THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A002200210001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 22, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 26, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
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x-14
26 June 1967
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Information as cf 1600
26 June 1967
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In contrast to the heavy contact of the weekend,
light and widely scattered actions ,.?\' re report_,t_ on
26 June.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
A US patrol in central Binh Dinh Province located an
enemy regimental-size hospital complex (Para. 2).
US Marines began a new sweep effort named Operation
CALHOUN in Quang Nam Province on 25 June (Para. 3).
I The 5t
Viet Cong Division, which has trace idly oper-
ated in the northeastern III Corps area with two
regiments, may soon be reinforced with a third regi-
ment (Paras. 6-7).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
During a conference begun on 25 June in Pleiku for
the purpose of drawing up a special law for the
montagnards, Premier Ky made verbal promises to
meet all the tribesmen's demands (Paras. 1-2).
Both the Provisional National Assembly and the Peo-
ples-Ar:y Council have petitioned the government
to ensure free elections, particularly by abolish-
ing press censorship (Paras. 3-5). A Chinese deputy
in the assembly has been campaigning for Premier Ky
among the Chinese community in the Saigon-Cholon
area (Para. 6).
III. North Vietnamese Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.
IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
Chinese shoot down US aircraft south of Hainan
(Paras. 1-2).
V. Communist Political Developments: Another
foreign correspondent is told Ho Chi Minh is ill
(Paras. 1-2).
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The Situation in the Coastal Provinces of South Viet-
nam's II Corps
US observers see noticeable military progress in
the heavily populated coastal provinces of central
South Vietnam where GVN, US, and South Korean mili-
tary operations during the past year have severely
damaged the Communists. The enemy retains a capa-
bility to conduct major campaigns this summer, how-
ever.
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Sa abnakhet
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VIETNAM \\
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SOUTH VIETNAM
26 JUNE
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. After a weekend of reported heavy contact
between allied and Communist forces throughout South
Vietnam, only light and widely scattered actions
were reported on 26 June.
2. A US patrol with scout dogs discovered a
large Communist hospital complex several miles west
of Route 1 in coastal Binh Dinh Province. The hos-
pital, located about six miles southwest of Phu My,
was hastily abandoned approximately two hours prior
to being discovered. The hospital was estimated to
be large enough to support a regimental-size enemy
unit and could have possibly served elements of the
North Vietnamese Army (NVA) 3rd Division and/or
other main force and local guerrilla units operating
in Binh Dinh Province.
3. Six battalions of US Marines began a new
sweep operation--codenamed CALHOUN--28 miles south
of Da Nang in the southern portion of Quang Nam
Province on 25 June. This search-and-destroy opera-
tion is another of a series of US Marine efforts to
clear known enemy concentrations and base camps in
the Quang Nam - Quang Tin Province area. Nearly
2,000 Communist troops are estimated to be active
within the CALHOUN area. Only light contact has
thus far been reported; eight enemy soldiers have
been killed.
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5th Viet Cong Division Reinforcements
6. The 5th Viet Cong Light Infantry Division,
which has traditionally operated in the southeastern
III Corps area with two regiments, may soon be
reinforced with a third regiment.
7. Two recent ralliers from the 5th Division
have referred to a "third regiment." One stated
that he personally saw the new unit, which was com-
posed of North Vietnamese Army personnel undergoing
training. The other rallier stated that in addition
to a new regiment, the existing 275th Regiment of
the 5th Division has received "many young North
Vietnamese Army replacements." The second source
indicated that the new regiment would be ready early
this summer. The upgrading of the 5th to full
division status would appreciably increase the en-
emy threat in the southeastern III Corps area.
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Premier Ky verbally promised to meet montagnard
demands during a conference begun on 25 June in Pleiku
and aimed at drawing up a special statute for the tribes-
men. According to press reports, Ky pledged to accept the
provisions of a petition drafted at the conference which
called chiefly for creation of a cabinet-level ministry
for montagnard affairs and the appointment of montagnard
officers, rather than Vietnamese, to montagnard mili-
tary units.
2. The montagnards, have several times been disap-
pointed by government leaders who have made verbal
promises to meet their demands. It remains to be
seen how sincere Ky's promises are; the pledge may
simply be a ploy to gain additional support in the forth-
coming elections.
Appeals for Free Elections
3. According to local Vietnamese press reports,
the Peoples Advisory Army Council met on 24 June and
petitioned the government to institute certain measures
to ensure a free election. These measures include:
punishment of civil servants found cheating in the elec-
tions; request for a United Nations team to observe
and supervise the elections; permission for newsmen
from throughout the world to observe and report on the
elections; abolition of press censorship during the
elections; permission for each ticket of presidential
and vice-presidential candidates to publish an elec-
tion campaign paper; and "unreserved assistance" to
help voters' and people's organizations participate
in the elections.
4. The Provisional National Assembly has issued
a similar appeal for abolition of press censorship,
according to press reports. In a letter to the Di-
rectorate made public during its 26 June session, the
assembly urged that censorship be repealed in order
to ensure free elections and to prevent adverse enemy
propaganda.
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5. It is unlikely that either petition will have
much effect, especially in respect to press censor-
ship. Although censorship appears recently to have
eased somewhat, Ky seems determined to retain some
measure of control over what appears in the local
press.
Electioneering in Cholon
6. Trieu Sen Hoach, a Chinese deputy in the Pro-
visional National Assembly and a member of the Saigon
Municipal Council, is reportedly working among the
Chinese community in the Saigon-Cholon area to solicit
support for Premier *1 1
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Huong for the presidency, but has changed his allegiance
because he now feels "100 percent sure" that Ky will
win. Hoach claims to have been given this campaign
role by Saigon Mayor Van Van Cua and is himself
running on a ticket with Cua for the upper house.
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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
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1. A US F4C was downed south of Hainan Island on
26 June, probably by Chinese Communist fighters. Ac-
cording to US operational reports, the aircraft was
on a ferry flight from the Philippines to South Viet-
nam when it experienced navigational problems. The air-
craft went down at 5:.50 AM EDT at 17-35N-109-20E.. Air-
craft sent to rescue the pilots of the downed aircraft
reportedly were fired upon by Chinese Communist boats.
The Chinese boats left when a US destroyer approached,
however, and the pilots were recovered.
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. North Vietnamese-officials have told another
foreign corres ondent that Ho Chi Minh is ill. The
corres ondent
was to y a
DRV Foreign Ministry official that Ho was not giving
press interviews because the "condition of his health
was not very good." There is still no indication of
what is wrong with the North Vietnamese President, but
I Iwas led to believe that
Ho was suffering some disability connected with his
age and fatigue, and that he was "resting someplace
in the countryside."
2. This is the third report of this nature in re-
cent months. Ho continues to remain out of public view.
His last known appearance was in mid-March and he has
failed to take part in the public ceremonies connected
with recent visits-by two high-level European delega-
tions to Hanoi--an Hungarian military delegation in
mid-May and a Polish delegation from 17 to 22 June.
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THE SITUATION IN THE COASTAL PROVINCES OF
SOUTH VIETNAM'S II CORPS
Summary
US observers believe that there has been no-
ticeable military progress in the heavily populated,
rice-producing coastal provinces of central South
Vietnam where GVN, US, and South Korean military
operations during the past year have severely damaged
enemy main forces. North Vietnamese and Viet Cong
units in the region have not been destroyed, how-
ever, and they retain a capability to conduct major
campaigns this summer. In addition, the clandestine
Viet Cong infrastructure remains effective in many
areas and is capable of frustrating GVN efforts to
expand Saigon's control over the population.
Military Operations
1. In Binh Dinh Province, allied forces--pri-
marily the US 1st Air Cavalry Division and the Korean
Capital Division--have harassed the North Vietnamese
Army 3rd Division for the past 18 months, forcing it
to disperse and retreat into the highlands along the
Binh Dinh - Kontum - Quang Ngai border. Similar prog-
ress has been made in Phu Yen Province to the south,
where the two major enemy units--the 95th NVA Regi-
ment and the 85th Viet Cong main force battalion--
were hard hit by allied forces in late 1966. Since
then, the 85th has made every effort to avoid combat
and only in recent weeks has the 95th showed signs
of renewed aggressiveness.
2. In Khanh Hoa Province, US sources report
that the presence of the Korean 9th (White Horse)
Division since the summer of 1966 has had a "numbing
effect" on the Viet Cong, especially- in districts
immediately along the coast and in the area surround-
ing the provincial capital, Nha Trang. The main enemy
unit in Khanh Hoa, the 18B NVA Regiment, has been un-
able to shift troops between its most important base
areas, located near Da Ban and on the Hon Heo Peninsula.
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The total strength of the 18B Regiment was originally
estimated at about 2,400 troops, but this year it is
believed to have been reduced to about 1,900.
3. Ninh Thuan is the only province along the
central coast in which a general military stalemate
appears to exist. The Korean and ARVN battalions as-
signed to the province reportedly have been unable to
provide basic security for the population outside of
the immediate vicinity of the provincial capital and
the four district headquarters. Accordinq to US sources,
the Viet Cong have dominated the entire southern
half of the province over the past year, and even in
the northern half they apparently have been able to
penetrate most of the rural hamlets.
4. Enemy successes in Ninh Thuan have been ac-
complished by a relatively small number of Communist
regular troops. During 1966, enemy forces in the
province were believed to consist primarily of ir-
regulars, which according to a captured enemy docu-
ment numbered approximately 4,400. In December 1966,
however, a North Vietnamese Army battalion reportedly
arrived to reinforce local units.
5. The military situation in Binh Thuan Province,
the southernmost coastal province in the II Corps area,
is reported to be improving. There are two Viet Cong
battalions (the 482nd and the 840th) in the province
and they have been under almost constant pressure from
a battalion of the US 1st Air Cavalry Division and two
ARVN battalions supporting Revolutionary Development.
The Communists reportedly have been unable to mount a
major attack on a center of population or even carry
out any significant acts of sabotage in the southern
portion of the province since July 1966. An experi-
enced US intelligence officer, however, states that
the 482nd Battalion is "not yet beaten."
6. US observers conclude that in these coastal
provinces of II Corps, the Viet Cong and North Viet-
namese units have been driven from the lowlands into
sparsely populated jungle and mountain retreats and
have found it increasingly difficult to supply them-
selves with food, water, and medicines. This has
forced them in some instances to rely on increased
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coercion and terrorism to obtain supplies from the
people, who in some areas are becoming alienated
from the Communists.
7. Another result of the stepped-up allied
military activity during the past year has been
lower enemy morale, reflected in an increased num-
ber of Chieu Hoi ralliers. Most of these defec-
tors, however, are young, low-level guerrillas. The
hard-core apparently remain "as staunch as ever" and
the Communist infrastructure in the villages is be-
ing only slowly eroded or fragmented. In several
coastal provinces, however, successful work by
the Military Security Service and the National Po-
lice has resulted in the arrest of some medium and
high level Communist cadre.
GVN Progress
8. One tangible result of the allied military
campaign in the coastal provinces has been the open-
ing of roads, including the major north-south coastal
Route 1, which is now reasonably safe for normal traf-
fic during the day from Binh Dinh Province southward
to Phan Rang city in Ninh Thuan Province. Some roads
from the coast into the interior also have been made
comparatively safe, although in many cases the Viet
Cong are still able to mount roadblocks and maintain
taxation points.
9. Indications of GVN political progress are
less clear. In some areas, allied military victories
have created political vacuums which the GVN has found
difficult to fill, and US sources believe that more
GVN police and civic action personnel are needed to
catch up with military clearing operations. In Binh
Dinh and Phu Yen provinces the Vietnamese have re-
sponded with some initiatives of their own to provide
a government presence in the newly cleared areas.
10. One factor which has allegedly prevented the
GVN'from taking full advantage of allied military suc-
cesses against the Viet Cong is the prevalence of north-
erners among local GVN officials. In Phu Yen Province
the province -chief, deputy province chiefs, and police
26 June 1967
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chief are all northerners, whereas
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almost all of the Viet?Cong district and
provincial cadre are natives of the province. Other
factors which contribute to a lack of confidence in
the GVN and are probably more important to the aver-
age villager are the prevalence of petty corruption
graft, and inflationary 7s. In general, I 25X1
the vast majori y
or rne people along the cen ra coast remain uncom-
mitted, although further successes in Revolutionary
Development in these provinces may dispel their apathy.
11. The strength of the GVN in the coastal prov-
inces of central South Vietnam is directly related to
the strength of the military shield provided by allied
military forces. In recent months this shield has
provided the GVN with some opportunity to develop, but
more time is needed to exploit the opportunity.
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