Published on CIA FOIA (foia.cia.gov) (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom)


PROTECTION OF SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE VEHICLES

Document Type: 
CREST [1]
Collection: 
General CIA Records [2]
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79B01709A002300010023-2
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
4
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
March 25, 2004
Sequence Number: 
23
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
April 18, 1963
Content Type: 
MF
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP79B01709A002300010023-2.pdf [3]104.69 KB
Body: 
Approved For Release 2001 1011W C1A-RgP791301709AO023A'011 23 2 0 ^/ USIB-D-41. 14/ 32 (COMOR-D-13/8) 18 April 1963 UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD SUBJECT: Protection of Satellite Reconnaissance Vehicles The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance has agreed that the attached paper would be useful to the National Reconnaissance Office, and therefore recommends that USIB authorize forwarding it to NRO for use as appropriate. It relates directly to the first recommendation of the -paper on "Require- ments for Collection by Satellite Image-Forming Sensors" (USIB-D-41.14/28; COMOR -D-13/4). 25X1 Copies 2, 3 5 6, 7,8,9 10 11, .12 13, 14 15, 16 17, 18 1.9 20 State TCO DIA D NIC DIA DIA TCO OACSI TCO ONI TCO AFNIN NSA NRO AEC FBI NRO review(s) completed. Executive Secretary 25X1 25X1 25X1 Copy.iof 84 Approved For Release 2004/0f(5-p: S 17980 709A002300010023-2 R??P' 2004/0710QPCf &-9961 709A002300010023-2 USIB-D-41.14/ 32 COMOR-D-13/8 1. There is a need to include in the research and development program for reconnaissance satellites means of reducing their vulnerability to interdiction by Soviet anti-satellite weapons systems. NIE 11-3-62 pro- vides the agreed community opinion that a potential threat to satellites exists at the present time. NIE 11-3-62 also estimates that the Soviets might be engaged in the development of a specific anti-satellite missile system, possibly in conjunction with their ABM program. 2. The current threat is based on the concept that the Soviets could launch an IRBM or an MRBM on such a trajectory as to intercept a satellite in orbit at or near the apogee of the intercepting missile. Sufficient orbital data would have to be acquired to permit prediction of the inter- cept point prior to launching the intercepting missile and would probably involve radars and tracking facilities from other systems or programs. Be- cause in most cases the intercepting missile would have to be launched prior to the appearance of the satellite above the horizon, this technique is often called "blind firing". Such a system would probably require the use of a nuclear warhead. 3. Development of a specific anti-satellite missile system, while some time in the future, e.g. 1965-1966, is visualized as a system having the capability to make an interception on an early, perhaps the first, orbit 25 within range. X1 Approved For Release 2004/07LOI - CI~J ?P, '. B01709A002300 10023-2 TOP lease 2004/0T/O7PG'g- Ri'JAB01709A002300010023-2 USIB-D-41, 14/ 32 COMOR-D-13/8 4. The need for reducing the vulnerability of reconnaissance satel- lites is expected to vary both in terms of the type of mission and in terms of international tension at the time. For example, the use of a reconnaissance satellite in times of crisis for indication of hostilities might be more likely to be subject to interception than "routine" surveillance vehicles in times of relative calm. 5. The research and development program should include efforts to reduce the vulnerability of satellite reconnaissance vehicles by various means, e.g. 25X1 NRO This work must be accomplished prior to the first "incident" WW in which a Soviet intercept is attempted in order to preclude a long period 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/071?3p C1,A:ff6 B01709A00230?010023-2 Approved For Release Copy 1 21 , Z2 23 24 25 26 27 28,29 30, 31 32, 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 - 58 5.9 - 84 DCI TCO for USIB/S Asst/OPS(NPIC) C/PSD(NPIC) C /PID(NPIC) C /CSD(NPIC) LS/PID(NPIC) TSO CIA DDI TCO OSI TCO for CIA COMOR Member OSI TCO OCI TCO ONE TCO ORR TCO DDP TCO DDR TCO AD/OSA D/FA/OSA Intel /OSA SO/OSA SAL/OSA USIB IS SA/DDR Approved For Release 2004/07~ZPChalf B 2004/07107 f C& k%F79B01709A002300010023-2 USIB-D-41. 14/32 COMOR-D-13/8 25X1

Source URL: https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp79b01709a002300010023-2

Links
[1] https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document-type/crest
[2] https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/collection/general-cia-records
[3] https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79B01709A002300010023-2.pdf