ANALYSIS OF THE (Sanitized) PAPER CASE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000600120026-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 13, 2010
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: August 31, 1964
• Content Type: MF

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31 August 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR-COMPTROLLER 14*
SUBJECT: Analysis of the Matthias Paper Case
1. On 23 August, the CHICAGO TRIBUNE published excerpts from a
CIA document classified "secret." How the newspaper got the document
is a problem for security officials and as such is beyond the scope
of this report. Publication of the document, however, has affected
the Agency's public relations. It has injected CIA in the domestic
political campaign - and in a way that is disadvantageous to the
President. It has also had considerable repercussion abroad. In
retrospect, there are lessons to be drawn from this case which, if
applied, would minimize the impact of such a security breach in the
future.
2. The wording on the cover sheet is ambiguous as to how much
institutional authority is behind this paper:
1. This paper was written by Mr. Willard Matthias of
the Board of National Estimates and has been twice revised
and supplemented after Board discussion. It has general
Board approval, though no attempt has been made to reach
complete agreement on every point of it.
2. It is circulated for information.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES: Sherman Kent,
Chairman. Underlining added).
On the one hand, there are caveats: the fact that it was written by one
man, that "'no attempt has been made to reach complete agreement," and
that "it is circulated for information." On the other hand, the underlined
portions above indicate the author's standing as a member of the Board,
the fact that the Board has taken it up and discussed it, that it has
given general approval to it, and that the Chairman of the Board, acting
for the Board, has authorized its circulation. It is a cardinal rule that
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all documents must be worded with absolute precision so that there can
be no misunderstanding as to their import. What Secretary Rusk tried to
convey in his background briefing - that this is a "think-piece"; one
man's opinion; not an official, formally-approved CIA or US1B document,
let alone a policy statement - should have been made evident on the
covering memorandum. An analogy comes to mind in those DDP documents
that depart from factual reporting to give a field evaluation. They are
carefully hedged. Their purpose is made obvious - they are "aids to
understanding the operational environment," etc.
3. The name of the author should not have appeared on the document.
This is a departure from the usual intelligence practice. While it could
not be foreseen that there would be a security leak, there is no reason
makes the author a target for press inquiries.
1. The paper that was "secret" in February was declassified and
stamped "official use only" in June and given wider circulation. While
ironically, the paper that was leaked was the "secret" version, it should
be realized that removing the classification and substituting the adminis-
trative control indicator "official use only" increased the chances of a
leak a hundredfold. "Official use only" is not a security classification.
In other parts of the Government, such documents are frequently shown the
press. On the security side, while this document may not contain
identifiable classified material, it was written by a man with full access
to classified intelligence materials and full knowledge of U.S. policy
positions. No matter that the paper represents one man's subjective
evaluation, the same paper could not have been written by someone without
access to classified materials.
5. Secretary Rusk, in his efforts to show that the paper was
basically a scholarly exercise rather than an intelligence or policy
document, said that it had been submitted to a magazine and rejected.
It was a mistake to say this. It strengthened the impression of some
that CIA was trying to get this paper out. Thus, the NEW YORK HERALD
TRIBUNE's editorial, "Leaky CIA" and the remark of a Congressional aide,
"It sounds like your Soviet economy story all over again."
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6. The attempt to take the edge off the CHICAGO TRIBUNE's "exclusive"
and to put the Matthias paper in its proper perspective by having Rusk
surface it and explain it on background has something to be said for it,
but in retrospect, it would have been preferable to wait and see what
would be stressed and what the impact would be. As it turned out, the
CHICAGO TRIBUNE story and headline addressed itself mainly to the portions
on the USSR in the Matthias paper. The headline read: "Theory of Soviet
Amiability Revived in Secret CIA Report." Only 2 of 29 paragraphs dealt
with Vietnam in the TRIBUNE story. However, all the stories filed after
Ruskts briefing concentrated on Vietnam. Thus, the Secretary's fears
highlighted the Vietnam portion of the report and generated the stories
on Vietnam.
7. In covering this story the press has not been unkind to CIA,
with the possible exception of two editorial comments. The NEW YORK
HERALD TRIBUNEts editorial, "Leaky CIA" is based on the idea that the
Agency cannot meet the secrecy requirements of an intelligence Agency,
with the implication that CIA is to blame for the security breakdown or
that CIA wanted to get the story out. The NEW YORK DAILY NEWS editorial
calls the Matthias paper a "defeatist document about the South Vietnam
war" and wonders why, if it does not represent Administration policy,
it got "all this publicity." Both conservative and liberal newspapers
tend to see in the story confirmation of their view that the war is not
going well in Vietnam, but they draw different conclusions. For the
conservatives, this means that the Administration has not done enough to
in and/or that it is hiding the fact that we are losing from the people.
For the liberals, this means that the Administration should no longer
spurn proposals for a negotiated settlement. Finally, the timing of the
story was conducive to its credibility. Events in Vietnam during the
past week tended to confirm the pessimistic view reflected in the Matthias
paper.
Paul M. Chr4tien
Assistant to the Director
for Public Affairs
Attachment:
Summary of Press Coverage
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SUMMARY OF PRESS COVERAGE
1. The original story by Willard Edwards in 23 August Chicago Tribune
was quoted by both the AP and UPI on 22 August. The AP noted that the
Johnson Administration had made the Matthias study available after learning
it would be published in the Chicago paper. The UPI said "official sources
disclosed the existence of the document when they learned it had been
offered for publication as a major outline of American policy."
2. The news agency stories carried the following headlines in
23 August papers: CIA OFFICIAL IS DOUBTFUL OF VICTORY IN VIETNAM
(Washington Star), VIET VICTORY DOUBT VOICED--CIA OFFICIAL SUGGESTS
NEGOTIATIONS WITH REDS (Baltimore Sun), DISSIDENT VOICE INSIDE CIA DOUBTS
VICTORY IN VIETNAM (Philadelphia Bulletin), VICTORY IN S. VIETNAM DOUBTED
IN CIA PAPER DISAVOWED AS POLICY Philadelphia Inquirer), CIA VIET PAPER
IS CALLED 'ONE MAN'S OPINION' (New York Journal American), CIA OFFICER
DOUBTFUL OF ASIA VICTORY (Los Angeles Times), and THE CIA'S SECRET VIETNAM
STUDY (San Francisco Chronicle).
3. None of the above rated banner headlines, but it is reported
that a Harrisburg, Pennsylvania paper spread the story in bold print across
the top of its front page. Also on 23 August, stories by byline reporters
appeared in the following: RELEASE OF CIA REPORT HAS POLITICAL OVERTONES
(Murrey Marder in Washington Post), A VIEW WITHIN CIA: CAN'T WIN IN VIET
(Laurence Barrett in New York Herald Tribune), and CIA AIDE SUGGESTS SAIGON
SETTLEMENT (Jack Raymond in New York Times) -- the latter two appearing on
the front page. The Rochester Democrat and Chronicle, in a report headlined
ROW LOOMS ON CIA'S "CAN'T WIN IN ASIA" PAPER, predicted that the Matthias
study would probably have international as well as domestic political
repercussions.
4. Editorial comment has appeared in several papers. On 24+ August,
the New York Herald Tribune headed its editorial "Leaky CIA" and concluded
that the evaluation in the Matthias study "does not help restore confidence
in the CIA either at home or abroad." On the same day the New York Times
editorial noted that "the publication of a Vietnam evaluation made inside of
the nation's most responsible intelligence bodies adds an important new element
to appraisal of the war in Southeast Asia," but it added that the document
was released after a leak "as a means of denying that it represents Adminis-
tration policy" although as Jack Raymond had originally reported, it reflects
a view "widely held in the Government and the subject of recurrent official
discussion." The evening edition of the Baltimore Sun on 24 August said the
CIA analysis prepared last June as an individual aide's view "received the
general agreement of key intelligence officials." The Atlanta Journal on
24 August declared that "a worse time for publication of such a report could
hardly have been chosen." Certainly "our intelligence people should examine
every facet of our operations in Southeast Asia," the paper said, "but this
is something that is not done publicly."
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The following day the New York Daily News appended to an
editorial blast at Democratic policies in contrast to Republican
ones ("Challenge vs. Chicken") a second editorial describing the
Matthias study as "A Defeatist Document." On 25 August the New
York Post hoped that the study was representative of high-level
Administration feeling, adding that "it is reassuring, moreover, to
learn that this kind of tough, realistic analysis is permitted
inside the CIA." The Chicago Tribune editorial on 25 August reviewed
comment in the New York Herald Tribune and the New York Times, and
two days later cited the "gloomy Matthias study in an editorial which
declared that "the latest upheaval in South Vietnam should demonstrate
to Washington the impossibility of defeating communism when the people
concerned are indifferent or hostile to the undertaking."
On 26 August the St. Louis Post Dispatch noted that "it was as
predictable as sunrise that Senator Goldwater would react as he did
to the news that a Central Intelligence Agency official has entertained
the forbidden thought of a negotiated settlement in Vietnam." The
Richmond Times Dispatch on 26 August, after reviewing several "defeats"
of the Johnson Administration, asserted that "to add to the confusion"
the Administration "may be considering a 'negotiated settlement'in
Vietnam as hypothetically proposed in a 'study' written by Willard
Matthias." The paper added that a State Department spokesman "promptly
denied that Matthias' paper represented a statement of the policy
originally recommended by President de Gaulle." On 27 August a second
editorial in the New York Post commented that "it was to be expected
that Barry Goldwater would seize upon the CIA tthink piece' about
South Vietnam to charge the Johnson Administration with a 'no win'
policy in that area." The Christian Science Monitor on 28 August
declared that "whatever might be said about some of its assessments,"
the CIA position paper was "manifestly right" when it spoke of the
counterguerrilla effort floundering. The editorial section of the
Washington Sunday Star on 30 August referred to the Matthias paper
after noting that "obviously no official in the Johnson Administration
is going to speak pessimistically in public."
5. News agency dispatches in the 2i- August press quoting a State
Department statement on the Matthias study were headlined thus: STATE
DEPT. DISOWNS CIA NEUTRALITY PAPER (New York Daily News), U.S. 'DISOWNS'
CIA REPORT ON 'NEUTRAL' VIET (New York Journal American), and CIA REPORT
WORRIES OFFICIALS (Washington Daily News). While most bylined stories on
the State Department statement, including the mention of the Matthias
study, were headlined with the U.S. support of the Saigon regime aspect of
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the story (U.S. STRESSES SUPPORT FOR KHAN, HITS RIOTS by Bernard Gwertzman
in the Washington Star, BACKING OF KHAN AFFIRMED BY U.S. by Tad Szulc in
the New York Times, IN WASHINGTON, U.S. BUOYS UP KHANH by Laurence Barrett
in the New York Herald Tribune, and U.S. DEPLORES VIET RIOTS, OFFICIAL SAYS
by William Anderson in the Chicago Tribune), the Baltimore Sun story on the
State Department statement by Howard Norton on 25 August was headlined CIA
VIETNAM PAPER BRANDED UNOFFICIAL.
6. Senator Goldwater referred to the paper in a speech before the
national convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars. Bylined stories in
the Washington Post, the Washington Star, and the St. Louis Post Dispatch
and news agency stories in other major papers on 25 and 26 August stressed
in their headlines that the Senator had charged that the Johnson Adminis-
tration was planning a negotiated peace in Vietnam. An A.P. story released
as an insert to the Goldwater speech noted that the Administration had ordered
an investigation to determine how the Chicago Tribune got the story.
7. References to the Matthias paper were also contained in reports of
a Goldwater press conference on 26 August in Avalon, California. Both the
New York Times and the Baltimore Sun carried byline stories on the Senator's
statement that there might be some value in talks with Peking and a follow-
up statement by his press Secretary Paul Wagner. The Philadelphia Bulletin
quoted Mr. Goldwater as stating that "I along with many others" have to see
a "lot of truth" in the CIA officer's evaluation.
8. The situation in Vietnam itself was commented on in Washington-
datelined stories in the Christian Science Monitor by Robert Brunn on
26 August and in the Baltimore Sun by Paul Ward on 28 August, both making
reference to the Matthias paper.
a. The Worker (New York) on 25 August headlined its first story
on the Matthias paper: SECRET MEMO BY CIA ADMITS U.S. PUPPET IN VIETNAM
IS LOSING.
b. Peking's New China News Agency on 23 August quoted from the
Matthias paper and several other U.S. sources (Senator Morse, the New
York Times, and columnist Walter Lippmann) to show that U.S. politicians
and newspapers acknowledge that "it is impossible for the United States
to suppress by force the South Vietnamese people who are persisting in
their just and patriotic struggle."
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c. On 24 August the East Berlin Neues Deutschland carried a short
news item which said: "In 7a report to U.S. Government organs, member
of the Planning Committee of the U.S. Intelligence Service CIA Willard
Matthias expressed doubts about a victory over the South Vietnamese
Liberation Front."
d. The Yugoslav news agency Tanyug on 24 August carried a
Washington dispatch which said "considerable concern" had been provoked
by a report "unofficially attributed" to CIA about the poor prospects
of a military solution in Vietnam. Tanyug concluded that "some
commentators consider the document is the view not only of the author
but also of the Central Intelligence Agency, which has approved it.,,
e. Hanoi's Vietnam News Agency on 27 August noted the "heated
debate" among U.S. officials over the paper "said to have been approved
by the CIA" and "considered a draft of the U.S. Government's line."
VNA quoted ten lines of the paper which, it said, was distributed to
the press by the State Department "because of the rumor that the
Republican Party, which also possessed this report, would soon publish
it in the Chicago Tribune."
f. On 31 August the Moscow radio, in a commentary for the
domestic audience in the USSR, noted that the report of the CIA
"specialists" on Vietnam concluded that "the only thing that the
United States could attain there is a continuous deadlock."
a. According to the Cairo radio, the 26 August Al-Akhbar stated that "the
recent CIA report regarding the use of force in today's world" means that
"the era of threatening the use of force has ended." The paper added that
the reference in the CIA report "to the increased strength of the UAR and
Indonesia and to their attempt to play a greater role in international affairs
also constitutes a gain for peace."
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b. The 24 August press in Munich gave front-page handling to the
report of the release of the Matthias study, emphasis being placed on
the conflict between the alleged Matthias position and U.S. policy.
c. The European edition of Stars and Stripes gave the story prominent
play, underscoring the thesis that it was only "one man's opinion."
d. The study was widely discussed in the 24 August French press,
which carried excerpts generally designed to show that the French thesis
on the necessity of the neutralization of Indochina was well founded.
Responsible moderate papers made a clear distinction between U.S. Government
policy, an Agency-wide agreed assessment, and an internal working paper.
The more sensational and leftist-oriented papers played up the neutralization
theme and did not explain the working-paper aspect.
e. In New Delhi on 24 August the Hindustan Times carried on an inside
page a Washington-datelined AP report to the effect that a CIA officer, in
a memo circulated among "a few lower-ranking officials," had voiced "serious
doubt that victory can be won" in Vietnam. The next day the Times of India
carried its own correspondent's dispatch from Paris saying that release of
the CIA document," which allegedly supports General de Gaulle's thesis,
is expected to strengthen the hand of the Pathet Lao at the tripartite
meeting because they are likely to argue that a military solution is no
more possible in Laos than in Vietnam.
f. In Karachi on 24 August, after Vietnamese developments had received
only passing attention over the weekend, a Dawn article by Washington
correspondent Ejaz Husain reported the New York Times account of the release
of the Matthias study which it said caused the Administration "great
consternation." Husain noted the State Department assertion that the study
was not necessarily reflective of Administration views, but he commented
that it still indicates doubts in some official quarters. Husain concluded:
"So far those quarters have been brushed aside by warhawk elements within
the Administration, especially in the State Department Policy Planning
Council."
g. In Tananarive on 24 August the Malagasy Republic Government Information
Bulletin carried an item which noted that the Matthias study on the war in
Vietnam stated that victory was not possible for the American cause.
h. The Melbourne Herald on 24 August reported that the Matthias study
assessed "victory" in Vietnam as impossible.
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NOTE: The Matthias study is not publicized in the three major U.S. weekly
news magazines (Time, Newsweek, and U.S. News and World Report , but Business
Week on 29 August, in an article headlined 'Hopes Fade for South Vietnam," says
"the CIA report is bound to shake confidence, both in Saigon and here at home,
in the steadfastness and realism of U.S. policy." The magazine concludes
that "high U.S. officials this week are at pains to discount the significance
of the CIA study," but some are privately looking again at the possibilities
of a negotiated settlement in Vietnam.
On 1 September, in a front page story headlined DELETIONS IN CIA REPORT
BARED, Willard Edwards of the Chicago Tribune charges that the State Department
made changes in the covering memorandum with "the apparent purpose" of down-
grading the importance of "the document as a government paper representing
official opinion." Edwards claims that the changes were noted when a comparison
was made of the February and June versions of the study, the latter being the
one "which was released to a selected group of reporters on Friday, Aug. 21."
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At -Z 4 t4_17 -- -
Para. 2. It is a cardinal rule that all documents must be worded
with absolute precision . . ."etc.
True indeed; and apparently this one was so worded. Paul's
analysis of the meaning of the covering memorandum is correct,
and indicated that indeed our precision was almost absolute.
What Secretary Risk said about it is something again -- he was
obviously not quite correct in saying that it was only pone
man's opinion" -- the covering memo makes plain that it was
a little more than that. It also makes plain that it was not
a formally approved CIA or USIB document. As for maki-ig plain
that it was not a policy paper or policy statement -- since when
do we have to assert this on intelligence papers?
In short, I don't think that Paul's second paragraph is
well taken at all.
Para. 3? Yes, I daresay that the name of the author should not appear.
Yet the names of authors do in fact appear on many papers
issued in this Agency for fairly wide distribution (ORR and
0SI). The author's name was put on this piece in part to
reinforce the point that it was not a formal ONE issuance
the fact that his name was on the document helped in establishing
the fact that it was not an official CIA position.
Para 14. Agree; though we can't obviously confine our writings to
those things which could, if leaked, be published without
giving anything away.
Para 5. I agree fully.
Para 6. I don't really agree, but Paul may be right. I think that
the Agency may have benefitted from the fact that the full
piece was made available, because it is a good piece, and
generally was so treated. Of course, if it had died on the
vine with the one Chicago Tribu story that-would have been
better, but I doubt if it would have so died.
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