THE SITUATION IN YEMEN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00429A001200030010-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 6, 2004
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: September 9, 1963
• Content Type: IM

25X1
Approved For Releo
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
9 September 1963
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: The Situation in Yemen
1. The overall picture in Yemen is that of a
continuing stalemate. While there has been no
abrupt rupture of the disengagement plan, its prog-
ress has been painfully slow. The UN observation
mission has been plagued with serious administra-
tive problems which have rendered it largely inef-
fective. However, the willingness with which both
Egypt and Saudi Arabia agreed to finance the UN
operation for an additional two months indicates
that both sides feel the mission continues to be of
some use.
2. There has been no significant change in
the military situation in northern Yemen for several
weeks. Egyptian and Yemeni republican forces re-
main unable to cope effectively with the guerrilla
tactics of the royalist tribes in the northern
hinterland but retain firm control of the major
population centers and the coastal lowlands. The
pattern of shifting centers of hostile action and
of shifting tribal loyalties in response to changes
in the tactical situation and to new offers of
money to individual tribes remains a constant. The
Egyptian forces continue to bear almost the entire
brunt of the actual fighting on the republican
side and are keeping up indiscriminate daily bomb-
ing and strafing attacks on royalist areas. As
long as these Egyptian troops remain in the field
the royalist forces cannot win a major victory.
They do, however, appear to have sufficient arms,
ammunition, and money within Yemen to continue hit-
and-run attacks at least for the immediate future.
3. Thus far there has been no major reduction
in the number of Egyptian troops in Yemen. Movement
Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00429A 1200030010-3
25X1
 25X1
Approved For Releas
aon than a withdrawal.
Egyptian troop Strength in Yemen at 299000
errs on a cons is a n y
number of Egyptian withdrawals, pri-
marily because of failure to observe the arrival of
troop replacements. The UN estimate is that 6-7,000
men have been withdrawn.
4. While we continue to believe that the Egyp-
tians desire to withdraw the bulk of their forces
fairly soon, they will do so only if this does not
endanger the republican government.
were originally sent to Yemen to Egyptian troops
for the republican government in its vstruggleowith
the royalist forces, who were then receiving con-
siderable Saudi aid and encouragement, and the con-
tinued survival of the regime remains a cardinal
Egyptian aim. If the Saudis continue to withhold
ammunition and money from the royalists, royalist
resistance might in time diminish sufficiently to
permit most of the Egyptian forces to withdraw. A
new Yemeni republican army is being trained, and
the Egyptians apparently expect that this force will
eventually deal with the minor tribal dissidence
that is endemic in Yemen. The Egyptians will al-
most certainly maintain a sizeable number of their
own forces in Yemen, however, as long as they
perceive a major military threat to the republican
regime.
-2-
Approved For 010220 1004107116 - 01200030010-3
of troops between Egypt and Yemen has been more in
the nature of a rotat'
25X1
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Rele
25X1
25X1
8. Egypt has indicated that it is interested
in such talks, but its primary concern in this re-
gard is to broaden the base of the present republi-
can government. It is worried over continued bick-
ering, corruption, and inefficiency within the re-
a a has alienated some elements of the southern
Shafi tribes--the main support of the republican
-3-
Approved For Re C1A-RE)P?9TOO429AOO 120 030010-3
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Rele
se 2004/07/16: CIA-RDP79T00429A001 30010-3
regime--by appointing a number of northern Zaidi
tribesmen to important posts, and his own position
appears to be in some doubt. Some Shafis,unhappy
with the present state of affairs apparently favor
a separate state free from the domination of the
Ra.iriic .:.i- ti..,-._ t _- ,. . . --
9. Egypt would not accept, however, a broaden-
ing of the Yemeni regime that would seriously com-
promise its republican, reformist, and "nonaligned"
character. Egyptian prestige is closely tied with
the preservation of the republican regime along the
broad general lines it has already charted for it-
self. Neither would Cairo be likely to favor the
breaking up of the present Yemeni state, over which
it maintains great influence. Faysal, for his part,
is probably resigned to some sort of republican re-
gime in Yemen, but hopes to be able to greatly re-
duce Egyptian influence once the Egyptian troops
leave the country. If the Egyptians can starve out
the royalist forces militarily and can perhaps re-
duce friction in Sana they will probably withdraw
the bulk of their forces from Yemen. But this may
take some time and before it occurs and the Saudis,
seeing the Egyptian troops remaining in Yemen and
continuing to violate the disgagement agreement,
may come to feel that they must renew their aid to
the royalists. Should this happen Egyptian bomb-
ing deep into Saudi territory almost certainly would
be resumed.
25X1
Approved For Rlelease 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T0042PA001200030010-3
 Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00429AO01200030010-3
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00429AO01200030010-3