Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79B01709A002300010023-2
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(COMOR-D-13/8)
18 April 1963
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SUBJECT: Protection of Satellite Reconnaissance Vehicles
The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance has
agreed that the attached paper would be useful to the National
Reconnaissance Office, and therefore recommends that USIB
authorize forwarding it to NRO for use as appropriate. It relates
directly to the first recommendation of the -paper on "Require-
ments for Collection by Satellite Image-Forming Sensors"
(USIB-D-41.14/28; COMOR -D-13/4).
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Executive Secretary
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1. There is a need to include in the research and development program
for reconnaissance satellites means of reducing their vulnerability to
interdiction by Soviet anti-satellite weapons systems. NIE 11-3-62 pro-
vides the agreed community opinion that a potential threat to satellites
exists at the present time. NIE 11-3-62 also estimates that the Soviets
might be engaged in the development of a specific anti-satellite missile
system, possibly in conjunction with their ABM program.
2. The current threat is based on the concept that the Soviets could
launch an IRBM or an MRBM on such a trajectory as to intercept a satellite
in orbit at or near the apogee of the intercepting missile. Sufficient
orbital data would have to be acquired to permit prediction of the inter-
cept point prior to launching the intercepting missile and would probably
involve radars and tracking facilities from other systems or programs. Be-
cause in most cases the intercepting missile would have to be launched prior
to the appearance of the satellite above the horizon, this technique is often
called "blind firing". Such a system would probably require the use of a
nuclear warhead.
3. Development of a specific anti-satellite missile system, while some
time in the future, e.g. 1965-1966, is visualized as a system having the
capability to make an interception on an early, perhaps the first, orbit
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4. The need for reducing the vulnerability of reconnaissance satel-
lites is expected to vary both in terms of the type of mission and in terms
of international tension at the time. For example, the use of a reconnaissance
satellite in times of crisis for indication of hostilities might be more
likely to be subject to interception than "routine" surveillance vehicles in
times of relative calm.
5. The research and development program should include efforts to reduce
the vulnerability of satellite reconnaissance vehicles by various means, e.g.
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NRO
This work must be accomplished prior to the first "incident"
WW in which a Soviet intercept is attempted in order to preclude a long period
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