THE COMMUNIST BUILD-UP IN SOUTH VIETNAMS NORTHERN I CORPS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001900010060-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 19, 2004
• Sequence Number: 60
• Publication Date: May 12, 1967
• Content Type: MF

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1 2 MAY 1967
RtMr. George Cerro
istant to the Vice
esidert
The Communis Build-up
South Vietnam s Northern..
I Corps
The attached nenoran4ui contains a re-
view of the background of the Present build-
up of North Vietnamese military forces in
northernmost South Vietnam. It also sets
forth the extent of the build-up-and assesses
the Communists* aims, strategy, and capabil-.
ity in that area.
A
:jsZ R. J. Smith
R. J. SMITH
Deputy Director for intelligence
a nt; als
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee(w/att) Cy 2
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1 - D/OCI (w/o/att)
OCl/MCO (w/o/att)
1 - DCI (w/att) Cy 17
1 - DDCI (w/att) Cy 19
2 - O/DDI (w/att) Cy 23
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Identical memos
sen to: See Reverse
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The Honorable Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President
The White House Cy 3
The Honorable Dean Rusk
The Secre4Ky Of. State Cy 4
The Honorable William P. Bundy
Assistant Secretary
Bureau of East Asian and PaCif
Department of State Cy 5
The Honorable Robert S.Mc amara
The Secretary of Defense Cy 6
airs
The Honorable Cyrus R. Vance
Deputy Secretary of Defense Cy 13
Lt. general Joseph P. Carroll , usAr
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Department of Defense CY 14
General Earle n. Wheeler, USA'
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff'
Department of Defense Cy 15
The Honorable Th4liaill ilit4biiV, Director
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Departtent of State Cy 16
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nr-rt
L.1.1 Ill ET
9 Nay 1967
MIMORANDUK TAXIING PAYER
UMORANDUM TITLE: The Communist Sutidup in South Ytetnan's
Northern I Corps
1 memo was requested by the Deputy Director of
Current Intelligence who desired OCI"s view on the current
intentions And capabilities of the enemy in the area*
2* The memo describes the origin and motivation be-
hind the Communist buildup, attributing the enemy's initial
trans.DMZ move to a desire to exploit the Buddhist oriole.
In discussing the current offensive of the North Vietnamese
forces, the memo takes note of their new tactics and
strategy which involve increased firepower, operation in
small, hard to detect, elements and the development of bet
an east-west and a north.south line of pressure against
the *Ines,
3, Thel memo concludes that the primary current inten.
tion of the *VA units is to inflict substantial casual-
ties on the allied forces, at the same time blocking any
demonstrable allied progress toward winning the war in
this sector which might be held up by the allies an a
return on the friendly casualties. The swinging stalemate,
Hanoi probably estimates, will have a depressing affect
on morale in the 1180 The North Vietnamese are apparently
prepared to throw considerable mngpower into the effort
for the foreseeable future.
di. The memo probably should be given hatted dis-
scainatten.
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Top Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
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Intelligence Memorandum
The Communist Build-up in South Vietnam's
Northern I Corps
Top Secret 25X1
11 May 1967
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
11 May 1967
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Communist Build-up in South Vietnam's
Northern I Corps
Summary
Following their initial thrust south from the
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in mid-1966, regrouped and
augmented North Vietnamese forces have opened a new
campaign this year in northern I Corps using some-
what different tactics and strategy. Many of the
troops involved have been told that the plan is to
"liberate" Quang Tri and Thua Thien, but this does
not seem to be the primary aim at present.
The North Vietnamese appear, rather, to regard
the sector as highly suitable for a continued war of
maneuver where occasional sharp encounters with al-
lied forces are developed from well-prepared and
reasonably defensible positions. This year they have
spread their operations farther to the west along
the DMZ and have also developed a north-south axis
in the mountainous backbone of Quang Tri and Thua
Thien designed to spread allied reaction forces out
and increase the pressure on them. The availability
of replacements and supplies nearby in the DRV and
Laos is undoubtedly a prime consideration in this
strategy, since it permits an expenditure of men and
firepower that would be above Communist capabilities
in any sustained campaign farther south.
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence
and coordinated with the Office of Research and
Reports and with the Director's Special Adviser on
Vietnamese Affairs.
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The North Vietnamese apparently hope to keep
the area insecure and to subject allied forces to
substantial and sustained attrition. The impact of
this attrition, Hanoi no doubt hopes, will be
greatly magnified if the Communists can block any
demonstrable allied progress toward winning the
conflict in this sector. The situation
wii 1.)uome a -aeaalocx." This, Hanoi probably be-
lieves, will have a dampening effect on morale in
the US and will create additional pressure against
current US policy in the war.
Although the campaign will no doubt ebb and
flow as the North Vietnamese seek to replace losses
and maneuver for fresh initiatives, it appears that
Hanoi is prepared to maintain its strength in the
area for the indefinite future, and possibly be-
lieves it can match a considerable increase in al-
lied ground strength in this region should it occur.
As many as five division-size enemy forces may now
be involved in the build-up.
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Background of the Build-up
1. Viet Cong activities were conducted on a rel-
atively small scale in the provinces of Quang Tri and
Thua Thien until early 1964, despite the accessibility
of the area to North Vietnam. The strength of the
regular Communist military forces in the area was
probably below 2,000 men, comprising no more than six
battalions. The bulk of the infiltrators sent to
build up Viet Cong main forces were moved to units
and new formations farther south. Although government
influence in the hinterlands was spotty--even negligi-
ble in some areas--security was relatively good in the
coastal lowlands and vulnerable mainly to sporadic
guerrilla harassment.
2. Hanoi, at the time, seemed anxious to avoid
disturbing the basic neutrality of the DMZ and thus
the possibility of facing retaliation across it. Al-
though the Communists had developed infiltration routes
through the far western edge of the DMZ, they appar-
ently were satisfied with their main infiltration cor-
ridor through Laos into base complexes along the South
Vietnamese border. The enemy's primary strategy, more-
over, involved the development of major military pres-
sure on government forces and facilities in the politi-
cally and economically more important southern area of
the country. Once the government had more than it
would handle in this area, an influx into the far
north would help materially in tipping the scales to-
ward a Communist victory.
3. In Hanoi's view, the time for this latter
move apparently seemed right by mid-1964. Diem was
out and instability, as a result of Communist military
pressure, was steadily accelerating in both the politi-
cal and military components of the Saigon government.
In May 1964, it was revealed that ethnic North Viet-
namese draftees had been infiltrating Quang Tri and
Thua Thien to form new main force battalions. Rein-
forcement continued steadily through the rest of the
year and into 1965. By the end of 1965, estimates of
Communist strength in the two northern provinces ran
from 4,000 to 6,000 regulars, plus 3,000 guerrillas.
The enemy military structure which has since become
the "Northern Front"--the North Vietnamese Army (NVA)
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6th Regiment, plus four battalions--was already
considered "probable" in US order-of-battle holdings.
4. The inability of the government forces to
meet the threat in the north while heavily engaged
in the southern part of the country was clearly
evident by early 1965. US Marine combat units
subsequently were deployed to the area to bolster
the government position. The Communists responded
by attempting to bottle up US forces through ex-
tensive guerrilla harassment, thus hoping to slow
the re-expansion of allied influence into the hinter-
lands. Although hampered, US units together with
the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) did make substan-
tial gains in improving security in the coastal low-
lands.
New Strategy
5. In late 1965, the Hanoi central committee
met to assess the progress of the war in the South
and the success of the Communists in meeting the
challenge posed by US combat troops. Despite the
heavy casualties already taken by NVA regulars in
their opening engagements with US forces, the cen-
tral committee called for their continued introduc-
tion and for their use as the main mobile striking
force in South Vietnam. On the basis of this de-
cision, it was almost inevitable that the enemy would
try further to augment his strength in northern I
Corps using regular NVA units.
6. The timing of their introduction was prob-
ably influenced primarily by the Buddhist "struggle
movement" which erupted in Hue and Da Nang in March
1966. The Communists evidently had been aware of
the growing restiveness among militant Buddhists who,
from late 1965 on, were looking for an issue with
which to challenge the military regime in Saigon.
described efforts by Viet Cong agents to exploit
dissatisfaction among Hue students and other poten-
tial tools of Buddhist agitators. Prisoners and
defectors taken during the initial Communist incur-
sions across the DMZ in the summer of 1966 reported
that they began their preparations for deployment
about March.
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7. When the "struggle" actually broke out
over the convenient issue of I Corps commander Thi's
dismissal, it attracted significant support among
government officials, police, and soldiers in the
Corps area and gave the agitation the character of
a regional conflict against Saigon's domination. The
Communists may have believed that with the use of
sufficient force, they could significantly contribute
to the deterioration of government authority in
I Corps and be in the position to pick up the pieces
should Saigon's reaction fail. Successful exploita-
tion of this situation would necessarily involve
rapid movement which could only be accomplished via
the DMZ. In Hanoi's view, the advantages of massively
violating the zone now apparently outweighed its value
as a defensive shield to North Vietnam.
8. The Buddhist strife was largely contained
between mid-May and late June--before the NVA units
could fully deploy into the Quang Tri area. Never-
theless, the situation argued for a continued follow-
through by NVA regulars, since the Communist cadre
and units already on the scene had proved relatively
ineffective in their efforts to exploit the unrest.
In addition, the Ky regime had moved quickly to
stiffen and expand its authority in the northern
I Corps area, partly by the appointment of tough,
loyal officials to key jobs.
9. Moreover, apart from the internal situation
in the northern provinces, Hanoi apparently felt
increasing concern during this period over the se-
curity of its vital supply routes to South Vietnam
via Laos. These routes had come increasingly under
air attack and small-scale ground probes had started
against them. Hanoi propaganda in the early months
of 1966 had occasionally mentioned the possibility
of a US ground thrust across Laos to cordon off the
North from the South. Trans-DMZ military operations
by the North Vietnamese would permit the development
of a staging area with short supply lines for the
mounting of sustained operations in the two northern
provinces and southward or eastward from them, thus
greatly complicating any allied ground move to choke
off infiltration.
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10, It seems doubtful now that the enemy's
initial intention was to seek out US forces in major
engagements in Quang Tri and Thua Thien.
indicates that the
North Vietnamese hoped to conceal their initial
deployment from the allies. Moreover, it appears
that they intended initially to operate mainly in
the eastern foothills and nearby lowlands of the
north-south mountain ridge down to Route 9. No
major US forces were stationed in this area at the
time. The enemy aim seemed mainly to be the bolster-
ing of the local Viet Cong position, preparatory to
more major actions at a later date.
Crossing the DM7
11. Enemy units began tho move into Quang Tri
in May 1966, with elements of the North Vietnamese
324th Division leading the way, By July, all three
regiments of the division plus support units had
crossed the DMZ. Despite their stealth, their
presence was soon evident. Although a Marine re-
action force hit them hard and inflicted heavy
casualties, the North Vietnamese continued to commit
troops to the effort,
12. By September, after some hard fighting,
it was evident that at least two battalions of the
NVA 341st Division were reinforcing North Vietnamese
units. In all, the North Vietnamese apparently com-
mitted the better part of four regiments to the
effort. Despite their action, they failed to achieve
a firm toehold south of the DMZ. On two occasions
prior to October, most of the units were compelled
to retreat into the DRV for rest, replacement, and
regroupment. Although units of at least company
size remained in Quang Tri conducting intelligence
and reconnaissance operations, they were contacted
only sporadically by allied units from October to
the end of 1966.
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Hanoi's View of the Action
13. Although their losses had been heavy, the
North Vietnamese leaders apparently did not view
their 1966 adventure across the DMZ as a total fail-
ure. The course of the action had demonstrated that
the deployment of a Marine reaction force to meet
them had been largely at the expense of Marine-
supported pacification efforts farther south--a re-
sponse which considerably lightened the pressure on
local Communist elements from Hue to Da Nang. US
forces also had to be pulled up from III Corps to
meet the growing Communist threat. Moreover, the
attrition rate inflicted on US elements in the north-
ern engagements had been at least as favorable to the
Communists as in many major confrontations farther
south.
14. From II Corps southward, in fact, allied
offensive actions were steadily building up steam
and, in a series of operations from coastal Binh
Dinh to War Zone C in Tay Ninh by the end of 1966,
Communist main forces had been hard hit. The enemy
may have been reaching the point where input to
his regulars in II and III Corps was little more
than keeping even with his losses. Moreover, there
had been extensive disruption of Communist logistic
systems in II and III Corps, thus restricting the
length and scope of possible operations by some
Communist units. Looked at in this light, the Com-
munists badly needed another pressure point on the
allies which would give their regulars from II Corps
southward a breather.
15. The situation, in short, seemed definitely
to call for a further probe across the DMZ, perhaps
with slightly altered tactics and an improved stra-
tegic plan.
New Border Crossings
16. Beginning in January 1967, North Vietnamese
forces in the DMZ area were extensively realianed
and augmented.
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almost
of US
Heavy
and
hamper the
forces.
to move
of April,
three
and pos-
of two other
had moved
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purpose of the added firepower
to reduce the maneuverability
reacted to NVA penetrations.
on Marine forward headquarters
probably hoped, would
of Marine reaction
these NVA forces again began
DMZ in January. By the end
probably involved at least
the 324th and 341st Divisions
regimental or smaller units
organizations which Hanoi
certainly
Marines
mortar attacks
bivouacs,
speed and
Elements
south of
the deployment
regiments
sibly other
divisional
into the
Recently
battle
of
April.
captured
around
the 325th
Tri and the
North Vietnamese
Khe Sanh
NVA Division
adjacent
soldiers from the
claim that three regiments
moved into western Quang
area of Laos in March and
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17. It appears, however, that in any case
Hanoi plans to hold a substantial force in reserve
just north of the DMZ, both for defensive purposes
and for deployment south as needed--perhaps as a
quick reaction/exploitation force.
18. US forces promptly moved again against the
incoming enemy units in an effort to trap and destroy
them or drive them out of the two northern provinces.
The Communists proved harder to find and pinpoint,
probably because of some new tactics and
however,
25X1 strategy on their part.
25X1 I Ithey are maneuvering now in smaller ele-
ments whichare more difficult to detect. Link-up
in large elements is made mainly for occasional of-
fensive forays, often in conjunction with local guer-
rilla and main force units. The enemy elements,
moreover, are apparently spread out over a larger
area than before, particularly westward along the
DMZ.
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DNIZ/QUANG TRI-THUA TFIIEN PROVINCES
Vinh Linh
DEMILITARIZED ZONE
NAM
GULF OF TONKIN
uang Tri
Hai Lang
AM
Lao Bao
Khe SanhV-
k
Nam Ho.. ??0
\
TNUA THIN
Shau Vatley
Oa Nang
25)(1,
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19. In addition, the enemy appears intent
this time on developing not only an east-west axis
against the allies south of the DMZ, but also a
north-south axis extending below Route 9 at least to
the A Shau Valley area through the mountainous back-
bone of Quang Tri and Thua Thien (see map). The
North Vietnamese apparently hope that pressure on
the allies at one or several points along these
lines will ease the reaction to North Vietnamese
operations throughout the area. This was probably
the enemy intention, in part, in the series of
actions since 24 April 1967 in the vicinity of the
US Marine outpost at Khe Sanh. By threatening the
perimeter of the camp, the North Vietnamese pulled
in several of the limited number of Marine reaction
battalions, inflicting substantial casualties on
them in return for heavy Communist losses. The
enemy appears capable of mounting a sustained threat
around the Khe Sanh area, thus necessitating a
continued protective deployment by the limited
allied reaction elements.
The Build-up Along the North-South Axis
20. There have been numerous reports
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since January 1967.
Extensive bunkering and automatic weapons
emplacements have recently been discovered along the
Laos - Quang Tri border near Route 9.
21. Farther
reports
that the communists are reinforcing an extensive
base complex near Route 922 in the Laos border area.
In early March, ground observers reported the pres-
ence of an estimated enemy regiment in this area.
south, there have been numerous
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B-52 bombing raids against this base have resulted
in an unusually high number of secondary explosions--
an indication of extensive enemy stockpiling of am-
munition and POL. There has also been considerable
road construction. Route 922 has been extended
across the Vietnamese border to join Route 548 into
the A Shau Valley of ?western Thua Thien. Truck traf-
fic has been observed along the length of this exten-
sion. Other road and trail improvement is also under
way in the valley which may be intended to support
Communist forces operating to the east and south.
Communist Capabilities and Intentions
23. Hanoi evidently feels its present
will put it in a strong position to mount a
series of engagements against allied forces
northern I Corps. There have been numerous
tions
strategy
sustained
in
indica-
that the Communists plan a -summer
campaign." One former NVA officer has stated that
enemy plans call for a gradual increase in the size
of attacking forces, moving to regimental and divi-
sional operations by early summer. There is good
evidence that this campaign will embrace all of I
Corps, although the major offensive capability is
now poised against the northern two provinces.
24. The development of the offensive will prob-
ably be affected considerably by the damage sustained
as a result of allied counteractions. The losses
inflicted on the NVA at Khe Sanh, for example, could
restrict future Communist thrusts.
25. Technically the enemy forces are conceded
the capability to attack Quang Tri from the DMZ area
with up to four NVA divisions, or to hit the pro-
vincial capitals in division strength. It appears,
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however, in view of their traditionally cautious
patterns of operation that they will be unwilling
to risk a single concentrated offensive--and thus
a single, overwhelming defeat--unless a particular
target offers unusually favorable opportunities.
They are more likely to continue tactics of maneuver
over a wide area, coordinating large-scale opera-
tions with guerrilla activities while taking heavy
losses, if necessary, in an effort to inflict sub-
stantial casualties on the allies. The Communists
will, in addition, be relying on their improved
firepower to launch mortar, rocket, and artillery
attacks where possible. This tactic offers the
possibility of inflicting substantial losses on
military targets at relatively small cost.
26. The renewed NVA thrust into northern I
Corps has been accompanied by a repetition of state-
ments from Hanoi that the Communists are, in effect,
digging in for a long war. They appear to have
gained additional confidence during the last few
months in their ability to withstand current levels
of allied military pressure and in their capacity
to outlast the US in a test of will on the war. If
they can inflict substantial damage on the allies
in northern I Corps, it will undoubtedly be an im-
portant element in buttressing their confidence.
Hanoi probably estimates that allied casualties
here--especially if inflicted in a series of battles
which, from the allied standpoint, are inconclusive
in cutting the enemy threat--will have a dampening
effect on morale in the US, thus creating additional
pressure against current US policy on the war.
Com arative Force Stren ths in the Northern Provinces
27. Although the exact number of enemy forces
in Quang Tri and Thua Thien is by no means clear,
the ratio between allied and Communist forces is
probably considerably less favorable to the Commu-
nists than at any time in the recent past. A realis-
tic assessment of enemy main force strength must
necessarily take into account those NVA units within
and immediately north of the DMZ which could rapidly
deploy to the South. Including estimated forces of
this nature, allied units in Quang Tri and Thua
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Thien face some 40,000 regular Communist troops, in
addition to an estimated 13,000 Viet Cong irregulars.
28. Approximately 75,000 US Marines spearhead
the available allied force for the far northern
provinces. Some 35,000 of them comprise a combat
maneuver component of 18 infantry and four artillery
battalions. The balance are members of the Marine
logistics command, aircraft wing, headquarters and
headquarters service support. Some of the latter are
engaged directly in combat support. Rounding out the
allied main force structure available for duty in
the northern provinces at present are some 30,000
ARVN troops--including 16,500 in 31 infantry and
three airborne maneuver battalions--and 4,500 troops
from the South Korean 2nd Marine Brigade based at
Chu Lai. Approximately 50,000 of the allied forces
above are now based in Quang Tri and Thua Thien.
Eight battalions of US Army infantry, comprising
some 6,600 men, are also based at Chu Lai, and
presumably could be moved to the far northern prov-
inces, if needed.
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