CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000100200001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 15, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 16, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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OCI NO. q~56
16 Qctober 1953
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
c ~~,~ftiT r~o. ~~
Ci~~;LP~.S:~!rlcD ~~
P.cXT i~cVIFVJ ~~1TE:
~~
f~EVIEWER:.~
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT It`JTELLIGENCE
RET
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SEC*
STATE review(s) completed.
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This material contains information affecting the
Natipnal Aefer~se of the Unit~,d States within the
meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC,
Secs. 793 and 794, the transm;issipn or revelation
of which in any manner to an unauthorized person
is prphibited by law.
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SUMMARY OF ~IJNTENTS
THE SOVIET WORLD
P e . P
. Page 4
YUGOSLAV REACTION TO THE AMERICArt-BRITISH ANNOUNCEMENT
ON TRIESTE . . P P ? Page 6
. P . ,
Yugoslavia?s violent reaction to the American-
British decision on Trieste is intended to delay with-
drawal of Allied troops from Zone A. Belgrade would
prefer to-use diplomatic means tc~ avoid a showdown but
has committed itself to military action .should Italian
troops enter Zone A.
PROSPECTS FOR SETTLING .THE SAAR QUESTION P P Page 8
Forthcoming French-German negotiations for a Saar
settlement, which is a prerequisite for French ratifi-
cation of EDC, will take place in the context of the
more favorable diplomatic situation produced by the
;6 September West German election?
FISHING DISPUTE.OBSTRUCTS NORMAL .JAPANESE-KOREAN.
RELATIONS P ? P P ? . Page 10
? ? . ? P P P ?
Renewed efforts to regularize Japanese-Korean re-
lations, following the recent South Korean seizures of
Japanese fishing vessels, offer little prospect of
success because of mutual unwilli~igness to make con-
cessionsP (SEE MAP)
NEW SATELLITE APPROACH TO CHRONIC AGRICULTURAL
PROBLEMS ? ? P Page 13
P 9 P P 9 O 6 P O P O
In an effort to raise agricultural production which
has not yet reached prewar level, the Eastern European
governments in recent months have introduced new agri-
cultural policies including increased state aid to
peasants and substantial material incentives.
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ARABS .DEMAND HIGHER OIL ROYALTIES a e o e e e Page 15
The Western oil industry in the Middle East is
faced with another round of Arab dem~~nds for higher
revenueso (SEE MAP)
SPECIAL ARTICLE, ANALYSIS OF THE PURGES IN THE USSR's
E RGIAN REPUBLIC a e 4 o a a o o Page lg
The nature of the purges in Georgia since T951
suggests that Beria was held personally responsible for
the Georgian political situationo Then purges therefore
shed some light on the changing fortunes of Beria
throughout this periodo
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The Soviet Union's demand that the UN Security Council
try again to set up an international administration-for the
.Free Territory of Trieste, together with. the 12 .October Soviet
note, represents an attempt to capitalize. on the dispute in
the hope of thwarting a Trieste settlement and to maintain the
pose of upholding peace treaties,
The Soviet note did not mention Yugoslavia, and Ambassador.
Bohlen believes that the Kremlin. is being careful to avoid the
appearance of supporting the Yugoslav position. The Soviet
maneuvers may be intended to create suspicions in Allied quar-
ters regarding Soviet-Yugoslav relations. Yugoslav UN dele-
gates, however, reportedly had attempted to dissuade Vyshinsky
from making the proposal at this time,
A Pravda editorial of 12 October addressed itself to re-
cent sugg-es'~i'ons from the West that Soviet fear of attack might
be relieved by some kind of nonaggression pact, Ignoring the
proposals advanced by Churchill, Adenauer and the French UN
delegate, Pravda centered its attack on "utterances by a number
of leading~me cans to the effect that NATO might allegedly
become 'a guarantee of security' for all European states, in-
cluding the USSR." This treatment suggests that Moscow is anxious
to avoid even an exchange of views on a nonaggression commit-
ment since it would inevitably raise-such explosive issues as
permanent frontiers, and Soviet domination of Eastern Europe,'
and would even challenge the alleged Communist apprehensions
of the outside world's aggressive intentions.
Pravda's reaction appeared to hint that, in the event of
an ac u~al ~iestern offer of a security pact, the Soviet leaders
would demand the dissolution of NATO and American withdrawal
from overseas. bases before they would seriously consider such
an arrangement.
After the failure of repeated Communist attempts to induce
.the UN to reconsider on the composition of the Korean political
conference, Chou En-lai on 10 Octolber accepted the United States'
proposals for a meeting to discuss time and place for the con-
ference to be held,
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The only modification of Chou's position of 13 September
is the dropping of the demand that Chinese and North Korean
representatives be invited to conduct "point negotiations" at
the UN General Assembly. H~,s current statement waters down,
but does not withdraw, the earlier demand for settlement of the
composition question before discussing the time and place.
Chows statement was probably timed to give new life to
Western hopes that Moscow's professed interest in reducing in-
ternational tension through negoti;~.tions is genuine. The Con--
munists-still appear to see a greater gain for the immediate
future in exploiting the actual an~i potential differences of
opinion between the United States sand other UN members on pro-
cedural questions than by negotiat:Lng on substantive issues.
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YUGOSLAV REACTION TO THE AMERICAN-BRITISH
ANNOUNCEMENT ON TRIESTE
Yugoslavia's violent reaction to the Anglo-American
decision to turn over the administration of Zane A of Trieste
to Italy is intended to delay withdrawal of Allied troops from
the zone. Belgrade would prefer to use diplomatic means to
avoid a showdown, but has committed-itself to military action
should. Italian troops enter `Lone A.
In his speeches of 10 and 11 October, Tito emphasized that
Yugoslavia would consider the entrance of Italian troops into
Zone A as an act of aggression, and warned that Yugoslav forces
would march into the zone the moment such a move was attempted,
The Yugoslavs have reportedly sent one marine and one paratroop
unit to .Zone B, and have reinforced the areas bordering the Free
Territory and Italy with one infantry and elements. of one tank
division. The Yugoslav assistant military. attache in Rome
told an American official that three additional divisions, one
naval and one air unit had been ordered to .positions along the
Yugoslav-zonal boundary.
By closing the zonal boundaries Yugoslavia has ,prevented
confirmation of strength increases in Zone B, but observations
by American officials tend to supp~~rt reports that reinforcements
-have been moved into the border ar~aas. It is possible that Yugo-
slavia intends merely to stage a military demonstration designed
to-give added force to its diplomatic moves, However, the move-
ment of troops into the immediate vicinity of the Italian border
would heighten tension in that are;, and increase Yugoslavia's
capabilities for attack should Belrade decide to resort to force.
Belgrade has attempted by thr~:ats and diplomatic maneuvers
to farce the United States and Gre;~,t Britain to choose between
a four-.power conference for reconsideration of the 8 October-
demarche on Trieste, or a United Nations debate on the dispute
as a "threat to the peace," JustijPying its action on grounds
that the United States and Great Britain have violated the
Italian Peace Treaty of 1947 and oj~fered.a "concession to Italian
expansionism,'' which poses a direct threat to the- national se-
curity of Yugoslavia, Belgrade on ]L2 October brought the issue
to the UN's attention. The Yugoslav note to the United Nations,
however, expressed the hope that action by the international
body might be obviated by an elimination of the "rising danger-
ous situation" through direct negotiations with Yugoslavia, the
United States, Great Britain, and ]Italy,
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Concurrent Yugoslav notes to the United States and Great
Britain emphasized that there would be no object to the suggested
four-,power .conference unless action on the American-British de-
cision was in the meantime delayed. By taking this action,
Belgrade hoped at least to delay f;he withdrawal of American-
British forces from Zone A, and ,possibly to win a more favorable
settlement..
Despite Tito's assurances that neither East nor West will
be allowed to exploit the ,pressured which have been brought
against him as a result of his firm attitude on Trieste, Yugo-
slavia's ,present ,position is highly vulnerable to Soviet di-
visive tactics. Anticipating the ,possibility that his belliger-
ent attitude might affect Yugoslavia's relations with the West.
'and lead to a.cut in Western assistance, Tito has ,publicly taken
the .position that "we cannot sell our country for this aid."
The-USSR has already entered the dispute by protesting
against the unilateral decision of the United States and Britain
and demanding that the United Nati~~ns .proceed with the estab-
lishment of a Free Territory of Trieste according to the terms
of the Italian Peace Treaty of 194'7. This Soviet proposal is
entirely unacceptable to the count~~ies directly concerned with
the problem, and will only confuse the issue further,
Belgrade has assumed a stand i"rom which it will have great
difficulty retreating, Commitmeni;s have been made which the
Yugoslavs will find impossible to ~.gnore and damaging to with-
draw, and Tito has raised the stakes by allowing. the issue to
.assume the ,pro,portions of a contest; involving national honor
and the ,prestige of his ,party and government .
Under the circumstances, Tito cannot easily afford to lose
his gamble. If he is unable to win, a more favorable settlement
of the Trieste issue or at least effect some change in the
American-British solution and thus save face, the passibility
that he will choose- to take military action cannot be excluded.
The concensus among Allied officials in Trieste is that Tito
is sincere in-his threats, and will not tolerate the entrance
of Italian troops into Zone A under present circumstances,
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PROSPL~CTS FOR SETTLING TI~:~ SAAp, QUESTION
.Forthcoming French-German negotiations for a Saar
settlement, which is a prerequis:tte for French ratification
of EDC, will take place in~the context of the more favorable
diplomatic situation produced by the C September West German
election. There are still some ~tnatty problems to be re-
solved, however, including the pE~rmanence of any proposed
solution, the issue of economic eights, and the question of
"free elections."
Talks between Chancellor AdE~nauer and Foreign Minister
Bidault art scheduled to follow i:he preliminary conversations
expected to begin on 15 October. Premier Laniel has indicated
that he also intends shortly to take a hand in the negotia-
tions. Both sides have expressed-confidence that an early
agreement can be reached.
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At present the French seem to be waiting for Adenauer to
follow up his hint of detailed .plans for a comprehensive
settlement, for which the most likely basis is the "~uropeaniza-
tion" concept developed by him anal former foreign minister
Schuman in 1952 and recently recommended in the van der Goes
report to the Council of Europe. The main difficulty will be
to devise a formula which will meet France's demand for a
definitive solution and at the same time be indefinite enough
to overcome German fears that it could be used as a precedent
for an eastern .border settlement in any peace treaty negotia-
tions.
As defined in the Council of Europe report,- under ":Euro-
peanization" the Saar would become '':~uropean territory"
guaranteed by France, Germany, Britain, and the United States.
The territory would have politica~~. autonomy under a European
commissioner for external affairs and defense, and a Saar
delegation would. be admitted to the assembly of the EDC and
the Coal-Steel Community. The existing economic union between
France and the Saar would be reel;iced by a 5C3-year treaty of
"economic cooperation.." Reaction to these recommendations has
been fairly favorable ,in the Saar,, somewhat less favorable in
the French government, and thus far cool among West German
officials.
France has indicated that it will not accept a treaty
of "economic cooperation" without a guarantee that the French-
Saar customs and currency union will continue until a similar
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integrated European union is established. In return, the
French might agree to offer Germany some special trading
status within the framework of the French-Saar customs union.
Moreover, they might also approve some other recommendations
of the Council's report, including that for a trilateral
convention protecting German culture in the Saar.
The method of submitting t~o the Saarlanders for approval
.any agreement evolving from French-German talks is also
unresolved. The Germans, for whom the Saar question is
primarily political rather than economic, have maintained that
the political rights of pro-German groups in the Saar should
be recognized immediately and that any French-German solution
should be submitted to a."freely elected" Saar bandtag. -The
.French have steadfastly insisted that a popular referendum,
limited to acceptance or rejection of the solution, should
precede "free elections."
?Although the German stand ~~n this point was supposedly
softened last spring ,, Adenauer :raised it again shortly after
his electoral victory. He may, however, be imerely attempting;
to establish a strong bargainin;; position in order to ensure
obtaining a solution which would satisfy Bundestag sentiment..
Aside from rightist opposition to political separation of
the Saar, the Bundestag can be expected to demand that any
settlement eliminating future r~aunion with Germany must be
conditioned firmly on European :integration. Some Christian
Democratic leaders are demanding; that-any agreement be subject
to revision within ten years and that it be reviewed whenever
a peace treaty is negotiated. Some leaders of the minor
coalition parties have threatened to leave the government
should Adenauer go "too far" in concessions to France.
Although the French would most probably refuse to write
any provision along these lines into an agreement, Adenauer
might be able to secure Bundestag approval of a solution by
arguing that such a condition was implicit though not explicit.
The Saarlanders,,most of whom accept their present
political separation from Germany, continually press the
French for more autonomy and therefore will probably not be
reluctant to become citizens of the first "European territory.?'
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FISHING DISPUTE OBSTRUCTS NORMAL JAPANESE-KOREAN RELATIONS
Renewed efforts to regularize Japanese-Korean relations,
.following the recent increase in South Korean seizures of
Japanese fishing vessels, offer litl;Ie prospect of success
because of mutual unwillingness to make concessions. A basic
.Japanese feeling of superiority and the traditional Korean ,
suspicion of Japan prejudice any attempt to establish normal
relations,
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The impasse over fishing righter and property claims caused
a recess in July of-the intermittent; negotiations for an over-all
settlement which had begun in OctobE~r 1951, This impasse nulli-
fied the progress toward agreements on ,such problems as the status.
of Korean residents in Japan, a basic treaty, and Korean claims
to vessels formerly of Korean registry.
President Rhee responded to the suspension of the UN Sea
Defense Zone in late August by ordering the South Korean navy
to exclude Japanese fishing craft from international waters
within the unilaterally imposed "Rhee line" (see map, p. 12).
This action directly contravened earlier. UN Command directives.
The Korean seizure of Japanese fishing vessels, including
an official fisheries patrol boat, provoked a strong popular
reaction in Japan spearheaded by politically influential fishing
interests. Despite powerful sentiment in the Japanese cabinet
for retaliatory moves,. including expulsion of the Korean minis-
ter and use of naval craft to protect Japanese .fishing boats,
action was postponed in an effort to avoid embarrassing the
United States or causing an open break with South Korea.
Japan on 24 September proposed that bilateral negotiations
be resumed, with priority to be given the fisheries issue, The
Japanese ,would have preferred to discuss only the fishing ques-
tion, but in deference to President Rhee's insistence on simul-
taneous treatment of all issues, they proposed full-scale talks.
The new talks began on 6 October.
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The initial meeting produced n~~ visible sign of a new basis
for a settlement. Subsequent talks apparently have convinced
the Japanese that South Korea genuinely fears Japanese compe-
tition against its poorly equipped :fishing fleet and that Korea
will not accept Japan's proposal to settle the fisheries problem
by a conservation agreement. The Japanese feel the. Koreans will
insist on "reserved areas" as a minimum demand. While Japan
cannot formally recognize such areaa,-the implication that it
might "voluntarily".refrain from fishing in them may offer
limited.-room for nego nation.
.The Japanese feel, however, th~~t the conference may quickly
reach an impasse over their request that Korea return captured
vessels, permit the dispatch of a mission to Pusan to assist the
detained fishermen, and suspend seis,ures to create a favorable
atmosphere for the negotiations. Even if-Korea rejects this
request, Japan probably will not break off the discussions
unless internal political pressure ter public opinion forces it.
Rhee's attitude toward Japan i~c more vindictive than
objective, and a solution of over-a].1 Japanese-Korean issues
while Rhee remains. in power is doubtful. Over and-above his
life-long anti-Japanese bias, he genuinely fears that the
Japanese, with their superior equipment, might eventually
monopolize fishing in the waters off Korea. He also believes
that aggressiveness on the fisheries question may enable him to
extract concessions from Japan on other issues where his bargain-
ing position is weaker.
Neither of the two governments is likely to make the sub-
stantial and politically unpopular concessions necessary for a
rapprochement. Since a request for American intervention
would probably follow a breakdown of the negotiations, the
possibility of the United States being involved increases as
the situation is prolonged.
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-~ .-;
U. S. S. R.
J HOKKAIDO
JAPAN - ~O RE A
U N Sea pefense Zone o ~,,... , : _ _
Demarcation Line C81e
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NEW SATELLITE APPROACH TO CHRONIC
AGRICULTURAL P:~,OBLEMS
In an effort to raise agricultural praduction,which has not
yet reached prewar levels, the Eastf;rn European governments in
recent months have ..introduced new agricultural policies including
increased state aid to peasants and substantial material incen-
tives. Agricultural production since the war has suffered from
emphasis on heavy industry and from the peasants' low morale and
resistance to collectivization.
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The first of these-new policies was announced in East-
Germany in June, and by mid-September all the Satellites had
followed. suit in varying degrees.
In Hungary, Rumania and Albania,concessions have been more
extensive than in Poland and Czechoslovakia, possibly because of
fear of peasant resistance to this year's crop collection program..
Farmers in the first three countries have been promised additional
equipment and consumer, goods, their debts and quota arrears caused
by the natural.clisasters of 1952 have been canceled, and taxes and
quotas on future crops have been reduced. In Poland, Czechoslovakia,
and East Germany, agricultural investments will be increased and
debts in arrears will be canceled or payments postponed, In
Czechoslovakia and Hungary increased credits are to be extended,
largely for the purchase of fertilizer, and higher prices are to
be paid to the peasants for some crops.
Substantially lower delivery quotas were decreed in East
Germany, where the agricultural Iabor~ shortage has been aggravated
by the flow of people from the countryside to industry and by
defection to the YYest, Similar reductions are to apply to both
private and collective farmers in a11?of Eastern Europe, although
concessions to collective farmers-are more extensive,
Announcements of the new policies were accompanied by assur-
ances of the voluntary nature of collectivization and emphasis on
the need for consolidation and cautious expansion of the col-
lectives.- In Hungary, however, Premier Nagy's 4 July speech. prom-
ising that members could leave collectives at-the end of the
harvest was interpreted by many peasants as signaling the abandon-
ment of collectivization. Many prega~^ed to withdraw immediately,
thereby endangering the harvest and causing confusion and poor
morale in local party cadres.
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Since then, the Hungarian regime ha.s restricted the right
to withdraw from collectives by discriminatory measures and by
threatening peasants with severe penalties, Leaders in other
Satellites have carefully avoided promising peasants permission
to withdraw.
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These new Satellite policies represent an adaptation to
local conditions of recent concessions made in the USSR in order
to promote greater agricultural production, The chief difference
between the Soviet and Satellite policies is that the Soviet con-
cessions are aimed at getting increased production from collect-
ivized peasants-while in the Satellites, where private farms are
still responsible for considerably more than half of the agricul-
tural production, concessions are being made not only to the
collectivized-sector, but also to 'the independent peasants, and
in some cases at the expense of thE; collectivization program,
The new policy also places emphasis. on raising-the low level
of mechanization which has handicapaped agriculture in Eastern
Europeo Since the domestic .industry is.unable to fulfill the need
for implements, the Soviet Union hays made commitments to aid Czech
agricultural mechanization and pos~;ibly other Satellites as well.
However, a 29 September decree of t;he Supreme Soviet stated that
the USSR would place orders for sorr~e types of agricultural equip-
ment with the People's Democracies< It seems unlikely that Satel-
lite agriculture will receive substantial aid from the Soviet Jnion,
The lack of consumer goods in rural areas and the policy of
discrimination between private and collective farms will continue
to handicap agricultural production. In late September and early
October the governments of Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia
began to complain that despite a good harvest, deliveries to the
state were lagging, This lag was partially caused by the peasants'
belief that additional concessions would be made and by their
reluctance, in view of past currency reforms and forced loans,
to surrender their crops until more consumer goods become available,
The governments have stressed that no new concessions are con-
templated, and in Hungary laggards were threatened with a ten
percent increase in quotas4
The new policies, therefore, are not adequate to salve the
acute Eastern European agricultural problem, Food shortages and
peasant resistance can be expected i~o continue,
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ARABS DEMAND HIGHER OIL. ROYALTIES.
The Western oil industry in the Middle East is faced
with another round of Arab demands four higher oil revenues.
Saudi Arabia is currently challenging the justice of the
pricing arrangements under which it makes a 50-50 .split of
the profits with the Arabian American. Oil Company (ARAMCO).
Negotiations are Scheduled to be reo~~ened on 8 November and
judging by the past, Saudi Arabia will try to reinforce its
position with crippling restrictions on-the operations of the
company if it px?oves too stubborn (sere map p. 1?) .
In the end, however, ARAMCO will. probably yield, thus
permitting the first inroads on the ~~0-50 principle which the,
company hopefully introduced into Mid'~dle East oil operations
in .1950. Eventually the Arabs may demand successively higher
percentages of the revenues.
Any Saudi gains will set new goals for the other oil-
producing states -- Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrein -- which
oUtained 50-50 agreements shortly after Saudi Arabia.
?
The Saudi negotiations will in part set the pace for Leb,-
anon and Syria, where a new aspect oi' the. problem is being
raised. Jealous of their rich oil-producing neighbors, the
states with transit pipelines argue that"Arab oil" should
be more equitably shared among all F~rabs. While this argu-
ment promises to figure prominently i.n intra-Arab politics
and finance, its present impact is felt in demands that the
pipeline companies share the "profit:c" realized by shipping
ail thx^ough pipelines rather than by tanker through the Suez
Canal, The companies stoutly insist that such a principle is
not applicable to a transport industry and that the present
fixed-fee arrangement should prevail. They are the objects of
press campaigns in both Lebanon and ;>yria.
Lebanon still refuses to ratify a 1952 agreement with
Iraq Petroleum and demands the renegotiation of a 1952 agree-
ment with TAPLINE, ARAMCO?s pipeline company. The Beirut gov-
ernment says-that it cannot accept these agreements because
they were signed by the late, discredited Khoury regime. The
compan~.es cite the Lebanese actions ~~s exemplifying the indus-
try's need for. long-term security and protection from unilateral
denunciation of agreements.
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In Syria, President Shishakli is expected soon to reopen
long-pending negotiations with Ir.ac~ Petroleum with a "share
the profits" demand calling for $2F~,000,000 annually rather
than the current $4,720,000. He ha.s suggested that Syria
receive 49 percent and Iraq Petroleum 51 percent of the sav-
ings effected by pipeline as against tanker shipment. These
negotiations are partly coordinated with the Lebanese and
are closely watched by Jordan and Egypt. Astride the Suez
Canal, Egypt may emerge from the current Anglo-Egyptian nego-
tiations as a dominant factor in setting tanker rates and
thus would be in a position to make common cause with the
transit states vis-a-vis either the producing states or the
pipeline companies,
The Arab League's recently established Petroleum Commit-
tee has recommended that the Arab countries take over the
production and distribution of oil in order to prevent leak-
age to Israel and also that steps be taken to prevent the
Western powers from fixing prices without ,prior consultation
with the producing states.
Rivalry among the Arab states may eventually force the
producing states to~make favorable loans or grants to the
transit states. In the coming negotiations, however, the
Arab states will be united against the companies in unremit-
ting pressure .for a greater share of the profits.
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t! ~ r . 2W SOa~.,.::..,;l~s ,^r~'-nebd__.._.~5"Kp
!! 'l5am
L6r3a ~ L U ~C' ~ ~' ~S ~ ~~1~ ~`;F,"a~i~:,~U ~~t~~~~~ ~* r~i~~.
7F L~;s ~ -~ ,~,,a
CRUDE PRODUCTION
ANNUAL
.....16,00.000 ??
EGTPT ...... __. .
'Q~7.1 . ................10.600.000
no . _ _ _ . _ ..... _. 1A0,690,000 ..
4,773.810.000 bW~
w..,oiy
11MKEY ... ....... ......1]9.000 ~ __
" ~
TOTAL -..__. ....779.00].700 bbls. INDDIf FAST - ~
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 Approved Release ~nndinB~R.~fE_Rnp~a_OOA000100200001-0
ANALYSIS OF THE PURGES I2d THE USSR'S
GEORGIAN REPUBL:[C
The purges and counterpurges in the Georgian Republic over
the past two years were apparently touched off by Stalin's
strong personal interest in his native republic's affairs and
perhaps by some degree of high-level political maneuvering
against Beriao The 1951-1952 purges in the republic's party
and gover nment administration suggested that Stalin held Beria
personally responsible for the degreE~ of corruption which had
developed there? -The April 1953 developments showed that with
Stalin out o~ the way, Beria-was proceeding with a free hand to
return many of his earlier followers to power,
In the latest purge, last September, Beria's associates
were again ousted, and it appeared that henceforth Georgian-
affairs would be run by Khrushchev, the party first secretary
in Moscow, who would not be influenced by national tieso
Beria rose~to national prominence during the 1930's through
police and party work in the Caucasus, In 1938 he left his post.
as .first secretary of the Georgian party to become head of the
NKVD, but it was assumed that he retained great influence over
party affairs in his. native republics In 1951-52, however, top
Georgian party and government leaders, many of them Beria pro-
teges, were replaced on charges of corruption and leniency toward
the growth of local as opposed to Soviet nationalismv Many
.characteristics of these purges suggest that they were to Beria's
disadvantage, and it is significant ghat Soviet press coverage
of the period often attributed the house-cleaning to Stalin's
personal instructions o.
In April of this year, following Stalin's death, the 1951-
52 purges were dramatically exposed as a provocative plot to
discredit loyal party cadres and incii;e feelings of national
hatred4 All three party secretaries and nine members of the
13-man burg were removedo This was followed by an extensive
replacement of the republic's ministei?ial personnelo Three men
who had been arrested in the 1951-52 shake-ups were exonerated
and given key positions in the new gover nmento
This reversal closely resembled the reversal of the doctors
.plot on 4 Aprilo In fact, the alleged ringleaders of the two
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 Approvec~ir Relea - -00~7A0
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.plots were linked together in the Georgian press as being
,partners in crime. Both reversals, clearly repudiating actions
taken during Stalin's lifetime which had appeared to reflect un-
favorably on Beria, probably resulted from the increase in Beria's
pawer and freedom of action after Stalin's death,
Members of the new leadership elected in April were pointed-
ly described in the ,press as "men trained under the best son of
Georgia and Stalin's companion, Lavrenti Beria," and analysis
of their careers supports this statement. Of the 13 members of
the newly elected buro, six including th~~ first secretary had
served ,previously on the 1938 buro headed by Berta. Two other
members of this group, V, M, Bakradze, the chairman of the
Council of Ministers, and V. G. Dekanozo~r, the MVD minister,
had had particularly long associations with Beria.
Bakradze was second secretary of thE~ Georgian Central Com-
mittee under Beria from 1934 to 19370 DE~kanozov's career also
began in Georgia, where he worked in the secret police under
Beria from-1921 to 1931. HP was apparent;Iy one. of-the few
Georgians Beria. brought with-him to Moscow in 1938.
These appointments once again gave Fteria control over
.Georgian affairs. Following his downfall. in July, however,
virtually all of these Long-time associates were replaced: A
party plenum on 20 Septemb:r noted that the Georgian party buro
and Council of Ministers had failed to fulfill the July decree
of the all-Union central committee of the party, the decree
which ousted Berta from his party and government .posts, The
first secretary of the party was replaced and a new central com-
mittee buro elected from which all of Beria's earlier appointees
to ,party ,posts were absent. Subsequent decrees removed-the
chairman and key members of the Council of Ministers, Signifi-
cantly, the plenum was attended by all-Union party secretary
N, N, Shatalin, who was probably sent from Moscow to assure
that the reorganization would be thorougho
The new leadership is composed primarily of Georgians who
.played no major role in the ,political maneuverings of the last
two years< The first secretary, V, T. Mzhavanadze, although a
native of Georgia, gained his party exper~.ence in the Ukraine,
It appears that the Kremlin, in ap,pointin~; such officials, is
attempting to neutralize the bitter factionalism of the last
two yearso
With the exodus of Stalin and Beria, it is unlikely that
Georgian Iocal politics will again be used) by top Soviet leaders
in their ,personal maneuverings for ,power. Instead of being con-
trolled by an influential native son in Moscow, Georgia will be
relegated ?o the position of the other Soviet r.erublics,whose .party
affairs are on the whole uniformly and impersonally directed by
the all-Union secretariato
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