MEETING ON FURTHER ACTION UNDER NSC ACTION 2454

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP63-00313A000500090044-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 12, 2002
• Sequence Number: 44
• Publication Date: June 26, 1963
• Content Type: MFR

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26 June 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Meeting on Further Action Under NSC Action 2454
1. NSC Action 2454 directed that studies be made to deter-
mine whether there are releaseable data such as mapping informa-
tion which would help create wider public acceptance of space
observation and photographs. In accordance with that directive, the
Department of Defense prepared a draft plan for release of degraded
ARGON photography.
2. A meeting, chaired by the Deputy Under Secretary of
State for Political Affairs (Mr. U. Alexis Johnson), was held at
the State Department on 24 June 1963, to discuss the draft plan and
the general concept on which it was based. The following personnel
participated in the discussions:
Defense - Mr. Nitze
USIA-Mr. Murrow
Defense - Dr. McMillan
NASC-Dr. Welsh
ACDA-Mr. Fisher
NASA-Dr. Dryden
OST-Dr. Wiesner
S/AL-Amb. Thompson
State/L-Mr; Meeker
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3. Basically, the discussions cover three areas of concern,
as follows:
a. Whether release of such materials would, in fact,
materially contribute to the acceptance of the legality of
terrestrial photography obtained by satellites.
b. Soviet reaction and possible countermeasures.
c. Concomitant effects on the security of our covert
satellite reconnaissance programs.
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4. Regarding "acceptance", Mr. Meeker, Deputy Legal
Counsel for the State Department, reported that at the most recent
meeting of the Legal Subcommittee of the U. N. Committee on
Outer Space,. there was considerably more support for the U. S.
position with regard to satellite observation than had been evident
at last year's session. Several countries, including Canada and
Italy, which previously had been reluctant to support the U. S.
position, lined up solidly with the U. S. - U. K. bloc on the legality
question. Although the Soviets tried to generate some opposition
among those nations outside the Soviet Bloc, their efforts, for the
most part, were unproductive.
5. In the light of Mr. Meeker's report, the group concluded
that it was highly questionable that the release of materials as pro-
posed would significantly contribute to international acceptance of
the legality of such activities and, conversely, might precipitate an
unfavorable reaction among those uncommitted nations which up to
now have displayed a singular disinterest in the whole problem. As
long as we are making some progress in establishing a favorable
climate in the U. N. , it was considered that it would be unwise, and
self-defeating, to force the issue at this time.
6. Concerning Soviet reaction, it was noted by Mr. Murrow,
and conceded by the group,-that the Soviets, unless directly con-
fronted in such a manner that they are forced to act in order to save
face, traditionally have been Willing to engage in polemics while, in
fact, accepting the realities of a given situation without acknowledging
that they have done so. It was agreed that release of satellite photo-
graphy could result in a direct confrontation with the Soviets on this
issue and probably would result in their undertaking active counter-
measures. Mr. Murrow also noted that in his opinion the degraded
materials which would be released would be almost patently "phony"
.and their publication might be regarded by many as an act of duplicity
designed to deliberately mislead. Mr. Murrow expressed his view
in an apt, though mixed metaphor, to the effect, "We might find we
have opened a Pandora's Box only to find it filled with Trojan Horses'.1.
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7. On the question of possible compromise of related
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Ireconnaissance programs, the group concluded
programs. They were unable to perceive any way in which thr,
release could plausibly be made without identifying the vehicle
used, the launch base, recovery base, camera type, etc. The
problem of re-indoctrinating the approximately 10, 000 holders
of T-TRH clearances was also recognized to be of appalling mag-
nitude.
that the plan, if implemented, would undoubtedly jeopardize such
8. In view of the foregoing, the group unanimously con-
cluded that implementation of the draft plan for release of satellite
photography would be undesirable and unwise. A memorandum
noting this discussion and recommending against such action is
being prepared by the State Department for transmittal to the
Hon. MacGeorge Bundy.
9. The CIA position as expressed during the course of the
discussions, was essentially that contained in the draft memo-
randum (not distributed). attached hereto.
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3 & 4- DD/R
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8 - Legal Counsel
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11 - SS/OSA
12 - SAL/OSA
13 - SAL/OSA (chrono)
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24? June 1963
Defense
Mr
Nitze
USIA -
Mr. Murrow
Defense
Mr.
McMillan
NASC -
Dr. Welsh
ACDA
Mr.
Fisher
OST -
Dr. Wiesner
White House
Mr.
Kaysen
SAL -
Amb. Thompson
NASA
Dr.
Seamans
INR -
Mr. Hughes
Mr. Meeker
SUBJECT: Further Action Under NSC Action 24$4 '
1. The CIA has studied the draft plan for release of terrestrial
photographs taken from satellites and, for reasons outlined below,
does not concur in the initiation of this plan.
2. The release of satellite mapping photography will jeopardize
CORONA security. The plan makes no provision for the protection of
the operational aspects of ARGON which are, of course, identical
with those of CORONA except for the camera package. We believe
that the ARGON photography cannot be released without identifying
the vehicle used, the launch base, the recovery base, the type of
camera used and who manufactured it. This being the case, the 0 25X1A
would immediately be identified as a
(reconnaissance facility. Concomitantly,
(CORONA), since; it would have to be identified as the vehicle
for obtaining the photography, would also be identified as a
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3. Another security problem in the draft plan is that of
re-indoctrination of the approximately ten thousand people holding
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T-KH clearances, a task assigned to PIA. We believe it would be close
to impossible to re-educate these people sufficiently to the point
that they would not inadvertently disclose their association or
knowledge of the released photography and the formerly
1+. If the. security
is breached, as we '
think it would be, the USSR and other Bloc countries could initiate.
a new compaign against all photo reconnaissance activities. Political
pressures could.then be generated tb' bring about a suspension or
reduction in the vital intelligence now gained from these activities--
a result which would be most unfortunate from intelligence community
5?
Farther, with the public identification of the purpose and
vehicles of our programs, we believe that the USSR might feel licensed
to take positive countermeasures against our vehicles as they traverse
apace over the Soviet Union.
6. The CIA General Counsel is of the opinion that successful
initiation of this plan would have no real effect on the legal status
of such programs. Acceptance of the concept by one country and non-
acceptance by another would have no bearing on the ultimate establishment
of legality on a world-wide basis.
7. In brief, it is the CIA view that the possible benefits to be,
derived from the plan are not at all clear, that the probability of
achieving the objectives are by no means high. Conversely, we believe
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that the hazards to our present programs are very clear and that
the probability of detrimental effects on our programs, either
through political or direct counter actions, are very high indeed.
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