THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE YUGOSLAV MILITARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001100040001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 17, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 4, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
04 May 1984
The Political Role of the Yugoslav Military
SUMMARY
The Yugoslav Peoples Army (YPA), the national
institution most resistant to divisions prevailing
elsewhere in the society, is being drawn into an
increased political role. The ineffectiveness of
the Yugoslav civilian collective leadership has
been evident for years, but the political
emergence of the YPA began only a year ago when
the military hierarchy began asserting its own
Later, the Army publicly supported calls
for a purge of leaders whose recalcitrant pursuit
of regional and special interests prevent
purposeful action at the federal level.
The generals still hesitate to enforce their
latent political authority. Heavy constraints--
mainly based on the fact that the Army's popularly
accepted role in the system is limited--hold any
"Bonapartist" tendencies in check. The Army also
knows that it cannot exercise its will without
exposing vulnerabilites to potential opponents.
This memorandum was prepared byl (East European
Division, Office of European Analysis. It was coordinated with
the Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and questions e
welcome and should be addressed to r Chief,
East European Division, Office Of European Analysis~
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EUR M 84-10093X
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The aging YPA elite can be forced into
retirement, if the civilians choose and
can make it stick. Some civilians
already have expressed resentment over
defense expenditures and unease about
the military's political intentions.
Aside from homilies on patriotism and
discipline, the generals have ventured
no solutions to Yugoslavia's deep-seated
economic and political problems and,
thus, lack broad pragmatic appeal as an
alternative source of leadership.
- The military must expend considerable
effort to keep ethnic strains and
political rivalries from infecting its
own rank and file.
Since the end of the year, the generals have
muted their criticisms. But we think that their
heightened political activity last year increased
their potential influence and that they are
learning to be more adroit. As frustration with
the collective leadership grows,.the YPA is likely
to develop closer affiliation with civilian
leaders distasteful of innovation and inclined
toward recentralization.
If economic deterioration or other events
further discredit the leadership, the YPA might
back a new hardline civilian coalition. Moreover,
in the less likely event that the incumbent
civilian authorities procrastinate in the face of
an imminent and clear threat to the stability of
the Federation, the YPA would have no real choice
but to act decisively--with force, and perhaps on
its own, without waiting for an invitation from
the civilian leadership. If the Army were forced
to take such drastic measures, it probably would
avoid assuming overt national leadership
responsibilities and prefer to operate behind a
new ruling civilian clique. But the generals
would retain dominant influence on decisions
until--or if--conditions allowed a return to their
strictly military pursuits.
For the West, the emergence of a hardline,
suppressive regime could well mean a cooling of
relations. Western criticism would probably meet
truculent rejection, and Belgrade would prove more
difficult to deal with in financial
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negotiations. Yugoslavia would also be more
inclined toward radical nonaligned causes. Moscow
might take encouragement from such developments,
but we do not believe the Yugoslav military, or a
civilian regime it supported, would wander from
the Titoist course of determined independence.
And eventually, hardliners in Belgrade, faced with
the need for economic recovery, would have to seek
expanded ties with the West.
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Introduction
Yugoslavia's post-Tito political elite has been unable to
cope effectively with the country's serious economic problems or
to ease ethnic strains in the fractious multinational state. As
political and economic cleavages have deepened, the Yugoslav
People's Army (YPA) has emerged as the national institution most
resistant to the divisions prevailing in society. Often
characterized by others as the only "All-Yugoslav" institution,
the YPA itself is now stressing its legal political obligation to
preserve national unity in time of crisis.
The military has been a loyal servant of the Titoist
system. More responsive, disciplined, and obedient to
hierarchical control than other Yugoslav institutions, the YPA
was a trump card against Tito's opponents in post-war political
crises. The Army accordingly participated in resolving national
problems--e.g., the Croatian crisis of the early 1970s--while
keeping within its constitutionally defined role and still
supporting Tito's efforts to strengthen the federal system. If,
however, Tito's successors fail to restore cohesive leadership,
we believe the military might intervene in proportions
unprecedented in post-war politics.
This assessment attempts to project how the attitudes of the
military may affect Yugoslavia's political development in the
next several years. Judgments on the motives and likely behavior
of an insular officer corps that keeps itself isolated from
outsiders are difficult to formulate. Our assessment relies on
second-hand evaluations of the attitudes of the most senior
officers and on our own and others' observations of the
military's behavior.
Out of the Shadows
Several recent developments indicate that Yugoslavia's
military leaders are considering a more active role to honor
Tito's express wish that they protect the country from internal
as well as foreign threats. At the request of the civilian
government, they have drawn up martial law contingency plans
The generals then disassociated
the military establishment from several key policy decisions of
the civilian leadership including adoption of the Western
financial rescue package in 1983, and became increasingly
critical in public of the civilian government.
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The military's growing impatience with the civilian
leadership became public shortly afterward. In a speech before a
plenum of the party Central Committee on 25 July 1983, Mamula:
-- Invoked the military's priority interest in internal
security, arguing that the prolonged economic crisis
was increasing Yugoslavia's--and the Army's--
vulnerability to domestic and foreign subversion.
-- Asserted that the military was a well-disciplined
component of the political system, not a force standing
apart.
Suggested the generals' readiness to play a larger
role, "at the disposal of the working class, if the
need again arises."
Urged that the party purge foot-draggers and dissidents
from its ranks.
Notably, Mamula did not pledge support to his collective civilian
commanders-in-chief. We believe he did this deliberately to
distance the military from the civilian leadership and from the
consequences of their policies, leaving the Army free to act on
behalf of "higher" interests of the party, the people, and the
Subsequently, senior officers made an unprecedented number
of speeches similarly critical of political leaders. Most of the
key military hierarchy--including Mamula's deputy, General
Petkovski, Chief of Staff General Gracanin, Navy Commander
Admiral Vilovic, and General Cuic, who heads the party
organization in the military and is ex officio member of the
party presidium--have attacked the regime's
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inability to enforce political discipline.
The Threats They See
Although most Yugoslavs worry that ethnic and regional
rivalries could explode in a major crisis, the generals must be
especially concerned lest centrifugal forces undermine the
country's military preparedness. In addition, they fear that
unresolved economic problems will increasingly undermine military
A Stake in Domestic Stability
We believe that the Yugoslav military is genuinely concerned
that division and irresolution within the civilian leadership is
weakening the tenous cohesion of the country's diverse
nationalities and minority groups. And, to the extent that the
military leadership sees this divisiveness spilling over into the
'
YPA
s own ranks, it must fear that the Army's defensive
capabilities are being undercut and the national security
threatened. The generals almost certainly conclude, therefore,
that a serious upsurge in domestic unrest would leave them little
choice but to act rapidly and decisively to restore order.
The military leadership has more than a symbolic stake in
maintaining Yugoslavia's "Brotherhood and Unity," because its
effective functioning requires domestic unity and active public
support of the regime. Yugoslav strategy depends on combined
defense by the regular armed forces--250,000 in peacetime--and a
mobilized citizenry--three million strong--as the core of its
deterrent capability. To the extent that public morale sags and
regional loyalties supplant commitment to the Yugoslav
federation, the Yugoslav defense establishment suffers. For
example, if there were anti-regime violence or inter-ethnic
bloodshed, rebellious citizens conceivably might take over
leadership of local Territorial Defense units, which have weapons
available in local armories. (See Annex I, The Lessons of
Kosovo)
We believe the military pays special attention to key
regions in the country where popular unrest might be especially
harmful to their defensive strategy. The most important is
Bosnia-Hercegovina. The mountain stronghold of Tito's partisans
in World War II, the republic is still a major military center
and, by common consensus of observers, would again be the "last
ditch" locale for resisting any invasion force. But the ethnic
mix and bloody legacy of the region--which saw atrocities among
Muslims, Serbs, and Croats during the last war--make for a
potentially volatile situation. (The leaders in Sarajevo, who
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keep ethnic tensions capped by harsh repression, worked closely
with the Army in 1971 when they joined forces in urging Tito to
purge the Croat party elite.)
The generals also fear that the regular army itself is being
infected--and might be effectively neutralized--by broadening
influences of "internal and external enemies" who are attempting
to sow dissent in the ranks and to undermine the population's
confidence in the YPA's ethnic neutrality. Evidence of such
infection, judging from a variety of sources including press
articles, is that since the Albanian nationalist riots in 1981,
Albanian recruits have more frequently been charged in military
tribunals for serious breaches--including sabotage--than those of
any other nationality.
Budget Concerns
Getting what it considers an adequate share of Yugoslavia's
declining budget funds is a further cause of military distress
with the country's civilian leadership. Although the generals
and their civilian counterparts play hardball when budget
priorities are at stake, the military so far have won enough
battles that the process by itself has not been sufficient motive
for overthrowing the system. But, there undoubtedly is concern
that modernization plans could be threatened if the economic
crisis is not resolved soon.
With the economy under severe pressure, the generals in the
past two years have seen unprecedented attacks on the defense
budget in the federal assembly and have had to fight ever harder
to justify their budget demands. In the spring of 1983, for
example, following IMF insistence on federal budget cuts, Finance
Secretary Florjancic ordered a pay freeze for active duty
officers and postponed a 12-percent raise for military
retirees. Just this March the Cabinet proposed other economies,
including an end to automatic military promotions, the
introduction of merit pay, and linkages to civil service wage
scales.
The defense budget over the past five years in fact has kept
pace with inflation--barely--but it has fallen considerably short
of promised levels.
the government:
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permitted the YPA to purchase some Western-made
hardware;
expanded the YPA's control of hard currency earnings
from exports of Yugoslav military products. The Army
later claimed that its earnings through exports fully
covered its import requirements--a significant
improvement over 1982 when only 70 percent of the
foreign exchange needed for imports came from arms
sales abroad.
Budget difficulties have inevitably drawn the military into
political infighting in Belgrade.
following the squabbles in 1983 over the pay freeze and other
economies, the generals criticized the finance secretary and
helped Premier Planinc force Florjancic's retirement last
December. To the faction-ridden civilian leadership looking for
ways to put the country's economy on a sound footing, the lesson
of recent years is that the YPA is loath to accept its share of
economies. And, perhaps more importantly for the future, the YPA
can be both a source of support, as well as a powerful opponent,
for factional infighting
Restraints
Despite their growing concern over the continued weakness of
the collective civilian leadership, the Yugoslav generals have
not moved impetuously into the political arena. After public
criticisms in late 1983, the generals refrained from further
public comment in early 1984. We think they suffer from
indecision over their proper role and from fear that overstepping
their normal bounds might threaten the YPA's internal cohesion
and expose vulnerabilities.
The possibility of broad popular disapproval--and even
resistance in some quarters--is probably the strongest inhibition
in the generals' minds against a dominant military role in
politics. The military establishment has worked hard to erase
the dark image left by its predecessors. The Royal Serbian Army
frequently played an adventurist role in politics with tragic
consequences. (Serb officers of the Black Hand Society
assassinated the last of the Obrenovic Kings in 1905 and
sponsored the attack on Arch Duke Franz Ferdinand in 1914 which
began World War I.) The pre-war Yugoslav Royal Army suppressed
non-Serbian minorities only to see some welcome the Nazi invasion
brought on by an Army coup d'etat.
Many non-Serb Yugoslavs, therefore, are conditioned to
distrust generals in politics, and they openly express anxiety
about military intervention. Vladimir Dedijer, Tito's official
biographer, claims in his newest book that in 1946 even Tito
said: "If I ruled a nation of intellectuals, I'd never wear a
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uniform again." 25X1
Because many civilians tend to distrust the military, the
YPA has had to accept certain safeguards designed to impede
generals' cabals.
Since the late 1960s, all officers by law are promoted
to field grade according to a proportional ethnic
quota. This has helped reduce the dominance of Serb
and Montenegrin generals.
About 80 percent of all recruits serve outside their
home regions. (By comparison, most civilians rarely
work outside their home republics.)
The Army's structure in many ways helps to isolate it
from regional power centers. Several of the ground
forces command regions crosscut or subsume many
territorial boundaries, thereby reducing the chance of
geographically aligning the YPA commands with inter-
regional squabbles. In a similar manner, the army's
party organization--which includes nearly all officers
and most NCOs--is the only component of the LCY Central
Committee organized on a cross-territorial basis. The
Party in the Army answers directly to the LCY
Presidency, rather than through regional parties.**
Additionally, because of the Army's uniquely hierarchical
structure and command-response discipline, the generals are
isolated from the mainstream of a political system that operates
on compromise, consensus, and collectivity. In the end, we
believe the generals fear that they cannot apply their distinct
management style to solving Yugoslavia's problems without
upsetting Tito's social compact, shattering the constitutional
crockery, and having to assume responsibility themselves for
putting it all back together again.
A sense of self-restraint may also make the generals
reluctant to get deeply embroiled in politics.
We
strongly suspect from evidence in the press, that several key minorities--
Slovenes, Croats, and Albanians--avoid military careers for both economic and
political reasons.
The "party commissar" system ended in the YPA just after the war. Since
then, commanders have used party cells to enhance, rather than ratify, their
authority.
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We also believe that the YPA's general officers must incline
toward caution in dealing with their civilian superiors because
nearly all of them--about 200 men--are vulnerable to forced
retirement. The State Presidency, which by law "appoints and
dismisses" generals, has allowed mandatory retirement ages to
slip in order to permit the partisan era generals to extend their
active service. A major rejuvenation of the senior officer corps
is therefore long past due. Since mid-grade officers, trapped
in holding positions, presumably would welcome opportunities to
advance, conflicting career aspirations could give the civilians
considerable leverage in checking the power of Tito's old guard
in the YPA.
The Generals and the Outside World
Should the military decide on some sort of more active
political involvement, we would expect no change in Yugoslav
nonaligned status. In peacetime, the generals support this
foreign policy because their non-bloc position permits maximum
flexibility in dealing with any foreign partners while avoiding
treaty entanglements. The YPA, therefore is able to buy arms
from both East and West and to sell extensively to the Third
World.
The generals undoubtedly realize that a strictly nonaligned
foreign policy offers little as a security guarantee. But their
historical experience must evoke cynicism about the reliability
of alliances, once hostilities begin. And the generals appear to
have accepted the argument that flexibility best serves
Yugoslavia's, security interests, notwithstanding nonalignment's
in 1980, the partisan
generation occupied all 35 "elite" command positions studied. They also had
restricted promotions through the next rung of 60 slots to their same club.
Announced retirement rates have been slow since 1981. Although Defense
Minister Mamula claims that the changeover of the postwar generation is almost
complete, to our knowledge, there is no general officer now holding a key
position who is not a "partisan."
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The YPA and the USSR
The Yugoslav military's stance toward the USSR is
contradictory in many ways. Yugoslav conviction that the Warsaw
Pact is the principal military threat in the region is the most
important underlying factor in defense policy. Yet, Belgrade
permits a measure of dependency on cheap Soviet weapons and it
also grants the USSR important concessions, such as overflight
rights to Third World hotspots. We believe, however, the record
convincingly demonstrates that Yugoslav military is both vigilant
against Soviet meddling in Yugoslavia and wary of compromising
th
t
'
i
e coun
ry
s
ndependence.
Moscow's position as Yugoslavia's primary supplier of
imported arms--see Annex II--makes the Yugoslav generals cautious
about giving gratuitous offense to the USSR and its military
establishment. Moreover, coinciding policy interests on some
crisis developments in the Third World--like support for the Arab
cause--have opened the way to unusually extensive cooperation.
Yugoslav arms shipment facilities, airspace, and even a
few of its airfields have been used in Soviet resupply
efforts.
And under a 1974 naval repair agreement, the Yugoslav Navy
permits four Soviet warships, stripped of weapons and a full
crew, to undergo repairs in Yugoslav yards at one time.
There are clear limits to Yugoslav cooperation. During the
Brezhnev era, Tito, with his generals' firm support, resisted
repeated Soviet requests for permanent basing rights. More
important, the Yugoslav military has always responded massively
to every threat of Soviet meddling.
-- During the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in
1968, the YPA mobilized and strongly denounced the
Soviet action. Afterward they adopted the All Peoples
Defense strategy as a means of deterring a similar
Soviet move against Yugoslavia.
-- In May 1980 when Tito died, the YPA without fanfare
ringed the capital and its airport with tanks and its
best troops. We believe this was a quiet signal of
readiness to defend against any surprise move from the
East patterned on the Soviet takeovers in Prague and
Kabu 1 .
The YPA has purged suspected pro-Soviets from its own
ranks three times--at the break with Stalin in 1948,
after the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and again
in 1974 when a pro-Soviet splinter party was discovered
in Yugoslavia. After the last purge, the military
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The West
The Yugoslav military's attitudes toward the West reflect a
similar ambivalence. The generals want strong relations with the
West to counter the East's influences, but they also worry about
the pull of Western ideas that they do not understand or trust.
Judging by their public comments, most generals are deeply
suspicious of Western cultural and political influences.
Military leaders frequently warn the rank and file to
avoid "anti-Yugoslav and hostile ideas in literatures,
music, films, the fine arts and theater."
-- A trend toward debunking the "Partisan myth" in
historical works, novels, and films sharpens the old
guard's animosity toward any reforms toward a more open
society.
More recently several key officials--including Mamula--have
criticized Western financial institutions--like the IMF--for
plotting to force unwanted system reforms on Yugoslavia.
Outlook
We believe the YPA, perhaps even reluctantly, will accrue
political influence--more than it ever had in the Tito era--and
the YPA may be pressed to use it in the cause of more effective
government. In our view, it is most likely to support tougher
and more pragmatic civilian leaders in a program of cautious
recentralization, tighter discipline, and increased vigilance
against encroaching foreign influences. And in the less likely
event of a threat to the federation, the YPA would use all its
means--including armed force--to restore order behind a harsher
civilian regime in which the generals would have decisive
influence.
For the short term--the next six months or so--we see the
restraints on the generals offsetting any inclinations to assert
vigorously their political influence. Because the YPA's first
experience in exerting public political pressure last year had
mixed results, military leaders in fact are likely to be
tentative and experimental in trying to nudge Yugoslavia's
special interest groups towards common goals. They will, in
addition, be sensitive about taking actions that might revive the
prewar specter of the military as Serbia's "gendarmerie", or
otherwise provoke opposition to the Army.
No matter what its hesitations, we believe the military
hierarchy would exert themselves in the event that civilian
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leaders again deadlock on key policy matters or underestimate
another internal security crisis--as they did in Kosovo in
1981. Events that could trigger.YPA activism include:
-- increasingly divisive policy fights, especially between
Croats and Serbs, the two largest and most antagonistic
ethnic groups.
-- rising unrest in key strategic regions, especially in
Bosnia-Hercegovina.
-- a perceived failure of the federal leadership to
effectively rebuff outsiders' efforts to take advantage
of Yugoslavia's weaknesses.
The generals in such circumstances might demand purges of inept
and indecisive civilians to reinforce other demands, this time
In any event, the YPA's influence is likely to grow and not
only by default of collective leadership. In time, we expect the
generals to become more adroit at political in-fighting. And,
they already have substantial untapped reserves of support.
-- Many, if not most, Yugoslavs are disappointed in the
collective leadership--and some with the system itself.
-- Hardliners are frustrated by the party's vain efforts
to muzzle academics and media critics.
Low level managers and other functionaries in the self-
management systems, especially in debt ridden
industries and the underdeveloped south, fear the
market reforms Belgrade is considering.
The YPA's reputation for discipline, order, and hierarchical
values, makes it a magnet for such constituencies.
In the event of a major shock to the current regime--say, a
spate of serious civil unrest--the collective leadership could
not ignore the demands of YPA-supported hardliners. Such a
faction could include Nikola Ljubicic, Serbia's President; Branko
Mikulic, his counterpart in Bosnia-Hercegovina; Dusan Dragosavac
Croatia's representative on the LCY Presidium, and Lazar
Kolisevski, Macedonia's representative on the State Presidency.
And, to the extent that the YPA and conservative civilians would
press in concert for recentralization, we would expect them to:
stress majority voting at the expense of strict
consensus and collectivity. (Without such reforms, few
orderly changes are possible.)
declare a hiatus in debates on market reforms which the
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generals think threaten "the achievements of the
revolution."
-- emphasize disciplined pursuit of common goals--with
particular stress on muzzling the media.
Resignations and replacements of liberals and reformers, in turn,
would change the character of the leadership, which would become
more narrowly based but would also be more effective in policy
follow-through. We would expect hardliners backed by the Army to
be harsh in suppressing ethnic nationalism and truculent at any
Western criticism, but also wary of Soviet blandishments.
Martial Law
A major crisis threatening the very existence of the
federation, which seems unlikely soon given the gradual tempo of
decline in the post-Tito era, would probably cause the YPA to
invoke martial law. Based on our readings of the Polish events
and the specific character of Yugoslav problems we expect the
signals of early preparations might include:
Intensifying criticism of the domestic situation by
senior YPA spokesmen.
Real or rumored YPA ultimatums to civilian leaders.
Restrictions of troops to caserns and increased levels
of political training.
Upgrading of military communications networks in key
regional commands, particularly in Belgrade, Sarajevo,
and Zagreb.
Intensified liaison and joint operations among Military
Counterintelligence, the Ministry of Interior, federal
militia battalions, and reinforced civilian police.
Tightened YPA security controls at Territorial Defense
Last stage preparations might include:
-- YPA maneuvers throughout the country accompanied by
mid-level alerts.
Extension of active duty for troops about to be
demobilized.
Mobilization of the best equipped and trained
Territorial Defense units and deployment out of their
home regions.
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Roundups of dissidents.
Imposition of YPA censorship on the media.
Supervisory controls on the courts, police and key
economic activities.
We suspect the YPA would install hardline civilians in the State
and Party Presidencies to give the new regime an appearance of
continuity and legitimacy.
Even a martial law regime would flounder if ethnic rivalries
undermined the YPA's internal command authority. We believe the
YPA leadership would use all of its unique assets to keep the
military united and effective in troubled times.
-- Rigorous discipline to control the most troublesome
elements would limit the spread of dissidence.
-- The ability to "quarantine" units in their barracks or
preoccupy them in field exercises could help isolate
the troops from pernicious outside contacts.
But such measures cannot succeed for long, especially if the
troops must play an active role in maintaining order. Military
cohesion thus ultimately depends on the leadership and
reliability of the middle-and lower-ranking professional officers
and NCOs. The YPA elite must communicate its common
institutional interests and sense of duty through these key
personnel to a conscript army torn by conflicting loyalties to
hold the YPA together. However, we do not know enough about the
political attitudes and reliability of the middle and lower ranks
confidently to predict their reliability in a crisis.
Implications for US Policy 25X1
To the extent that the Yugoslav government. concedes more
influence to the YPA, Belgrade could well be more difficult for
the West to deal with. Because some military leaders--like
Mamula and his predecessor, General Ljubicic--resent Western
economic leverage on their financially troubled country, US-led
efforts to provide aid to Yugoslavia would meet even more
suspicion. Some key military leaders might support the so-called
"Black Option" contingency plan--a scheme also debated in the
press--under which Yugoslavia would cut ties with the West,
perhaps repudiate its foreign debt, and attempt to survive on its
own resources. The YPA, with its strong interests in arms sales
to the Third World, might also be more inclined to support
radical nonaligned positions.
In the less likely event of a martial law regime, strains
with the West might be even more serious. In the first phase of
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a military-assisted crackdown, arrests and repression would
conflict with Western human rights policies. Isolationist
tendencies, coupled with demands.for unilateral debt repudiation,
might predominate in Belgrade. Because even hardline Yugoslavs
have bitter memories of the USSR dating from the 1948 Tito-Stalin
schism, it does not necessarily follow that a shift away from the
West would lead to a pro-Soviet Yugoslavia. An explicitly pro-
Soviet tilt would deprive any Yugoslav regime of popular
legitimacy and invite violent challenge. Moreover, though Moscow
could offer some support to a martial law regime, the Soviets
could not hope to replace the West's vital role in the Yugoslav
Following a period of consolidation and partial isolation,
we believe that even a hardline regime would have to support some
of the reforms now urged by Western lenders and the IMF. Even
hardliners could not overlook that disastrous domestic
mismanagement--not Western economic ties--had led to Yugoslavia's
economic problems. A hardline regime might even try to convince
potential Western trading partners that its stress on discipline
and efficiency was a necessary condition for workable economic
reforms.
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Annex I
The Lessons of Kosovo
In March 1981, alarmed civilian leaders in Belgrade ordered
the YPA and special interior ministry strike forces into action
against Albanian nationalist demonstrators in the Kosovo Province
of Serbia where Albanians constitute the overwhelmina mainrity
A brief inventory of the military force sent to Kosovo
indicates the YPA federal authorities sent more than ample force
to the province.
Regular army tank, infantry, and parachute units in
battalion to brigade strength from Macedonia, Serbia,
Slovenia, and Montenegro.
Three Territorial Defense brigades from Vojvodina,
Montenegro, and Macedonia.
Specially trained civilian police reservists in highly
mobile units that specialize in commando-style
We think that the Kosovo crisis taught Belgrade several
lessons:
The federal leadership can not depend solely on local
security forces because the regional police in Kosovo
both failed to warn Belgrade about the building unrest
and were unable to contain it.
The federal authorities' decision to act without delay
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I I
in committing armed forces was vindicated by the
successful outcome.
The YPA, if at all possible in future instances, should
be given a highly visible, but largely deterrent, role
in order to minimize aggravation of ethnic tensions.
Two important aspects of the Kosovo operation are relevant
to the country's All Peoples' Defense strategy.
-- Belgrade for the first time mobilized units from other
regions to serve in a police action under YPA command.
-- The local TDF in Kosovo, although ordered to mobilize,
responded slowly and did not function at all until
outside armed forces had consolidated the situation.
Hence, the Kosovo experience suggests that All-Peoples' Defense
may be effectively mobilized against an internal foe, but it may
only perform reliably if used outside its home area.
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Annex II
Foreign Arms Dependency
Although Yugoslavia's defense industries supply nearly 80
percent of its military needs, Yugoslavia must shop abroad for
some of its most sophisticated equipment. Belgrade is trying to
states goal of self-sufficiency is still illusive.
The Soviet Union supplies a substantial portion of this
weaponry, most of which goes to the Air and Air Defense Forces
(e.g., MIG-21 aircraft, helicopters, and surface-to-air
missiles). Belgrade harbors an abiding distrust of Moscow's
potential leverage through ancillary arms supply relationships,
and thus limits training in the USSR and the exchanges of
delegations of technicians to a minimum. And there is no record
of the YPA diverting its Western-acquired military technology to
the IICCD
The latest major weapons deal with Moscow illustrates the
YPA's efforts to reduce the leverage inherent in its continuing
dependency on Soviet arms. In March 1983 Belgrade contracted for
delivery of 230 T-72 tanks. Belgrade later announced that it
would also produce the T-72 under Soviet license, and that these
will be offered for sale to Third World countries after five
years of production, optimistically expected to begin in 1985.
The YPA has not been able to afford--or obtain for security
reasons--the best Western equipment. But the generals still make
some small-scale purchases to keep its Western option open,
especially in the event of emergency need.
-- Belgrade, for example, is still considering production
of a US engine and related equipment for its newest
supersonic aircraft.
The project appears to be part of complex "balance"
which placates inter-service rivalries--i.e., the new
plane for the Air Force, the T-72 tanks for the Army--
while dividing major projects between East and West.
Senior YPA procurement officers prefer to build arms on
license for several reasons. Domestic production:
reduces the short-term threat of a cutoff in foreign
arms supplies.
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permits economies of scale in production and increases
stocks for resale.
-- provides the arms industry experience with otherwise
unavailable high technology.
The licensing arrangements, however, do not much advance the
YPA's ultimate goal self-sufficiency in arms production because
it cannot keep ahead of the rapid obsolescence cycle of new
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The Political Role of the Yugoslav Military
DISTRIBUTION
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Amb. Lawrence S. Eagleburger
Hon. Mark Palmer
Mr. Hugh Montgomery
RADM Jonathan T. Howe
Hon. Richard N. Perle
LTG H. 0. Thomson, USAF
Amb. John Matlock
Ms. Paula Dobriansky
10.
NIO USSR/EE
NIO Warning
11.
D/EURA
12.
C/EURA/EE
13.
DC/EURA/EE
14.
C/EE/SE
15.
16.
DDI Registry
17.
DDO SE
18.
Sourced copy/Admin 5G44
19. 1 copy/Admin 5G44
20. CPAS/IDCD/CB 7GO7
21. CPAS/IDCD/CB 7GO7
22. CPAS/IDCD/CB 7G07
23. CPAS/IDCD/CB 7G07
24. Chrono/EURA/EE/SE
25. Production/EURA/EE/SE
s B copy 1 of 1 Vice President George Bush
DDI/EURA/EE/SEI I(04 May 84)
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Iq
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