefly, its findings were
that a personal interview of the subject or applicant is
useful and productive and probably should be used
more frequently than it is. The pilot project also found
that the National Agency Check (NAC) is productive
but not so much so that it should be relied upon
exclusively or even predominantly as a means of
assuring trustworthiness for access to sensitive infor-
mation. The pilot project further disclosed that some
sources do in fact overlap or duplicate productivity of
other sources and that a more determined effort to
identify principal sources or groups of sources could
lead to some improvement in efficiency. Another major
1) the depth. of the inquiry or questioning; and
2) the accuracy and candor of the source.
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finding disclosed that investigations with periods of
coverage less than ten years risked losing significant
amounts of adverse data. As its final conclusion, the
pilot study recommended that the analysis be contin-
ued with a special effort to broaden the data base both
in terms of the number of sample cases reviewed and
the number of agencies participating. That recommen-
dation led directly to the current phase of the program.
General Nomenclature
Ten of the Security Committee's member agencies
participated in the latest survey. The sample contained
5,204 background investigations. Adverse information
was disclosed about applicants in 1,261 of the cases
and 254 of them were resolved against the individual.
Due to some procedural differences in agency practice,
the term "resolved against" was defined to include
cases in which the individual was denied security
clearance or in which he was not hired for suitability
reasons based on the background investigation regard-
less of what decision may have been made concerning
security clearance. Each case permitted identification
of as many as four separate factors which influenced
the decision to resolve for or against an individual. Of
the 1,261 cases which revealed adverse data, 1,730
separate factors were noted. In turn, each factor
permitted the identification of (1) a broad category of
adverse data, (2) a more detailed sub-category, (3) the
age of the data or the minimum period of coverage the
investigation would have required to capture a specific
category of adverse data (entitled, "years ago"), and
(4) the various sources, including the subject himself,
which revealed the adverse data.
Included as Appendix B are the specific instructions
given to adjudicators and evaluators who compiled
data for this project.
Investigations included in this survey were conducted
principally by five agencies: the Defense Investigative
Service, the Office of Personnel Management, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, and the State Department. Investiga-
tions conducted to determine SCI access were expected
to meet the standards of DCID- 1 / 14. Most of the
investigations conducted for other purposes, including
Top Secret access or appointment to sensitive positions,
were accorded less stringent scoping although some
actually surpassed the requirements of DCID-1 / 14.
Figure I-1 depicts graphically the scope of the
various investigations examined in this survey.
Some observations are necessary concerning the sam-
ples submitted by each agency. Due to its large volume,
Agency One selected one out of every five cases.
Agency Five selected every case passing through
during the target period but reported that, due to
several factors, its sample was unusually low at that
particular time. Thus, for the four-month period of this
survey, its sample represented only six percent of the
2,510 applicant cases processed by Agency Five in
Fiscal Year 1979. Agency Eleven reported that its
sample related exclusively to applicants for officer
level positions, a group that might be assumed to be
characterized by relatively fewer adverse factors than
the general population.
Productivity Index
An analytical technique used frequently throughout
this study is the "productivity index." While it is
instructive to review some of the data in terms of gross
frequencies or percentages, occasionally it seems to be
more appropriate to consider a specific item of data in
relation to some other. On the one hand, it is helpful to
have the age of adverse data expressed in terms of the
respective percentages of different age groups (see, for
example, Figure III-1). On the other hand, to appreci-
ate fully the productivity of a particular source, such as
a credit check, it is necessary to examine the data in
relation to how many times the credit check was
performed. We therefore developed the "productivity
index," which is arrived at by dividing the percentage
of a subset by a corresponding percentage of the whole
set. Using the credit check example, we might divide
the percentage of cases in which the credit check
produced adverse information by the percentage of
cases in which the credit check was conducted. There
are several variations of this same theme throughout
the study. By using percentages, we are able to arrive
at an equation which, if portrayed graphically, would
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Scope of Investigations
Basic Period of Coverage
Education - High School
Education - College
Education - Interviews
Employment Records
Employment - Interviews
Police
Credit
Residence
Birth & Citizenship Required
Listed References Judgment
Developed Sources Minimum 3
Personal Interview Optional
Polygraph Optional
NAC Yes
Basic period of Coverage
Education - High School
Education - College
Education - Interviews
Employment Records
Employment - Interviews
Police
Credit
Residence
Birth & Citizenship
Listed References
Developed Sources
Personal Interview
Polygraph
NAC
Basic Period of Coverage
Education - High School
Education - College
Education - Interviews
Employment Records
Employment - Interviews
Police
Credit
Residence
Birth & Citizenship
Listed References
Developed Sources
Personal Interview
Polygraph
NAC
AGE 5 10 15
18 Years Years Years
AGE 5 7 10 15
18 Years Years Years Years
Required
2-3
2+
By investigators
Not used
Yes
AGE
18
Not Required
Required
Not required
Minimum 3
Yes
Not used
Yes
5 10 15
Years Years Years
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Figure I-1 (Continued)
Scope of Investigations
Basic Period of Coverage
Education - High School
Education - College
Education - Interviews
Employment Records
Employment - Interviews
Police
Credit
Residence
Birth & Citizenship
Listed References
Developed Sources
Personal Interview
Polygraph
NAC
Basic Period of Coverage
Education - High School
Education - College
Education - Interviews
Employment Records
Employment - Interviews
Police
Credit
Residence
Birth & Citizenship
Listed References
Developed Sources
Personal Interview
Polygraph
NAC
TREASURY
Basic Period of Coverage
Education - High School
Education - College
Education - Interviews
Employment Records
Employment - Interviews
Police
Credit
Residence
Birth & Citizenship
Listed References
Developed Sources
Personal Interview
Polygraph
NAC
AGE
5
10
15
18
Years
Years
Years
Required
Judgment
Minimum 3
Yes
Not used
Yes
AGE
5
10
15
18
Years
Years
Years
I
-F-
Checked if considered necessary
Judgment
Judgment
For clarification of allegations
Not used
Yes
AGE
18
5
Years
10
Years
15
Years
Checked if considered necessary
3
2-3
For Investigative Personnel
Used as "last resort" in DCI 1/14 cases
Yes
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Figure I-1 (Continued)
Scope of Investigations
AGE
18
5 10 Entire
Years Years Adult
Life
Basic Period of Coverage
Education - High School
Education - College
Education - Interviews
Employment Records
Employment - Interviews
Police
Credit
Residence
Birth & Citizenship
Listed References
Developed Sources
Personal Interview
Polygraph
NAC
Required
All (3)
Judgment
Extensively twice
Used as "last resort"
Yes
AGE
17
5 10 15
Years Years Years
Basic Period of Coverage
Education - High School
Education - College
Education - Interviews
Employment Records
Employment - Interviews
Police
Credit
Residence
Birth & Citizenship Required
Listed References Judgment
Developed Sources Minimum 5
Personal Interview Optional
Polygraph Required
NAC Yes
be a simple line graph with an upward slope of one.
Thus, an index of one signifies that, in quantitative
terms at least, the results were proportional to the
effort. Where productivity is desirable, the higher the
index, the more effective is the particular procedure
under review. On the other hand, where productivity is
not considered to be desirable, such as subject falsifica-
tions, a lower index is more effective. In reviewing any
of the tables in this study using the productivity index,
it should be remembered that the indices are relative
only with respect to other items being considered in the
same particular review.
Correction of Errors
Errors in the data base appeared quite early and
continued to be discovered as analysis progressed. The
complex nature of the IBM card itself was considered
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to be a prime cause of the error rate. Wherever
possible, known errors were corrected and omissions
were disregarded or stated as "not shown." The errors
were basically of two types, errors or omissions in the
original marking of the IBM card and errors in the
machine reading of markings on the cards. For
example, the "year of birth" was apparently confused
with the column for the "year of this investigation" in
several instances and was shown as the current year;
i.e., 1978 or 1979 are obvious errors. Corrections were
made by referring back to the original case or by
reviewing the IBM cards for possible machine reading
errors. Other corrections were made by deduction in
cards which failed to list a source as being checked in
"this investigation," but listed that source in any of the
four "factors" as the source of adverse information.
Errors of omission, failure to mark the IBM card, were
usually disregarded in the analysis of the data base in
an effort to use only that information which appeared
sound and complete.
Assumptions and Parameters
This study does not consider the recognized needs
(1) to assure continuity of identity, or (2) to acquire
positive information about the individual to permit a
finding of trustworthiness. It is limited to an analysis of
the effectiveness of the background investigation in
identifying significant adverse information.
This study does not address the question of what the
Background Investigation (BI) misses, if anything. It
is limited to assessing the sources from which we have
acquired adverse information and the minimum scope
needed to assure various degrees of probability of
acquiring the requisite lead to that information.
It is recognized that there is probably no way to
determine how many individuals are deterred from
applying for a government position. by the knowledge
that a BI will be conducted. The study revealed some
suggestion that this, in fact, occurs, but we have no way
to measure that phenomena.
far back in time as necessary to resolve the matter.
Such cases were expanded to include corroboration of
data amenable to proof as well as acquisition of other
data to offset or give perspective to information not
capable of direct confirmation or refutation.
This study does not address the matter of costs, at least
directly. Costs are, of course a valid (although possibly
over-emphasized) factor and ought to be considered
before any final decision is made concerning scope.
This study does seek to identify the percentage of cases
which, due to the age of the applicant, would require
up to 15 years of coverage under the most rigorous
standard. This should give at least a general idea of the
added burden on resources which can be attributed to
the higher standards.
This study assumes that at least the appropriate
Federal agencies were checked and, unlike the 1977
Pilot Study, various elements of the National Agency
Check (NAC) are examined separately.
This study does not assess possible changes in the
quality of sources although similar follow-on surveys
over a period of years could illustrate some changes.
For example, it should be possible to show the effects,
if any, of "privacy" laws, the Buckley Amendment,
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration initia-
tives, fair credit laws, etc., on the candor of certain
types of sources.
No consideration is given to significant events, such as
on the international scene or in the individual's own
life, which might suggest a specific period of coverage.
For example, we take no cognizance in this study of
events comparable to the German attack on the USSR
which prompted a 180-degree turnaround in the
Communist Party line. It is assumed that any indica-
tion, whether from the applicant or from some other
source, that the individual had spent a substantial
period of time in Eastern Europe would have moved
the case from a routine period of coverage to the
expanded variety noted above.
Any case in which potentially adverse information was
discovered, no matter what the source, was extended as
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This study does not assess the significance of such
variations in background patterns as urban, suburban,
or rural residences; frequent moves vs. a more static
life; or similar factors. The study may justify some
conclusion regarding the relative effectiveness of
neighborhood checks, for example, but does not break
it down further to show whether, for example, rural
neighbors are more candid or productive than urban
neighbors. Nor does it show the effect of short-term
acquaintance vis-a-vis longer term. Furthermore, it is
recognized that some of the arbitrary decisions as to
how to log an incident in the time frame may distort
the reality of the case. For example, an applicant has
lived in the same house for the past ten years. His
neighbor has known him all that time and recalls a
potentially significant incident which occurred seven
years ago. In theory, a one-year period of coverage for
neighborhood checks would have revealed this infor-
mation, but we log it as seven years back to show that,
for this case (and its value as a statistic), a seven-year
period of coverage would be required to capture the
data. It is clear that to acquire it the investigator would
have had to find a knowledgeable neighbor who knew
the applicant seven years ago. Moreover, in this case at
least, a seven-year period of coverage would have been
no greater a burden on investigative resources than a
one-year period of coverage. As our data collection is
set up currently, however, we are unable to make these
finer distinctions.
This study does not include a variety of other types of
data which might be of interest to the security
manager and which could be acquired easily by
expanding the data collection card. For example, data
concerning the number of contacts per investigation
and the number of sources requesting confidentiality
could be included in the future. With minor modifica-
tion it may be possible to learn more about the
adjudication process, what kinds of information are
more significant than others, and what factors, such as
the passage of time, influence the decisions. But these
matters should await later phases of the program.
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Section II
General Data and Observations
Figures II-1 and 11-2 portray much of the basic data by
agency. It is intriguing to observe the many similarities
as well as differences in data from agency to agency
and occasionally it is very instructive to inquire as to
the reasons for differences. The mean and median ages
of subjects of investigation in this study (lines 8 and 9
of Figure II-1), as well as more detailed data in
Appendices C-1 through C-11, could be useful in
assessing the cost implications of any contemplated
change in period of coverage. It should be noted that
the frequencies and percentages of cases with particu-
lar target periods of coverage for the investigations
used in this study (lines 11-24 of Figure II-1) include
the effect of any previous investigation which might
have been conducted on the individual. Thus, a 40-year
old individual who had been the subject 'of a back-
ground investigation six years ago but who was now
being considered for SCI access will be counted in the
row for a 6-7 year period of coverage. It is noted that
there are 176 cases which appeared to required a target
period of coverage of 16 or more years. It s not entirely.
clear why there were so many cases of this nature but
89 of them occurred in Agency Two. Given the large
number of cases conducted for SCI access by this
agency, it may be that the older periods of coverage
were required by the sensitive assignment of senior
officers who had not been cleared in many years and
for whom a file review reflected a need to cover some
particular point beyond the normal 15-year period of
coverage.
Although the data disclosed in this survey identified
the specific period of coverage and the types of sources
contacted in each case, it did not include the number of
contacts made. The number of contacts per case is
known to vary from one investigating agency to
another but precise data were not available. It must be
assumed that there is at least some relationship
between the number of contacts and the productivity of
significant data and any further study should include
the acquisition of figures on the number of contacts per
case and by type of source as well as by mode of
contact.
A review of the summary of adverse data (Figure 11-2)
reveals a number of points of interest. The range in the
percentage of total cases revealing adverse data is but
one example (see line 2). To some extent this range
might be attributed to differences in agency interpre-
tation of the definition of adverse data. Lines 3-8 were
therefore calculated to identify six less significant
kinds of adverse data or, in the case of lines 3 and 4,
data easily verifiable by means other than background
investigation. Even after deleting these particular data
from the total of adverse, however, there still remain
substantial variations in the percentages of adverse
from one agency to another (see line 12).
Adjudication Process
Lines 19 and following reflect the adjudication process
by agency. The apparent overlapping in terms used in
this section was designed deliberately to accommodate
the diverse practices from one agency to the next and
specifically to account for the situation in which an
individual might be found acceptable on narrow
security grounds but unqualified for more general
suitability reasons. Line 31 represents the total cases
resolved against the individual by agency and, noting
the percentages in line 32, it is apparent that the wide
disparity from agency to agency continues. The chart
in Appendix C-12 shows the data from another
perspective. Scattergrams correlating the percentages
of adverse and "resolved against" cases by the mean
period of coverage, shown in Figure 11-3, seem to offer
no help in explaining the differences. The ratio of data
resolved against to data resolved in favor of the
individual, shown in Figure 11-2, line 36, is but another
way of comparing the practices of one agency to those
of another. The lower this ratio, the greater the amount
of adverse data resolved in favor of the individual.
Conversely, the higher this number, the greater the
amount of adverse data was resolved against the
individual. The Working Group was unable to estab-
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Line No.
Agency
1
1.
Total Cases
301
Purpose of Investigation
2.
Not Shown
2
3.
SCI
299
4.
TS
-
5.
Q
-
6.
Crypto
-
7.
Other
-
8.
Age When Investigated (Mean)
25.3
9.
Age When Investigated (Median)
22
10.
This Investigation POC (Mean)
7.1
Cases by POC
11.
Not Shown
3
12.
1-5
172
13.
6-7
27
17.
21+
2
Percent of Cases by POC
18.
Not Shown
1
19.
1-5
57.1
20.
6-7
9
21.
8-10
11.3
22.
11-15
15.3
23.
16-20
5.6
24.
21 +
0.7
2
3
4
5
6
8
9
11
12
Totals
957
460
1,014
155
458
346
507
136
870
5,204
10
7
11
7
1
4
22
-
11
75
918
450
-
-
440
16
90
-
2,213
-
3
-
148
15
99
393
136
47
841
-
-
1,003
-
-
-
I
-
-
1,004
29
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
29
-
-
-
-
2
227
1
-
812
1,042
27.7
34.7
36.4
31.7
33.5
29.2
31.6
29.1
30.8
31.5
26
34
34
28
31
27
29
29
29
29
9.4
11.4
5.1
6.5
8.8
8.3
9.2
13
5.9
7.6
29
23
26
11
5
18
61
1
34
211
359
81
970
24
147
128
142
4
654
2,681
61
67
4
113
80
25
67
8
100
552
47
19
-
-
1
3
-
-
4
76
3
5
2.6
7.1
1.1
5.2
12
0.7
3.9
37.5
17.6
95.7
11
32.1
37
28
2.9
75.2
6.4
14.6
0.4
72.9
17.5
7.2
13.2
5.9
11.5
13.3
14.8
0.8
3.2
21
39.3
15.4
34.6
6.4
30.5
41.5
0.4
1.3
28
9
31
44.9
2
4.4
2.4
0.2
-
0.2
1.5
0.4
11
0.6
4.9
4.1
-
-
0.2
0.9
-
-
0.5
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
Adverse Cases
Percent of Total Cases
Selected Data: Adverse Cases
Subject Not Citizen
1
Spouse Not Citizen
3
Alien Relatives, N.H.
Drug Experimentation
7.
Juvenile Record
8.
Minor Traffic Record
3
9.
Total Selected Adverse Cases
25
10.
Percent of Total Cases
11.
All Other Adverse Cases
57
12.
Percent of Total Cases
19
Selected Data:
Resolved Against Cases
13.
Subject Not Citizen
14.
Spouse Not Citizen
15.
Alien Relatives, N.H.
16.
Drug Experimentation
17.
Juvenile Record
18.
Minor Traffic Record
Adjudications (All Cases)
Not Shown
22.
Status Unknown
-
23.
Clearance Granted
263
24.
Granted but Not Hired*
25.
Granted and Retained
26.
Granted; Status Unknown
-
27.
Denied; Status N.S.*
31
28.
Denied; Not Hired*
Totals
109
243
37
59
172
236
52
1.261
24
24
24
13
50
47
38
-
4
7
19
4
-
11
58
15
23
4
10
195
3
-
2
4
43
40
27
-
-
1
3
93
111
50
23
20
16
112
412
5
15
4
5
22
8%
123
156
124
849
13
45
24
16%
18
135
20
51
120
123
-
1
2
7
23
33
915
409
984
151
445
159
417
84
824
4,651
2
9
-
11
1
--
2
12
40
139
44
Continued on next page.
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
Figure 11-2 (Continued)
29.
Denied; Retained*
-
1
-
I
2
30.
Denied; Status Unknown*
4
2
-
-
1
-
-
-
7
31.
Total Resolved Against*
35
15
40
4
0
5
20
83
52
0
254
32.
Percent of Total Cases
12
2
9
0.4
0
1
6
16
38
0
5%
33.
Percent of Adverse
(Line 31=Line 1)
43
7
36
1.6
0
8
13
35
100
0
20%
34.
Resolved in Favor
47
219
69
239
37
54
152
153
0
37
1,007
35.
Percent of Adverse Resolved in Favor
57
94
63
98
100
93
87
65
0
100
80%
36.
Ratio: Resolved Against
to Resolved in Favor
(Line 31= Line 34)
.74
.07
.58
.02
0
.09
.13
.54
1.00
0
.25
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
40
9
1
1
30
4
5
M
2
3
20
6
1
12
1
2
3
4
5
8
7
8
8
1
0111
2131
41
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10111 1
5 2 31415
Period of Coverage in Years (mean)
Figure 93
Resolved Against Data
40
11
20
9
10
3
1
1
M
8
4
8
2
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
lish precisely why these differences occurred but
concluded that they may be attributable to a number
of factors including especially high self-imposed stand-
ards by one or more agencies, differences in the
populations of persons being considered, and possibly
differences in investigative practices.
Categories of Information
In reviewing the resolved against data by agency, it is
noted that "Drugs and Alcohol" figured the most
prominently with 30% of the citations. It is further
noted that Agencies One, Three, and Nine accounted
for more than three-fourths of the citations for that
category. The next most frequently cited categories
were "Irresponsibility" (16% of the citations),
"Dishonesty" (11%), "Financial" (9%), and "Immo-
rality" (8%).
appear to be significant differences from one agency to
the next. It is noted for example that Agency Eight has
a high proportion of the adverse data in categories
"Subject Cooperation," "Dishonesty," and
"Irresponsibility." These same categories figure
prominently in the resolved against data for the same
agency. As will be seen in Figure 11-6, that agency had
an extremely high ratio of positive police checks and
also had the greatest return on FBI fingerprint checks.
It is noted that Agencies Two and Four also had high
numbers in the "Criminal" category and that they, too,
had higher than average returns from the police and
FBI fingerprint checks.
Figures 11-4 and 11-5 depict the categories of adverse
data and resolved against data by agency. Again, there
Table of Categories by Agency
(All Adverse Data) (All Factors)
5
6 8
9
11
12
Totals
Percent
of Total
(1,730)
Category
A
Subject Cooperation
10
6
2
5
B
Loyalty
-
1
-
2
0.4
C
Foreign Connections
7
25
22
6
1
25
1
2
106
6.1
D
Dishonesty
10
19
8
20
50
19
2
1
131
7.6
E
Irresponsibility
7
40
8
24
94
16
27
2
_
228
13.8
F
Immoral Conduct
6
5
4
24
3
7_
-
3
6
90
5.2
1
__
1 49
8.6
4
3 9
4.6
_
25
15 41
171
6
1
452
26.1
J Criminal
4
12 24
7
-
17
300
17.3
K Other
6 8
11
13
1
65
Totals
109
299
139
300
42
64 375
Number of Cases with
Adverse Information
82
234
109
243
37
59 172 1
236
52
37
1,261
155
458 346
507
136
870
5,204
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
Table of Categories by Agency
(All "Resolved Against" Data) (All Factors)
B Loyalty
C Foreign Connections
D Dishonesty
E Irresponsibility
F Immoral Conduct
G Financial
H Medical
I Drugs or Alcohol
J Criminal
K Other
Totals
Total Number of
Resolved Against Cases
2 4
3 9 15 1
4 - 5 1
5 3 5 1
1 6 -
60 32 64 12
58
2
1
120
Percent
of Total
(409)
26 6.4
124 30.3
Observations Involving Selected Sources
Figure 11-6 depicts data concerning selected sources
arranged by agency. It is interesting to note that police
checks seemed to be very productive for some agencies
and much less so for others. The same phenomenon
seems to occur with regard to the FBI fingerprint
checks. It was concluded that the nature of Agencies
Five, Six, Nine, and Eleven is such that there may be a
"natural" screening process in the sense that the
individuals under consideration as a rule require
qualifications not found across the total spectrum of
our society, whereas the individuals considered by
Agencies One, Two, Three, Four, and possibly Eight
may be more closely representative of the entire
population. Simply knowing that one will have to
undergo a security screening process may deter some
individuals from applying for certain positions or with
certain agencies.
I - 7 1 - 16 3.9
1 10 11 2 - 45 11
16 11 27 - 66 16.1
- 25 3 - 34 8.3
5 2 2 - 37 9.1
1 2 3 - 16 3.9
Only Agencies Four and Eight reported significant
results from the NAC-OPM check. It was noted that
both of these are large civilian agencies and that the
phenomenon may be due to the fact of a highly mobile
work force. It was further noted that Agencies One,
Two, and Three reported a large percentage of returns
from the NAC-DOD check. These are three of the four
military agencies involved in the study and it is
assumed that the phenomenon is due in part to the fact
that the DOD personnel file would be included in this
check.
In passing it was noted that some agencies conducting
investigations for SCI access failed to report developed
sources in certain cases even though DCID 1/ 14
required such checks.
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
Observations Involving Selected Sources of Adverse Data
(By Agency)
6
8
9
11
12
Totals
Total Cases
301
957
460
1,014
155
458
346
507
136
870
5,204
Police Checks (Positive)
21
91
48
98
3
9
193
-
6
19
488
Percent of Total
7.0
9.5
10.4
9.7
1.9
2.0
55.8
-
4.4
2.2
9.4
FBI Fingerprint (Positive)
5
8
10
23
-
5
49
-
-
-
100
Percent of Total
1.6
0.8
2.2
2.3
-
1.1
14.2
-
-
1.9
NAC-OPM (Positive)
-
-
1
38
1
1
91
2
2
136
Percent of Total
-
0.2
3.7
0.6
0.2
26.3
0.4
0.2
2.6
NAC-DOD (Positive)
27
38
95
14
-
11
11
2
-
198
Percent of Total
9.0
4.0
20.7
1.4
-
2.4
3.2
0.4
3.8
Total SCI Cases
299
918
450
-
-
440
16
90
2,213
SCI Cases without
Developed Sources
9
21
58
12
1
3
104
Percent of SCI Cases
3.0
2.3
12.9
2.7
6.3
3.3
4.7
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
Figures 11-7 and 11-8 depict adverse data and resolved
against data by categories and subcategories for each
of the four possible factors for each case.
Although not shown in these figures, the following
totals should be kept in mind when reviewing the data:
Total Cases 5,204
Adverse Cases 1,261
Resolved Against Cases 254
Adverse
Resolved
Against
Cases with 1 factor only
1,261
254
Cases with 2 factors
334
108
Cases with 4 factors
36
12
Total Factors
1,730
409
It should be noted that there will be instances in these
two charts where the figures do not add up accurately.
This is due to the fact that occasionally data was not
shown or only partially shown. For example, an
adjudicator completing the survey might have indi-
cated a category but failed to note the subcategory.
The data is still extremely interesting to review,
however, particularly Figure 11-9, which shows the
percentage of adverse data that figured in eventual
denials or not hired. It must be noted, however, that
some of the adverse data consisted of allegations which
presumably were resolved in the subject's favor by
investigation and interview. Thus, it is noted that only
56% of those cited in the "Drug Trafficking"
subcategory resulted in denials or not hired. It is also
noted in passing that "Drug Experimentation" was
cited as a subcategory in only 4% of the total cases
investigated and that all drug-related subcategories
accounted for less than 7% of the total cases. This
figure is substantially lower than the 46% reported by
one agency in a recent study which covered several
thousand cases over a period of five years and with a
sample population which can be assumed to be
reasonably representative of the general population of
our society. Even if it may be granted that the
populations of certain of the agencies participating in
the current survey were subjected to a sort of "natural
screening," the figure still seems surprisingly low.
Referring to Figure 11-2, line 6, we note that one
agency, Agency Nine, accounted for 93 of the cases (or
18% of its total cases) in which drug experimentation
was cited. Agency Five accounted for 23 (or 14% of its
total). Both of these agencies have intensive personal
interview programs and one uses the polygraph to
supplement the personal interview. Although a more
detailed analysis of the various types of personal
interview will be found in Section VI, the Working
Group believes that the unexpectedly low percentage
of drug-related citations is probably due to the
variations from agency to agency in the matter of
personal interviews. The "natural screening" which
seems to occur with some agencies may also account
for the phenomenon but we believe further analysis is
required before any further conclusion is reached. To
complete this review of the categories and
subcategories of adverse data, the reader is referred to
Appendix C-13 for a description of the data identified
in the category, "other." Although some of these data
could have been included under specifically identified
headings and some others, e.g., medical disqualifica-
tions not disclosed by investigation, no adjustments in
the data were made.
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
Categories and Sub-Categories of Information
(Adverse Factors)
A. Subject Cooperation
Fl F2 F3 F4 Totals
122
1. Refusal to furnish information 5 2 7
2. Refusal to
give release 1 1
3. Falsification in papers or interview 18 56 25 15 114
4. False identity
B. Loyalty
1. Treason
2. Espionage
3. Sabotage
4. Subversion
5. Disaffection
2
3
5
6. Conflict of security interest
2
C. Foreign Connections
-
4
5*
106
1. Subject is not US citizen
4
4
2. Spouse not citizen
19
19
3. Relatives potential "hostage"
I I
12
4. Alien relatives, "hostage" unlikely
58
3
62
5. Life abroad cannot be verified
3
1
4
D. Dishonesty
1. Criminal: theft, burglary, forgery, fraud, perjury, etc.
80
23
106
-2.-Non-criminal: lying, cheating, plagiarism, etc.
17
7
1
25
E. Irresponsibility
I
1*
228
1. Violation of security regulations
5
6
2. Insubordination, misfeasance
26
12
1
50
3. Draft evasion, desertion
3
1
6
4. Poor judgment
87
23
4
122
5. Indiscreet
9
1
19
6. Scofflaw
9
2
24
F. Immoral Conduct
I
2*
90
1. Homosexual conduct
21
1
30
2. Other perverted conduct
6
7
3. Heterosexual misconduct
35
51
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96MO1138RO01200020003-2
Figure 11-7 (Continued)
Categories and Sub-Categories of Information
(Adverse Factors)
C. Financial
1
1*
149
1. Excessive indebtedness
29
4
4
37
2. Irresponsibility, refusal to pay debts
65
19
8
95
3. Living beyond means, unexplained affluence
4. Excessive or compulsive gambling
5. Business bankruptcy
3
6. Personal bankruptcy
9
H. Medical
79
1. Mental illness or impairment
3
4
2. Emotional instability
27
7
3
37
3. Inability to cope with stress
26
10
1
37
1. Drugs or Alcohol
3
4*
452
1. Drug experimentation
195
222
2. Drug abuse, rehabilitated
39
9
48
3. Current marijuana use
41
6
1
48
4. Current abuse of other drugs
16
5. Alcohol abuse
78
6. Drug trafficking
7
9
J. Criminal (other than above)
2
1
3*
300
1. Juvenile
43
7
1
51
2. Adult: only minor traffic violation
94
19
2
115
3. Adult misdemeanor
94
10
5
109
4. Adult felony
13
8
22
K. Other
47
13
4
65
Totals
1,261
334
99
1,730
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138R001200020003-2
Categories and Sub-Categories of Information
(Resolved Against Factors)
A. Subject Cooperation
1. Refusal to furnish information
2. Refusal to give release
3. Falsification in papers or interview
4. False identity
4. Subversion
5. Disaffection
6. Conflict of security interest
C. Foreign Connections
2
2'
16
1. Subject is not US citizen
3
2. Spouse not citizen
3
3
3. Relatives potential "hostage"
3
1
4
- _
4. Alien relatives, "hostage" unlikely
3
3
-
5. Life abroad cannot be verified
1
1
D. Dishonesty
45
1. Criminal: theft, burglary, forgery, fraud, perjury, etc.
22
11
2
35
2. Non-criminal: lying, cheating, plagiarism, etc.
6
4
10
E. Irresponsibility
66
1. Violation of security regulations
1
I
2. Insubordination, misfeasance
2
2
3
7
3. Draft evasion, desertion
1
i
4. Poor judgment
36
6
4
2
48
5. Indiscreet
1
4
i
6
Scofflaw
_-_-
.
2
2
4
Immoral Conduct
1
1 ?
34
Homosexual conduct
16
4
2
1
23
2. Other perverted conduct
1
1
3. Heterosexual misconduct
2
4
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Figure 11-8 (Continued)
Categories and Sub-Categories of Information
(Resolved Against Factors)
G. Financial
37
1. Excessive indebtedness
7
1
2
10
2. Irresponsibility, refusal to pay debts
8
11
2
1
22
3. Living beyond means, unexplained affluence
4. Excessive or compulsive gambling
5. Business bankruptcy
6. Personal bankruptcy
3
1
1
5
H. Medical
16
1. Mental illness or impairment
2
2
2. Emotional instability
4
3
1
8
3. Inability to cope with stress
4
2
6
1. Drugs or Alcohol
1
1'
124
2. Drug abuse, rehabilitated
8
6
14
3. Current marijuana use
27
6
1
34
4. Current abuse of other drugs
14
14
6. Drug trafficking
4
1
5
J. Criminal (other than above)
20
1. Juvenile
3
1
4
2. Adult: only minor traffic violation
2
2
1
5
4. Adult felony
4
4
1
9
K. Other
19
3
1
23
23
Totals
254
108
35
12
409
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
Categories and Sub-Categories of Information
Ratios of Resolved Against
to Adverse Factors
A. Subject Cooperation
1. Refusal to furnish information
2. Refusal to give release
3. Falsification in papers or interview
4. False identity
B. Loyalty
1. Treason
2. Espionage
3. Sabotage
4. Subversion
5. Disaffection
.20
6. Conflict of security interest
.50
C. Foreign Connections
1. Subject is not US citizen
,75
2. Spouse not citizen
.16
3. Relatives potential "hostage"
.33
4. Alien relatives, "hostage" unlikely
.05
5. Life abroad cannot be verified
.25
D. Dishonesty
1. Criminal: theft, burglary, forgery, fraud, perjury, etc.
.33
2. Non-criminal: lying, cheating, plagiarism, etc.
.40
E. Irresponsibility
.29
1. Violation of security regulations
.17
2. Insubordination, misfeasance
.14
3. Draft evasion, desertion
.17
4. Poor judgment
.39
.26,----
.17
.77
2. Other perverted conduct
.29
3. Heterosexual misconduct
.16
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Figure 11-9 (Continued)
1. Excessive indebtedness .27
2. Irresponsibility, refusal to pay debts .23
3. Living beyond means, unexplained affluence -
4. Excessive or compulsive gambling -
.42
.25
H. Medical .20
1. Mental illness or impairment .50
2. Emotional instability .22
3. Inability to cope with stress _ .16
1. Drugs or Alcohol .27
1. Drug experimentation .15
2. Drug abuse, rehabilitated .29
3. Current marijuana use .71
4. Current abuse of other drugs .88
5. Alcohol abuse .21
6. Drug trafficking .56
J. Criminal (other than above) .07
1. Juvenile .08
2. Adult: only minor traffic violation .04
3. Adult misdemeanor .02
4. Adult felony .41
K. Other .35
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Productivity According to Purpose of Investigation
The next review was an analysis of the productivity of
adverse data according to the purpose of the investiga-
tion; the basic data is summarized in Figure II-10. This
chart makes use of the index concept by which an
attempt is made to show the productivity of a subset as
compared to the subset's relative share of effort. For
example, it is seen that the investigations conducted for
SCI access did not produce adverse data or resolved
against data in proportion to their share of the total
cases. On the other hand, investigations conducted for
Top Secret clearance produced both adverse data and
resolved against data in excess of their share of the
total cases. The "Q" clearance cases produced about
their share of adverse data but when it came to
resolved against cases, their ratio was far below all
others. There are a number of possible reasons to
explain the relatively lower productivity of the SCI
cases as compared to the Top Secret cases. Among
them are different agency investigative standards,
different agency adjudication standards, and, finally,
the skewing effect of a previous investigation which
seems to be more prevalent with the SCI group cases.
It is noted elsewhere that 40% of the SCI access
investigations had previously been subjected to either a
BI or an SBI. (See Section IV for further details.) A
careful review of the sample indicated that a substan-
tial number of Top Secret cases involved the use of the
polygraph and another significant portion involved
special agent applicant cases for the FBI.
Assuming that these cases would be more thoroughly
investigated and more stringently adjudicated, their
data was omitted from a recalculation of the productiv-
ity indices. The full data are shown in Appendix C-14
but the indices themselves are depicted in Figure II-11.
Although the influence of the polygraph will be
assessed in more detail in Section VI, Figure 1I-12
compares differences between investigations in which
the polygraph was used and those in which it was not.
Investigations conducted for SCI access or Top Secret
clearance, including the FBI sample, produced a
resolved against rate of 5.8%. When preemployment
and other miscellaneous investigations were added to
the total, the resolved against rate was reduced to
3.8%. Interestingly enough, the DCI's intelligence
community SCI access resolved against rate was 5.1%
for 1978, as cited in a 1979 Congressional Committee
Report. *
In contrast, the current survey shows that, where the
polygraph was used in addition to ordinary investiga-
tive sources, the resolved against rate was 21.4%,
almost four times as high as the rate for the other
investigations.
*Subcommittee on Oversight, Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives, Staff Report, "Security
Clearance Procedures in the Intelligence Agencies," September
1979, Pages 8 and 13.
Productivity Indices
According to Purpose of Investigation
TS
Q Crypto
Other
Totals
75
2,213
841
1,004 29
1,042
5,204
Percent of Total
1.4
43
16
19 0.5
20
Adverse Cases
16
478
326
-
242 -
199
1,261
Percent of Total Adverse
1.27
37.91
,
25.85
19.19 -
15.78
Index*
.91
.88
1.62
1.01 -
.79
Resolved Against Cases
5
94
133
4 -
18
254
Percent of Total Resolved Against
1.97
37.01
52.36
1.57 -
7.08
Index**
.35
* Indices derived from dividing Percentage of Total Adverse by
Percentage of Total Cases.
* * Indices derived from dividing Percentage of Total Resolved
Against by Percentage of Total Cases.
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Productivity Indices
According to Purpose of Investigation
(Omitting CIA Polygraph and FBI Cases)
SCI TS
Adverse Data Index
(1,010 Cases)
Resolved Against Data Index
(132 Cases)
General Adverse and Resolved Against Data:
Comparison of SCI Access (SBI) and
TS (BI) Cases with Others
Total
Cases
No. of
Adverse
Cases
SCI*
2,213
478
TS**
378
75
TS-FBI***
136
52
Sub-total
2,727
605
Others
2,150
457
Sub-total
4,877
1,062
TS-Polygraph
327
199
Total
5,204
1,261
* 2,107 of these cases were conducted by the Defense Investigative
Service.
* * Includes investigations conducted by CIA without use of
polygraph.
*** Investigations conducted on Special Agent applicants only.
Adverse
as Pet of
Total
Cases
No. of
Resolved
Against
Cases
Resolved
Against as Pct
of Total
Cases
21.6
94
4.2
19.8
11
2.9
38.2
52
38.2
22.2
157
5.8
21.3
27
1.3
22.8
184
3.8
60.9
70
21.4
24.2
254
4.9
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Investigative Agencies
Some interesting comparisons are shown when the
general data in Figures II-1 and [I-2 are grouped
according to various investigative agencies (see Figure
II-13). OPM investigative sources produced the lowest
percentage of cases with adverse information, followed
by slightly higher rates at CIA, Defense Investigative
Service (DIS), and the State Department. The highest
rates came from Treasury and the FBI. While it could
be said that these figures roughly reflect the compara-
tive thoroughness of investigations among the various
agencies, certain caveats must be made which tend to
confuse such claims. For example, OPM conducted a
large number of pre-employment investigations and
did not need to adhere to DCID 1/ 14 standards, while
almost 97% of the DIS investigations were SBI and
would be expected to produce more adverse informa-
tion. As shown in Figure II-13, the strength of the
polygraph examination is strikingly evident.
The significance of adverse information becomes more
apparent when the resolved against rate is shown. It
appears that almost none of the adverse information
produced by State and OPM was critical enough to
produce clearance or employment denials, while, on
the other hand, the FBI found that its adverse
information was sufficient in every case to deny
clearance or employment. It should be noted, however,
that the FBI sample contained special agent applicants
only. Excluding the FBI example, the highest resolved
against-to-adverse information ratio by far came from
the use of the polygraph.
General Data Grouped by
Investigative Agency
Pct of
Cases With
Pct of
Cases With
Ratios: Pct of
Resolved Against
Relative Productivity Index*
Adverse Data
Resolved Against
Data
Divided by
Pct Adverse
Adverse Data
Resolved Against
Data
Defense Investigative Service
22.2
0.198
.92
Office of Personnel
Management
14.9
0.2
0.013
.61
State
23.9
0
0
.99
FBI
38.2
38.2
1.000
1.58
7.83
Treasury
49.7
5.8
0.117
2.05
1.18
CIA (Non-Polygraph)
20.6
7.2
0.350
.85
1.48
Sub-totals
21.8
3.8
0.174
.94
.77
CIA (With Polygraph)
60.9
21.4
0.352
2.51
4.39
Totals
24.2
4.9
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Period of Coverage Analysis
The data were examined from several points of view to
determine the extent to which older information was
acquired in investigations, the extent to which older
information was used in making adverse decisions, and
any changes in productivity for particular sources or
groups of sources of older as distinguished from newer
information. The adjudicators completing the survey
were instructed to identify for each factor of adverse
data the age or "years ago" of the data. More
specifically, they were instructed to select a time frame
which would represent the minimum period necessary
to acquire that particular item of data. A current
condition or characteristic was to be identified as
having a "years ago" of one year.
Figure III-1, drawn on a semi-log scale, depicts the
total number of adverse factors by age groups and also
shows the frequency of cases by target period of
coverage. The line describing the age of the adverse
data shows a general decline overall but indicates a
relative degree of productivity in the seven to 10-year
range with only a slight drop from there to the 15-year
old information.
Correlation Between Period of Coverage and Age of
Data
Assuming that there might be some correlation be-
tween the period of coverage and the age of the adverse
data acquired, the scattergram shown in Figure 111-2
was prepared. The numbers reflect the identifications
of the agencies and the letter "M" reflects the mean.
As will be seen, there may be a very general correlation
between the period of coverage and the age of data
acquired but clearly the experience from one agency to
the next is widely varied and evidently the basis for any
more specific correlation must be sought elsewhere.
Figure 111-3 depicts the data organized by age ("years
ago maximum") against the intended period of cover-
age. The "age" is calculated on the basis of the oldest
minimum "years ago" for any of the factors cited in
the case. The intended or "target" period is calculated
on the basis of the subject's age and takes into
consideration the fact of any previous investigation.
This particular array encompasses the 1,261 cases in
which adverse data was revealed. As was to be
expected, the investigations with shorter periods of
coverage revealed a fair amount of adverse data
acquired outside the specified period of coverage.
What was not expected was the fairly large amount of
adverse data acquired outside the period of coverage
for investigations at the upper level of the scale. It is
noted, for example, that investigations requiring a five-
year period of coverage produced adverse data over the
full range of years up to and including 21-plus. It is
also noted, however, that the total number of investiga-
tions requiring a five-year period of coverage (332
cases) was very substantial, more than 26% of all
adverse cases, and, as will be discussed later (see
Figure 111-7), the productivity of adverse information
for the five-year period of coverage cases was not as
dramatic as might be supposed.
With the thought that some of the adverse data in the
foregoing figure might have been produced by previous
investigation, a new array was compiled on the basis of
data limited to the adverse information produced by
the investigations in which there had been no previous
investigation. This new array, shown in Appendix
C-16, did not produce any substantial differences from
that represented by all adverse data in Figure 111-3 and
it is noted that the cumulative percentages for each are
extremely close. It is also noted that these are gross
data and do not take into consideration the relative
effort made for each period of coverage grouping.
It is interesting to note from the foregoing data that
84% of the adverse data captured was within the target
period of coverage and included cases in which the
period of coverage was not shown. 90% of the adverse
data captured was within the target period of coverage
plus three years and 95% of the data was within five
years of the target period of coverage.
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1000
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
z
100
90
80
70
60
60
20
I
7 10 16 20 21+
Target Period of Coverage or Age of Data In Years
Figure I11-1
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15
11
10
12
1 2 3 4 5 6
Age of Adverse Data (mean)
Figure 111-2
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Adverse Data (1,261 Cases)
(Years Required To Capture Data)
NS
10
7
3
10
3 16
25
19
31
2
1
127
21+
1
0
0
1
0 17
1
4
8
0
2
34
100
20
0
0
0
0
7
0
4
4
0
0
15
97
15
2
0
0
0
1 9
3
9
22
5
0
51
96
10
4
0
1
0
l
6
7
5
1
1
1
t
i
7
5
1
1
3
4
39
9
13
13
4
3
92
72
4
3
4
5
4
3 28
5
18
14
1
2
87
64
3
3
3
7
10
8 34
13
24
11
2
2
117
57
2
7
12
15
14
8 54
22
28
23
0
1
184
46
1
15
22
22
23
15 73
48
59
56
3
5
341
30
Figure 111-4 depicts data involved in the 254 cases
which were resolved against the applicant. It is noted
that, although 7% of the data used was captured
outside the target period of coverage, all of the adverse
data resolved against the individual was captured
within a 15-year period of coverage. Again, using only
the cases in which no previous investigation had been
conducted (see Appendix C-17), the cumulative per-
centages of productivity are remarkably similar to
those of the total data.
The cumulative frequencies shown in Figures 111-3 and
111-4 are shown graphically in Figure 11I-5. Both
curves, one representing the cumulative percentage of
adverse data, the other the cumulative percentage of
resolved against data, are rather uniform and indicate
decreasing increments as the data increases in age. As
expected, the age of resolved against data tended to be
somewhat newer than the age of all adverse data.
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Resolved Against Data (254 Cases)
(Years Required To Capture Data)
NS
4
2
1
4
1
0
3
2
8
26
-
21+
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
100
20
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
100
6
100
18
97
7
0
0
0
1
0
2
5
10
7
2
27
89
0
5
0
0
1
1
0
1
2
6
5
17
78
4
1
0
2
3
0
5
4
6
5
27
70
H
3
1
0
2
4
4
1
1
6
5
25
58
2
4
0
2
3
2
2
4
4
8
0
0
29
47
1
4
2
5
11
2
9
10
14
20
2
0
79
35
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Percentage of Data Acquired by Age (Years Ago ) of Data
Pa
ale e Data
.rte
e
~ ~ Pd
we
e,
Figure 111-5
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Periods of Coverage Risking Loss of Data
These results are summarized in Figure 111-6. It is
noted that the investigations with a five- or seven-year
target date of coverage risk losing substantial percent-
ages of data resolved against the individual, 22% and
11%, respectively. This percentage drops off somewhat
at the ten-year level and, at least in the sample used in
this study, was reduced to zero by a 15-year period of
coverage.
adverse data (see Figure 111-3), the relative productiv-
ity index was actually at .70, substantially lower than
the index of any of the other target periods of coverage.
A similar examination of the cases which were resolved
against the individual reveal even more dramatic
differences (see lines 6-8). It is noted for example that
the 20-year period of coverage yielded an index of 2.25.
This could be due to the distorting effect of a small
sample or possibly it could be explained by differences
in agency practices. For example, the agencies setting
a target period of coverage of 16 or more years (there
A Period of
Coverage of
Would Risk Losing
Adverse Data
Data
7 Years
17%
11%
10 Years
9%
3'
15 Years
4%
0%
An attempt was then made to relate the gross data
discussed above to the actual effort expended for each
period of coverage grouping. Figure 111-7 depicts the
data used to calculate a productivity index (line 5)
according to target period of coverage. It is somewhat
surprising to note that, although the cases targeting a
five-year period of coverage showed a high number of
were 176 cases in this category) might well require a
substantially greater investigative scope in terms of the
number of contacts per case. Referring back to the
data in Figure II-1, however, we note that Agency Two
accounted for 89 of the 176 cases. The Working Group
member representing that agency indicated that the
scope was not extraordinary and did not differ
substantially from that of the other participating
agencies. While the Working Group found it difficult
to account for some of the phenomena shown in this
figure, it seems evident that target periods of coverage
of 10 and 15 years, and quite possibly 20 years, are
relatively productive in terms of both adverse and
resolved against data.
Productivity Indices According To
Target Periods Of Coverage
Period of Coverage
in Years
1. Number of Cases
136
1,955
552
655
928
100
76
5,204
2. Percent of Total Cases
2.613
37.567
10.607
12.586
17.832
1.922
1.460
-
3. Number of Adverse Cases
51
50
57
67
40
332
144
249
230
24
17
1,261
4. Percent of All Adverse Cases
4.044
3.965
4.520
5.313
3.172
26.328
11.420
19.746
18.239
1.903
1.348
-
5. Productivity Index *
1.00
.96
1.00
1.95
1.21
.70
1.08
1.57
1.02
.99
6. Number of Cases Resolved Against
16
4
13
27
9
21
31
56
66
11
--
254
7. Percent of All Cases Resolved
Against
6.299
1.575
5.118
10.630
3.543
8.268
12.205
22.047
25.984
4.330
8. Productivity Index **
1.56
.38
1.13
3.90
1.36
.22
1.15
1.75
1.46
2.25
-
NOTE:
* Line 4 divided by Line 2 = Line 5.
** Line 7 divided by Line 2 = Line 8.
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Sources and Age of Data
In an effort to understand the low productivity indices
for cases in the five-year target period of coverage, we
noted that Agencies One, Four, and Twelve had fairly
significant proportions of their cases in that range. It
was also noted that Agency Twelve had a relatively
lower rate of adverse information (see Figures II-1 and
11-2). When the data were restructured, leaving out
that of Agency Twelve, the indices became somewhat
smoother and the index for the five-year target period
of coverage was raised from .70 to .82. The revised
data are shown in Appendix C-18. Several other
correlations were tabulated by deleting one or another
agency in an effort to explain the low productivity for
the group of cases with a target period of coverage of
five years and, conversely, to explain the relatively
higher productivity of cases targeted at either three or
four years. It may be assumed that, given the formula
for the productivity index, the relatively low number of
cases with a target period of coverage of three or four
years would tend to distort the ratio represented by the
productivity index, but no similar explanation could be
found for the low index for the five-year period of
coverage group. With the thought that the solution
might lie in the types of sources checked in these
investigations, a table was compiled showing individ-
ual types of sources arrayed according to the target
period of coverage. These frequencies are shown in
Appendix C-19. When the data are reduced to
percentages as shown in Appendix C- 19, one fact
immediately stands out. The number of cases in the
five-year period of coverage in which developed
sources were checked is substantially lower than the
comparable figure for any other period of coverage. It
will be seen elsewhere in this report (see especially
Section V) that the developed source is highly produc-
tive. This observation appears to account for the low
productivity of adverse data in the five-year target
period of coverage group.
On the assumption that the wide fluctuations in the
indices for the years one through five could be
traceable to a variety of factors and recognizing that
reduction of coverage below five years is not a serious
alternative, the data were then reorganized to show the
figures for periods of coverage for one through five
years as a single entry. The revised data are shown in
the chart at Appendix C-21 and the indices themselves
have been graphed in Figure 111-8. It should be noted
that this chart does not illustrate the age of the adverse
information or the resolved against data but rather
relates only to the target periods of coverage which
produced adverse or resolved data over the full range of
years. It will be seen, for example, that investigations
targeted at one through five years or 20 years or more
did not produce adverse data as often as might be
expected while those targeted at 10 or 15 years
produced relatively more than their share of adverse
data. Turning to the information resolved against the
individual, it will be seen that the investigations
targeted at 10 years were most productive although
those targeted at 15 and 20 years produced relatively
much more than their expected share of resolved
against data.
It should be noted that the foregoing examinations in
Figures 111-7 and 111-8 considered not the age of the
information produced or the "years ago maximum"
but rather merely the target period of coverage. For
example, a case which actually produced data only two
or three years old might still be accounted for in the 15-
year column on the grounds that the target period of
coverage was 15 years. In view of this, it was therefore
necessary to re-examine the data analyzing the actual
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Productivity Indices By Target Period Of Coverage
16
Period of Coverage (Years)
Figure 111-8
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
age of the information. To simplify the procedure
somewhat, that analysis was limited to field type
sources; the NAC, the polygraph, and subject admis-
sions were excluded from the computation. The only
manner in which these latter sources were considered
at all was when identifying the uniqueness of field
sources. For example, credit checks were cited as
unique sources of adverse data seven years or older on
four occasions and in those four instances, there were
no other sources of any kind which provided the same
information. A recapitulation of the data used in this
exercise is shown in Appendix C-22. A summary of the
productivity indices derived from that data is seen in
Figure 111-9.
It was not surprising to note that the residence check
was relatively unproductive for this older information;
this undoubtedly is due to the fact that few agencies
attempt to check residences more than five years old.
The bar charts shown in Figure I-1 further illustrate
that fact. Similarly it should be noted that most
agencies limit personal source checks at places of
employment to ten years. We note that this type of
check did not figure at all as a unique source for
information 15 years old or more although it did figure
rather strongly in conjunction with other sources of
data that old. It is further noted that police checks
figured quite prominently as a source of older
information.
Previous Investigations
Although the effect of a previous investigation will be
examined in more detail in Section IV, an effort was
made to ascertain the extent to which older adverse
data were disclosed in investigations which had pre-
viously been subjected to either a background investi-
gation or a special background investigation. The
frequencies are depicted in the chart at Appendix C-23
and the indices are shown in Figures III-10. Although
it was expected that these investigations would have
revealed a lower share of adverse data, it is somewhat
surprising to note they did nevertheless disclose data of
some vintage and, as a matter of fact, the indices for
cases previously subjected to an SBI were fairly high.
The group with a target period of coverage of 10 or
more years actually had an index of 1.1, slightly better
than might have been anticipated from the effort.
Productivity Indices:
Older Data *
7 Years
or Older
10 Years
or Older
15 Years
or Older
7 Years
or Older
10 Years
or Older
15 Years
or Older
Education Record
.15
-
.09
Education Personal Interview
.23
.38
.24
.23
-
Employment Record
.62
.41
.90
.79
1.02
Employment Personal Interview
.37
.20
.89
.75
.34
Residence
.10
.12
.11
Listed References
.17
-
.45
.45
.46
Developed Sources
.93
.61
.64
1.85
1.63
1.53
Police
4.71
5.81
5.54
3.08
3.50
3.22
Credit
.61
.25
.53
.88
.77
.70
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Older Adverse Data
After Previous Investigation
All
Years
Years
7 Years
or Older
10 Years
or Older
15 Years
or Older
7 Years
or Older
10 Years
or Older
15 Years
or Older
Number of Cases
1,212
800
654
445
222
130
Percentage of Total Cases (5,204)
23.29
15.37
12.57
8.55
4.27
2.50
1.59
.98
Adverse Cases
246
168
141
90
49
31
22
11
Percentage of Total Adverse (1,261)
19.51
13.32
11.18
7.14
3.89
2.46
1.75
0.87
Index*
.84
.87
.89
.84
.91
.98
1.1
.89
* Note: Indices derived from dividing Percentage of Total Adverse
by Percentage of Total Cases.
Effects of Overall Increase in Period of Coverage
The Working Group recognizes the concern that any
significant increases in the period of coverage would
require additional resources and that some managers
in the security community have expressed the view that
the costs attendant to any substantial increases could
be prohibitive. An attempt was made, therefore, to
ascertain possible outside parameters for any such
increases in effort using the data available in the
current survey. In Appendix C-1, data is portrayed
showing the age of the subjects of investigation by
Effect of Change in Periods of Coverage
Compared to Actual Mean for
This Survey
Agency:
Mean Target Period of
Coverage, this Survey
agency. These data relate exclusively to the age of the
subject and do not show the target period of coverage
for the particular case. In other words, the data do not
take into consideration the possibility that the current
investigation was merely a "bring-up" from an earlier
investigation and the column "Period of Coverage"
relates only to the theoretical period of coverage for a
person of that age. In Figure III-11 these data are
If a 5 year POC were standard,
mean would be: 3.6 4.0 4.9 4.7 4.3 4.7 4.4
Pct of change from actual,
this survey
If a 10 year POC were standard,
mean would be:
Pet of change from actual,
this survey
If a 15 year POC were standard,
mean would be:
Pct of change from actual,
this survey
-17 +72 -06 -05 -06 -06 -11 +47 +03
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summarized to compare, by agency, the theoretical
mean target period of coverage for a standard five-year
POC, a 10-year POC and a 15-year POC. The data for
each agency is then compared to the mean period of
coverage actually targeted in the current survey and
the percentage difference between each theoretical
period of coverage and the actual mean for the current
survey is shown. Because several agencies (notably
One, Two, and Eleven) conducted a number of
investigations in the current survey with a target
period of coverage in an excess of 15 years, the
theoretical mean for a standard 15-year POC for those
agencies is revealed as less than the actual mean for the
current survey. It is assumed that those agencies,
having decided that the extra period of coverage was
needed in the current cases, would continue to regard
such additional coverage as necessary, so a net savings
ought not to be presumed. For the other agencies, a
standard period of coverage of 15 years would, in fact,
appear to require additional resources ranging from a
13% increase for Agency Three to a 126% increase for
Agency Four or a 32% increase for the total sample.
With the exception of Agency Four, and possibly Five
and Twelve, a change in standard periods of coverage
to 15 years would not appear to require a substantial
increase in costs, particularly when it is remembered
that these data do not take into consideration the effect
of a prior investigation. Moreover, an increase from
five or ten years to 15 in most situations would not
represent an across-the-board increase for all types of
sources. For example, there ought to be no increase in
listed reference coverage nor should the credit check
require any extra effort. Further, the education and
residence checks would be largely unchanged due to
the fact that few agencies now cover residences for
more than five years anyway and most verify at least
higher education even outside the period of coverage. It
should be noted further that the mean target period of
coverage shown in this figure may be somewhat higher
than the mean of all cases conducted for a particular
agency, especially for Agencies One, Two and Three
(and possibly Six), inasmuch as the samples for those
agencies included a large number of special back-
ground investigations. Undoubtedly these observations
can be refined and eventually should be related to the
actual dollar costs of conducting investigations.
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Effects of Previous Investigations
Recognizing that many of the current investigations in
the survey were of persons who had previously been
subjected to investigations ranging from the Entry
NAC to the SBI, a number of questions immediately
come to mind. Does the nature or extent of the previous
investigation have any discernible effect on the produc-
tivity of a subsequent one? For example, would the
existence of a previous SBI tend to diminish the
productivity of a current investigation and, if so, could
that be explained as the "screening effect" of the
earlier inquiry? Does a previous investigation, espe-
cially one meeting BI or SBI standards, influence the
productivity of (1) specific types of sources, (2) the age
of the adverse data acquired, or (3) the type of data
acquired? More particularly, do older data in a case
previously subjected to a BI or SBI tend to come from a
narrower range of sources? Taken from another
perspective, could this group of cases be regarded as
indicative of the effect of a routine reinvestigation,
taking into consideration, of course, that a more
stringent adjudication standard may be pertinent to a
current case than to an earlier one?
Types of Previous Inquiries
Figure IV-1 depicts data which compare the type of
previous inquiry to the purpose of the current investi-
gation. It is interesting to note that 33% of the
investigations for SCI access had been subjected
previously to a BI and another 7% had previously been
subjected to an SBI. The relevant data for the Top
Secret investigations had comparable percentages.
Still, 59% of all cases in the entire sample had no
previous inquiry of any type.
Relationship of Scope and Productivity
The data portrayed in Figure IV-2 leads to the
development of a productivity index according to the
type of previous inquiry. Adverse data derived solely
from the FBI main files, OPM, DOD or other NAC
records were deliberately omitted from this analysis to
make certain that the adverse data considered came
solely from the current investigation and not from the
previous one. The productivity index shown in the last
column forms a very neat, downward curve and clearly
suggests that the scope of any previous inquiry does, in
fact, have a strong and direct relationship to the
amount of adverse information produced in a subse-
quent check.
Sources and Categories of Information
An effort was then made to determine whether the
adverse data in these cases which had previously been
subjected to either a BI or an SBI could be attributed
to any particular sources or groups of sources. In
addition, the data were examined to determine the age
of the adverse data revealed in the current investiga-
tion for both groups. Appendix C-23 is a recapitulation
of the data from these various perspectives. It is noted
that cases previously subjected to a BI acquired
current information from the full spectrum of sources
although the education sources, residence checks, and
listed references were relatively weak. Police sources
were very stong, as were various elements of the NAC,
and employment sources were not far behind. The
polygraph again emerged as an extremely strong
source and had a greater degree of uniqueness than did
the other sources. Examining cases previously sub-
jected to an SBI, the same general pattern emerges
although on a somewhat reduced scale, as might be
expected by the fact of the greater scope accorded the
SBI.
Referring back to Figure III-10 (in the previous
section), which is a summary of the data arranged
according to the age of the adverse data produced, it
will be observed that there appears to be no particu-
larly strong pattern in the productivity indices derived
from that data. With all indices in the range from .84
to 1.1, it appears that those cases produced adverse
information of an age roughly proportionate to the
effort expended in terms of the target period of
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coverage. The figures are relatively small, however,
particularly regarding the cases previously subjected to
an SBI. It may be that with a larger sample a more
discernible pattern might become apparent.
It is interesting to note the types of resolved against
data revealed by current investigation in cases where
the individual had previously been subjected to a BI or
an SBI. The data is shown by category in Appendix
C-24. Of the 78 factors for the 49 cases involved,
homosexual activity accounted for nine (11%), while
drugs and alcohol accounted for 24 (or almost 31%).
Foreign connections, dishonesty and criminal activ-
ity-"other than above" accounted for seven each (or
about 10% each). As might have been expected, most
of the data was current or relatively new, at least 70%
of it five years old or less.
Previous Investigation Type Compared To
This Investigation Purpose
This Investigation
FREQUENCY
PERCENT
ROW Pct
COL Pct
NS
SCI
TS
Previous Investigation
NONE
43
728
503
866
21
920
3,081
0.83
13.99
9.67
16.64
0.40
17.68
59.20
1.40
23.63
16.33
28.11
0.68
29.86
57.33
32.90
59.81
86.25
72.41
88.29
2
253
2
1
5
0
263
0.04
4.86
0.04
0.02
0.10
0.00
5.05
0.76
96.20
0.76
0.38
1.90
0.00
2.67
11.43
0.24
0.10
17.24
0.00
3
280
12
50
1
12
358
0.06
5.38
0.23
0.96
0.02
0.23
6.88
0.84
78.21
3.35
13.97
0.28
3.35
4.00
12.65
1.43
4.98
3.45
1.15
2
40
3
0
0
23
68
0.04
0.77
0.06
0.00
0.00
0.44
1.31
2.94
58.82
4.41
0.00
0.00
33.82
2.67
1.81
0.36
0.00
0.00
2.21
19
745
274
87
0
87
1,212
0.37
14.32
5.27
1.67
0.00
1.67
23.29
1.57
61.47
22.61
7.18
0.00
7.18
25.33
33.66
32.58
8.67
0.00
8.35
6
167
47
0
2
0
222
0.12
3.21
0.90
0.00
0.04
0.00
4.27
2.70
75.23
21.17
0.00
0.90
0.00
8.00
7.55
5.59
0.00
6.90
0.00
Totals
75
2,213
841
1,004
29
1,042
5,204
1.44
42.52
16.16
19.29
0.56
20.02
100.00
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Figure IV-2
Productivity Index According to
Previous Type of Investigation:
Cases With Adverse Information
es of Previous
T
Frequency
Percent of
Frequency
Percent of Productivity
yp
ation
ti
I
of Cases
Total Cases
of Adverse
Total Adverse --Index **
nves
g
715
62.66 1.06
71
6.22 1.23
82
7.19 1.05
15
1.31 1.00
221
19.37 .83
37
3.24 76
* Excludes cases in which the only adverse data came from FBI main
files, OPM, DOD, or NAC-other.
** Percent of Total Adverse divided by Percent of Total Cases equals
the Productivity Index. The higher the index, the greater the return
for the effort; or conversely, the lower the index, the more effective
the screening of the previous investigation.
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Source Analysis
A principal objective of the survey was to determine
the productivity of various types of sources or groups of
sources used in the background investigation proce-
dure. As noted elsewhere in this report, the analysis
related solely to the productivity of adverse data and
did not take into consideration an agency's need for
positive information about the individual.
Although the original plan for this survey had included
an attempt to acquire data on the effectiveness or
productivity of the polygraph examination as a
"screening procedure," distinct from the background
investigation, unforeseen circumstances precluded that
particular review. The survey did, however, include
examples of the polygraph examination in conjunction
with the background investigation; the productivity of
that particular pattern of polygraph procedure is
included in some of the analysis which follows in this
section. A more detailed review of the polygraph is
discussed in Section VI.
Types of Sources
Figure V-1 illustrates graphically the percentage of
cases in which individual types of sources were checked
in the cases examined in this survey. The National
Agency Check is not shown inasmuch as all cases are
expected to include that type of inquiry. It should be
noted that the bars do not represent true effort
inasmuch as they do not reflect the years of coverage
involved in each type of check. For example, as shown
in the charts in Figure I-1, few agencies verify
residence for more than three years. Further, the bars
do not represent the number of contacts per type of
source checked.
Figure V-2 illustrates the percentage of total cases in
which any particular source was cited for adverse data
in any of the four factors. In this instance the various
parts of the National Agency Check are included and
it is noted that police, subject admissions, developed
sources, and employment interviews appear to be
especially productive. It should be remembered, how-
ever, that these data do not take into consideration the
number of times these particular sources were
checked.
Productivity of Sources
Further analysis was therefore required to establish
the productivity index for each type of source. The
basic data for this latter review are shown in Appendix
C-25 and the indices derived therefrom are depicted in
Figure V-3. In this review each source citation for any
of the four factors is counted and then compared with
that source's share of the total source checks for the
entire sample. In this particular analysis, the subject as
a source was defined as including only cases in which
the subject was interviewed by either an "administra-
tive screening" or an "investigative interview." Spe-
cifically excluded from this particular heading were
(1) cases involving the polygraph, which are shown
separately and (2) cases in which the only subject
participation was in the form of personal history
papers. From any point of view, whether in terms of the
productivity of adverse data or resolved against data,
the polygraph procedure appears to be far and away
the most productive of all the individual types of
sources, with the subject interview a distant but still
strong second. In passing, it is noted that, in this
particular survey, the polygraph examination was
usually conducted after the investigation and could
therefore be considered more in the nature of a
confrontation, whereas the subject interview was
limited by definition to cases in which the interview
preceded the investigation. More specifically, inter-
views conducted as a matter of confrontation were
eliminated from the survey by definition. All this,
however, does not obviate the fact that the polygraph,
when used as it was in these cases, is a highly
productive technique. Of the other sources, police and
developed sources emerged as highly productive, while
the DOD portion of the name check and the employ-
ment interview also produced more than their expected
share of the adverse and resolved against data. It may
be significant that employment records as distin-
guished from interviews with employment sources
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Percent of Cases in Which Specific Types of Source Were Checked
Percent
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Subject Interview
Education Record
73.0%
Education Personal Source
Employment Record
Employment Personal Source
90.8%
Residence
95.4%
Listed Reference
Developed Source
60.1%
Police
Polygraph
? 6.3%
Does Not Include Polygraph
Figure V-1
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Percent of Total Cases In Which a Source was Cited In Any Factor
Percent
2 4 6 8 10
I I I
* Subject Admission
FBI Fingerprint
FBI Main
OPM
DOD
Other NAC
Educational Record
Education Personal Source
Employment Record
Employment Personal Source
Residence
Listed Reference
Developed Source
Police
Polygraph
00.5%
= 0.8%
1= Does Not Include Polygraph
Figure V-2
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Index of Adverse Data
Index of "Resolved Against" Data
(1,730 Factors)
(409 Factors)
As Unique
Source'
As Any
Source
As Unique
Source
As Any
Source'
Subject'
4.48
2.96
2.13
2.61
NAC: FBI Fingerprint Files
.09
.40
-
18
FBI Main Files
.03
.22
-
.06
OPM
.03
.55
-
1.56
DOD 2
.47
1.03
.54
1.40
Educational Records
.14
.13
-
.02
Educational Pers. Interviews
.12
.34
.12
.40
Employment Records
.29
.82
.40
.74
Employment Pers. Interviews
1.06
1.23
1.66
1.71
Residence Checks
.21
.34
.19
.39
Listed References
.07
.45
-
.52
Developed Sources
1.92
1.96
1.40
2.92
Police
1.92
2.03
1.49
1.35
Credit
.83
.65
.49
.67
Polygraph
50.80
14.96
79.79
23.48
NOTE:
' Includes cases in which Subject was interviewed administratively or
by investigator; excludes polygraph (shown as separate source) and
cases in which only source was Subject but in "papers only."
3 Estimated from totals for Agencies 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, and 9. Excludes
Agencies 5, 11, and 12.
' Not included in analysis; frequency of checks made is unknown;
checks were made only as needed.
' Index derived from dividing percentage of total unique sources by
percentage of total frequency. Example: Subject, 20.18%=4.5% _
productivity index of 4.48. (See Appendix C-25.)
' Index derived from dividing percentage of total as any source by
percentage of total frequency. Example: Subject, 13.34%=4.5% _
productivity index of 2.96.
were substantially lower. Educational and employment
records seemed to be relatively much less productive as
were credit checks and listed references. It should be
remembered, however, that in this analysis only
adverse data was recorded, not the positive data which
many agencies rely upon. Again, there is no attempt to
correlate these indices with the actual cost in terms of
either dollars or effort and, while most of the NAC
seems to be relatively less productive, it is also
relatively inexpensive.
In passing, a tabulation was prepared showing the
productivity of individual types of sources by agency.
The figures relating to adverse data are shown in
Appendix C-26 while the resolved against data are
shown in Figure V-4. There seem to be no major
surprises in this data; however, it is noted that three of
the four DOD agencies cited the DOD part of the
NAC as a source for resolved against data rather
frequently (especially Agency Three). Employment
interviews, as distinguished from employment record
checks, figured prominently and for Agency Eleven
that source was particularly productive.
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Table of Sources by Agency
(Resolved Against Data)
Not Shown'
Subject 2
Subject
NAC: FBI Fpt.
FBI Main
OPM
DOD
Other
Educational Records
Educational Personal
Employment Records
Employment Personal
Residential
Listed References
Developed Sources
Police
Credit
Polygraph
Totals
No. of Cases Resolved Against
' Not included in Totals.
- 1 1 -
8 1 2 -
17 12 36 -
13 5
3 7
1 5 - 1 -
9 5 11 3 -
30 6 21 9
15 10 16 2
9
11 12
2
1
7
10
1
-
4
-
10
5
-
-
2
1
-
4
1
-
3
3
2
3
4
10
30
5
6 -
10
1 -
18
18 -
7 -
2 Totals include submission of papers only.
Totals include results of administrative screening and investigative
interviews combined.
' Source used by one agency only.
Totals Pct. of
Resolved
Against
To Adverse
23 8.9
83 22.2
11 11.0
4 7.1
11 8.1
68 34.3
17 13.8
1 4.2
12 30.0
42 22.8
23 28.4
22 29.3
110 37.5
82 16.8
31 26.1
39.6
23.9
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Some idea of the quality of the data produced by each
source can be gained by comparing the frequency of
resolved against data with the frequency of all adverse.
The comparisons are expressed as percentages in the
far right-hand column of Figure V-4 and, while the
polygraph again emerges as the most productive,
developed sources and employment interviews are also
close behind. Surprisingly, from this perspective, listed
references, residence checks, and educational inter-
views (as distinguished from records) are also produc-
tive. Noting a relatively lower percentage for the police
checks, these comparisons lead to the observation that
persons interviewed seem to provide more data re-
solved against an individual than do record sources.
(See Figure V-5.)
In view of this observation, the data were regrouped
and compared in a simple correlation as shown in
Figure V-6. The source interviews are fairly produc-
tive, accounting for approximately 37% of the adverse
data, but the pattern is not particularly strong when
Record Sources by
Interview Sources *
Adverse Data
Interview Sources
No
Yes
567
379
Record
No
33%
22%
Sources
Yes
579
205
33%
12%
Resolved Against Data
Interview Sources
No
Yes
140
119
Record
No
34%
29%
Sources
Yes
90
60
22%
15%
Adverse Data
Interview Sources (Education, Employment,
Residence, Listed References, Developed Sources)
No
Yes
Record Sources
486
379
(Education,
No
29%
22%
Employment
Police, Credit)
Yes
579
246
34%
15%
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compared with either record sources or other sources
outside both groups such as the NAC, the polygraph,
or subject admissions.
The data were then reorganized into various mixes and
compared in the same format. Figure V-7 depicts the
data relating to all source citations for any of the 409
factors involved in the 254 resolved against cases. This
display includes the NAC and the personal interview
but does not include the polygraph or data revealed
only by the subject in personal history statements. A
pattern is clearly discernible here with 66% of the
resolved against data coming from the group of sources
which includes the NAC, the personal interview,
police, and credit checks.
Figure V-8 depicts the same data but with both
employment checks shifted from one group to the
other. It is noted that the pattern becomes more
pronounced with the new grouping of the NAC, the
personal interview, police, credit, and employment
checks accounting for 71% of the data in the resolved
against cases. The other groupings-education, resi-
dence, listed reference, and developed source-ac-
counted for only 11% of the resolved against data.
Resolved Against Data
NAC, Personal Interviews (W/O polygraph),
Police, Credit
No
Yes
Education, Employment
9
75
Residence,
No
--
9%
36%
Listed Reference,
7
62
64
Developed Source
7
30%
30%
Resolved Against Data
NAC, Personal Interviews (w/o polygraph),
Police, Credit, and Employment (R&I)
No
Yes
Education (R&I),
70
178
Residence,
No
18%
47%
Listed Reference,
Yes
42
89
Developed Source
11%
24%
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Recognizing that the polygraph examination tended to
be especially productive, the data were then
reexamined with the polygraph added and the results
are shown in Figure V-9. Obviously, addition of the
polygraph creates a substantial impact in favor of the
group consisting of the NAC, the personal interview,
police, credit, and employment checks.
Several correlations were prepared comparing individ-
ual sources with similar sources. For example, Figure
V-10 illustrates the relative productivity of the police
check as compared with the FBI fingerprint check. It
will be noted that, although the FBI fingerprints
produced data in 5% of the cases, they were the unique
source in only 1%, while the police checks were unique
in 22% of the cases.
Figure V-11 depicts the same data but is limited to the
cases which were resolved against the individual.
Again, the police check emerges as significantly
stronger than the FBI fingerprint check.
It is clear that the police check is one of the most
productive and useful sources of both adverse as well as
resolved against data. The Working Group is particu-
larly concerned, therefore, over evidence that access to
such data is being increasingly denied to the federal
agencies conducting personnel security investigations.
Comparison of Selected Sources
Resolved Against Data
NAC, Personal Interviews, Police, Credit,
Employment, and Polygraph
No
Yes
Education,
34
230
Residence,
No
9%
58%
Listed Reference,
Yes
31
100
Developed Source
8%
25%
Comparison of Police and
FBI Fingerprint Checks
All Cases With
FBI Fingerprint
Any Adverse Data
No
Yes
925
15
Police
No
73%
1%
Yes
272
49
22%
4%
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Figure V-11
Comparison of Police and
FBI Fingerprint Checks
Resolved Against Cases
FBI Fingerprint
No
Yes
213
0
No
83%
Police
Yes
37
4
15%
2%
Recent testimony before the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence suggests that the problem is
serious and that prompt corrective action is
appropriate. *
Value of National Agency Check (NAC)
Of the many additional correlations attempted, one
was particularly interesting. The NAC was compared
with all other sources including the personal interview
and the polygraph. The results are depicted in Figure
V-12. The 27 factors attributed to neither group of
sources represented either errors in which the source
was "not shown" or data derived solely from the
subject's personal history statment.
* For additional details see the Committee's report, pp.16-20. See
also a March 1979 report by Search Group Incorporated, "Federal
Access to State and Local Criminal Justice Information for Federal
Personnel Security and Employment Suitability Determination."
Sources and Categories of Information
Next the data were reviewed to ascertain whether
there might be an apparent correlation between
sources or groups of sources and the categories of
information revealed. The set reviewed consisted of all
cases resolved against the individual (denials or not
hired). The 254 cases had a total of 409 factors in
which categories of adverse information were cited.
There were a total of 618 source citations. The data are
shown in Appendix C-27 arranged according to
categories or resolved against data as revealed by five
major source groupings. Appendix C-28 displays
similar information for the 1,261 adverse cases with a
total of 2,432 source citations and 1,730 factors in
which categories of adverse information were cited.
The resolved against data is briefly summarized in
Figure V-13 on page 52.
Figure V-12
Comparison of the NAC
and Other Sources
Resolved Against Data
NAC
No
Yes
All Other Sources,
27
7
2%
Including Personal
No
7%
Interview and
Yes
277
98
Polygraph
68%
24%
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Source Citations (Grouped) by Category of Information
Resolved Against Data Only
Subject
Coopera-
[ion
12
NAC
26%
Loyalty
Foreign
Connec-
tions
7
32%
Dis-
honesty
12
17%
Irrespon-
sibility
11
12%
Immoral
Conduct
7
15%
Financial
13
18%
Medical Drugs
and
Alcohol
4 25
14% 14%
Criminal
8
25%
Other Total
6 105
23% 17%
5
7
4
20
2
53
2
93
Polygraph
23%
10%
4%
43%
3%
29%
6%
15%
5
1
6
6
5
3
15
1 31
4
6
83
Subject Interview
11%
50%
27%
9%
~
6%
6%
21%a
4% 17%
13%
1 23%
13%
--- 21
-
34
- __ 49
-
5
_
28
10 38
14
7
206
Employment (Records & Interviews)
Police Credit
45%
49%
56%
11%
39%
36%
44%
27%
33%
9
1
4
10
19
12
14
13 38
4
7
131
Education (Records & Interviews)
Listed References Dev. Sources
19%
50%
18%
15%
22%
25%
19 0
20%
4 o
13%
27%
21%
Total 47
2
22
69
88
47
72 72
185
28
32
26
618
Percent of total 7.6%
0.3%
3.6%
11.2%
1 14.2%
7.6%
11.7%
4.5% 29.9%
5.2%
4.2%
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
It was noted that the category cited most often in
resolved against cases was "drugs and alcohol" which
was cited as a category in almost 30% of the total
citations. The categories next most frequently cited
were irresponsibility (14% of the citations), financial
(12%), dishonesty (11%), and immoral conduct (8%).
It was also noted that each of the source groupings
figured prominently throughout the data. The subject
interview excluding the polygraph was cited in 13% of
the factors while the polygraph figured in 15%. The
NAC figured in 17% of the citations. It seems evident
that, at least as groups, no single grouping should be
dismissed as a potential source of significant data in
these investigations. Individual types of sources, of
course, were examined elsewhere in this report from
the point of view of the uniqueness of their production
of significant data (see Appendix C-25). It is worth
noting, however, that for the category most frequently
cited (drugs and alcohol), subject admissions figured
in 46% of the citations. As might be expected,
information in the categories which might be regarded
as more subjective in nature, such as "irresponsibility,"
came from sources other than the subject, and we note
that 78% of the citations for the category
"irresponsibility" did in fact come from sources other
than the subject or the NAC. It is perhaps somewhat
surprising to note, however, that only 6% of the
information in the medical category came from the
subject. It is also surprising that only 24% of the
information in the financial category came from the
subject. Referring to the more detailed chart in
Appendix C-27, two points are noteworthy. The
polygraph was the unique source for 47 of the "drugs
and alcohol" citations or 38% of the factor citations for
that category, which in turn was the most frequently
cited in resolved against cases. On the other hand,
employment, police, and credit constituted the unique
source of 30 (or 46%) of the citations for
"irresponsibility," which was the second most fre-
quently cited category (16% of the total).
Further review of the 409 factors found in the 254
cases resolved against the individual that the poly-
graph examination was the unique source in 84
instances (20%) and the other types of personal
interview, whether administrative screening or investi-
gative interview, were the unique source in 15 in-
stances (4%) (see Figure V-14). More than one-half of
the factors for which the polygraph was the sole source
involved drugs or alcohol, which in turn accounted for
well over one-fourth of all of the resolved against
factors. The polygraph was also the most productive in
disclosing information concerning immoral conduct,
accounting for 56% of the data of that nature (see
Appendix C-27).
Figure V-14
Resolved Against Data, All Factors
No. of Factors
in Which Cited
Pct. of Factors
in Which Cited
No. of Times
Cited as Unique
Pct. of Times
Cited as Unique
11,
3%
Subject Interview*
83
20%
15
4%
Employment, Police, Credit
206
50%
80
20%
Education, Residence, Listed
References, Developed Sources
131
32%
36
9%
Polygraph
93
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138R001200020003-2
Effect of Screening Procedures
All of the investigations examined in this survey
include one of four basic types of input from the
subject. As a minimum, every subject was required to
complete some form of personal history statement. In a
number of cases that was the only direct contact with
the subject and it ranks as the lowest on the scale of
"screening procedures." In many cases the subject was
interviewed in conjunction with the background inves-
tigation and it is noted that such an interview is a basic
requirement of the DCID-1 / 14 standards. To facili-
tate analysis, two basic types of personal interview
were identified. One type is the interview conducted by
a professional investigator, the other type conducted by
some other individual such as a personnel officer or
company commander. The latter is identified in this
survey as "administrative screening" whereas the
interview by a trained investigator is identified as an
"investigative interview." The fourth and highest level
in this range of procedures is the polygraph. Initially
the intention was to distinguish between polygraph
examinations administered prior to any investigative
work and polygraph examinations administered after
completion of field inquiry. As it turned out, however,
the agency which conducts most of its polygraph
examinations in advance of the investigation was
unable to participate in the study with the result
that polygraph cases included in this analysis were
limited by and large to the situations in which the
polygraph examination followed the investigation and
in a sense may be viewed as a confrontation-type
interview. This circumstance should be kept in mind
when considering the various reviews in this section as
well as in Section V.
Given the four basic types of "screening" procedures, a
number of questions immediately come to mind. For
example, to what extent does the use of the polygraph
or any of the other procedures affect the overall
results? Do the various "screening" procedures
produce certain kinds or categories of data as com-
pared to that revealed in other procedures or by other
sources?
Review of Subject Responses in Interviews
In considering the data which follows, it may be
helpful to remember that the 1,261 cases producing
adverse information include a total of 1,730 factors. In
approximately 8% of those factors, subject input was
not shown. The subject admitted the adverse data 800
times (or 47% of the times shown). The subject
falsified the matter 361 times (21%) and was not asked
about it 385 times (23%). Examination of the adverse
data as individual factors revealed the following
percentages (see Appendix C-29). In 59% of the cases
the subject either admitted all of the adverse data or
admitted part and was not asked about the rest. In 15%
of the cases subject falsified and in 22% of the cases the
subject was not asked at least before or during the
investigation. In 3% of the cases the subject admitted
part and falsified part. The foregoing data relate to all
of the cases in this study, including those in which the
subject was not interviewed but rather was expected to
provide the relevant data only in personal history
papers. It is recognized that some categories of adverse
information are highly subjective in nature, such as
those dealing with emotional instability, poor judg-
ment, or general irresponsibility. Nevertheless, it is
believed that a rate of-"not asking" in 22% of the cases
is higher than it should be. In Appendix C-30 the
relevant data is analyzed according to the type of
"screening" procedure: the relevant productivity
indices derived from that analysis are recorded in
Figure VI- 1.
Productivity of Screening Procedures
Appendix C-31 portrays the resolved against data
according to the type of "screening" procedure and the
relevant indices are shown in Figure VI-2. Considering
factor one, which by definition was the most significant
factor in each case, it appears that subject admissions
were just about what might have been expected, with a
relatively low productivity index for cases in which
there was no interview at all ranging up to the
polygraph, which produced a disproportionately high
rate of admissions. The pattern is not seriously
distorted when considering the subject admissions for
all factors.
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Effectiveness Index of Screening Procedures (Adverse Data)*
SCREENING
PROCEDURES
Not Shown Admitted Falsified
Not Asked
Not Shown
Admitted
Falsified
Not Asked
None (Papers Only) 0.52 0.74 1.51
1.41
0.51
0.75
1.76
1.44
Administrative Screening 0.32 0.85 0.44
0.57
0.32
0.87
0.32
0.62
Investigative Interviews 1.05 1.03 0.71
_
1.00
1.05
0.98
0.51
0.86
Polygraph 7.23 3.35 1.05
0.18
7.23
3.36
0.62
0.21
*Note: See Appendix C-30 for explanation of how to derive indices.
a
Effectiveness Index of Screening Procedures (Resolved Against Data)*
SCREENING
PROCEDURES
Not Asked
None (Papers Only)
0.31
1.04
0.51
Administrative Screening 0.55 0.79 0.60
0.93
0.55
0.98
Investigative Interviews 1.06 1.08 1.81
0.95
1.39
2.18
Polygraph 7.96 6.59 2.37
6.17
1.42
0.19
*Note: See Appendix C-30 for explanation of how indices are
derived.
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Some problems become apparent, however, when we
examine the indices for falsifications or for situations
in which the subject was not asked the relevant
questions. It should be noted that in the latter two
groupings, the effectiveness of the "screening" proce-
dure is indicated by a lower rather than a higher index.
Referring to the falsification group and the index for
factor one, we note that seven of the 47 falsifications
appeared to have occurred in cases in which the
polygraph was used, for an index of 2.37. This could be
due to a number of reasons. First of all, the relatively
lower numbers are vulnerable to rather extreme
distortions in the index when changed even slightly.
However, after review of the instructions and discus-
sion with representatives of the member agency which
accounted for all of the polygraph interviews, it was
concluded that the adjudicators completing the survey
may have misconstrued the guidelines and identified as
a falsification any case in which the subject denied the
matter up to but not including the polygraph, even
though he may have eventually acknowledged it during
the polygraph examination. A review of the individual
survey cards confirmed this hypothesis. On balance the
Working Group concludes that, despite this apparent
anomaly, the polygraph has been shown to be a highly
productive technique, at least when used, as it was in
the cases examined in the current survey, in conjunc-
tion with the background investigation.
The relatively higher indices for cases subjected to
investigative interview which revealed that the subject
was not asked about the adverse information in the
resolved against cases suggest that improvements
could be made in the scope or depth of the matters
covered in personal interviews. In Section V, for
example, we noted that the subject was a poor provider
of information in several categories, as expected in
some aspects but rather unexpectedly in others,
particularly in financial and medical matters. Again,
remembering that the lower the index the more
effective the screening procedure, the Working Group
was not able to account for the differences between
cases subjected to administrative screening and those
in which there was no personal interview of any type.
While this particular phase of the analysis seems to
present more than its share of problems, the group
nevertheless believes that this analytical approach is a
useful one. Moreover, it is our belief that the effective-
ness of the polygraph and, to a much lesser extent, that
of a sound personal interview of the subject, have been
more than amply demonstrated by other reviews in this
study.
In an effort to screen out any possible distortions which
might arise from the presence of older data revealed
in a prior investigation, adverse data was reviewed
in the investigations in which there had been no
previous inquiry. The data appear in Appendix C-31
and the indices derived from that data are shown in
Figure VI-3. Except for a striking increase in the
subject admissions related to use of the polygraph,
there were no serious distortions of the pattern set forth
by Figure VI-1.
Figure VI-3
Indices: Adverse Data by Type of Screening Procedures
(No Previous Investigation-787 Cases)
SCREENING
FACTOR ONE
PROCEDURES
Admitted
Falsified
Not Asked
Admitted
Falsified
Not Asked
None (Papers Only)
0.89
1.83
1.60
0.90
2.00
1.66
Administrative Screening
0.57
0.17
0.33
0.56
0.14
0.35
Investigative Interviews
0.86
0.46
0.96
0.84
0.31
0.80
Polygraph
7.99
1.01
0.09
4.22
0.52
0.13
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Next the data were reviewed to identify what patterns
there might be in subject admissions and falsifications
when considering the type or category of adverse data.
The respective frequencies according to category are
shown in Appendix C-33 and the indices derived from
that data are shown in Figure VI-4. It is noted that, as
might have been expected, subjects tend to acknowl-
edge data concerning foreign connections most readily
and conversely tend to falsify them least often. The
categories of "Drugs and Alcohol" and "Criminal"
yielded a relatively higher rate of subject admissions.
Subject admissions in the category "Subject Coopera-
tion" showed a very low index but this is more likely
due to the fact that falsifications were also included in
the definition of this category. Although subjects
tended to admit criminal records, they also tended to
falsify data concerning dishonesty, especially when the
data was not a matter of record, Apparently they also
tended to withhold circumstances which fit the largely
subjective category of "Irresponsibility" and we note,
not surprisingly, that this category also yielded a
rather high index in the "Not Asked" column. Again,
it was not surprising that subjects apparently were not
usually asked the highly personal questions concerning
"Immoral Conduct" but we were somewhat surprised
to observed the high indices in the "Not Asked"
column for "Financial" and "Medical" information.
These observations tend to support the earlier sugges-
tion that there is room for improvement in the scope of
questions asked of applicants.
Productivity Indices and Subject Admissions
by Category*
(All Adverse Factors; No Previous Investigation)
Category
Admitted
Falsified
A Subject Cooperation
.04
3.59
B Loyalty
1.05
C Foreign Connections
2.03
.11
D Dishonesty
.79
1.52
E Irresponsibility
.54
1.36
F Immoral Conduct
.88
.64
.51
.36
H Medical
.70
.29
I Drugs and Alcohol
1.43
.66
J Criminal
(other than above)
1.54
.48
K Other
.72
.26
Not Asked
.04
1.98
-
.84
1.47
2.15
2.60
2.32
.56
.53
2.31
*Note: Indices derived from dividing percentage of each subset by
percentage of total. For details, see Appendix C-33.
Example: 2 of 477 "admitted" cases are in the "subject cooperation"
category-0.419 percent. The 92 "subject cooperation" cases are
9.701 percent of the total set of 999. The 0.419 percent subset
divided by 9.701 percent produces a productivity index of .04.
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Although it is useful to explore the entire report with
supporting documents and to question the occurrence
or non-occurrence of a variety of phenomena appearing
therein, the most pertinent conclusions derived from
this study are listed here. Again, it should be remem-
bered that the recognized need to acquire positive
information about nominees for SCI access or security
clearance was not addressed in this survey.
1. As noted in Figure 11-2, the ratio of data resolved
against the individual to adverse data varies widely
from agency to agency. Such wide variations suggest
that efforts to achieve standard adjudication practices
should at )Past consider different agency needs, par-
ticularly in the matter of suitability requirements. (See
Section II.)
2. Except for cases in which the polygraph was used,
adverse data in this study relating to drug abuse appear
to be especially low. (Section II, Figure 11-7.)
3. Approximately 84% of the adverse data in this study
was captured within the target period of coverage, 90%
within the target period of coverage plus three years,
and 95% within the target period of coverage plus five
years. Much of the data acquired outside the period of
coverage was from the "newer" end of the scale rather
than the "older"; nevertheless, much significant infor-
mation was acquired in the 10- to 15-year range. (See
Section III.)
4. As shown below, target periods of coverage of seven,
10, or 15 years risk losing significant adverse data,
including data resolved against the individual. This
survey identified six cases in which a 15-year period of
coverage acquired data significant enough to resolve
against the individual. Put another way, data resolved
against the individuals in those six cases would not
have been identified with less than a 15-year period of
coverage. (Section III.)
A Period of
Coverage of
Significant
Adverse
Data
Resolved
Against
Data
5 Years
28%
22%
7 Years
17%
11%
10 Years
9%
3%
15 Years
4%
0%
5. Police checks, developed sources, and to a lesser
extent, employment sources (both record checks and
personal interviews) were very productive for the
target period of coverage of seven years or more.
(Section III.) The one target period of coverage group
which was singularly unproductive (the five-year
group) was characterized by an extremely low number
of developed source factors. (See Appendix C-19.)
6. A standard 15-year period of coverage would appear
to require no more than a 32% increase in effort
compared to the sample included in this survey. It is
noted, however, that this increase in effort would vary
by agency from 13% to 126%. (Section III.)
7. Cases previously subjected to a background investi-
gation or to a special background investigation still
produce enough adverse and resolved against data to
support the concept of periodic reinvestigation. While
the polygraph examination was by far the most
productive source of adverse data in cases previously
subjected to field investigation, the police check was
also very strong; to a somewhat lesser extent, the
employment checks were very productive as well.
These cases produced significant amounts of adverse
data in the categories of homosexual activity, drug
abuse, and criminal activity. Of the cases previously
subjected to field investigation, 70% of the data was
less than five years old. (See Section IV.)
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8. In rank order, the most productive as unique sources
of data resolved against the individual were the
polygraph examination, the subject interview, the
employment personal interview, the police check, and
the developed source. The developed source rose to
second place in the rankings for shared source produc-
tivity. The rank order for productivity of adverse data
again placed the polygraph examination and subject
interview first and second, respectively, followed by the
police check, the developed source and the employment
personal interview. (See Section V.)
11. The residence check was a unique source in less
than 2% of the adverse or the resolved against data but
did overlap with other sources in slightly more than 3%
of the resolved against data. As might be expected,
education checks (both records and personal inter-
views) and listed references fared even worse as unique
sources. (Section V.)
12. The National Agency Check (NAC) generally was
not very productive as a unique source of either adverse
or resolved against data. (Section V.)
9. Unlike the pilot study, this survey included data
compiled from the polygraph examination. It proved
by far to be the most strikingly productive source when
compared to all other sources. The polygraph examina-
tion was found to be particularly effective in acquiring
adverse data on drugs and alcohol, immoral conduct,
and foreign connections. (See Section V and Appendix
C-24.)
10. Personal interview sources generally appear to be
generally more productive than record sources.
(Section V.)
13. Subject interviews by professional investigators
tend to be more productive than those by non-
professionals but the results of the survey suggest that
even the professional interviews ought to be expanded
in scope. (See Section VI.)
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APPENDIX A
1977 STUDY
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138R001200020003-2
Appendix A
1977 Study
65
Previous Studies
65
Objectives of Current Study
66
Tab I-A: Investigative Coverage
67
II. Method of Study
69
73
III. General Assumptions and Limits of this Study
Tab III-A: False Identification: Excerpt
from Congressional Record
77
Tab III-B: FBI Fingerprint Checks
79
IV. Observations
Tab IV-A: General Summary of Data
87
Tab IV-B: Percentages of Cases Requiring
Different Levels of Coverage
by Agency
88
Tab IV-C: Summary of Data Acquired by
Category and by Source
89
Tab IV-D: Period of Coverage Analysis: Cases
90
Tab IV-E: Period of Coverage Analysis: Percentages
91
Tab IV-F: Period of Coverage Analysis: Denials
92
Tab IV-G: Period of Coverage Analysis: Denials with
95% Capture Line
93
V. Conclusions and Recommendations
95
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In the spring of 1977 a working group of the Security
Committee undertook a pilot study to measure the
effectiveness of background investigations. The Com-
mittee was concerned about conflicting claims among
security experts about the relative effectiveness of
different scopes of investigation, in terms of both years
of coverage and types of source contacted. Tab I-A
summarizes the current investigative standards of
various agencies and the DCID-1 / 14. The Committee
was also concerned that to date there has been no
comprehensive effort to compile or analyze such data,
with the result that most decisions concerning scope
are being made solely on the basis of either costs or
intuitive feeling.
Five agencies participated fully in the current study
and a sixth conducted a parallel review of its own cases,
furnishing partial results which have been merged
where possible with the results of the primary study.
(See Tab IV-A.)
2. None has considered years of coverage.
3. All have been limited to what adverse informa-
tion was acquired and from what source. All have
assumed that the cases under scrutiny did, in fact,
acquire all data about the individual which would
have been relevant. None have recognized the
possibility that something significant might have
been missed, e.g., by not checking enough sources,
not checking the most knowledgeable sources, or not
going back far enough in time.
4. None recognized the need for positive informa-
tion about a person's strength of character or about
his or her identity. The Major Issues Study did
include these points in its preliminary statement of
limitations, but drew final conclusions which
ignored them.
5. None considered, much less attempted to meas-
ure, the deterrent effect of a BI on a prospective
applicant who may realize he or she could not
survive such scrutiny.
A. A number of studies by various agencies have
attempted to analyze the effectiveness of Background
Investigations (BI) or aspects thereof, including such
matters as years of coverage and productivity of
sources.
B. Some were very superficial and some very compre-
hensive. The two best documented, the DOD Major
Issues Study of 1970 and the more recent DOD PSWG
Study, carefully limited their objectives and, accord-
ingly, their conclusions.
C. Some common limitations of previous studies:*
1. Most studies seem to have been inordinately
influenced by costs which, while important, ought
not to be the primary determinant.
*These comments do not refer to the CIA studies of 1973 and May
1977, which are classified and have not been disseminated.
6. The current study, it must be emphasized, is also
limited and suffers some of these same drawbacks.
These represent areas which should receive further
attention before any final decisions are made to revise
the scope, or specifically to reduce the period of
coverage or the types of sources checked.
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Objectives of the
Current Study
The objectives of the present study were:
a. To determine whether certain types of sources or
certain investigative techniques, such as the personal
(subject) interview, are more productive than others.
b. To determine whether some sources consistently
duplicate information available elsewhere.
c. To determine how far back in time we ought to
investigate to have a reasonable probability of
acquiring at least a clue to significant information.
We recognize that any inquiry must be pushed back in
time to resolve or clarify significant problems. The key
question, then, is what minimum period of coverage for
each type of source does experience suggest is neces-
sary to be sure we learn at least that a problem may
exist which requires further investigations?
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96MO1138RO01200020003-2
DIS
STATE
CSC
CIA
PRO]
D( ID
10
1(14
BI
SBI
Basic POC
5
15
7
5
is
5
15
Birth
x
x
X
X
Citizenship
subject
x
_ J
spouse
a
a
other
A High School R
15 if
7 if not
5 if
15
5
IS if
noB
2ofB
noB
noB
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5 if
15
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5
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B College R
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IS
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T
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C Business, R
all
15
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V
Technical,
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Trade 1
5
5
7 if
15
5
full time
D Correspondence R
15
I
15
Last Claimed even if
B
B
last
B
B
B
prior to POC
B
Federal R
5
15
7
5
15
15
1
S
10
7
5
15
10
Other Full Time R
5
15
7
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5
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Part Time R
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5
10
7
5
15
10
E
Temporary R
5
15
7
5
I5d
15
w
1
5
10
7
5
15d
10
Gaps Covered
Military Service C
X
R
7
15
t5
15
I
lh(I80)
Neighborhood
5
5b(180)
current
3
I5d
5
5h11801
1(30);
2b(l80)
References
listed
0
0
2-3
judg
judg
developed
3+
2+
3
3
Total
judg
4+
judg
judg
judg
judg
Police
5
15
7
15
15
5
15
Credit
5
current
15
5
5
only
Divorce R
X
X
1
X
Personal Interview
if
before
x
X
foreign
-
tics
-- -
after
x
~
_
clarification
x
X
X
X
x
X
Ic
Local FBI FO
5
5
Coverage of
Spouse
NAC
NAC
NAC
NAC
--checked only if indicated appropriate by papers or investigation
b-point covered if within indicated period of years but only if (days) or longer
_ - recent 3 years all over 30 days; previous 2 years all over 60 days
u - not covered if an isolated lead
- fingerprint check
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138R001200020003-2
Section II
Method of Study
A. This study examines all cases handled by the
participating agencies during a two-month period. For
agencies A, B, C and F, they were all cases considered
for SCI clearance using DCID-1 / 14 standards and the
period was March-April 1977. For agency E, the cases
were all applicants being considered for initial Top
Secret clearance and the period was April-May 1977.
B. Regular adjudicators completed the data sheets as
they handled the cases. Their instructions are shown
below.
C. In defining the categories of significant adverse
information, the current study drew on the experience
of the DOD Major Issues Study, as well as the
categories used by CIA in its recent study. The current
project, however, reduced the categories in number by
consolidating certain sub-categories of closely-related
types of data. The current study also attempted to re-
define categories in terms of their relevance to the
adjudication process. For example, if an individual was
fired from a job for stealing, the data was recorded as a
theft with the employer cited as the source. By this
approach it was hoped to eliminate such vague
categories as "unsatisfactory employment record."
F. A number of sheets showed apparent error or
misunderstanding on the part of an adjudicator.
Where errors were obvious, they were corrected on
copies used in the analysis. The originals of those
sheets have been retained intact for further review if
appropriate. For example, where an arrest record
clearly showed the matter involved theft or was drug or
alcohol related, the adjustment was made from cate-
gory J to category D or I, respectively, with police (or
NAC) shown as the source. Most errors corrected were
to the "safe" side or the least distorting. Thus, it is
believed that such corrections did not significantly
skew the results of these analyses. Clearly, in any
further studies, we would want to avoid or minimize
any need for such corrections. A number of types of
data, cited by adjudicators as significant, were moved
to the "substantially clear" category for the analysis.
(See Tab IV-A, lines 4b, 4c, and 4d.) The following
types of information were in this category:
1. Juvenile arrest data, if revealed only by the
subject and not by any other source;
2. Information concerning drug experimentation, if
revealed only by the subject and not by any other
source;
D. Another approach in the current study was to
request adjudicators to estimate how far back in time it
was actually necessary to go to acquire the data they
needed to make their decisions. The study attempted to
be conservative in this respect and sought the most
recent date which revealed sufficient hint of the
significant information to warrant expansion of the
investigation.
E. A few of the data sheets submitted neglected to
show some information and, where it was deemed
necessary to the study, the missing data were sought by
referral back to the adjudicator. In some phases of the
study, sheets still missing some data were simply left
out of the particular correlation.
3. Information concerning drug abuse, if revealed
only by the subject who entered a voluntary rehabili-
tation or amnesty program (2 cases); and
4. Adult misdemeanor information clearly shown as
minor traffic violations such as parking or speeding
tickets. If the incident involved driving while intoxi-
cated, an accident, an excessive number of viola-
tions, or if the details were not shown, the data were
retained in the analysis.
G. Also removed from the analysis were data concern-
ing foreign relatives. Such data was retained, however,
if it was revealed only by the background investigation,
that is, if it was not revealed by the subject.
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H. One case of a denial was removed from the analysis
because the reason was not shown and could not be
determined.
1. To determine whether certain types of sources are
more productive than others.
1. After the 127 cases with less significant information
were removed as noted above, there remained 300
cases which were subjected to various analyses and
correlations as shown in the data summaries. (See
Section IV.) These cases included a total of 365 "bits"
of significant data. The 300 cases included 42 denials.
J. A "bit" signifies a specific type of category of
incident or character trait, as defined on the reverse of
the data collection sheet (Tab II-B). Thus, if an
individual had been implicated in several incidents
involving drug abuse, even including arrests, a single
"bit" was shown, in this case, "I." Similarly, no matter
how many sources had reported the individual's
problems, it was still shown'as a single "bit."
K. The relative productivity of sources was examined
by identifying the various sources for each category of
data and charting the results according to source,
group of sources, or technique. Figure II-1 shows an
example of the chart. Since the analysis in each case
was limited to significant data acquired and from
where, that is, since it excluded substantially clear
cases, the upper left quadrant is always blank. The
lower right quadrant represents the overlap, i.e., the
data revealed by both sources (or groups of sources)
being correlated. The upper right quadrant represents
data revealed only by the source (or group or tech-
nique) identified at the top of the figure, and the lower
left quadrant represents data revealed only by the
source identified at the left margin of the figure. Data
is usually shown in terms of number of "bits" or cases
and in percentages of the total data being examined.
2. To determine whether some sources consistently
duplicate information available elsewhere.
3. To determine how far back in time we ought to
investigate to have a reasonable probability of acquir-
ing at least a clue to significant information. We
recognize any inquiry must be pushed back in time to
resolve or clarify significant problems. What minimum
period of coverage for each type of source does
experience suggest is necessary to be sure we learn at
least that a problem may exist which requires further
investigation?
Complete the form for any case, other than a routine
update, whether or not significant adverse information
was revealed. For a completely clear case, all we need
is the data in the upper part of the sheet, including year
of birth and year of investigation.
If the subject was previously investigated, e.g., by
another agency, which meant that the current investi-
gation was reduced in scope to cover only the period
since the previous inquiry, put the year of the previous
investigation in the box, "Applicant investigation
updated from:".
If the current investigation is an updating required to
meet DCID-1 / 14 standards for an employee who was
Data Being Analyzed
Source
No
Yes
No
Always
Blank
Source
Yes
Overlap
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previously investigated and cleared for lesser access
(e.g., a DOD employee given a BI for TS clearance
now requires an SBI), show the year of the previous
investigation in the box, "DCID-1 / 14 investigation,
updated from:".
Do not submit a sheet for any routine re-investigation,
such as the five year update, or for any special inquiry
prompted by a current allegation.
Code: Show the code for the type of significant
information on the line for each source which revealed
it and in the column for the year the incident occurred
or the trait was manifest.
If a former supervisor reports the applicant was fired
for stealing from petty cash and a neighbor reports
he was fired but the neighbor does not know why,
mark Dl on the supervisor line and on the neighbor
line in the column of the year he was fired.
confirmed any of the same data, also show the code
on the appropriate source line and in the pertinent
year column.
Estimate of minimum coverage: The adjudicator is
asked to estimate the minimum coverage in years
which would have been necessary in the particular case
to be sure of turning up the significant data. This does
not mean how far back we might have had to go to
confirm or refute a matter; we assume the investigator
will do whatever is necessary once the problem is
surfaced. How far back did we have to go to surface the
problem? One way of testing your estimate is to
assume the scope was one year less than your estimate.
Would that lesser scope have given us the leads we
needed? In making this estimate, do not count the
NAC, PHS or PI but, if any of those three would
reduce your estimate, put an asterisk after the number
in the box.
If a police record shows the applicant was arrested
twice for being drunk and the applicant admitted
only one arrest, put 13 on the police line in the two
columns showing when he was arrested, put 13 in the
PHS and/or PI line in the column of the arrest he
admitted, and put A3 in the column of the arrest he
failed to disclose.
When a problem or situation has extended over a
period of time, mark the code in the latest year known
to apply.
If an applicant's PHS shows he has close relatives
now living in Eastern Europe, put C2 on the PHS
line in the YOI column.
If a college instructor thinks the applicant is
emotionally unstable and gives examples, put H2 or
H3 in the column of the latest year the instructor
had direct contact with the applicant.
If the case was updated from a previous one which
revealed significant information, note the code for
each type of such information on the NAC( +) line
in the pertinent year column. If the current inquiry
Key source: If a type of significant data was revealed
by two or more sources, not counting the PHS and PI,
circle the code for that bit of information on the line of
the source you regard as the "key" source. This is not
necessarily the best or most probative source, nor is it
necessarily the most recent or the one the investigator
came to first. It is largely a judgment call but is best
summed up as the one source of the two or more which
reported the information which the least coverage (in
terms of both time and type of source) would have
included. Examples:
If the NAC( +) was one of the sources of a category
of information, circle the code on the NAC(+) line.
A neighbor reports the applicant was arrested for
drunkenness in a town where he neither lived nor
worked and which would not have been checked.
The police there confirm it. For some reason, the
NAC does not reveal it. Circle 13 on the neighbor
line.
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Same situation as above but the arrest was in the
same town the applicant lived in and police were
routinely checked. Again, the NAC is clear. Circle
13 on the police line.
without any recurrence in the past 5 years and which
you considered to be of any significance at all, not
necessarily that it served as a basis for denial.
Examples:
Certain types of data, e.g., the A category and C3,
need not have a key source marked.
Circle a code on the PHS or PI line only if the PHS
or PI led to a corroborating source we would not
otherwise have checked.
If in doubt as to the key source, explain very briefly
in notes.
"Old" information: Explain very briefly in the notes
any adverse data which was older than 5 years but
Expelled from college for cheating on exam, 13
years ago;
Fired from job for fighting, 7 years ago;
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96MO1138RO01200020003-2
Agency Code I Case Number Applicant investigation
LL_ updated from
Purpose ^ SCI Result ^ granted DCID-l/14 investigation
updated from
^ TS ^ denied
Year of
birth
[_1
pre-
-15 -10 -5
15
Record
_--
Instructor
Z
Academic
2
record
Other
U
record
-
-
-
Lc
d
Instructor
U
Other person
Record
z
Supervisor
---
Co-worker
U
Landlord
z
Neighbor
--
_
---
Police
I
Credit
0
NAC(+)
BVS
Li
t
d
s
e
References
d
D
l
1....
__
-
eve
ope
Sources
Other (see notes)
PHS, PSQ, SF-86, etc.
Personal Interview
ESTIMATE minimum period of coverage to assure acquisition of relevant adverse data:
years
CIRCLE key source, if appropriate (see Directions)
Notes:
YOl
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138R001200020003-2
Types of Information
A. SUBJECT COOPERATION: (1) refusal to fur-
nish information; (2) refusal to give release;
(3) falsification of application; (4) false identity.
B. LOYALTY: (1)treason; (2) espionage; (3) sabo-
tage; (4) subversion; (5) disaffection.
C. FOREIGN CONNECTIONS: (1) citizenship;
(2) relatives, hostage; (3) life abroad cannot be
verified.
G. FINANCIAL: (1) irresponsibility, living beyond
means; (2) excessive indebtedness, refusal to pay
debts; (3) unexplained affluence; (4) excessive
gambling.
H. MEDICAL: (1) mental illness or impairment;
(2) emotional instability; (3) inability to cope with
stress.
1. DRUGS OR ALCOHOL: (1) experimentation;
(2) drug abuse; (3) alcohol abuse; (4) drug trafficking.
D. DISHONESTY: (1) theft, burglary, forgery,
fraud; (2) lying, cheating, plagiarism.
E. IRRESPONSIBILITY: (1) violation of security
regulations; (2) insubordination; (3) draft evasion,
desertion; (4) poor judgment; (5) scofflaw; (6) family
desertion.
F. IMMORAL CONDUCT: (1) sexual perversion;
(2) heterosexual misconduct; (3) other.
J. CRIMINAL (other than above): (1) juvenile;
(2) adult misdemeanor; (3) adult felony. (Explain
offense in notes.)
K. OTHER: (Explain)
Notes (continued):
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
General Assumptions
and Limits of this
Study
A. Any case in which potentially adverse or other
significant information is discovered, no matter what
the source, will be expanded as far back in time as
necessary to resolve the matter. This includes corrobo-
ration of data amenable to proof as well as acquisition
of other data to offset or give perspective to informa-
tion not capable of direct confirmation or refutation.
B. Supplementary techniques, such as polygraphing an
applicant in advance, and similar procedures which
have the effect of screening candidates against suit-
ability or security criteria, would tend to skew the
results of this study, both with respect to percentages
of cases with adverse information and possibly con-
cerning types of adverse and other factors. For this
reason, the study does not include programs where
such procedures are in effect.
C. Even so, the current study included a large number
of persons already employed who presumably had
already survived some scrutiny at the time of appoint-
ment and during the course of continued satisfactory
employment. This fact, despite the apparent productiv-
ity of up-date investigations, undoubtedly skewed the
results of the study somewhat toward the clear and
away from the adverse.
D. This study does not consider other recognized
personnel security needs: (1) to assure continuity of
identity (see Tab III-A), and (2) to acquire positive
information about the individual so as to permit a
finding of trustworthiness. It is limited to an analysis of
the effectiveness of the BI in identifying significant
adverse information.
E. This study does not address the question of what the
BI misses, if anything. It is limited to assessing the
sources from which we have acquired adverse informa-
tion and the minimum number of years which actually
were needed to assure various degrees of probability of
acquiring the requisite lead to that information.
Moreover, it is limited to cases involving current
clearance decisions and specifically does not include a
review of "security failures," a category which logi-
cally involves more than the occasional spy, and does
not examine the extent, if any, to which the investiga-
tion and adjudication procedures might have failed in
such cases. Clearly, final decisions concerning scope of
investigation ought to take this aspect into
consideration.
F. It is recognized that there is probably no way to
determine how many unsuitable individuals are de-
terred from applying by the knowledge that a BI will
be conducted.
G. This study does not address the matter of costs, at
least directly. Costs are, of course, a valid though
possibly overemphasized factor. They ought to be
considered before any final decision is made concern-
ing scope, although any analysis of cost effectiveness
obviously should consider all alternatives, not merely
those of reduced scope. This study does seek to identify
the percentage of cases which, due to the age of the
applicant, would require up to 15 years of coverage
under the most rigorous scoping standard. This may
lead at least to a general idea of the added burden on
resources which can be attributed to higher standards.
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H. This study assumes that at least the appropriate
Federal agencies will always be checked, no matter
what the other changes in scope. This study does not
distinguish the various elements of the NAC. It might
be interesting to learn the relative productivity of the
FBI fingerprint check vis-a-vis the name check, but
that can be handled more easily as a separate study.
For details of the present FBI fingerprint procedure,
see Tab II-B.
1. This study does not assess the possible changes in the
quality of sources, although similar studies over a
period of years might illustrate any changes. For
example, it should be possible to show the effects, if
"privacy" laws, the Buckley amendment,
NU initiatives, fair credit laws, etc., on the produc-
tivity and candor of certain types of source.
J. No consideration is given to significant events on the
international scene or in the individual's own life,
which might suggest a specific period of coverage
different from a standard. For example, we take no
cognizance in this study of events comparable to the
German attack on the USSR which prompted a 180
degree turnaround in the Communist Party line, nor do
we consider "Socialist" lines on more recent interna-
tional issues. Similarly, it is assumed that if there were
any indication that the individual, for example, had
spent a substantial period of time in Eastern Europe,
the case would require expanded coverage as noted in
paragraph A above.
K. This study does not assess the significance of such
variations in background patterns as urban, suburban
or rural residences; frequent moves vis-a-vis a more
static life; and similar factors. The study may justify
some tentative conclusion as to the relative effective-
ness of neighborhood checks, for example, but will not
break it down further to show whether, for example,
rural neighbors are more candid or productive than
urban neighbors. Nor will it show the effect of short
term acquaintance vis-a-vis longer term. Similarly, no
attempt was made to assess the relative efficacy of an
education check on a graduate student as compared to
the undergraduate.
L. Further, it is recognized that some of the arbitrary
decisions as to how to log an incident in the time frame
may be said to distort the reality of the case. For
example, an applicant has lived in the same house the
past 10 years. His neighbor has known him all that
time and recalls a potentially significant incident
which occurred 7 years ago. Although in theory a one-
year period of coverage for neighborhood checks (or
even less) would have revealed this information, we log
it at 7 years back to show that for this case (and its
value as a statistic) a 7-year period of coverage would
be required to capture the data. It is clear that to
acquire it the investigator would have had to find a
knowledgeable neighbor who knew the applicant 7
years ago. Moreover, in this example at least, a 7-year
period of coverage, presumably, would have been no
greater a burden on investigative resources than a one-
year period of coverage. As our data collection is set up
currently, however, we are unable to make these finer
distinctions which are probably better saved for a later
phase of this effort.
M. This study does not include a variety of other types
of data which might be of interest to the security
manager and which could be acquired easily by
amending the data collection sheet or instructions. For
example, data concerning the number of points per
investigation and the number of sources requesting
confidentiality could be included in the sheet as it is
now set up. Similarly, no attempt was made to
distinguish the relative effectiveness of employment or
educational records as distinguished from source
interviews at those places. With minor modification it
should also be possible to learn more about the
adjudication process, what kinds of information are
more significant than others, and what factors, such as
the passage of time, influence the clearance decisions.
But again, these matters should await the later phases
of the program.
N. The present study was limited in scope. It covered
only six agencies. It was limited largely to persons
considered for SCI clearance although some applicants
were included. It covered only a two-month period
which, for State at least, was notable for a large
number of younger people being hired for summer
jobs. This almost certainly skewed the data concerning
age groups. It also appears that some of the adjudica-
tors made errors in completing the data sheets.
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TAB 111-A
Excerpt from
Congressional Record Senate
June 22, 1976, pp. S10152-57
"False Identification: A Pro-
liferating Problem"
(Withdrawn)
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
FBI fingerprint files are managed by the Identification
Division. These files are completely separate from the
main FBI investigative files and a fingerprint check
does not include a check of the latter files.
The essential purpose of the fingerprint check is to
determine whether any previous record of a criminal
nature is on file. A search can be made, if necessary, to
determine whether a non-criminal submission has been
made previously, but this is not routine procedure with
the NAC fingerprint check and ordinarily should not
be requested.
If the tentative hit does not match the current chart or
if no practical hit is made in the name index, the chart
is then sent to the fingerprint files for technical search.
The technical files are maintained in two basic parts,
criminal and non-criminal, although there are further
breakdowns in each. Only the criminal print files are
searched routinely. This is the key check which is
considered the most accurate aspect of the "fingerprint
check." The 10 impressions are classified and are then
searched in the prior criminal submissions according to
that classification and any reasonable variations.
The primary method of identification and file search in
the Identification Division is by fingerprint classifica-
tion, using all 10 fingers. Although there is a technique
for coping with scars or amputations, the basic
classification system requires legible prints of all 10
fingers for routine filing and search.
As an internal aid, solely to promote efficiency, the
Division maintains card indices of the names appear-
ing in the name block and, if different, the signature
block of prior submissions. These indices are in two
main parts, criminal and non-criminal, depending on
the nature of the prior submission. When a new chart is
submitted, the names from the name block and, if
different, the signature block are checked in the card
index of prior criminal submissions only. The non-
criminal index is not checked routinely. The check of
the criminal name index is basically an internal aid to
expedite the search for a criminal record. Due to the
volume of such cards and the possible variations of
most names, the name index search generally is limited
to the exact name appearing on the newly submitted
chart. If the signature shows a variation, that, too, will
be checked. As a rule of thumb, when there are many
index cards on the same name, the searcher may check
as many as fifteen or so to see if there is any further
match, e.g., DPOB or primary fingerprint classifica-
tion. If a tentative hit is made, indicating at least one
prior criminal submission, the procedure skips immedi-
ately to a check of the prior submission to determine if
the prints match.
To facilitate the search of the criminal records, which
are very voluminous, they are separated into parts. One
contains records of individuals shown on the chart to be
54 years old or younger, another for those shown as 55
or older. Using a five-year possible variation in age, an
incoming print will be checked only in the "younger"
files if the person is 49 or younger, both files if 50 to 59
and only the "older" files if 60 or more.
Fingerprint charts will be removed from the criminal
files under the following circumstances:
1. If the individual is reliably reported to be
deceased;
3. If the original contributor requests the return of a
specific submission, either upon a court order for
expungement of a criminal record or for any other
reason. The FBI will not remove a chart from the
files merely on the request of the individual,
although, in accord with the Privacy Act of 1974, it
will accept any additional information the individual
wishes to submit.
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From the foregoing, it is clear that when a criminal
record is submitted for a person who has previously
been checked only for non-criminal purposes, such as
for Federal employment, the current check will not
necessarily reveal the prior employment check, even if
the current chart shows the exact name given in the
previous chart. As a matter of established policy,
however, the FBI will ascertain the Federal employ-
ment and will inform the CSC or the employing agency
if:
1. The current criminal chart shows Federal employ-
ment; or
2. The individual also had a prior criminal chart,
which routinely would have been consolidated with a
subsequent non-criminal (employment) submission.
Stated another way, the FBI would not make the
connection between a current criminal submission and
a former non-criminal (employment) submission, even
if the person used the same name as in his employment
check, unless the current chart shows Federal employ-
ment or unless the person had a criminal record which
predated the employment check and with which the
employment record was consolidated.
If the FBI does become aware that a current criminal
submission relates to a Federal employee and so
advises the CSC or the employing agency, it does not
advise of further disposition of the matter, leaving such
follow-up to the agency concerned.
The Identification Division advises that the most
common problem they encounter with employment
checks is the submission of illegible prints. The Henry
system of classification is an intricate procedure which
requires clear prints of all 10 fingers and which
incorporates certain aspects of those impressions and
their relationship to one another into a final classifica-
tion by which the cards are filed and searched.
Although some people, such as bricklayers and dish-
washers, may have barely legible prints, most illegible
prints are due to carelessness on the part of the person
taking the prints. The FBI has no choice but to return
such charts. When re-submitting a chart, the FBI
suggests stapling the new chart to the old illegible one,
with the idea that between the two enough of the prints
can be read for proper classification.
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Section IV
Observations
A. Review of the General Summary of Data (Tab
IV-A) reveals a number of intriguing points.
1. The ages of the persons investigated show
remarkable variations from agency to agency. (See
lines 10 and 11, and Tab IV-B.) For the military
agencies (A, B, C, and F) the median age was over
30. For agency E (one of the two civilian agencies),
on the other hand, it was 21. Part of the difference
may be due to the nature of the cases studied, i.e.,
largely applicant cases for agency E vis-a-vis SCI
clearance for military, which included new person-
nel as well as senior personnel moving into more
sensitive positions later in their careers. Whatever
the reasons, it seems evident that higher investiga-
tive standards are a substantially greater burden on
resources for agencies A, B, C, and F than for
agency E. The current study attempted to estimate
the impact of various standards of coverage on
resources but finally gave it up as premature and too
speculative given the limitations on the data cur-
rently available. It is a matter, however, which must
be addressed before final decisions are made con-
cerning scope, inasmuch as scope, resources and the
degree of assurance are inextricably interrelated.
(See paragraph E-7 below.) The key point to be
observed here is that, because the spectrum of ages is
not uniform, changes in coverage requirements will
result in different changes in resource needs for
different agencies. Moreover, it seems clear that, for
example, a one-third cut in coverage will not amount
to a one-third reduction in resource requirements
but something less than that.
2. Update investigations were surprisingly produc-
tive, considering that the individuals had been
subjected to earlier, presumably clear investigation.
(See lines 13 and 14.) Six of these cases resulted in
denial. All six involved drug or alcohol abuse
occurring since the previous investigation. Three of
the six also involved additional factors.
3. Other features of the General Summary also
merit perusal, if for no other reason then to prompt
curiosity about the differences from one agency to
the next.
B. The Personal Interview of the subject, as a
preliminary procedure, seems to be a useful source of
information. The correlation shown here was limited to
the State Department results only, since it was not
clear whether the investigations conducted by other
agencies included a routine interview at the outset of
the investigation or were limited to confrontation
interviews after discovery of significant information
elsewhere. Also, it was not clear whether personal
interviews in the other agencies were conducted by
investigators, as the State cases were. For any future
study, the data sheet should be amended to reflect
these distinctions. In the State analysis, the Personal
Interview revealed 38 of the 70 bits of significant data
acquired or 54%. The BI plus the NAC revealed 52 bits
or 74%. The PI revealed 26% of the data not revealed
by the BI or NAC. The BI and NAC revealed 46% of
the data not revealed in the PI (see Figure IV-1).
Clearly, if these results are typical, the PI is useful in
acquiring significant data but it cannot stand alone. Of
course, there are other advantages in the pre-investiga-
tion personal interview.
C. Productivity of the NAC:
1. The correlations regarding the NAC show a
rather low rate of productivity for the NAC. These
correlations include all bits of data but may be
skewed in two respects. On the one hand, the large
numbers of military personnel on board presumably
have kept reasonably clean records and one would
not expect as high a rate of return from the NAC on
them as on the general population of previously
untested applicants. On the other hand, it appears
that some of the NAC return shown in the "NAC
only" block actually included military records
shown as NAC whereas they more properly might
have been logged as employment records rather than
NAC.
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
2. Figure IV-2 indicates that the NAC revealed 18%
of the 365 bits of significant data in the study. Half
of that (9% of the total) was also revealed by the BI,
which included the PI. 82% of the data, however,
was revealed only by the BI (including the PI).
3. To ascertain the relative significance of the data
revealed by each procedure, another correlation was
made, limited to the data which resulted in denials.
Figure IV-3 indicates a slight drop in the productiv-
ity of the NAC. If results of this small sample hold
true, it is clear that the NAC alone ought not to be
relied upon in granting clearances for access to the
more sensitive information. (For the effectiveness of
the NAC in combination with other sources and
techniques, see paragraph D below.)
4. Figure IV-4 shows the relative productivity of the
NAC and the police check. It is noted in passing that
these two sources accounted for 161 or 44% of the
365 bits of significant data revealed in the entire
study. As might be expected, the productivity of the
NAC was somewhat higher than when compared
with the complete BI, but still, with an overlap of
only 19%, did not match the effectiveness of the
police check.
State only (bits)
BI Including NAC
No
Yes
32
Personal
No
46%
Interview
Yes
18
20
26%
29%
All Agencies
NAC
(bits: 365)
No
Yes
33
BI
No
9%
Inc]
Yes
298
34
PI
82%
9%
All Agencies; Denials Only
NAC
(bits)
No
Yes
3
BI
No
4%
Intl
Yes
63
5
PI
89%
7%
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138R001200020003-2
D. While a number of additional source-by-source
correlations would be possible, it was felt that the
limited objectives of the current study did not justify
the effort. The only further correlations attempted,
therefore, were according to combinations of sources,
to ascertain whether any particular combination seems
to be especially effective. It should be noted, too, that
these analyses are limited to denials only.
1. Figure IV-5 portrays the relative productivity of
the combination of the NAC, the PI, and police and
credit checks vis-a-vis all other sources. We are not
sure how many of the PIs were true preliminary
personal interviews rather than confrontations (or
indeed how many of the military cases actually
included PIs) but the record check-personal inter-
view combination seems somewhat productive, ac-
counting for 79% of the information on which
denials were based. Still, 21% of the denial data had
to be acquired elsewhere. It seems unreasonable to
forego that type of information by reducing the
investigative standard to this level, even for the
Secret clearance.
2. Review of the summary of data by source (Tab
IV-C) indicated that employment checks were of
relatively high productivity, and the next correla-
tion, therefore, invloved moving Employment from
the "Other" source group into the record check-
personal interview combination. Figure IV-6 exam-
ines the bits of data in the denial cases, and the
productivity of the new combination jumps dramati-
cally, accounting for 93% of the data, compared to
7% which had to be acquired elsewhere. To assess
the relative significance of those bits, the next run,
shown in Figure IV-7, considered only the cases. In
our small sample of 42 denials it turned out that the
7% of the bits of data acquired only from "other"
sources happened to occur in cases in which other
denial data was acquired only from the record
check-personal interview-employment combination,
with the result that, when considered on a case basis,
the latter combination accounted for every denial.
None of the denial cases depended on information
acquired solely from the "other" group of sources. If
these results were to hold true in a more comprehen-
sive study, it would seem that checks of education,
residence, listed references and developed sources
essentially duplicate data received from record
checks, employment checks and personal interviews.
This observation, of course, does not take into
consideration any other advantages there might be
in checks of the former group of sources.
E. The final phase of the study was to examine the
period of coverage actually necessary to acquire
significant data. The results are shown in Tabs IV-D
through G. Of the 300 cases involving significant data,
11 could not be included in this analysis due to
incomplete data. In all four charts, the theoretical
period of coverage, the horizontal axis, is based on the
individual's age as adjusted to account for any previous
investigation. It should be remembered that in deter-
mining the actual years required to gain a hint of
significant information, the minimum period of time is
cited, not the period as expanded to clarify the matter.
1. Tab IV-D identifies the actual numbers of cases
according to the theoretical period of coverage
(horizontal axis) and the actual number of years
needed to acquire the data (vertical axis). Tab IV-E
translates the same data into percentages (or, if the
results hold true in more comprehensive studies,
probabilities) of capture.
2. It is interesting to note that 40 cases (13.8%)
acquired significant data outside the theoretical
period of coverage. This is based on the assumption
that any investigation will cover at least two years of
the individual's life. The figure is 32 cases (or 11%),
if we go by the DOD standard of "15 years or back
to 18 but not less than 3." Inasmuch as these cases
were not expanded to capture the data, it suggests a
phenomenon we tend to forget, that is, that actual
coverage in terms of source knowledge of the
individual seldom conforms precisely with the theo-
retical period of coverage. We assume that case
supervisors and adjudicators will assure the cover-
age does not fall short, but it is evident that many
sources, both records and persons, will have knowl-
edge which pre-dates the specified period of cover-
age. In the current study this was most pronounced
at the two ends of the age spectrum, the younger
people and those 33 years of age or older. The
significance of this phenomenon may be assessed by
referring to Tab IV-F, which charts the denials only.
The phenomenon was most significant only with
regard to the younger individuals. While the current
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
Figure IV-4
All Agencies (bits: 161 of
NAC
365 Total)
No
Yes
33
No
20%
Police
Yes
98
30
61%
19%
All Agencies; Denials Only
NAC+ PI +Police+ Credit
(Cases)
No
Yes
Employment+
12
Education+
No
29%
LR+ DS+
Residence
Yes
9
21
21%
50%
All Agencies; Denials Only
NAC + PI + Police + Credit + Employment
(bits: 70)
No
Yes
Education +
53
LR+
No
76%
DS +
Yes
5
12
Residence
7%
17%
All Agencies; Denials Only
NAC + PI + Police + Credit + Employment
(Cases: 42)
No
Yes
Education +
27
LR+
No
64%
DS+
Residence
Yes
0
15
36%
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138R001200020003-2
study was unable to account more precisely for the
phenomenon, it might be possible with refinements
to correlate it with the more stable personal back-
grounds, those in which the individual had longer
periods of employment at the same job or longer
residence in the same locality. If so, this might
suggest ways in which investigative standards might
be altered for greater cost-effectiveness. For the
present, however, no conclusions are drawn.
3. There was a noticeable gap between roughly the
10-year line and the theoretical period of coverage
line for the group which required 11 to 14 years of
coverage. We could not determine why. It might
have reflected the fading of memories, or less
comprehensive field coverage. But these factors
would apply even more so to the group of cases
requiring 15 or more years of coverage, and yet the
"capture" rate for that group was spread fairly
evenly through the whole 15-year period. (See the
15-year column on Tabs IV-D and IV-E.) Figure
IV-8 shows the relative productivity of the 289 cases
in the sample according to period of coverage groups
(lines 2 and 3). The marked drop in denials for the
groups requiring 11 or more years of coverage is not
matched by the rate of productivity of significant
data for the same groups. It is further noted,
however, that, as might be expected, these "older"
groups are also characterized by a higher incidence
of up-dates, i.e., there were previous investigations
which presumably were either clear or revealed data
of so little significance that earlier clearances were
appropriate. The combination of all these factors,
plus the rather small sample involved in this study,
may account for the apparent gap noted above. For
this reason, it is believed that no firm conclusion is
deserved yet concerning the productivity of higher
periods of coverage, at least with regard to
applicants.
4. Taking into consideration the vagaries noted in
paragraphs 2 and 3 above, it appears that the 100%
capture line very roughly approaches the theoretical
15-year period of coverage line although there may
be a slight drop in productivity at the upper limit. It
would be interesting to compare these results with
cases in which the whole life or whole adult life of
the individual were included in the scope.
5. While this observation necessarily is subject to
several qualifications, it appears from the current
study that reduced investigative coverage would
have risked losing relevant information according to
the data shown in Figure IV-9.
6. In the chart at Tab IV-G, a line representing the
"capture" line of 95% of the significant data (from
Tab IV-E) has been superimposed on the chart
showing denials. This line, if smoothed out, espe-
cially for the 9- to 15-year period of coverage, would
adequately cover all of the denial data in the study.
7. If the techniques used in this study were to be
adopted permanently to cover all or the majority of
agencies so as eventually to build a sound statistical
data base, it should be possible to identify more
precisely drawn lines of percentage (i.e., probability)
of capture. It should also be a simple matter to
estimate the costs of various levels of coverage and to
present the security manager with clear, well-
documented options. For example, line 15 in the
chart at Tab IV-A indicates that in the current
sample roughly half of all cases actually required
more than 7 years of coverage. If the manager were
to ask what the effect would be of reducing coverage
from 15 years to 7, a 50% cut or theoretical savings
in resources, he could tell by referring to the chart at
Tab IV-E that his probability of acquiring signifi-
cant data would be reduced from 94 to 81%. He
could then decide whether the benefit would be
worth the cost.
F. Some of the data collected, though cited by
adjudicators as significant, clearly is not. (See Tab
IV-A, lines 4-b, 4-c, and 4-d.) Part of the problem
undoubtedly is the newness of this project and the
imperfections of our instructions to the adjudicators.
Still, the question persists, are we collecting irrelevant
data? A more difficult question would be how to screen
out such data without placing the investigator in the
position of evaluating. On the other hand, across the
board the sample revealed "significant" data in
approximately 22% of the cases. This does not include
the minor data moved into the substantially clear
category. Roughly a sixth of the significant data cases
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resulted in denials (3.6% of the total cases), while the
remaining five-sixths (or 18% of the total cases) were
resolved in the individual's favor. While no one has
ever attempted to set guidelines in this respect, the
five-to-one ratio does not seem unreasonable. More
specifically, it does not appear that we are ranging too
far afield in our investigations. More accurate conclu-
sions on this point, however, probably should follow a
more comprehensive analysis of the actual adjudica-
tion process.
G. Conclusions concerning scope or the productivity of
sources would have greater impact if they could be
based solely on cases resulting in denials. Statistical
probity would require a substantially larger sample,
however, and it might be reasonable to seek to include
all denials by all agencies. Considering the 58 denials
in the current study, the five agencies involved, and the
two-month period covered (about 44 working days), it
appears that we had roughly one denial every four days
for each agency. The highest estimate we received as to
the time required for an adjudicator to complete the
data sheet was ten minutes. Thus, presumably for
about 15 minutes a week per reporting unit, we could
build a data base of all denials. For that matter, since
the total number of cases involving significant data
was only six times that of the denials, it appears that
for about an hour and a half per week per reporting
unit, we could document all cases involving significant
data. This all assumes, of course, that the data sheet is
completed by the adjudicator who actually handles the
case. Since it would also be desirable to extend the
analysis to applicant cases, the numbers and thus the
time involved, would increase but, from the data we
now have, we cannot forecast how much.
POC Groups
2-5
6-7
8-10
11-14
15+
Total
1. Total Cases
597
207
197
157
438 _
1596
2. Significant Data #
98
44
37
40
71
290
%
16
21
19
25
16
18
3. Denials #
18
8
8
2
4
40
%
3
3.8
4
1.2
2.5
4. Up-dates
30
21
41
66
256
414
Would Risk Losing
A POC of
Significant Data
Denial Data
5 Years
27%
7%
7 Years
19%
5%
10 Years
12%
0%
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
General Summary of Data
A
A
B
C
E
F
Total
I
gen
cy
1
5/77
1
Period Surveyed
3-4/77
3-4/77
3-4/77
4-5/77
3-4/77
-
2
e of Cases
T
SCI
SCI
SCI
applica
nt
SCI
applicant
.
3
yp
ber of Cases
N
650
416
176
234
136
1,612
classified
.
4.
um
a. Completely clear
478
293
123
132
113
1,147
b. Clear except for II from
subject only
49
3
2
42
0
88
c. Clear except for J1 from
subject only
5
2
2
4
1
13
d. Clear except for other
very minor data
2
6
0
2
2
11
%
33 1%
5.
Substantially clear
534
82%
304
73%
127
72%
180
77%
116
85%
1,259
78
6.
Something significant re-
aled
116
18%
112
27%
49
28%
54
23%
20
15%
353
22%___
66 9%
7.
ve
Total denied
32
5%
9
2%
14
8%
2
.8%
1
.7%
58
4%
%
n.a.
8
Denied only for C
a
12
0
1
0
1
14
.8
.
.
Denied for other reasons
b
20
3%
9
2%
13
7%
2
.8%
0
44
3%
9
.
Resolved in subject's favor
84
13%
103
25%
35
20%
52
22%
19
14%
295
18%
.
10
to 23
e u
A
184
28%
72
17%
23
13%
129
55%
18
13%
426
27%
57.4%
.
p
g
a.
b. Age 24 or 25
56
9%
36
9%
20
11%
31
13%
16
12%
159
10%
8.2%
7
8%
27 or 28
e 26
A
c
57
9%
43
10%
21
12%
16
7%
12
9%
149
9%
.
,
g
.
e 29-32
d
A
69
11%
63
15%
22
13%
21
9%
15
11%
190
12%
11%
.
g
e 34+
A
e
283
44%
199
48%
89
51%
34
15%
75 _
55%-
680---
43%
15.5%
11.
12.
g
.
Median age
Total up-dates *
30
36
6%
32
184
44%
33
90
51%
21
33
14%
33+
73
54%
30
416
26%
20.6%
13.
Up-dates revealing signifi
cant data
4
43
16
5
72
14.
Line 13 as % of line 12
11%
23%
18%
16%
_ _
7%
17 0
%
POC 2-5
15
**a
199
31%
150
36%
52
30%
149
65%
47
34%
579_
37
.
.
POC 6 or 7
b
64
10%
62
15%
31
18%
25
11%
25
18%
207
13%---
---
.
9 or 10
POC 8
60
9%
65
16%
34
19%
14
6%
24
18%
197
12%
,
d. POC 11-14
e. POC 15
67
259
10%
40%
43
93
10%
22%
18
40
10%
23%
15
20
7%
9%
14
26
10%
19%
157
438
_10%_
27%
*These were not routine re-investigations. See Tab II-A for details.
**Age groups adjusted to take up-dates into account.
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
Percentages of Cases Requiring Different Periods of Coverage
(Left Column: By Age; Right Column: Adjusted For UpDates)
,
~y~,sJ'
y~ ~
; ~~
fir`
C r`
v~ +
??
jb
~
'
JF"
?
Y ~
~
ti
~~
{f
4~
Y
y~1
r
L...'*..'.J-.-
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
Type of Data by Key Source
Educ
Empl
Res
Pol
Cred
NAC
Only
LR
DS
Sub-
total
Subj Total
only # %
A-Subject Cooperation
1
1
2
2
.5
B-Loyalty
1
3
4
4
C-Foreign Connections
4
3
1
1
9
9
3
D-Dishonesty
3
16
11
3
33
2 .35___
10
E-Irresponsibility
5
21
4
6
4
40
~
2 42,
12
F-Immoral Conduct
8
2
1
1
1
13
7 20
6
G-Financial
1
3
8
3
27
42
2 44
12
H-Medical
4
1
1
3
1
10
I I 1 21
6
I-Drugs, Alcohol
3
18
2
45
4
9
4
85
10 95
27
J-Criminal
1
54
8
63
7 70
20
K-Other
2
5
1
2
10
3 13
4
Total
16
76
19
124
27
28
l4
7
311
44 355
%
5
21
5
35
8
_____
8
__
4
2
88
12
100
I does not include admissions of drug experimentation if the only
source was the subject.
J does not include juvenile data if the only source was the subject. It
also does not include data shown as minor traffic offenses, i.e., not
involving drinking, accidents, or scofflaw.
C includes only data revealed by an outside source and not by the
subject.
NAC only is checked only if the NAC was the only source. For
relative productivity of the NAC, see Figures IV-2 and IV-3.
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
Actual Years Required to Capture Data (Cases)
Total
16+
17
17
15
3
3
14
2
2
13
4
4
12
1
1
11
1
2
5
8
10
1
1
5
7
9
1
3
F 1
4
9
8
1
2
1
1
5
7
4
1
1
1
2
1
2
12
6
2
3
1
1
1
3
11
5
1
1
4
3
2
4
2
2
2
1
2
1
2
4
5
2
1
5
1
3
2
3
1
1
2
2
3
3
8
6
3
5
5
2
1
2
1
2
2
6
21-0
2
12
2
3
8
4
1
2
1
1
5
1
23
3
6
4
2
7
2
4
2
4
4
2
8
POC
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
Total
49
14
14
21
21
23
15
12
10
12
9
10
9
71
289
Percent
17
5
5
7
7
8
5
4
3
4
3
3
3
25
100
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
Actual Years Required to Capture Data
(Percentages of Cases)
Total
~o
16+
100
100
15
76
94
14
72
93
13
69
92
12
63
91
11
100
100
62
91
10
100
100
55
88
04
Vl
9
90
100
100
48
85
I-i
8
100
100
89
42
82
a
U
7
87
92
80
78
100
78
41
81
6
95
100
60
70
67
38
76
5
100
100
100
95
86
87
53
83
75
67
80
56
34
4
98
93
71
81
76
70
40
60
58
56
60
44
31
3
88
79
64
57
71
57
27
67
50
40
22
27
73
2
71
36
33
48
48
20
50
30
38
18
1
47
21
43
19
10
30
13
33
20
33
44
20
11
POC
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
Actual Years Required to Capture Denial Data
(Cases)
No.
%
16+
15
14
13
12
11
10
1
1
100
9
1
1
8
15
7
1
1
95
6
5
1
2
1
1
5
4
3
1
1
1
2
1
9
3
2
2
1
1
1
7
93
2
4
1
2
1
1
9
1
2
1
1
1
2
7
POC
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
Total
11
3
2
2
3
5
2
2
4
1
1
4
40
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
Actual Years Required to Capture Denial Data
(Cases)
No.
%
16+
15
14
13
12
11
10
I
1
100
9
1
1
8
d
7
1
1
95
6
5
1
2
1
1
5
4
3
1
1
1
2
1
9
3
2
2
1
1
1
7
93
2
4
1
2
1
1
9
1
2
1
1
2
7
POC
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
Total
11
3
2
2
3
5
2
2
4
1
1
4
940
!
~ This line represents the actual capture of 95% of the
significant data. See Tab IV-E.
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138R001200020003-2
Section V
Conclusions
A. Some sources and investigative techniques appear
to be more productive than others:
1. The personal interview of the subject is a useful
procedure and should be included as part of any
background investigation. It is not so effective,
however, as to warrant its use in place of field
investigation. How much and what type of field
investigation is necessary to complement or to
maintain the integrity of the personal interview
should be the subject of further study.
2. The NAC is a productive source of relevant
information and should be retained as part of the
background investigation. Its productivity, com-
pared either to the local police check or to the rest of
the background investigation, does not appear to
warrant relying on it alone for granting access to the
more sensitive information.
C. Before any conclusions may be drawn validly from
this study, it will be necessary (1) to broaden the
analysis to provide a statistically sounder data base,
and (2) to determine the extent to which certain
sources or certain patterns of coverage may be
necessary for other purposes than the mere acquisition
of adverse data.
A. Maintain the investigative standards of DCID-1 / 14
as they are. Review them again in a year, after a more
comprehensive data base has been established along
the lines of this pilot program.
B. Adopt the techniques of this pilot study on a
permanent basis for all agencies.
3. Other sources, such as the neighborhood check or
the education check, may be more productive under
certain circumstances, which were not examined in
this study, but, as far as the current study is
concerned, these sources were essentially duplicative
of the basic combination of NAC-personal inter-
view-police-credit-employment check, which ac-
counted for 93% of the significant data and 100% of
the denial data in the study.
B. For the cases involved in the current study, a
reduced period of coverage would have risked losing
substantial amounts of significant data. Anything
below 10 years would have risked losing denial data.
C. Consider a pilot project to examine the adjudication
process, including such factors as the significance of
various types of data; the significance of the passage of
time since an incident; the countervailing effect of
other, more positive data to offset adverse data; the
compounding effect of multiple data in the same case;
and the significance of the type or level of access or
position sought. These matters seem ideally suited to
Bayesian analysis.
D. Consider realistic alternatives to investigative
techniques or standards, especially those involving
high cost, with the objective of testing such techniques.
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138R001200020003-2
APPENDIX B
INSTRUCTIONS FOR
CURRENT SURVEY
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138R001200020003-2
 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138R001200020003-2
August 16, 1978
MEMORANDUM
TO
FROM
SUBJECT:
Members, Investigative Standards Working Group
Validation Study
Under separate cover I am sending you two boxes of the IBM cards printed for
Phase II of our validation study. As agreed, we would like to cover the period
October 1 through November 30, 1978.
Attached is a revised copy of our instructions for completion of the card. I
suggest that the first batch of completed cards be submitted as of October 15
to let us see what problems may be developing. If there are any questions,
please feel free to call me at
Attachment:
Instructions
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138R001200020003-2
 Investigative Standards Working Group
Background Investigation Validation
Project - Phase II
A. To determine whether certain types of sources are
more productive than others.
B. To determine whether certain sources or groups of
sources consistently duplicate information available
elsewhere.
C. To determine how far back in time it is necessary to
investigate in order to have to have a reasonable
probability of acquiring at least some indication of the
existence of significant information. It is recognized
that, once possibly significant information is revealed,
the inquiry must be sufficiently broadened in terms of
period of coverage and numbers and types of sources
contacted to resolve or clarify the matter. The present
study seeks to determine what minimum period of
coverage for each type of source experience suggests is
necessary in order to acquire that first indication of a
problem.
YEAR
BIRTH
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
_RrV_IOUS
INVESTIGATION
II
THIS INVESTIGATION
w rU U
> na 2 SOURCES
U~
a
WW
2
O
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QN
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1. Complete a card for each case adjudicated, based
on investigation completed within the past year,
whether or not significant adverse information was
revealed. Do not complete a card on a case in which the
current investigation was prompted by a complaint or
allegation, nor on a routine "up-date" or "bring-up"
case.
2. Use a No. 2 pencil to darken the appropriate spaces
on the face of the card. Erasures are permitted but
should be clean.
3. Specific guidance:
Case No.: Write in the case number according to
your own system. Do not use an identifiable number,
such as a Social Security number, but rather some
random number from a key list, by which the true
identity of the case can be traced if necessary.
Agency: For the purpose of this project, each
participating agency will be assigned a specific letter
identification, which should be used for all cards
submitted by that agency.
Year of Birth: Mark the last two digits of the year in
which the subject was born.
00 I
I I I I I
wC
40
O
(7
mF-
17/1U
DO
moo is
QO ? 0 F w
UU Q w c- U
U N }
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oL
F W_
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PJ
P,
00
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0
NV
Q ?
F w
O =
Z O
a0
LL
LL
 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138R001200020003-2
Previous Investigation: Complete these columns
only if the subject of the present investigation was
also the subject of a prior inquiry.
If there was a significant earlier inquiry, identify:
Type:
ENAC: the abbreviated NAC customarily done
on military enlistees;
NAC: Self-explanatory;
NACI: Self-explanatory;
BI: background investigation with a 5 or 7 year
period of coverage;
SBI: background investigation meeting or exceed-
ing DCID-1 / 14 standards.
If there was more than one previous inquiry, indicate
only the most extensive.
Year: Last two digits of the year the previous inquiry
was completed.
This Investigation:
Year:: Last two digits of the year the current
investigation was completed.
The first column will indicate the nature of any pre-
investigative personal interview with the subject.
Mark only the most comprehensive of the three
options. The purpose of this column is to permit
analysis of the skewing effect such preliminary
screening procedures may have on the final investi-
gative results. Do not count an interview or confron-
tation which might have been required to resolve
discrepant or adverse information disclosed in the
investigation. Administrative screening refers to the
non-investigative interview which DOD requires
before an employee is proposed for SCI clearance.
Investigative interview means a pre-investigative
personal interview conducted by a trained investiga-
tor. Polygraph is self-explanatory and assumes that
an investigative interview was part of the process.
In the next column, indicate all types of source
actually checked during the course of the current
investigation:
Educational personal sources (persons having
knowledge of the, subject)
Residence or neighborhood sources, whether
records or persons
Purpose: Identify the intended purpose of the
current adjudication.
POC: Identify the intended period of coverage of the
current investigation, taking into consideration the
pertinent regulations and the age of the subject.
Round out to the next higher block available in the
column. E.g., if the subject is 24 years old and
DCID-1 / 14 standards are being used, the intended
POC would be 6 years, which should be shown by
marking the "7" block.
Sources: Use the next two columns to identify the
types of sources actually used in the current
investigation.
Developed sources, not falling into any of the
foregoing categories
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
More than one block in this column will ordinarily
be marked.
Adjudication: If the level of clearance or access
shown in the "Purpose" column was granted, mark
the "granted" block. If that clearance or access was
denied, mark the "denied" block. For this purpose
do not consider possible appeals or reversals. If the
adjudication decision is to deny, and if the data can
be acquired without unnecessarily delaying submis-
sion of the card, also mark the most appropriate of
the following three blocks.
Not Hired will signify that the subject either was not
hired due to the adverse decision or that, if already
employed, he or she was separated due to the
decision. If the individual was found to be eligible
for the clearance sought but was denied employment
on suitability grounds, check the "granted" and "not
hired" blocks.
Retained will signify that, even though the clearance
or access sought was not granted, the subject
nevertheless was allowed to remain in service,
presumably with a lower level of clearance. A
common situation might be denial of SCI clearance
due to an alien spouse, where the individual is
allowed to retain, say, a Secret clearance.
A. SUBJECT COOPERATION:
1. refusal to furnish information
2. refusal to give release
3. falsification in papers or interview
4. false identity
B. LOYALTY:
Status Unknown will signify that the particular
clearance sought was denied but that the denying
official does not know what effect the investigation
may have had or will have on the subject's employ-
ment status.
For those cases which revealed no significant or
adverse information, nothing further need be com-
pleted on the card.
Should the investigation have revealed significant or
adverse information, however, even though clearance
might have been granted, the adjudicator is asked to
review the entire case, to consider the various kinds of
information revealed, to evaluate the order of gravity
of the data, and to answer certain questions regarding
each factor or category of the data. Note that space
allows comment only up to four factors, the presump-
tion being that in any given case, four different types of
adverse data probably will be more than sufficient for a
decision.
E. IRRESPONSIBILITY:
1. violation of security regulations
2. insubordination, misfeasance
3. draft evasion, desertion
4. poor judgement
5. indiscreet
6. scofflaw
H. MEDICAL:
1. mental illness or impairment
2. emotional instability
3. inability to cope with stress
1. DRUGS OR ALCOHOL:
1. drug experimentation
2. drug abuse, rehabilitated
3. current marijuana use
4. current abuse of other durgs
5. alcohol abuse
6. drug trafficking
J. CRIMINAL: (other than above)
1. juvenile
2. adult: only minor traffic
violations
3. adult misdemeanor
4. adult felony
1
treason
.
2.
espionage
F.
IMMORAL CONDUCT:
3.
sabotage
1.
homosexual conduct
4.
subversion
2.
other perverted conduct
5.
6
disaffection
fli
f
i
i
3.
heterosexual misconduct
.
con
ct o
secur
nterest
ty
G.
FINANCIAL:
C. FOREIGN CONNECTIONS:
1. subject not US citizen
2. spouse not citizen
3. relatives potential "hostage"
4. alien relatives, "hostage"unlikely
5. life abroad cannot be verified
1. excessive indebtedness
2. irresponsibility, refusal to pay debts
3. living beyond means, unexplained affluence
4. excessive or compulsive gambling
5. business bankruptcy
6. personal bankruptcy
D. DISHONESTY:
1. criminal: theft, burglary, forgery, fraud, perjury, etc.
2. non criminal: lying, cheating, plag;arism, etc.
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138R001200020003-2
The Types of Information shown on the reverse of the
card identify some categories (lettered) and sub-
categories (Numbered) of information which com-
monly are found to be relevant in the adjudication
process. Note that they are not mutually exclusive.
Forgery, for example, is criminal and could probably
be said to be irresponsibly poor judgment, but for
purposes of this study it is placed under "D-DIS-
HONESTY." Similarly, any of the drug related
activities could be placed under "E-IRRE-
SPONSIBILITY" or "H-MEDICAL" or possibly
"J-CRIMINAL," but for purposes of this study they
are grouped into a single category. The adjudicator is
asked to select the most appropriate category and sub-
category of data which describe the most serious factor
in his or her evaluation of the case, even though the
clearance might have been granted, and to identify
that element under "FACTOR 1." The "J-CRIMI-
NAL" category should be used only when none of the
previous categories is appropriate, and the nature of
the criminal offense, if known, should be written out at
the bottom of the card. If none of the listed categories
seems appropriate, the adjudicator is asked to use
"K-OTHER" and to explain briefly at the bottom of
the card.
Subject: Referring only to the information given by
the subject in the case papers or in a pre-investiga-
tive interview (as distinguished from a post-investi-
gative confrontation), indicate whether the subject
offered in substantial part the data considered as
Factor 1, whether he or she can be considered to
have falsified or withheld the information, or
whether he or she was not asked or can be
considered not to have been obliged to volunteer the
information.
NAC: Cite each element of the National Agency
Check which revealed the information of Factor 1.
More than one block of this column may be marked.
If the data came up only in a previous investigation
and not the current one, cite it in this NAC column
in the most appropriate block.
Sources: Mark appropriate blocks to identify all
other sources which revealed the information of
Factor 1. More than one block of this column may
be marked.
The process should be repeated for the second most
significant factor in the adjudicator's assessment, then
the third and, if necessary, the fourth.
Taking each factor in order of gravity, the adjudicator
is asked to identify it by category and sub-category,
and to provide the following additional information:
Years Ago: If the factor refers to a specific incident
or series of similar incidents, cite how long ago the
latest such incident occurred, rounding out to the
highest appropriate block. If the factor relates to a
situation or trait, cite the fewest number of years
back the investigation had to go to discover the
situation or trait. If it is current, mark the "1"
block, to signify that a one-year period of coverage
would have captured the data.
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
APPENDIX C
TABLES AND CHARTS
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
Appendix C
Tables and Charts
108
109
C-3
Histogram: frequency of ages for agency 2
110
C-4
Histogram: frequency of ages for agency 3
ill
112
113
C-7
Histogram: frequency of ages for agency 6
114
C-8
Histogram: frequency of ages for agency 8
115
C-9
Histogram: frequency of ages for agency 9
116
C-10
Histogram: frequency of ages for agency 11
117
C-11
Histogram: frequency of ages for agency 12
118
119
C-13
Descriptions of "Category K: Other"
120
C-14
Productivity Indices: By purpose of Investigation
121
C-15
Productivity Indices: By Investigative Agency
122
C-16
Years required to capture adverse data
(no previous investigations)
C-17
Years required to capture resolved against data
(no previous investigations)
C-18
Productivity Indices by target period of coverage
(all agencies except 12)
125
C-19
Frequency of Sources Checked by target period of coverage
125
C-20
Percentages for data from appendix C-18
126
C-21
Productivity Indices by target period of coverage (1-5 grouped)
127
C-22
Productivity Indices-older data (seven years or older)
128
C-23
Productivity Indices-older data and previous investigations
C-24
Categories of Resolved Against data-
cases previously investigated
130
C-25
Data for productivity indices by sources (Adverse and
Resolved Against data)
131
132
C-27
Sources and categories of factors in 254 resolved against cases
133
C-28
Sources and categories of factors in adverse cases
C-29
Subject responses in 1,261 adverse cases
C-30
Adverse data by type of screening procedure
136
C-31
Resolved Against data by type of screening procedure
137
C-32
Adverse data by type of screening procedure
(no previous investigation)
138
139
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
Year of Birth
When Investigated
Period of
Coverage
Agency
(Age in Paren)
(Yrs)
1
1958 (20) or later
1-2
132
1957(21)
3
12
1956(22)
4
11
1955 (23)
5
18
1954(24)
6
10
1953 (25)
7
5
1952(26)
8
10
1951 (27)
9
4
1949(29)
11
4
1948(30)
12
9
1947(31)
13
8
1946(32)
14
7
1945 (33) or earlier
15+
63
306
6
50
11
29
47
58
-
43
682
25
9
23
2
7
19
14
-
12
123
30
16
54
10
24
12
26
1
28
212
42
15
42
12
24
22
30
3
38
246
42
17
33
13
25
24
34
3
63
264
27
23
39
5
23
20
26
5
49
222
29
16
38
5
19
15
19
21
57
229
30
19
35
8
17
17
16
10
61
217
15
38
13
16
25
26
20
55
250
30
16
28
7
16
21
17
ll
47
197
33
14
35
3
12
8
18
17
57
206
35
11
31
8
18
14
19
12
44
200
24
18
28
2
9
12
8
12
43
163
270
265
522
44
219
90
193
21
273
1,960
460
1,014
155
458
346
507
136
870
5,204*
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
Frequency of Ages for Agency I
0
0
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------
--
--------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0
0
Go
0
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------
0
-------------- -----------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0
0
0
_ __ _
nt it hRr 1-1-f fll kF - gh - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
$ ~mfl r, C3 F, C;3 r,
0
15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 35.0 40.0 45.0 50.0 55.0 60.0 66.0 70
Age
Figure C-2
--- - ------------------------------------------------------------
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
CCD
0
9
Frequency of Ages for Agency 2
-1wo
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CI
I
0
M
P4 -
0
0 iJ
t-
0
0
411111111111
25.0 30.0
-----------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------
15.0 20.0
35.0
N
40.0 45.0
Age
Figure C-3
-----------
, n n - nnnRn
n-
50.0 65.0 60.0 65.0 70
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
0
Frequency of Ages for Agency 3
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------
-------- ------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
o -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
a - ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
f----------------- --- ------------------------------- -- - -
----------
4 IT ----- :~A;~flnrT
O
C;
a
0
-r- rn4
30.0
35.0
15.0 20.0 25.0
40.0 45.0 50.0 55.0 60.0 65.0 70
Age
Figure C-4
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 rA rovuencase 2001 : CIA~DPf 60Mr 1 001enc03-2
F
ba y 0 Ages g Agency 4
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
15.0 20.0
25.0
T
30.0
35.0
11 11
MU ---- --
M
40.0 45.0 50.0 55.0 60.0 65.0 70
Age
Figure C-5
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
Frequency of Ages for Agency 5
0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
o -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
o -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
~ -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
o -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3 ~ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0
x W ~-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0
0-
------- -1 lnnn ------ ------------------------------------------
? r,n-n[ln,-,nnnr,,-,nnflflTnr,n
o
15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 35.0 40.0 46.0 60.0 55.0 60.0 66.0 70
Age
Figure C-6
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 .,Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
requency of Ages for Agency 6
0
0
- ---------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------
o ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------
o --------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
9 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------o ----------------------------------------------------------------------------1
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
20.0 25.0
30.o
R
35.0 40.0 45.0
Age
Figure C-7
nr-, r, n r, T --------
55.0 60.0 66.0 70
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
Frequency of Ages for Agency 8
0
Go t
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0
a
0
I
0
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
----------------------------------------------------------
inn - .:--::--:-
15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0
35.0
40.0 46.0
Age
Figure C-8
50.0
55.0
60.0
65.0 70
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Frequency of Ages for Agency 9
0
0
0
-9
15.0 20.0 25.0
30.0
1
35.0
VU11-
40.0 45.0
Age
Figure C-9
OR -- - -------------------
n ffn r' r-11--= C3 CM C3
50.0 65.0 60.0 65.0 70
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
Frequency of Ages for Agency 11
O
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
o -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
o -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
o ---------------------------------------------------
--------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
o -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------.------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
o ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------.fl -^- -------------------------------------------------------
0
0
--------~nnTlr
15.0 20.0 25.0
f{
30.0 35.0 40.0 45.0 50.0 65.0 60.0 66.0 70
Age
Figure C-10
~^ r r--- -
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
Frequency of Ages for Agency 12
a
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
00
U.
?
it
0
0
15.0 20.0 25.0
--------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------
30.0 35.0
ni 1111 InI 111111 In r,r,nnr-l
40.0 45.0
Age
Figure C-11
50.0
60.0
66.0 70
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
 Approved. a 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138R001200020003-2
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
Adjudications Not Shown Not Hired Retained
Status Unknown
Not Shown 135
51
123
33
Clearance or Access 4651
11
4
2
Clearance or Access Denied
139 44 2
7
(Figures inside the box represent data resolved against the
individual)
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
Agency Factor I Factor 2
2 Assault and Battery Draft Evasion
2 Marijuana Possession
2_ _ Traffic Violations
2 Marital
2 Juvenile Record
3 Previous membership in leftist
organization 15 years ago
Adjudication
Granted
Granted
Granted
Granted
Financial Irresponsibility Usable to verify subject's denial Denied
of all derogatory record infor-
mation
3 Leaving scene of accident and
DWI
3 DWI
3 Drug Experimentation Suspected child abuse two years
3 LSD used once
3 Four drunk-related incidents in
past 16 years
3 Past arrest not on SPH
3 Immaturity, unreliability Criminal Dishonesty
3 Drunk
3 Accidential Shooting Emotional Instability
3 LSD twice in 1970
4 INS deportation 21 years ago
4 Alien status with US citizenship
three years ago
4 Pituitary gland causes stress
problem
6 Bad check, 1962
6 Abortion, 1975
6 Loose morals
6 Juvenile Record AWOL
6 -Minor credit derog
6 Brief treatment for depression
8 Questionable business practice
and conflict of interest
8 Tax deficiency
8 Tax problems
8 Tax problems
9 Criminal Dishonesty Work Habits
9 Suitability
9 Criminal Dishonesty Inability to cope with stress Poor Work Habits
9 Conscientious objector, religion
9 Drug abuse, rehabilitated Foreign travel
Foreign relative, cousin in Ger-
many
Medical disqualification, hear-
ing
I I Vision disqualification
I I Medical, asthma
it Adult misdemeanor
It Medic at disqualification,
asthma
I 1 Medical, diabetes
I t Hearing
I 1 Timid, shy personality
11 Poor judgment
I l Lack of ability in his field,
accounting
II Vision
I1 Vision/Hearing
11 Overage
Difficulty with English
language
Physically disqualified from
USMC
Granted
Denied
Denied
Granted
Denied
Denied
Granted
Denied
Denied
Granted
Granted
Granted
Granted
Granted
Granted
Granted
Granted
Not Hired
Retained
Retained
Retained
Granted
Denied
Granted
Granted
Granted ___ _
Not Shown
Granted/Not Hired
Granted/Not Hired
Denied
Granted/Not Hired
Granted/Not Hired
Denied
Denied
Granted Not Hired
Granted/Not Hired
Granted/Not Hired
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96MO1138RO01200020003-2
Productivity Indices: By Purpose of Investigation
Omitting CIA Polygraph Cases
No. of Cases
75
29
1,042
4,877
Pct. of Total (4,877)
1.538%
45.376%
10.539%
20.586%
0.595%
21.366%
No. of Adverse Cases
17
478
126
242
-
199
1,062
Pct. of Total Adverse (1,062)
1.601%
45.009%
11.864%
22.787%
-
18.738%
.99
1.13
1.11
-
-88
No. of "Resolved Against" Cases
5
94
63
4
18
184
Pct. of Total "Resolved Against"
2.717%
51.087%
34.239%
2.174%
9.783%
1.13
3.25
.11
.46
Omitting CIA Polygraph Cases
and FBI Cases
No. of Cases
75
2,213
378
1,004
29
1,042
4,741
Pct. of Total (4,741)
1.582%
46.678%
7.973%
21.177%
0.612%
21.978%
No. of Adverse Cases
17
478
74
242
-
199
1,010
Pct. of Total Adverse (1,010)
1.683%
47.327%
7.327%
23.960%
-
19.703%
Index *
1.06
1.01
.92
1.13
-
.90
No. of "Resolved Against" Cases
5
94
11
4
-
18
132
Pct. of Total "Resolved Against"
3.788%
71.212%
8.333%
3.030%
-
13.636%
Index **
2.39
1.53
1.05
.14
.62
Note:
* Derived from dividing percentage of total adverse cases by
percentage of total cases in column.
** Derived from dividing percentage of total "Resolved Against"
cases by percentage of total cases in column.
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96MO1138RO01200020003-2
 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
No. of Cases
Percent of
Total (5,204)
No. of Adverse
Cases
Percent of
Total Adverse
Index *
No. of Re-
solved Against
Percent of
Total Resolved
Index **
(1,261)
Cases
Against (254)
Defensive Investigative Service
2,176
***
41.814
484
38.382
.92
95
37.402
.89
Office of Personnel Management
1,884
36.203
280
22.205
.61
4
1.575
.04
State
155
2.978
37
2.934
.99
0
FBI
136
2.613
52
4.124
1.58
52
20.472
7.83
Treasury
346
6.649
172
13.640
2.05
20
7.874
1.18
CIA (Non-Polygraph)
180
3.459
37
2.934
.85
13
5.118
1.48
Sub-Totals
4,877
93.716
1,062
84.219
.94
184
72.441
.77
CIA (With Polygraph)
327
6.284
199
15.781
2.51
70
27.559
4.39
Totals
5,204
1,261
254
Note: Indices derived from
* Dividing percentage of total adverse cases by percentage of total
cases.
** Dividing percentage of total "Resolved Against" cases by
percentage of total cases.
*** 2,107 of these cases were Special Background Investigations.
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
Adverse Data (1,261 Cases)
No Previous Investigations
(Years Required to Capture Data)
Total
Pct
Cum
Pct
NS
8
2
2
5
2
12
17
8
20
1
77
10
100
21+
1
12
4
4
1
22
3
90
20
6
2
8
1
88
15
1
6
2
5
4
2
20
3
87
10
2
28
3
23
12
1
1
70
9
84
7
4
1
1
15
6
24
16
2
69
9
75
5
1
1
3
30
7
9
9
2
3
65
8
66
4
2
1
3
2
2
21
5
11
7
1
1
56
7
58
3
2
1
4
6
5
30
11
15
8
2
84
11
51
2
5
6
5
6
5
42
17
16
15
117
15
40
1
8
11
9
11
7
61
30
36
25
1
199
25
25
TGT POC
NS
1
2
3
4
5
7
10
15
20
21 +
Total
34
22
24
34
21
263
98
153
120
11
7
787
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 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
Figure C-17
Resolved Against Data (254 Cases)
No Previous Investigations
(Years Required to Capture Data)
Total
Cum
Pct.
NS
3
1
3
3
5
1
16
21+
20
15
1
2
3
100
E~
_ _
10
2
1
6
3
1
13
98
7
1
1
3
5
5
2
17
89
5
1
1
5
5
1
13
78
4
1
2
2
3
4
4
2
1
19
70
3
2
2
2
1
1
5
5
1
19
57
2
4
3
1
4
1
7
20
45
1
2
2
4
6
1
5
6
11
11
48
32
TGT POC
NS
1
2
3
4
5
7
10
15
20
21+
Total
12
2
9
18
4
10
23
37
44
9
168
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
Productivity Indices According to Target Period of Coverage
(Excluding Agency 12)
in Years Shown
Number of Cases 176 214 235
141
134
1,305
452
599
911
95
72
4,334
Percent of Total (4,334) 4.061 4.938 5.422
3.253
3.092
30.111
10.429
13.821
21.020
2.192
1.661
Number of Adverse Cases 44 50 56
67
40
304
143
249
230
24
17
1,224
Percent of Total Adverse Cases (1,224) 3.595 4.085 4.575
5.474
3.268
24.837
11.683
20.343
18.791
1.961
1.389
Index * .89 .83 .84
1.68
1.06
.82
1.12
1.47
.89
.89
.84
N
to
Frequency of Sources Checked by Target Period of Coverage
Period of Coverage 1 2 3
4
5
7
21 +
Sub-
Not
Frequency
in Years
Total
Shown
Educational Records 193 210 117
105
1,164
466
528
734
84
57
3,658
143
3,801
Educational Personal Interviews 164 171 82
79
910
349
286
296
45
19
2,401
105
2,506
Employment Records 175 190 122
117
1,856
488
592
824
91
69
4,524
166
4,690
Employment Personal Interviews 171 188 126
123
1,874
511
542
854
96
70
4,555
169
4,724
Residence 199 218 129
127
1,887
533
614
904
96
75
4,782
181
4,963
115 90
84
1,292
434
513
620
76
47
3,361
136
3,497
127
118
355
422
557
853
90
72
3,007
119
3,126
Police 199 226 132
135
1,903
538
646
906
98
75
4,858
180
5,038
Credit 192 201 94
117
1,061
484
575
805
96
76
3,701
124
3,825
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
Percentage of Cases in Which Cited Source Was Checked-
By Target Period of Coverage
Source
Educational Records
5.078*
5.525
3.078
2.762
30.624
12.260
13.891
19.311
2.210
1.500
12.246
12.076
11.482
10.448
9.462
11.030
10.880
10.800
10.881
10.179
10.497
Educational Personal Interviews
6.544
6.824
3.272
3.152
36.313
13.927
11.413
11.812
1.796
.758
10.406
9.833
8.047
7.861
7.397
8.260
5.893
4.356
5.829
3.393
6.890
Employment Records
3.731
. 4.051
2.601
2.495
39.574
10,405
12.623
17.569
1.940
1.471
11.104
10.926
11.972
11.642
15.087
11.550
12.199
12.125
1 1.7 88
12.321
12.982
Employment Personal Interviews
3.620
3.980
2.667
2.604
39.670
10.817
11.473
18.078
2.032
1.482
10.850
10.811
12.365
12.239
15.233
12.095
11.168
12.566
12.435
12.500
13.071
4.010
4.393
2.599
2.559
38.021
10.739
12.372
18.215
1.934
1.511
12.627
12.536
12.659
12.637
15.339
12.615
12.652
13.302
12.435
13.393
13.723
2.574
3.289
2.745
2.402
36.946
12.411
14.670
17.729
2.173
1.344
5.711
6.613
8.832
8.358
10.502
10.272
10.571
9.123
9.845
8.393
9.645
6.174
7.038
4.063
3.775
11.356
13.500
17.818
27.287
2.879
2.303
12.246
12.651
12.463
11.741
2.886
9.988
11.477
12.552
11.658
12.857
8.629
3.950
4.486
2.620
2.680
37.773
10.679
12.823
17.983
1.945
1.489
12.627
12.996
12.954
14.433
15.469
12.734
13.311
13.331
12.694
13.393
13.941
5.020
5.255
2.458
3.059
27.739
12.654
15.033
21.046
2.510
1.987
12.183
11.558
9.225
11.642
8.265
11.456
11.848
11.845
12.435
13.571
10.621
* Top figure is percent for the row; lower is percent for the column
(Data in Appendix C-19)
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
Productivity Indices by Target Period of Coverage * *
Years Ago
N.S.
1-5
7
10
15
20
21 +
Total
Number of Cases
210
2,683
552
655
928
100
76
5,204
Percent of total (5,204)
4.072
51.537
10.603
12.582
17.826
1.921
1.460
No. of Adverse Cases
52
546
143
249
230
24
17
1,261
Percent of Adverse Total (1,261)
4.124
43.299
11.340
19.746
18.240
1.903
1.348
Index
1.01
.84
1.07
1.57
1.02
.99
.92
No. of Resolved Against Cases
16
74
31
56
66
11
-
254
Percent of Resolved Against
Total (254)
6.299
29.134
12.205
22.047
25.984
4.330
--
** Note: Indices were derived from dividing percentage of Adverse combined percentage of the 20-year and 21-year plus categories
and Resolved Against cases by percentage of total cases within each (3.381%). Example: In the 1-5 year category, the resolved against
period of coverage category. The index marked by the asterisk (*) percentage (29.134) divided by the total case percentage (51.537)
was derived in the same manner except that its denominator is the produces an index of.57.
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
 This Source
Checks
Was Checked
7 yrs or More
Frequency-Pct
10 yrs or More
Frequency-Pct
15 yrs or More
Frequency-Pct
7 yrs or More
Frequency--Pct
10 yrs or More
Frequency-Pct
15 yrs or More
Frequency-Pct
Educational Records
3,801
10.496
1
1.61
3
0.997
2
1.081
1
1.470
Educational Personal Interviews
2,506
6.920
1
1.61
1
2.632
-
5
1.661
3
1.622
-
-
Employment Records
4,690
12.950
5
8.065
2
5.263
11.111
35
11.628
19
10.270
9
13.235
Employment Personal Interviews
4,724
13.044
3
4.839
1
2.632
-
35
11.628
18
9.730
3
4.412
Residence
4
963
13
704
4
329
1
3
622
1
1
1
470
_ _. -------
,
- -
.
.
.
.
Listed References
3,497
9.656
1
1.61
13
4.319
8
4.324
3
4.412
Developed Sources
3,126
8.632
5
8.065
2
5.263
1
5.556
48
15.947
26
14.054
9
13.235
Police
5,083
14.036
42
67.742
31
81.579
14
77.778
130
43.189
91
49.189
37
54.412
3,825
10.562
4
6.452
1
2.632
1
5.555
28
9.302
15
8.108
5
7.353
62
38
18
301
185
68
* Note: Although this particular analysis excludes the NAC,
Subject Admissions, and polygraph, the Uniqueness source totals do
include those items and thus signify uniqueness amongst all other
possible sources. Indices on Figure 111-9 are derived from dividing
the percentage of cited frequency in each year group by the
percentage of total checks. Example: In the seven-year group cited as
unique source above for Educational Records, 1.61% is divided by
the Educational Records Percentage of total checks, 10.496, to
produce an index of. 15 (first column in Figure 111-9).
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
Comparison of Unique and Shared Sources (Adverse Cases)
(Based on Years Required to Capture Data)
NAC: FBI Fingerprint_
2/6*
FBI Main Files
3/14
OPM
1/8
DOD
18/32
Other
5/9
Educational Records
1/2
Educational Personal Interviews
1/1
Employment Records
6/17
Employment Personal Interviews
4/23
Residence
0/7
Listed References
2/12
Developed Sources
6/35
Police
27/32
Credit
4/9
Polygraph
14/1
Total Cases
1,212
Percent of Total Cases (5,204)
23
Adverse Cases
246
Percent of Total Adverse (1,261)
20
Index
.84
7 or More 10 or More 15 or More
1/3 1/3 1/3
3/9 3/7 3/2 1/0
1/1 1/1 0/0 0/1
10/23 9/19 5/16 2/7
3/7 2/7 1/4 1/0
1/1 1/1 1/1
1/0 1/0 1/0
5/13 5/13 2/7 0/5
3/14 3/12 3/6 0/4
0/3 0/3 0/2
1/8 1/7 -0/4 0/4
5/26 5/23 3/13 0/3
18/23 14/22 10/14 5/7
3/9 3/7 2/3 2/1
9/0 7/0 5/0 8/2
800 654 445 222
16 13 9 4.27
168 141 90 49
13 11 7 --- 3.89
.87 .89 .84 .91
1/0
1/0
/0_
0/1
0/1
0/1
2/5
0/4
0/3
1/0
1/0
0/3
0/2
0/1
0/2
0/1
0/0
0/2
0/2
0/0
0/1
0/1
0/0
4/5
3/4
2/3
2/1
1/1
0/1-
512
3/2
1/0
130
83
51
2.50
1.59
0_.98
31
22
11
-
2.46
1.75
0.87
.98
1.1
.89
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138R001200020003-2
Figure C-24
Categories and Subcategories of Resolved Against Data
(49 Cases Previously
Subjected to BI or SBI)
4. False identity
B. LOYALTY:
1. Treason
1. Subject not US citizen
2. Spouse not citizen
3. Relatives potential "hostage"
4. Alien relatives, "hostage" unlikely
5. Life abroad cannot be verified
1. Criminal: theft, burglary, forgery, fraud, perjury, etc.
2. Non-criminal: lying, cheating, plagiarism, etc.
E. IRRESPONSIBILITY:
1. Violation of security regulations
2. Insubordination, midfeasance
3. Draft evasion, desertion
4. Poor judgment
5. Indiscreet
I. Homosexual conduct
2. Other perverted conduct
1. Excessive indebtedness
2. Irresponsibility, refusal to pay debts
3. Living beyond means, unexplained affluence
4. Excessive or compulsive gambling
5. Business bankruptcy
4. Current abuse of other drugs
5. Alcohol abuse
1. Juvenile
2. Adult: Only minor traffic violation
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138R001200020003-2
 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
Adverse Data (1,730 Factors)
Resolved Against Data (409 Factors)
Productivity Index
Productivity Index
c6 ~'
[-~ `
cd y
y
,. .,
7
v
T O
... O
, o ,
U
O
O C
r-
Cr
4J
0
.0
0
=
~ U
aVi
?
7 C/1
C
C U
O U
7
0
?
C
G U
G U
$.a
.9
s>
o
7
Q
3 .~
.a
s>
a
a'
Q
w
ai
ww`
aa
?
wrR
<
QLon
cif
a~S
GiQ
a t-?
Qcn
4
Subject'
2,646
51
4.500
156
20.18
374
13.34
4.48
2.96
18
9.57
83
11.74
2.13
2.61
N AC: FBI Fingerprint Files
5,204
100
8.851
6
0.78
100
3.57
.09
.40
-
-
11
1.56
-
.18
FBI Main Files
5,204
100
8.851
2
0.26
56
1.99
.03
.22
-
-
4
0.57
-
.06
5,204
100
8.851
2
0.26
136
4.85
.03
.55
-
-
11
1.56
-
1.56
4,043
78
6.876
25
3.23
198
7.06
.47
1.03
7
3.72
68
9.62
.54
1.40
2
0.26
123
4.39
-
-
17
2.40
-
-
3,801
73
6.465
7
0.91
24
0.86
.14
.13
-
-
1
0.14
-
.02
Educational Personal Interviews
2,506
48
4.262
4
0.52
40
1.43
.12
.34
1
0.53
12
1.70
.12
.40
Employment Records
4,690
90
7.976
18
2.33
184
6.56
.29
.82
6
3.19
42
5.94
.40
.74
Employment Personal Interviews
4.724
91
8.034
66
8.54
277
9.88
1.06
1.23
25
13.30
97
13.72
1.66
1.71
Residence
4,963
95
8.440
14
1.81
81
2.90
.21
.34
3
1.60
23
3.25
.19
.39
3,497
67
5.947
3
0.39
75
2.68
.07
.45
--
-
22
3.11
-
.52
3,126
60
5.317
79
10.22
293
10.45
1.92
1.96
14
7.45
110
15.56
1.40
2.92
8.568
127
16.43
488
17.41
1.92
2.03
24
12.77
82
11.60
1.49
1.35
Credit
3,825
74
6.505
42
5.43
119
4.25
.83
.65
6
3.19
31
4.38
.49
.67
Polygraph
327
6
0.556
220
28.45
235
8.38
50.80
14.96
84
44.68
93
13.15
79.79
23.48
Totals
58,798
773
2,803
188
707
' Includes cases in which Subject was interviewed administratively
or by investigator; excludes polygraph (shown as separate source)
and cases in which only source was Subject but in "papers only."
2 Estimated from totals for Agencies 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, and 9. Excludes
Agencies 5, 11, and 12.
' Not included in analysis; frequency of checks made is unknown;
checks were made only as needed.
" Index derived from dividing percentage of total unique sources by
percentage of total frequency. Example: Subject, 20.18%=4.5% _
productivity index of 4.48.
' Index derived from dividing percentage of total as any source by
percentage of total frequency. Example: Subject, 13.34%=4.5% _
productivity index of 2.96.
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
Table of Sources by Agency
(All Adverse Data)
Agency
Source:
Not Shown '
5
8
6
Subject 2
19
12
142
3 12
Subject'
33
171
1
21 38
NA_C_:_ FBI Fpt.
5
8
23
5
FBI Main
4
2
OPM-_
38
1
DOD
38
14
11
Other
99
3
1 1
1
6
--
Educational Personal Interviews
4
15
8
Employment Records
12
30
16
21
Employment Personal Interviews
27
40
19
- 62
Residence
13
3
38
Listed References
9
6
3
24
4 I
Developed Sources
36
30
37
70
4 6
91
48
98
Credit
9
22
14
26
Polygraph '
-
-
Total
213
Number of Cases with
82
Adverse Information
' Does not appear in Totals.
2 Totals include submission of papers only.
3 Totals include results of administrative screening and investigative
interviews combined.
? Source used by one agency only.
55
3
-
257
5
-
10
374
49
-
-
100
8
32
56
91
2
-
2
136
11
2
198
4
4
-
1
123
8
3
3
24
3
4
2
2
40
87
6
4
3
184
71
14
31
4
277
6
8
6
-
22
1
5
75
55
37
14
4
293
19
488
8
119
235 's
-
-
235
101
3,060
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138R001200020003-2
Sources and Categories of Adverse Factors
in 254 Resolved Against Cases
[ 'v
U ooa
O ?O E p 'p d .
U wa waa F: / ri] S w?
0
0
0
0 yr 0
105 93 83
?- ,nyqueSource.
0 - Shared Source.
0
0
C
G _ 8 E s
OQ U O
2 2
1 -
1 -
1 -
2-
3
2
1 -
1
1
-
- 6
4
1
2-
2
1
1
4-
2 4
7 2 -
?
36
- 1 -
2 -
3 -
2
0
0
6
- - - - - -
1 -
5
0
0
1 - 1 - 2
1 -
3
-
206
131
409-
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
Sources and Categories of Adverse Factors
in 1,261 Cases
j ~ ~
Ur t
-'d 44
aV
c~j 10
a. RS ~i
._
C
O
C
C
0
0
U
C
00 F
O
H
w? A
iSou ce Not Shown
123
4 -
13 4
1- 11
2 -
13 12
94
1 1
23 2
67
2 -
11 3
403
58 1
- 46
199
31 -
1 26
1 _
47
1 2
96
1-
13 4
158
6 3
7 12
42
1 3
1
16
0 0
0
30
- 1
3
0
0
0
0
35
0
0
2
0
0
0
0l 0
0
0
13
1-
- 1
546 235 379
905
417
1,730
122 8
106 131
? - Uiqu Source.
0 - Shared Source.
F,
U
C U
ti O C ~
bq p CV d
AQ U 0
7 3
3 4
31
3 4
13
6 26
2 1
149
2 1
2 10
35
3 2
- 3
18
----
97 7
49 7
49
34 2
14 4
28
2-
12 2
9
6 2
8 1
18
22 23
22 17
32
12 7
2 6
8
5 4
2 2
9
2-
2-
6
228 90
149 79
452
O 0
40 14
11 1
6 3
12 5
24 1
79 10
56 3
18 1
37 6
3 11
1 1
1-
300 65
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
Subject Responses in 1,261 Adverse Cases
Response
Frequency
Percentage
Subject Admitted
618
54.5
Admitted or Not Asked
51
4.5
Falsified
154
13.6
Falsified or Not Asked
17
1.5
Admitted or Falsified
32
2.8
Not Asked
253
22.3
All Three Combined
8
0.7
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
Procedures
Cases
Total (5
204)
,
Not
Admitted
Falsified
Not
Total
Not
Admitted
Falsified
Not
Total
Shown
Asked
Shown
Asked
None (Papers Only)
2,231
42.87
31
210
118
165
524
31
257
273
238
800
Administrative Screening
1,484
28.52
13
162
23
44
242
13
199
33
68
312
Investigative Interviews
1,162
22.33
33
153
29
61
276
33
,L75
41
74
323
Polygraph
327
6.28
64
140
12
3
219
L
64
,--
169 7.
14
5
252
Totals
5,204
141
665
182
273
1,261
141
-00
361
385
1,687
None (Papers Only)
Administrative Screening
Investigative Interviews
Polygraph
Totals
Factor One
All Factors
21.99
31.58
64.84
60.44
21.99
32.12
75.62
61.82
9.22
24.36
12.64
16.12
9.22
24.88
9.14
17.67
23.40
23.01
15.93
22.34
23.40
21.88
11.36
19.22
45.39
21.05
6.59
1.10
45.39
21.12
3.88
1.29
11.18
52.74
14.43
21.65
8.36
47.42
21.40
22.82
* Note: Indices in VI-1, VI-2, and VI-3 are derived by dividing shown above as 21.05%. That rate is divided by 6.28%, which is the
percentages of each item by that item's share of all cases. Example: Polygraph's share of all 5,204 cases, to arrive at a relative
Percentage for Polygraph in Admitted column of Factor One is effectiveness index of 3.35 in Figure VI-1.
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
Screening
All
Percent of Factor One
All Factors
Procedures
Cases
Total (5
204)
,
Not Admitted
Shown
Falsified
Not
Asked
Total
Not Admitted
Shown
Falsified
Not
Asked
Total
None (Papers Only)
2,231
42.87 4 14
13
8
39
4 23
40
18
85
Administrative Screening
1,484
28.52 6 26
8
10
50
6 46
14
23
89
Investigative Interviews
1,162
22.33 9 28
19
34
90
9 37
28
40
114
Polygraph
327
6.28 19 48
7
1
75
19 67
8
1
95
Totals
5,204
38 116
47
53
254
38 173
90
82
383
Factor One
All Factors
None (Papers Only)
10.53 12.07
27.66
15.09
10.53 13.29
44.44
21.95
Administrative Screening
15.79 22.41
17.02
18.87
15.79 26.59
15.56
28.05
23.68 24.14
40.43
64.15
23.68 21.39
31.11
48.78
Polygraph
50.00 38.73
8.89
1.22
Totals
18.50
20.87
21.41
* Note: See Appendix C-30 for Adverse Data and explanation of
how indices are derived.
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
Adverse Data by Type of Screening Procedures:
No Previous Investigation (787 Cases)*
Procedures
Cases
Total (5
204)
,
Not
Shown
Admitted
Falsified
Not
Asked
Total
Not
Shown
Admitted
Falsified
Not
Asked
Total
None (Papers Only)
2,231
42.87
21
151
99
122
393
21
185
232
179
617
Administrative Screening
1,484
28.52
3
64
6
17
90
3
77
11
25
116
Investigative Interviews
1,162
22.33
21
76
13
38
148
21
90
19
45
175
Polygraph
327
6.28
43
104
8
1
156
43
127
9
2
181
Totals
5,204
88
395
126
178
787
88
479
271
251
1,089
None (Papers Only)
Administrative Screening
Investigative Interviews
Polygraph
Totals
Factor One
All Factors
23.86
38.23
78.57
68.54
23.86
38.62
85.61
71.31
3.41
16.20
4.76
9.55
3.41
16.08
4.06
9.96
23.86
19.24
10.32
21.35
23.86
18.79
7.01
17.93
48.86
26.33
6.35
0.56
48.86
26.51
3.32
0.80
11.18
50.19
16.01
22.62
8.08
43.99
24.89
23.05
'Note.- See Appendix C-30 for explanation of how indices are
derived.
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2
Productivity Data: Subject Admission by Category
(All Adverse Factors; No Previous Investigation)
Percent of
Not Asked
Total
(Excluding
NS)
Percent
of Total
Subject Cooperation
A
4
2
0.395
92
9.209
.
B. Loyalty
-- _
1
0.210
-
0.395
2
0.200
C. Foreign Connections
7
34
7.128
1
0.372
35
3.504
D. Dishonesty
6
32
6.709
35
13.011
18
7.115
85
8.509
E. Irresponsibility
10
_
39
8.176
55
20.446
56
22.134
150
15.015
F. Immoral Conduct
7
17
3.564
7
2.602
22
8.696
46
4.046
G. Financial
4
20
4.193
8
2.974
54
21.344
82
8.208
di
l
M
H
4
13
2.725
3
1.115
23
9.091
39
3.904
ca
e
.
1. Drugs and Alcohol
36
173
16.729
36
14.229
254
-25.425----
J. Criminal (other than above)
4
136
28.512
24
8.922
25
9.881
185
18.519
K. Other
6
10
2.096
2
0.743
17
6.719
29
2.903
Totals
88
477
253
999
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP96M01138RO01200020003-2