LABOR CONDITIONS AND SOCIOLOGICAL OBSERVATIONS IN THE USSR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-01028R000100090007-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 16, 2001
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: April 21, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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r------------- - SECURITY; INFORMATION
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Approved For Release .200tW?RALCI RN800900
INFORMATION REPORT
25X1A
COUNTRY : USSR
SUBJECT : Labor Conditions and Sociological
Observations in the USSR
PLACE 25X1 A
ACQUIRED :
DATE
ACQUIRED BY SOURCE ;
DATE OF INFORMATION .-
o HIS DOCUMENT CONTAIN! INFORMATION AFFECTING TOE MMTIONRL DEFENSE
F THE UNITED STATEN, NITHIN TN6 YeANIMG OF TI 7L[ 1Gr SECTIONS 703
AND 7\1r OF TO[ U.S. CODE, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR Rev[-
LOTION OF ITS CO:.
ENTS TO OR RECEIPT tY RN UNAO TNORI[[D FERION ID
?RONI\IT[D \Y LANTN[ R[FRODUCTION OF THIS TORY It IRONI\1TE D.
25X1X I
Administration at the GIPKh Institute
1. As far as I know, the GIPKh Institute was under the direct
administration of the Ministry of the Chemical Industry'and was
not subject to the control of any intermediate direction, The
Ministry (located in Moscow) -exercised very strict control over
the operations of~r`-the Institute. Even the most minor matters
were referred to Moscow for decision. This close supervision
by the Ministry was probably brought about as much by a reluctance
on the part of the directors of the Institute to accept responsi-
bility as by any formal administrative control, Whenever any
difficulty or new problem arose, those directly concerned would
hesitate to make any decision for.fear that something would go
wrong and that they would be branded as saboteurs. Such matters'
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would invariably be referred to Moscow for decision, The
Ministry's. decisions would be carried out by the Institute
even when it was known that doing so would result in failure..
This same fear 'of punishment paralyzed initiative on all
levels of operation,
Because of the nature of the work at the Institute, production
norms were set in.terms'of`schedules and not in terms of physical
output. These target dates or norms were seldom mete One
section.would announce that, because of certain difficulties,
it was 'forced to ' delay the completion of its project by five per-
cent*. This would be followed in a short time by similar ounce
rents from other sections. his .practice did not prevent the
holding of internal competitions between the various sections in
the -Institute nor did it prevent the non-fulfillment of norms or
schedules? any O25 A
other forem oraer o give a appearance
of fulfillment .of 'norms; When a . section failed to fulfill its
norm, the management of then Institute would call on the section
chief to furnish.appropriate explanations. The management would
simultaneously apprise the trade union committee (zavkom) and the,
Institutelo:party committee of this situation. The section chief
would be required to call a meeting of his section in order to
determine the causes for this failure and to submit a report of
his fildings. to the zavkom. The assignment of norms was-the main
method of maintaining labor discipline and controlling output..
A chart'was posted in each section which listed. assignment and,
fulfillment of norms` Assignments were listed according to
sections but fulfillments were listed according to individuals.
The.Instituute!a'zavkom was generally responsible for the
maintenance of proper work conditions, the fulfillment of norms,
the improvement of output, etc. Ramasan Teacbaro pu was first
secretary of the trade union committee dur..ng'myassignment
there, Tsacharorov'was'neither a'technician nor a scientist but
held several mportant administrative positions. In addition to
being.the zavkom first secretary, he was responsible for-the
supervision of the German scientists and technicians assigned to
the Institute, He also.4cted as their interpreter. I feel
certain,that-Tsaaharorov was a'party member and believe'that he
was a member of?the Instituters party committee. He was either
a demobilized army major or an officer in civilian clothes. Al].
Soviets employed at the Institute were undoubtedly either party
members or individuals who had been cleared for this type-.,of
,w.ork. I. estimate that 50% of the Soviets employed in my section
were party members, I ;am . unable to identify all the members of
the Institutet.s party committee but believe that it included
Tgacharorov, Slukov, and Vnukov. Both Klukov and Vnukov were
leading, figures in the Instituters administration. The former
Was chief of the personnel section and the latter was technical
assistant to the director. The German technicians suspected all
three of being members of the MGB .(the Soviet Ministry of State
Security,,).. Others whom I thought to be party members were:
Qofmann:, Kvosiev, Lewin, Lewitski, Pituehin, Ryabkov,..,Servyelski,.
t
S e
anov, Tertehov,,Prokofev (first director and business manager
f the institute-and concerned more With the technical as
ects
p
bf , its operations.
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The party committee was primarily responsible for the distri
button of propaganda material, conducting courses for party
members, and for arranging meetings, special ceremonies, etc.
Enormous quantities of propaganda material were distributed
by; agitators, who numbered about one for every ten party
members, Agitators also held at least one discussion period a.
week in each section, shop, or kollektiv, which were attended
by all workers,. They based the discussions on the material in
the itators': Notebook (Bloknot Agittatora), Monthly assemblies
.were Jaeld for all emp c gees r stitute, These assemblies
evidently sponsored by the zavkom, were held individually in
each section and dealt. with general political subjects as well
as with subjects design to improve 'labor efficiency and
accelerate production` The party committee, however, by no
..means confined itself to_ propaganda activities. It evidently
received direct orders from Moscow and had the final voice .
concerning operations. When things were not functioning properly,
it would intervene in matters which were normally the responsi-
bility of the Institute management or zavkom. For example, when
norms were not met or faulty production detected, the party
committee might intercede, investigate the matter, and order
corrective measures. The party was also consulted before any
major modification was, made in the building or before any
important operational changes were made. The party committee
exercised strong influence in personnel matters. If anon-
''party worker had a complaint., his only recourse would be through
.the normal channel the zavkom. A party member, however, could
get more done by appealing directly to the party committee rather
than to the zavkom or management. The party committee, in
acting on such a complaint, would work through channels, -It
would take..,up the matter with the.zavkom, which in turn would
deal with the worker' s foreman or section chief,
Despite the intervention of the party committee in such
matters, I noticed no conflict between the party committee and
the technicians. 'Similarly,. the party committee and zavkom 25X1A
worked closely together, When any differences in opinion ar-de,
they were generally settled in a spirit of cored
YGf7"a v=4=ssjt,Lv.Laa wrio 1a -uo lna;aiL .a pipe in his shop and
decides that the ceiling would be the best place for it. How-
ever, a member of the factory's party committee might come along
and order the worker to lay the pipe under the floor. In the
Soviet Zone, the worker.-- being a German would react with the
feeling that a. party functionary cannot tell an expert anything
about his trade. -So he would carry out the party's orders, but
out of spite, would lay the ..pipe three feet instead of three
inches under the floor, and thus make sure that it could-not
possibly funotion. On the other hand, the Soviet technician at
the . GIPSh Institute . would cooperate with the party functionary
.and arrive at a practicable solution. `Another example of the
difference between th tems was illustrated at Leuna, 25X1A
A,