REFUSAL BY EXECUTIVE TO PROVIDE INFORMATION TO CONGRESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R002500110003-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 22, 2003
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: October 7, 1952
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2
7 October 1952
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Refusal by Executive to Provide Information to Congress
1. Several of the many cases where the President or heads of executive
departments have refused to furnish information requested by Congress are
summarized below.
2. In 1879 George F. Seward, Consul General of the United States in
China, appeared before the House Committee on Expenditures in the State
Department, which was investigating his official conduct. A subpoena
duces tecum had been served upon him to produce certain books and papers.
Seward refused and was not held to be in contempt for so doing. The
Chairman of the Committee submitted a report in which he stated:
",And whenever the President has returned (as sometimes he has)
that, in his judgment, it was not consistent with the public
interest to give the House such information, no further proceedings
have ever been taken to compel the production of such information.
Indeed, upon principle, it would seem that this must be so. The
Executive is as independent of either house of Congress as either
house of Congress is independent of him, and they cannot call for
the records of his action or the action of his officers against
his consent, any more than he can call for any of the journals and
records of the House or Senate."
The report. indicated the perils incident to divulging "state secrets" to
a committee of the House and stated that the executive must make the
decision in each case:
"Somebody must judge upon this point. It clearly cannot be
the House or its committee, because they cannot know the importance
of having the doings of the executive department kept secret. The
head of the executive department,. therefore, must be the judge in
such case and decide it upon his own responsibility to the people,
and to the House, upon a case of impeachment brought against him
for so doing, if his acts are causeless, malicious,-willfully wrong,
or to the detriment of the public interests." *
* Rpt. No. 141, March 3, 1879, 45th Cong.,3rd Sess.
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3. In 1941 the Chairman of the House Committee on Naval Affairs
requested the Federal Bureau of Investigation to furnish reports and
correspondence on investigations made by the Department of Justice into
strikes and subversive activities at industrial establishments having
naval contracts. The request was not complied -with. Attorney General
Jackson replied in an opinion in -which he stated as follows:
"It is the position of this Department, restated now with
the approval of and at the direction of the President, that all
investigative reports are confidential documents of the executive
department of the Government, to aid in the duty laid upon the
President by the Constitution to 'take care that the laws be faith-
fully executed,' and that congressional or public access to them
would not be in the public interest." #
4. On January 20, 1945, at a hearing of the Select Committee to Investi-
gate the Federal Communication Commission the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation refused to testify as to certain matters on which
the President had directed him to remain silent. There is no record in the
hearing reports of any action taken by the Committee to force a response.
5. Various executive Department heads refused to provide information
desired by this same Committee, among them being Harold D. Smith, Director
of the Bureau of the Budget, James L. Fly, Chairman of the Federal Communi-
cations Commission, Robert P. Patterson, Acting Secretary of War, and James
Forrestal, Acting Secretary of the Navy. Secretary Patterson stated in his
reply to the Committee as follows;
"The President directs that the committee be informed that he,
the President, refuses to allow the documents to be delivered to the
committee as contrary to the public interests. For the same reason,
I a linable to permit the witnesses to appear."
. In December 1947 the Joint Committee on Reduction of Non-essential
Federal Expenditures sought reports of personnel figures from the Central
Intelligence Agency. Full disclosure was politely refused because of the
risk of publication and dissemination beyond the Committee. A compromise
was effected -hereby the Committee Chairman, Senator Harry F. Byrd, was
given access to certain information which the Committee desired.
By letter of January 24, 1952, President Truman directed the Secre-
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tart of State not to furnish the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee with
the loyalty file of I land certain other papers and reports
from the files of the State epar en?. These had been requested by Senator
McCarran. The President based his decision on the public interest, stating
# 40 Opinions Attys. Gen. p. 46, April 30, 1941.
it* Hearings, Select Committee to Investigate the Federal Communications Com-
mission, Vol. 1, pp. 46, 48 - 67.
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that the production of such information would create a serious danger
of intimidation and demoralization of Foreign Service personnel, as well as
involve the disclosure of confidential information and sources of information.
Also, the release of individual loyalty files to congressional committees
was cited as contrary to the President's directive of March 13, 1918, on
this subject, which was addressed to all officers and employees in the
executive branch of the Goverment.
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Ar?r Intelligence gem tS
that it would be penetrates at so
to would be oriainaW negligent if we ?id not
line, from chal rw n to ex utfys,,, wo be f
"t on that ass=pLion. 'I his Is wt
or 0 2c siglayses or to str Best that aror of
"riri4l d" with C ea fists an i been allag
~fe, pu b, in spite of the art u ua1 precautions,
rA ,amiss the in
i:talisi of
preca cti a of intelligence
ranks in the Vnitod States.
over is t elaborate security and co art
Vca r top level is able to gain the
he ' Obtain part of it. We have to act on
that our nts an at least as swart as we are,
they will gain entrance from time to time.
c tent vigilance in ardor to keep than out, to prevent ti
vital information If and when they get in,
possib ee.
zwon with all other ",ecurit r Aeneies of t'',oi nannt, is ex
tr y 4otive, in ex ciain 0-,144'-U
Statement given to Press 9/30/52 is result of testimony- given at Bent on-4,1cCart1W
hearing.
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1. The subpoena was issued by a section of the Com. in California to:
(a) Question on background of statement, and
(b) Scoop rival Com.
2. Considered view of whole Com, however, was that such action would
not be advisable in view of the political implications, and subpoena was
to be cancelled.
3. Chairman Wood nevertheless wanted to proceed with questioning for
undisclosed reasons.
4. Wood allegedly wants to question regarding a story brought to him
by an informant identified only as a very wealthy man not connected
officially in D.C. uh o received the tale from someone "close to the
Director".
5. The story, which may well be garbled and was not clear to source,
is that a so-called "radical evaluation group" in the agency had been
pressing to obtain the identities of sources of agency information, and
had been opposed by a "conservative group". The latter had addressed a
memorandum on the subject of source disclosre to the Director, who had
agreed that sources were not to be disclosed. Doubtful security in the
radical group was supposedly the cause of the resistance .o revealing
sources.
5. In addition to the above, and in the event that legal blocks are
not placed in the wqy, the Com. wants to query also on two agency
employees:
(a)
(b)
6. Representatives of the FBI ref rtedly have shown interest in what the
Com. seeks to learn. This interest is not believed to be officially
inspired and produced no results.
7. The agency was described as the only one wherein the Com. did not
have its own sources, which accounted for the garbled or unclear version
of the above "story".
8. The Com. questioning is intended to be on an entirely friendly
basis, with little or no pressure, unless the above story leads to
resistance to probing into internal agency affairs.
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TF F CUNNING OF t ',TJ F`7 .FOFtCI"S AND TFF I 'POPTANCF OF BFING 'VFP ALFPT.
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s S. aJOOB ',)-GA) ANNOUNCF) SEPT. 30 T$T CO ?-
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UNAPIERICAN (TOPS 14)
PHILADELPHIA-(AP)-GEN. WALTER BEDELL SMITH, HEAD OF THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, SAID TOT AY IF THE NEXT PRESIDENT, WHETHER DEMO-
-CRATIC OR RrPUBLICAN~ "DOES AS WELL AS PRESIDENT TRUMAN" IN FIGHTI 'G
COMMUNISM'` IN THM FEDERAL GOVERNMENT THE ,AMERICAN PEOPLE "HAVE LITTLE
TO WORRY ABOUT."
TTar" . GENERAL MADE THE STATEMENT AS A WITNESS BEFOREc: AN OPEN HEARING
OF THE HOUSE UN-AP'MERICAN ACTIVITIES COMMITTEE RICH K A SUBPOENAED
HIM TO EXPLAIN TESTIMONY K F GAT-". ON SEPT. :29 AT TV" MMCCART 1Y-BENTON
SLANDER AND LIBEL HEARING THAT HE 2rLIF"Vfl COMMUNISTS "ARE SO ADROIT
AND ADEPT THEY HAVE INFILTRATED EVERY SECURITY AG NCY OF THE GOV"RP'-
?iENT. "
SAMITH SAID TODAY THAT HIS STATEMENT WAS "PREDICATED ON PUR THEORY
AND PAST PERFORMANCE." HE ADDED UNDER CROSS EXAMINATION BY COMMITTEE
COUNSEL::
"I WOULD BE EXTREMELY COMPLACENT IF I BELIEVED THAT THERE WAS NO
COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE GOVERNMENNT."
REP. WALTER (D- PA) ASKED THE GENERAL FLATLY:
"DO YOU KNOW POSITIVELY THAT THERE ART COMMUNISTS IN YOUTR OR.GANIZA-
TION (Tr`y` CIA)?"
"I AM "':ORALLY CERTAIN THAT THERE MAY BE COMMUNISTS IN THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY " SMITH REPLIED}.
WALTER ASKE`"D: "10 YOU KNOW WHO THEY ARE?"
SMITH REPLIED:' *NO.*
JG1139A 10/13
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 SC
r~p{edc-jR~Je3h1 /C cCjIA-RDP80B01676R00250
P! a ILA,
THE COURTROOM IN T""" T'^FDAL D JIL DING 'II?S F LYD I TS CA CITY
ABOUT 125 PERSONS. A DOZEN POLICEMEN PATROLLED OUTSIDE. NO ONE WAS
ALLO T7D TO STAND IN THE `TPRING RQOr .
WALTER CON1.11ITT.1C`'AIDN1AN JOHN S.W (?)-GA) AND RF"P.l'ARQL'1
VFLDF. (2-ILL) AIDED PY COUNSEL FRANK ? NNER, JR. QUESTIONED
SNIITIT REPFATr 1LY OP' HIS SEPT. 29, STATE_
.JALTFR SAID "SUCH A STATy J?I"N'' .IS . ISTU RING TO THE ENTIRE COUNT' Y. "
"ONE OF Till". REASONS I CA1 E TODAY r1 t S TO ALLEY IAT THAT
DISTURBANCE S"ITI` ' FPLIFO.
PUT JALT 'R AND WOOD ASSERTED T'-AT SH'IT'' S170ULD STATE FLATLY 3~'r"THED
I'T' " AS CERTAIN" THERE WAS COMMUNIST IPA ILTRA:TION IN EVERY GOVT RN'Irr T
SECURITY AGENCY.
THE GENERAL*i HOWEVER SAID -TIHAT ,7r COULD NOT PIAKF. SUCH A STATEN'17NT,
THAT THE WORK pF THE CIA WAS DEVOTED ENTIRELY TO 0PFEIATIONS C)UTSIDF
OF TIM UNITED STATES. BUT HE '.DID-,.SAY THIS
"I HAVE FOUND NO PENETRATION O F CO" H1JNISTS IN ' "Y ORGANIZATION IN
THE UNITED STATES. NO ANERICA-N CON`'r'TJNISIS AND NON WITHIN THE SCOPE
OR INTERESTS OF THIS CONNITTEF. "
"I BELIEVE TEAT THERE ART COt=r?I!1''ISTS IN NY ORGANIZATION Q1.1TS IDE OF
TITE UNITED STATES BECAUSE IN THE PAST WE HTAVT FROM TINtr. TO TIT
DISCOVERED ONE OR TWO IN OUR RANN'KS. "
SNI TH N OTEB THAT THIS IS A PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION YEAR AND SAID THAT
EVERY STATENNEPT NADE BY AN OFF'ICE'? OF TTtr T It',ISTRATION "IS GOIHH'C TO
ET SEIZED IJPOPNN AND QUOTED OUT OF CONTEYT. "
I F, ADDS NO "I lAV17 NO POLITICAL LEANINGS OP AFFILIATIONS. ANY FUTURE PRT'SI-
D1-.'Ni REPUBLICAN OR DE NOCRAT IS GOING TO HAV TO J ORK WITH THE SAS NE
SECIJ ITY AG?'i'CIF'S NO? IN EXI T' i'C? . BOT TILL DAVE T' -E SANE DIF ICTIL-
TIES THAT WE NOW I NCOUNTER TODAY. IF EIT17R Q. OF TI?T"''? THE DF''QC`~AT
OR THE REPUBLICAN, DOES AS WELL AS PRESIDENT T';UNAP' IN C6OP RATIO'
WITH THE; SECURITY AGENCIES IN FERRETTING OUT SIJBVERS IVES. THE ANFT?ICAN
PEOPLE. CAN COINGRATULATE FACT` OTH7,. AND WILL HAVE LITTLE TO WORRY ABOUT."
WALTER ASKED SMITH WHETHER IN !'AXING HIS STATEMENT ABOUT THE CO!'?'IM-
ISTS IN THE. FEDERAL SFCU FITY AGFNCIrS T-F '-A?) ANY FIRST-' AND KNOWLEDGE
OR FACTS.
"NY RESPONSIBILITIES ARE ALL ABROAD," SNITY-. ANS.JERED. ""Y KNOWLEDGE
CONCERNS ONLY ACTIVITIES ABROAD. 7)r,,,'FR ''JHEN I TALK I 717. .ER ONLY
TO THOSE ACTIVITIES WITH Wl'ICI' I AN FAt'ILIAR."
"I nl1JST ASSUME-17F CONTINUED "FROM NNY PAST FXPERIFNCF THAT
THERE' HAS BEEN IN ILTRATION OF S Ci!??ITY ORGAt IZATIONS."
WALTER ASKED:. "THEN' YOU ASSUM'E' AND P'ESUN E ONLY THAT T,'r'RF IS AN
INFILT:'ATION? YOU HAVE' NO FACTS?"
"IF I KNr, WHERE Ty E WAS A CONNU,"IST'I WOULD DO S0'TT`-'I"N,G Ar'OI1T
IT," SMITE REPLIED.
"DOES T H`.AT ALLAY YOUR DISTURBANCE. CONE tESS''At'?" IHF ASKED ?WTALTER.
THE LATTER BLUNTLY SAID: "NO, BECAUSE THE POSITIONYOU HOLD PLACES
YOU IN THAT S ITUATI OIN HERE ANY STATEMENT YOU "AY NNAKF t'A t;FS IT APPEAR
 CL. 13ERVICE Approved
This Full-rate
Telegra Cable-
gram u, \s de-
ferred ch 'is in'-
;a 'able
The filing time shown in the date line on telegrams and day letters is STANDARD TIME at point of origin. Time of receipt is STANDARD TIME at point of destination
. .RA020
6,,wtAXU LUNG WVT NL PD=TDPE PEKIN ILL 11=
GEN WALTER BEDELL SMITH=
-PENTAGON WASHDCZ
SUNDAY AFTERNOON TO ATTEND UNAMERICAN ACTIVITIES COMMITTEE
REPRESENTATIVE HAROLD H VELDE WILL LEAVE FOR PHILADELPHIA
:FOR YOUR INFORMATION I HAVE ISSUED THE FOLLOWING RELEASE,.
HEARING MONDAY MORNING. MR VELDE WILL BE THE ONLY REPUBLICAN,
MEMBER OF THIS COMMITTEE ATTENDING THE HEARING. FIRST WITNESS
WILL BE GENERAL WALTER BEDELL SMITH WHO RECENTLY CHARGED THAT
COMMUNISTS HAVE INFILTRATED MANY BRANCHES OF THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT, GENERAL SMITH IS HEAD OF THE C,IA,
WHICH INVESTIGATES WORLD WIDE ESPIONAGE AND SABOTAGE
AGAINST THE UNITED STATES,, VELDE SAID BEFORE HE LEFT FOR
GENERAL SMITH. I WILL ALSO ASK THAT PRESIDENT TRUMA N ,RESCIND
INCLUDING MR J EDGAR HOOVER TO SUBSTANTIATE THE STATEMENT BY
COMMITTEE TO CALL THE HEADS OF OTHER INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
--- - - - ---- HE ISN. T ABLE TO DO SO I SHALL ASK THE UNAMERICAN ACTIVITIES
GENERAL SMITH WILL BE ABLE TO SUBSTANTIATE THESE CHARGES, I F
PHILADELPHIA. QUOTE I FIRMLY BELL EVE THAT THIS GREAT AMERICAN
PERSONAL REGARDS,,
AGENCIES OPERATING UNDER HIS CONTROL., UNQUOTE.. WITH -KINDEST
CURTAIN AROUND THE FILES OF THE VARIOUS INTELLIGENCE
HIS -EXECUTIVE-ORDER WHICH HAS-IN THE PAST PLACED AN IRON
HAROLD H VELDE M C EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS DISTRICT OF
ILLINOIS PEKIN ILLINOIS=.r= `-~
Aa rsav d Earn leas .20Q3111144__~ CIA-RQP_84B 00250 10 03-2
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COPY
BY AUTHORITY OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CONGRESS OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
W. J. Jones
are hereby commanded General Walter 8. Smith,
You to.summon -------- -------- -------- ----------------- ----------------------------
Dire ctor, Central Intl . ae AgswW,. Washington,. D. C.
Case tte. on Cnr-American Activities or a d autbo
to be and appear before the -----sebc ttes--thereof---------- ------------------------------------__ -- -
xxxxxxxot
Committee of the House of Representatives of the United States, of which the Hon- -----------------------
Jobe S. Wood
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- is chairman, ---------------------------------------
C >, Ledts t >tss ~}- aa~eraite#~ ?a ;
in their chamber in the city of Washington, on ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
October l3, 1952 10:00 &.a,
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- at the hour of --------------------------------------------------
then and there to testify touching matters of inquiry committed to said Committee; and he is
not to depart without leave of said Committee.
Herein fail not, and make return of this summons.
Witness my hand and the seal of the House of Representatives
of the United States, at the city of Washington, this
Sq tambeRr 52
-------------------- day of --------------------------------------------- 19----
16-25308-2 Clerk.
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Security Standards for Applicants
To be acceptable for employment in CIA, the applicant, after
investigation, must be shown to possess:
1. undivided loyalty to the United States
2. excellent character
3. unquestioned integrity
lt. unquestioned discretion
5. unquestioned trustworthiness
6. credit or financial habits and a background which
indicate that applicant would not succumb to bribery
or blackmail
7. no relatives or next of kin subject to a foreign
power
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Investigative Standards
for Applicants
Investigation conducted on applicants includes:
1. A check of the records of other security organizations,
such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department
of State, Department of the Army, Navy, Air Forces,
Civil Service Commission, and the House Committee on
Un-American Activities,
2. Interviews with employers, references, associates, and
neighbors, and
3. Checks of educational, police and credit records and
with such confidential sources as are deemed necessary.
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CIA Security Program
To prevent and assist in the detection of penetration of the
Agency we use:
1. A system of security and intelligence records dating
back to the early days of OSs
2. A close working relationship with other government
agencies
3. Highly skilled investigative staff conducting thorough
investigations
4. An experienced reviewing staff studying and analyzing
investigative reports of applicants, as well as security
files of Agency employees
5. A security follow-up system, including a plan for re-
investigation of employees
6. Internal security controls, such as compartmentalization
and the use of special types of clearances
7. A constant vigilance on the part of CIA employees to detect
any penetration or attempted penetration
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Security Policy with Respect to FBI Records
The name of every applicant investigated for possible employ-
ment with CIA is checked against the records of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation.
Security Policy with Respect to HCUA Records
The name of every applicant being investigated for possible
employment with CIA is checked against the records of the House
Committee on Un-American Activities. When a record is found, the
investigation is directed so as to explore the significance of the
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Notes on Probable Additional Questions and Suggested Answers
Q. What are your current measures of preventing penetration?
A. We investigate each applicant thoroughly prior to employment.
Q. What are your measures of detecting penetration?
A. There are numerous detailed measures, many of which should, for
security reasons, not be related. I think that the reason for
this, of course, is obvious. Among those that I may mention,
however, are our program of reinvestigation of employees, the
detailed study of cases involving possible attempts of penetration
so as to pick up other important facets involved in the case, and
of considerable importance along this line is the awareness of
employees of my Agency of the possibility of our having been
penetrated; thus, a constant awareness to detect possible pene-
tration. At this point I should like to mention the fact that
our program of compartmentalization of work, so that no single
individual below the very top level is able to gain a whole
picture, goes far toward reducing the effectiveness of any
penetration if it has occurred or should occur. Also, we operate
on the principle that no employee of the Agency receives any more
classified information than is necessary for him to do his job.
Q. How do you accomplish the removal of undesirable persons from
your organization?
A. I have ample authority under the provisions of Public Law 253,
80th Congress.
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ATINTL
Q. Have you been subjected to political pressure so as to hamper
the release of undesirable persons from your Agency?
A. No.
Q. Do you comply with the provisions of Executive Order 9835 (The
President's Loyalty Program)?
A. Yes.
Q. Have any persons been dismissed from your Agency on loyalty
grounds under the provisions of Executive Order 9835?
A. No.
Q. How many cases have been heard by the CIA Loyalty Board?
A. Since the institution of the Loyalty Program under the provisions
of Executive Order 9835, the cases of ^ CIA employees have been STATINTL
heard by the CIA Loyalty Board.
Q. Do you have any reason for the fact thaticases were heard and STATINTL
none were dismissed on loyalty grounds? ~uJ
A. Yes, I attribute it to my thorough applicant screening program.
Q. Are loyalty cases handled by your Agency under the provisions of
Executive Order 9835 subject to review by the Loyalty Review Board?
A. Yes, in this connection we follow the same procedure as any
other agency.
Q. Are there any Loyalty Board cases pending in your Agency?
A. All cases have been heard by the CIA Loyalty Board.
Q. How many persons have you dismissed on security grounds?
A. Since I took over CIA we have been prepared to dismiss four persons
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under the provisions of Public Law 253. All four persons,
however, left before I executed my final dismissal authority.
These were not cases of penetration, however.
Q. Have you advised the FBI of these cases?
A. Yes.
Q. Have you ever over-ruled your Board in favor of an individual?
A. No.
Q.
Do you employ the use of the polygraph in CIA?
A. Yes, we have, on a voluntary basis, afforded polygraph examinations
to many employees. I do not care to go into the detailed employment
of this aid to interrogation, however, I may add that we have
been able to detect cases of security risk by use of the polygraph.
I do not feel that I should, however, go into great detail on
this point other than to say that it is used entirely on a
voluntary basis, and that we are extremely careful so as to
protect the normal rights of an individual in our use of the
machine.
(Although it is suggested that no statistics be given on the
use of the polygraph, the following are indicated for your
benefit:
cases have been run. During the last year
approximatelyIpeople have resigned as a result of polygraph
examinations. The matter of procuring resignations is the subject
of strong feeling in many government circles. Hence, it may be
well to avoid, if possible, discussions along that line.)
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