THE ARAB POSITION REGARDING A PEACE SETTLEMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A002900080001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 15, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 8, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved FQ.Release 2003/10/29: CIA-RDP79T00MBA002900080001-6
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
8 November 1967
SUBJECT: The Arab Position Regarding a Peace Settlement
Summary
The Arabs, basic attitudes toward a peace settlement have
remained constant since the end of hostilities. Their ne-
gotiating position, however, has become clearer. They now
accept "nonbelligerency,". Israel's existence, and freedom of
navigation through Suez and Tiran. "Nonbelligerency," how-
ever, is directly tied to Israeli agreement to an Arab refugee
settlement, which would include repatriation or compensation.
They refuse to accede to the Israeli demand for face-to-face
negotiations, but would accept a UN go-between. The Soviets
have encouraged the Arabs to be more realistic but Moscow
cannot afford to get too far out in front of the Arab posi-
tion.
Note: This memorandum was prepared solely by CIA. It was
produced by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated
with the Office of National Estimates and the Clandestine
Services.
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1. Although the Arabs' position on a peace settlement
with Israel may appear to have hardened in recent weeks,
what really has happened is that their basic attitudes have
become clearer. From the very first days after the war the
Arabs have insisted that any settlement must not involve
territorial acquisition by Israel. What is new is the
emphasis Arab leaders now place on the linkage between Israeli
passage through the Suez Canal and an Arab refugee settlement.
This, in turn, is directly connected to the Israeli demand
for an end of "belligerency." In Arab eyes the end of Arab
"belligerency" also entails a reciprocal Israeli acceptance
of responsibility for the refugees; i.e., accept the repatria-
tion of those who desire it or pay adequate compensation for
seized Arab properties.
2. New Arab attitudes have evolved, however, from where
they were before last June's war. The Arabs now are ready
to acknowledge Israel's existence, although they continue to
reject diplomatic relations. Arab acceptance of the concept
of non-belligerency also is new.
3. With regard to Suez, Nasir believes that he can
consent to Israeli passage only if he can present the Arab
people with the quid pro quo of Israel's acceptance of its
responsibility for the refugees.
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4. Nasir believes that the US attitude on Arab-Israeli
questions is pro-Israel, and he suspects. that it has been
formulated through connivance with the Israelis. He and
other Arab leaders believe that the US position is hardening,
and they cite as evidence the decision to send arms to
Israel, the banning of Egyptian cotton sales to the US, and
their conviction that the US position on Jerusalem and
territorial integrity has changed since the President's
"Five Points" were enunciated.
5. In short, King Husayn and Nasir--having expressed
their readiness to end their state of belligerency, to
acknowledge Israel's right to exist, and to permit Israeli
traffic through Suez and Aqaba in return for a refugee
settlement--believe they have gone a considerable distance
toward achieving a reasonable accommodation with Israel. To
agree to direct negotiations would be, in Arab eyes, to bow
to the enemy's demands. These leaders clearly are sincere
in doubting that they, or any Arab leaders, could survive
such a "sell-out." Their firmness on this point however,
probably would not preclude contact with the Israelis through
a UN mediator.
6. The Soviets have encouraged the Arabs to be. more
realistic. Moscow has encouraged the Arabs. to recognize the
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existance of Israel, end the state of belligerency, and
accept political solutions to the remaining problems.
Nevertheless, Moscow.cannot afford to get too far in front
of the Arab position and may therefore be circumspect in any
strong public endorsement of these terms.
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