ISRAEL'S ARAB POPULATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00314R000400040003-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

STAT
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LO;
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Israel's Arab Population
NESA 84-10317
December 1984
Copy 3 6 2
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Intelligence
Israel's Arab Population
was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations.
Central Reference, and NESA. It
with a contribution by Office of
This paper was prepared b
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis,
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, NESA,
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Confidential
NESA 84-10317
December 1984
Directorate of
Confidential
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Summary
Information available
as of 6 November 1984
was used in this report.
Israel's Arab Population I 25X1
image.
Over the next five years, Israel's Arab citizens-who comprise approxi-
mately 14 percent of Israel's population-will become increasingly disaf-
fected, in part because Israel's heavily encumbered budget will leave only
scarce funding to address Israeli Arab grievances and, also, because most
Jewish Israelis do not believe it is desirable or necessary to devote greater
attention to this issue. The Israeli Arab community, nonetheless, is
unlikely, in our judgment, to engage in prolonged antigovernment violence.
We expect that Israel will be able to deal with sporadic Arab unrest, in
part by resorting to measures that will further tarnish Israel's international
Israeli Arabs have become increasingly dissatisfied with their inferior
political, social, and economic position in Israeli society. They are not so
well educated as Jewish citizens; the family income of Arabs lags
significantly behind Jewish income, and Arabs are excluded., often system-
atically, from many social welfare benefits and career opportunities. 25X1
independent Palestinian state in the occupied territories.
The increasing frustration of Israeli Arabs is indicated by the results of the
1984 Knesset election. For the first time in Israel's history, the majority of
Israeli Arabs voted for leftist parties that support the establishment of an
formulation of Israeli Government policy.
Arabs historically have had little political influence in the Israeli Govern-
ment, despite the fact that they account for 10 percent of the electorate.
Although mainstream Israeli political parties have benefited from Arab
electoral support, once in power these parties have done little to improve
conditions for the Arab community. At the same time, leftist parties that
cater to the Arab vote have been excluded from active participation in the
be of greater concern for the government.
We doubt that Israel's national unity government will devote significantly
greater attention to solving problems affecting the Arab community than
its predecessors. Israel's troubled economy, the complaints of Israel's
Sephardi Jews, and maintaining the country's military infrastructure will
iii Confidential
MESA 84-10317
December 1984
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The existence of a large Arab population within Israel already possessing
most civil rights will spell serious trouble for US-Israeli relations should a
future Israeli government annex the West Bank. Because the Arab
population of Israel, together with that of the West Bank, will surpass the
Israeli Jewish population sometime in the next century, Israeli annexation
would be unlikely to involve extending suffrage and other civil rights to
West Bank Arabs. Israel would be hard pressed to defend such dual
policies in international forums-a dilemma most likely to generate
growing international criticism of the United States for maintaining its
special relationship with Israel.
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Summary
Half Full or Half Empty
Arab Politics
3
Recent Political Trends
7
8
Implications for the United States
10
Prominent Arab Personalities
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Figure 1
The 1950 Israeli proclamation
that Jerusalem be the national
capital is not recognized by the
United States
21 lade ,
,,;agle
Tel Aviv-Yafo.
24
-,32
(Israeli occupied- //
status to be determined)
Egypt
SINAI
1967
Cease-fire i
Line
1 ~
23~/ WEST BANK
t (Israel; occupied- 1.7
25 y tatus to be determined)
27 1
Jordan
*AMMAN
Israel's
Arab Population
(Percent of region total)
29
3 30 ,1 JrJerusele,
33
34
I
38
/
/
Natural Region
Arab
Population
Percent of
region total
t
Hula Basin
0
0
2
Hazer
2.300
184
t
3
4
Eastern Upper Galilee
Elon
2.900
5.100
104
52 6
f'
5
Nahanyya
3.500
36 8
6
Akko
1'1.000
33.7
7
Yeham
29.700
78.5
J
8
Western Lower Galilee
117.000
86.1
9
Eastern Lower Gallee
13.900
76.6
10
Kinero1
1.600
3 8
/
11
Haifa
35000
8 6
/
1 2
Nazareth Tran Mts
109.000
75.0
13.
Kokhav Plateau
4.000
65 6
14
Karerel
5.300
41 1
15. Zkhro. Vu ugov 200
2 5
16 Menashe Plateau 0
0
17 Yizrel Basin 3.100
6 6
18 Harod Valley 800
11 8
19 Bet She an Basin 0
0
20 Alexander Mt 46.400
98.1
of
21 Hadera 21600
21.8
22 Sharon 39.200
20.6
23 Sn uthern Sharon 3.800
3 4
24 Tel Aviv 10900
1 1
/
21 Petah Tigwa 8.900
4 8
26 Rishon LeZiyyon 300
3
27 Lod 13300
1 2 0
l
28. Ashdod 300
4
4
I
29 Rehovot 600
6
`
30. Judean loo
34
31 Judean Mts
32 Ashgelon
Jordan
33 Ma l akhi 100
34 Lakh,sh
3
35 Gerar 0
0
36. Besor 0
0
37 Beer Sheva 52900
28 7
38 Negev Mts 100
3
39 Northern Arava 0
0
40 Southern Arava 1000
4 7
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Israel's Arab Population
After the 1948-49 War of Independence, many Israeli
Jews feared that the 160,000 Arabs remaining within
Israel's borders would create serious security and
political problems for the country. With a few excep-
tions, however, most Israeli Arabs have been political-
ly quiescent and have not identified actively with
broader Palestinian nationalist aspirations. Neverthe-
less, Israel's Arabs have remained outside the politi-
cal, economic, and social mainstream of Israeli soci-
ety. The 550,000 Arab citizens of Israel today
comprise approximately 14 percent of the country's
population.'
Israel is committed in principle to assuring equal
benefits to all its citizens. In practice, however, the
primary domestic goal of the Israeli state during its
first 36 years has been the creation of a viable
homeland for the Jewish people. Successive govern-
ments have focused on absorbing Jewish immigrants;
addressing the problems of the Arab community has
been a secondary concern at best.
The Arabs who found themselves inside Israel's
boundaries after the War of Independence were not
typical of the Arab population living in the area
before the conflict. Four-fifths of the region's Arab
inhabitants left their homes during the fighting. Most
of the Arab elites political and religious leaders,
businessmen, educators, and intellectuals left the
country. An Israeli official at the time described those
Arabs remaining as a "headless body." All academic
sources agree that the poorest, least educated Arabs
were the ones who stayed in Israel.
After the war, Israeli Arabs were concentrated in two
regions of the country. Well over half lived in Galilee;
' The Israeli Government cites a figure of 700,000 Israeli Arabs,
but this number includes Arabs living in East Jerusalem. This
paper is limited to a discussion of Arab citizens of Israel living
within its pre-1967 borders and thus does not include Arab
residents,of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip.7
another 20 to 25 percent lived in the "Little Trian-
gle," a small section of Israel populated almost exclu-
sively by Arabs adjacent to the northwestern border
of the West Bank. Approximately 10.1100 Bedouins 25X1
lived in the Negev. Most Israeli Arabs were Sunni
Muslims, approximately 15 percent were Christians,
with Druze Arabs constituting an even smaller minor-
ity (see appendix A).
Until 1966, 85 percent of Israeli Arabs lived under
military jurisdiction. They were denied basic civil
liberties such as freedom of movement and had to
apply for permits to travel from village to village.
Military rule was lifted that year, however, because
Israeli Arabs had not posed any significant security
threat. Arabs today share most rights and obligations
of Israeli citizenship. The key exception is that Arabs,
except for the Druze, are excluded from military
service.
Academics and Israeli-based media commentators
differ on the extent to which Arabs have prospered
under Israeli rule. Those critical of the I iraeli Govern-
ment point to the significant economic disparities
between the country's Jewish and Arab families.
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Figure 3
Middle East: Labor Force Occupational
Breakdown, 1977
Figure 4
Middle East: National Income and GNP
Figures, 1983
Percent
M Agriculture Industry
Pgypt
Syria
I ray
Jordan
Lebanon
Israeli Jews
Israeli Arabs
Saudi Arabia
National income ? GNP per capita
per capita
Israeli Arabs
Israeli Jews
Iraq
Syria
Jordan
Lebanon
Egypt
I
GNP figures unavailable for Israeli Arabs and Jews separately.
Note GNP and National income in US S.
Defenders of Israeli policy toward Arabs argue that
economic and social conditions in the country's Arab
communities have improved appreciably since 1948,
and that Israeli Arabs have one of the highest stand-
ards of living in the Middle East.
Data are available to support both arguments. Ac-
cording to official Israeli Government figures, the
average household income of Arab families in urban
areas is only 70 percent of that of Jewish urban
families. Over 30 percent of Arab homes have more
than three people per room, compared to 1.3 percent
of Jewish families living in similar conditions. In 1982
only 20 Arabs belonged to university faculties in
Israel, compared to 6,000 Jews. Arabs comprise ap-
proximately 1 percent of government employees but
account for 80 percent of laborers and construction
workers.
Observers defending Israel's policy toward its Arabs
point to the success in extending education and health
benefits to Arab communities. In 1949, 45 primary
schools served 9,991 Arab students; in 1980 over
200,000 Arab children were receiving primary or
secondary education. According to government statis-
tics, by 1980, 57 percent of Israeli Arabs between the
ages of 18 and 24 had had at least nine years of
schooling, and another 34 percent had had between
five and eight years of schooling. These figures com-
pare favorably to those of Arab states in the region.
Other indices suggest a general improvement in the
standard of living for Israeli Arabs. In 1983 Muslim
Arabs suffered 3.9 deaths per 1,000, compared to 6.3
deaths per 1,000 in 1967 and 19.4 deaths per 1,000
during 1941-44. The Arab mortality rate is lower
than that for Israeli Jews, in part because of the Arab
exclusion from military service.
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Figure 5
Middle East: Unemployment, 1980
Isr,icI, Ar,ah
Is r.icII Jcw
svriai 1
I.ch:lnon
Iraq
Iq I'l
Jordan
~. '&(" CHl .oner
Ql d"I"
I .1IFil lICfi.
families were affected by land expropriation.
The programs to settle Galilee and build new roads
and other infrastructure there often required the
expropriation of Arab land. In addition, much of the
land that was abandoned by the Arabs who left Israel
during the fighting in the late I 940s eventually came
under government control, and many other Arabs who
remained in Israel could not provide adequate docu-
mentation to prove their ownership of contested land.
One Israeli Jewish academic has estimated that Arabs
lost between 40 and 60 percent of their land from
1948 through 1967, and that 56 percent of all Arab
Discrepancies in Israeli Government policies toward 25X1
Arab and Jewish communities persist. There are
significant gaps in the funding allocated to Arab
versus Jewish municipalities by the national govern-
ment. The Jewish development town of Nazerat 'I flit
(Upper Nazareth), for example, receives three times
more government revenue per capita than does the
neighboring city of Nazareth, a predominantly Arab
community. Some academics estimate that the funds 25X1
extended to Jewish localities exceed those to Arab
towns and villages by a ratio of 8:1 per capita
In addition, international Zionist organizations pro-
vide financial assistance for new settlements and
improved services in Israel. Arab communities are not
eligible for such programs---unlike Arab communities
in the West Bank, which receive funding via Jordan
from Palestinians in the diaspora. A Jewish town, for
example, can turn to Zionist organizations for funding
to build new facilities if there is no financing from the
national government. As a result, most academics and
journalists agree that the standard of social services
available in Arab towns and villages is well below that
In our view, the two interpretations of the Arab
experience under Israeli rule are not contradictory. As
Israel has prospered, Arabs have benefited from the
general improvement in the standard of living. The
Arab community, however, suffers from specific prob-
lems that have yet to be addressed by any Israeli
government. The record of previous governments
shows that the great majority of development pro-
grams have been directed at solving the problems of
the Jewish community
During the 1950s and 1960s, for example, the govern-
ment earmarked funds for the development of the
Galilee region. Most Arab communities in the area,
according to academic studies, were economically
underdeveloped, but the government programs were
directed almost exclusively at increasing the Jewish
population there to prevent an Arab demographic
majority. Development towns were created to house
new Jewish immigrants; there were no housing pro-
grams for Arab residents.
of Jewish communities.
Because most of the Arab community's elites left
Israel during the War of Independence, the first
military governors responsible for the Arab sector had
to deal with the more traditional leaders of Arab
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Figure 6
Israel: Labor Force by Ethnic Group and Education,
1961 and 1982
Years of education
I-4
-K
9-12
13-IS
16+
196 1
Israeli JeAs Israeli Arabs
Israeli Je%s Israeli Arabs
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Figure 7
Israel: Employed Persons by Economic
Branch, 1982
1gricultIirc,
l'orestn, and fishing
Indu,tn, mining,
and nwnulacturing
Utilities
( onstructinn
onunerce, hotels,
and restaurants
Transportation,
storage, and
c onnnuni cations
IinanLing and
husine,s services
I'uhlic and
COMMUn to services
villages. Israeli political parties, particularly after the
lifting of military rule, also initiated contacts with
Arab village leaders, offering them patronage jobs,
financial aid, and social services in return for their
community's vote at national elections.
Figure 8. Israel: Arab voters 25X1
bassy reporting.
The Labor Party was the most successful in attracting
Arab support, largely because Labor leaders promised
that they would address the problems of Arab corn-
munities. Although other Israeli parties paid lip-
service to Arab needs, the Labor Party, through its
association with the Iistadrut labor federation, was
better able to deliver on promises of jobs and social
services. Today, approximately 10 percent of the
Histadrut is Arab, as is one of the 16 members of the
federation's executive committee. Arabs are more
fully represented in the Histadrut than in any other
Israeli institution. Arabs assure the Labor Party of a
majority within the Histadrut, according to US Em-
Traditional leaders, because of the importance of clan
relationships among Arabs, had significant influence
in their towns and villages during the 1950s and
1960s. According to academic studies, they tended to
be conservative in their political outlook: they sought
to accommodate themselves to the Israeli system and
gain personal prestige and financial rewards for their
communities by cooperating with it.
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In recent years, however, economic and social change
in the Arab community has eroded support for tradi-
tional leaders. In a 1980 survey of Arab attitudes,
only 14 percent of the respondents considered Arab
leaders associated with the Labor Party as represent-
ing the interests of Israeli Arabs. Arabs dissatisfied
with the performance of their traditional leaders
argue that these leaders have been co-opted by Israeli
society and have betrayed Arab interests by placing
personal gain before community concerns
As Arabs became frustrated with their traditional
leaders and Israeli policies, they began casting their
votes in local and national elections for Rakah, the
Israeli Communist Party. The Rakah leadership,
which is almost wholly Jewish, has sought to portray
the party as the preeminent representative of Israeli
Arab views. Rakah supports the creation of a Pales-
tinian state in the West Bank and a greater economic
and political role for Arabs living in Israel.
Rakah has become very active in Arab local politics.
Approximately half of the Arab communities in Israel
have locally elected governments, and almost half of
the local councils are headed by Rakah supporters.
The party is particularly popular in the Galilee region.
Nazareth, Israel's largest Arab town, has had a
Rakah mayor since 1975.
Arab electoral support for Rakah grew throughout
the 1970s, and in the 1977 Knesset election the party
garnered just under half of the Arab vote. Rakah
cultivated the Arab electorate by lobbying hard
against government policies detrimental to Israeli
Arabs. The party was the principal organizer of the
first Arab Land Day demonstration on 30 March
1976. Arabs throughout Israel, but particularly in the
north, protested Jewish expropriation of Arab land in
the Galilee; some of the demonstrations turned vio-
lent, and six Arabs were killed and another 300
arrested.
Despite Rakah's political strength in the Arab com-
munity, the party does not attract the support of all
Arabs opposed to the politics of their traditional
leaders. More radical Arabs, particularly the younger
and university educated, object to the party's "estab-
lishment politics," the predominance of Jews within
the party hierarchy, and its recognition of the state of
Israel. Arabs who reject cooperation with the Israeli
Government divide their support between two organi-
zations, the Sons of the Villages and the Progressive
National Movement.
The Sons of the Villages began to emerge as a
political force in Arab communities in the early
1970s. It had its roots in an earlier radical organiza-
tion, the Land Movement, which was outlawed in
1964 because of its Palestinian nationalist views. As
its name indicates, the movement draws much of its
support from rural Arabs. The group supports self-
determination for Israeli Arabs and the eventual
creation of a secular state in Palestine. F
he Sons of the Villages have avoided
government censure by, for the most part, not engag-
ing in violence. The movement's inept leadership has
reduced its effectiveness and thus contributed to its
escaping government censure.
The Progressive National Movement (PNM) also
emerged in the 1970s and espouses views similar to
those of the Sons of the Villages. The Progressive
National Movement operates almost exclusively
among Arab students at Israeli universities. It criti-
cizes the Sons of the Villages for being "all talk but
no action." The Prime Minister's Arab affairs adviser
has characterized the PNM as more radical than the
Sons of the Villages. In the late 1970s, according to
the Arab affairs adviser, seven PNM members, on
their own initiative, made their way to Iraq, where
they received terrorist training. Upon their return to
Israel, they carried out two acts of violence before
being caught. Other members have been expelled
from Israeli universities and subjected to house arrest
for spreading subversive propaganda.
Despite the considerable attention that the PNM and
the Sons of the Villages receive from the Israeli press,
the US Embassy estimated in 1983 that the member-
ship of both organizations was quite small. Surveys of
Israeli Arab attitudes do not normally include these
two groups in their polling questions.
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One imprecise way of measuring the degree of com-
munity support for the Sons of the Villages and the
Progressive National Movement is by gauging Arab
views concerning the PLO and the advisability of
illegal protest against Israeli policies. According to a
1980 survey of Arab attitudes, 48 percent believed
that Palestinian personalities or organizations abroad
(read PLO leaders and factions) represented the inter-
ests of Israeli Arabs. The same survey found that 18.4
percent of Israeli Arabs favored the use of force to
effect changes in government policies. Another 17.6
percent supported illegal demonstrations. These re-
sults suggest that a significant minority of Israeli
Arabs support the PNM and the Sons of the Villages.
Although almost half of Israeli Arabs apparently
support the PLO, there is little evidence to suggest
that the PLO has had success in organizing secretly
within Israel. Israel's efficient internal security ser-
vice has only rarely discovered attempts to form PLO
cells. The PLO can maintain informal contacts with
Israeli Arabs, however, by meeting with them when
they travel abroad. The US Embassy believes that the
Progressive National Movement and the Sons of the
Villages may receive funds from the PLO.
Islamic fundamentalism is another political force
among Israeli Arabs, but its support is difficult to
quantify. The US Embassy reports that as of 1983 the
fundamentalist movement among Israeli Arabs was
still a minor phenomenon. Government policies proba-
bly will continue to make it difficult for Islamic
fundamentalism to become an organizing force in
Israeli Arab politicsF__1
Muslim religious functionaries and institutions, in-
cluding mosques, depend on the Israeli Government
for much of their income; civil servants recommend
who will receive grants from Waqf funds, which are
managed by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The
National Religious Party usually has controlled the
religious portfolio in most coalition governments, arid,
because of its power to dispense benefits, this party
has received 3 to 4 percent of the Arab vote in the last
two national elections. Most Arab leaders complain
that the Ministry of Religious Affairs is not respon-
sive to Muslim needs; there is, for exarriple, no higher
school in Israel for training Muslim clerics.
Despite the obstacles faced by Muslim leaders, Islam-
ic fundamentalist groups are active among Arabs,
particularly in the religiously conservative villages in
the Little Triangle. The Islamic fundamentalists gen-
erally object to all contacts with Israeli Jews, which
tends further to reduce their influence, given the
government's control of funds for Arab communities.
Rakah's electoral support from Israeli Arabs has
declined in the last two national elections from its
high of almost 50 percent in 1977. In 1981 Rakah's
electoral list, running as the Democratic Front for
Peace and Equality, received 37 percent of the Arab
vote, and this year its proportion of the vote declined
to 34 percent.
Several factors account for the decline in Rakah's
fortunes. In the 1981 election many Arabs who
traditionally had cast a protest vote for Rakah voted
for the Labor Party in hope of preventing a second
Likud victory. In addition, the more radical Arab
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Figure 10
Israel: Arab Voting Trends in National
Elections, 1969-84
I.ahur tnd Arah
i sts
I'rogres~ivc I it
for Pcacc
groups called for a boycott of the election, and 32
percent of the eligible Arab voters abstained, com-
pared to 25 percent in the 1977 election
In the 1984 election, however, the percentage of
Arabs voting rose to 77 percent, but Rakah did not
attract significant support among the new voters.
Most apparently voted for the Progressive List for
Peace, a new Arab-Jewish party that appeals to
disaffected Arabs looking for a non-Communist alter-
native to Rakah. The PLP won almost 18 percent of
the Arab vote, enough for two Knesset seats. F__~
Rakah and the PLP together have six seats in the new
Knesset, but their political influence is not commensu-
rate with their numbers. Unlike other smaller parties,
Rakah and the PLP were not courted as potential
coalition partners. The two parties' support for a
Palestinian state in the occupied territories has effec-
tively eliminated them from consideration.
Some Arab moderates publicly argue that their com-
munity wastes its vote by supporting Rakah and the
PLP. They believe that their interests would best be
served by forming an independent Arab party that
avoided Palestinian nationalist issues. Such a party
would instead concentrate on Arab social and eco-
nomic needs and seek to ally itself with mainstream
Israeli parties.
An independent Arab party theoretically could con-
trol up to 12 seats in the Knesset; even if only 30
percent of the Arab electorate voted for an independ-
ent party, it would receive four or five Knesset seats
and become a potentially important coalition partner.
nationalist causes.
Nevertheless, efforts to form an independent Arab list
have faltered. The Labor Alignment has opposed such
a move, and Rakah has fought it as well. To this end,
both parties have dispensed patronage benefits to
discourage Arab politicians from joining an independ-
ent party. Arab local leaders also have proved unwill-
ing to organize a party divorced from Palestinian
Previous Israeli governments have prevented the cre-
ation of Arab national movements by using broad
discretionary security powers dating from the British
mandate period. In 1980, for example, Prime Minister
Begin prevented the establishment of a Congress of
Arab Masses, envisaged as a representative body for
all Arabs. Begin accused the nascent organization of
supporting separatism and acting as a front for the
PLO.
Unless local Arab leaders establish an independent
party that can use its position as a coalition partner to
bargain for specific reforms in government policies,
we do not expect any significant redress of Arab
social, economic, and political grievances. There is
little support within the Israeli Jewish population for
addressing Arab concerns. According to a poll taken
earlier this year, 54 percent of Israel's Jewish popula-
tion would prefer that the country have no Arab
residents. Other polls indicate that most Jews believe
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they should be given preference over Arabs in the
distribution of jobs and welfare benefits. Over two-
thirds believe the government already is doing enough
or too much for its Arab citizens.
We do not believe that Israel's national unity govern-
ment will be able to improve Arab conditions signifi-
cantly. The government's need to deal first with
Israel's troubled economy almost certainly will under-
cut its ability to devote increased resources to the
Arab community. Addressing the economic and social
grievances of Israel's Sephardi Jews and maintaining
the country's large military infrastructure will contin-
ue to be a higher priority.
In addition, the structure of Israeli society favors Jews
over Arabs; this will be difficult, if not politically
impossible, for any Israeli government to change.
Institutional factors, such as the prohibition against
Arabs working in defense-related industries-which
account for a growing percentage of Israeli jobs-will
limit Arab access to improved salaries and benefits.
Similarly, many government social welfare programs
systematically exclude Arabs. According to a recent
law, for example, large families receive subsidies on
the condition that males in the family have served in
the Army, a provision that automatically excludes
Arabs, except the Druze. College students receive
funds to defray tuition based on their Sephardi back-
ground, residence in development towns, or status as a
military veteran-criteria that exclude those of Arab
origin. Despite a Defense Ministry announcement
earlier this year that it would begin to accept Arab
recruits on an experimental basis, we doubt that any
Israeli government could countenance, for security
reasons, a large influx of Arabs into the military.
Most Arabs, because of their political views, are
unlikely to volunteer for military service, thus remain-
ing unable to qualify for many social welfare pro-
grams.
Despite the poor prospects for change in the govern-
ment's approach to the Arab community, we do not
believe that growing Arab discontent will pose near-
term security problems for Israel. Polling data indi-
cate that two-thirds of Israeli Arabs still believe their
situation can be improved by "acceptable democratic
means." Over half of Israeli Arabs, according to a
1980 survey, were not prepared to consider moving to
a Palestinian state if one were established alongside
Israel. 25X1
To date, there has been little politically motivated
Arab violence. Since the 1960s there have been two
periods of increased unrest in the community. After
the Israeli occupation of the West Bank in 1967 and
the emergence of the PLO, Israeli Arabs began to
sympathize more with Palestinian nationalist aspira-
tions. Between 1967 and 1973, 320 Israeli Arabs were
arrested for joining terrorist organizations; some car-
ried out attacks before their capture. The level of 25X1
violence dropped off in the mid-1970s, however, and
in 1978, for example, no Israeli Arab was arrested for
pro-PLO activity, according to the t ;S Embassy.F_-]
The second spurt of political violence occurred be-
tween 1979 and 1982. During that period, the Israeli
security forces announced the breakup of several
terrorist cells. Most of these cells were associated with
the PLO, but some were connected to indigenous
Israeli Arab groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood.
The increase in politically motivated violence led some
observers to predict a long-term escalation of Arab
unrest. The last two years, however, have been rela-
tively quiet.
The 1976 Land Day demonstrations are the major
exception to this pattern, but many observers attribute
the violence then to unsophisticated and excessive
Israeli police tactics. Most Land Day observances
since 1976 have been relatively peaceful. During Land
Day demonstrations earlier this year, few arrests were
made, and what little violence occurred was largely
limited to fistfights between Rakah supporters and
members of more radical Arab groups. The slogan 25X1
this year reflects the Arabs' low-key approach to the
event: "Against land expropriation, for Jewish-Arab
friendship." The US Embassy reports that the Israeli
police were conspicuous by their absence
The lack of effective Arab leadership in Israel will
continue to militate against the emergence of sus-
tained, violent protest in the Arab community. Israeli
authorities are confident that they have the more
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radical groups, such as the Progressive National
Movement and the Sons of the Villages, under con-
trol. Tel Aviv presumably welcomes diversity in Arab
political organizations because this works against
Arab unity. The government would move quickly to
disband radical groups, however, should they become
more effective in mobilizing the Arab population.F_
Rakah's appeal and effectiveness are also limited. The
party's senior leadership is predominantly Jewish, and
Communism as an ideology has only limited appeal to
Israeli Arabs. The Israeli Government apparently
understands Rakah's limitations and thus sees little
reason to ban Rakah even though the party supports
the creation of a West Bank Palestinian state.
Over the long term, the Israeli Government may find
it more difficult to control the Arab population.
Demographic factors will add to the size of the Arab
problem. The Israeli Arab population is very young;
the mean age of Arabs in Israel is 21, compared to 30
for Jews. Some 75 percent of Israeli Arabs are under
the age of 35, and the Arab annual rate of natural
increase is 38 per 1,000 compared to 18 per 1,000
among Jews.
University-educated Arabs are increasingly frustrat-
ed, both by their impotent political position and by
their inability to obtain good jobs. Polls consistently
indicate that younger, better educated Arabs are less
sanguine about the prospects for peaceful change.
Although Arab young people have not translated their
discontent into political violence, their disaffection
has apparently resulted in increased delinquency.
According to Israeli Government figures, 48 percent
of juvenile crimes in Israel are committed by Arabs;
10 years ago their share was negligible. It is still too
early to tell, however, whether the more radical views
of Arab youth endure as they reach adulthood
We believe that the significant differences in the
views of Israeli Arabs and Jews will increasingly
alienate the Arab community from the Israeli Gov-
ernment and society generally. Even though most
Israeli Arabs believe change is possible within the
system, most Israeli Jews believe change is neither
necessary nor desirable. Given our judgment that
little change is forthcoming and that demographic
trends favor the Arabs, the Israeli Government proba-
bly will face increasing social unrest from the Arab
community over the long term.
The recent election of the ultrarightist Meir Kahane
to the Knesset will also fuel Jewish-Arab tensions.
Kahane advocates the expulsion of Arabs from Israel,
and his inflammatory statements and actions have
already resulted in violent protests in Arab communi-
ties. A dramatic event, such as an attack on the Dome
of the Rock in Jerusalem, could serve as a catalyst for
Israeli Arab protest and prompt spontaneous violence
even in the absence of popular leadership.
Security problems probably will remain limited to
areas such as the Little Triangle and the Galilee,
where Arabs now are a majority of the population. To
contain Arab protests and violence, however, Israel
probably will have to resort occasionally to harsh
security measures that will further tarnish Israel's
international image
Israel's success so far in handling its indigenous Arab
population has implications for the government's poli-
cies in the occupied territories-potentially the most
serious point of contention in US-Israeli relations. We
expect that the lessons learned in the Galilee and
Little Triangle will be applied to the West Bank and
Gaza Strip. Rural and traditional leaders in the
occupied territories have been courted and supported
at the expense of more radical, educated urban elites.
In addition, many Israelis, particularly members of
Likud, are not impressed by predictions that Israel
will have significant political and security problems
governing the over 1 million Arabs in the occupied
territories, given the relative ease with which Israel
has handled its own Arab citizenry.
The existence of a sizable Arab population within
Israel that already has most civil rights will create
problems for any Israeli government should it decide
to annex most or all of the West Bank. The Arab
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population of Israel, together with that of the West
Bank, will outnumber the Israeli Jewish population
sometime in the next century. For this reason, Israeli
annexation of the West Bank, in our view, would not
involve the extension of many civil rights, such as
suffrage, to the Arab residents of the territory. Israel
would be hard pressed to defend such dual policies
toward its Arab residents. Under such circumstances,
the United States will come under increasing criticism
for maintaining close relations with Israel.
Annexation of the West Bank would, in particular,
further erode Israel's credibility with key West Euro-
pean and Latin American governments. This in turn
would complicate future US efforts to rally support
for Israel in the United Nations and at other interna-
tional gatherings. Israeli annexation of the West Bank
could also lead to West European sanctions-similar
to or worse than those imposed after Israel's invasion
of Lebanon in 1982-that might worsen Israel's
domestic economic difficulties.
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Appendix A
The Druze-A Special Case
The Israeli Druze have long enjoyed the most amica-
ble relations of any minority group in the Jewish state.
Since before the formation of Israel, the Druze have
been sympathetic toward the aspirations of the Jewish
settlers. Unlike Muslim Arabs, the Druze generally
have attempted to assimilate into Israeli society. The
Israeli invasion of Lebanon, however, generated
strains between Druze leaders and the government,
and the younger generation of Druze may not be so
well disposed as their elders toward the Jews.
history, the Druze have sought, as long as the viability
of their community was not at stake, to conform to the
outward customs and practices of the majority com-
munity. According to a Druze proverb, "a man's shirt
does not change the color of his skin."
for maintaining friendly ties.
In contrast to the Druze's often strained relations with
other Muslim sects, relations between the Druze and
Jewish communities have been amicable. According
to one of the few in-depth studies of the religion, the 25X1
Druze believe that the Jewish religion is to be con-
demned less than Islam or Christianity. As minority
communities in a majority Muslim region, the Jews
and Druze traditionally also shared practical reasons
The esoteric characteristics of Druze culture and
religion account, in large part, for their ability to
reconcile themselves to Jewish rule and even prosper
under it. The Druze religion-which originated as an
offshoot of Shia Islam in 1 1 th-century Egypt-main-
tains a mystical theology that is understood complete-
ly by only a small percentage of its adherents. It
differs significantly from the Sunni and Shia sects;
most of the obligations of Muslims, for example, are
not binding on the Druze
Although the Druze religion was founded in Egypt, it
never took root there. Instead a Druze community
developed in the Mount Lebanon area, founded by a
proselytizer for the new sect, Muhammad bin Ismail
al-Darazi, whose name eventually was attached to the
religion. As a minority sect with a penchant for
secrecy, the Druze had their share of problems with
the dominant Muslim Arab population of the region.
To protect themselves in the often hostile environ-
ment, the Druze became both expert and feared
fighters and astute and crafty diplomats.
The tradition of dissembling to protect the group's
interests was incorporated at a very early stage as the
principle of "taqiya." Taqiya permits the individual
Druze to pretend to follow another religion without
actually abandoning his sect; the Druze also applied
the principle of "pretending to be what you are not"
to their political and economic dealings. Throughout
By the time large-scale Jewish migration to Palestine
began in the early I 900s, the Druze population in the
Middle East was concentrated in three regions the
Mount Lebanon area, Syria, and the Galilee. During
the British mandate over Palestine, many Druze living 25X1
in Galilee formed personal and economic links with
members of the growing Jewish community. Arab
nationalists opposed to the Jewish presence in Pales-
tine attempted to recruit Druze to their cause in the
1930s, but their efforts met with little success. Indeed,
some Druze began assisting Jews resisting British
rule. In 1947 Druze sympathizers hid a wanted
Jewish resistance fighter-who later became mayor of'
Haifa-from British security forces
During the Arab-Israeli war of 1948. Druze living in
Syria and the Mount Lebanon area formed a battal- 25X1
ion to fight against the Israelis. When this battalion
arrived in Galilee, it encountered a Druze population
that had no desire to join the fight against the Israelis
and urged its Druze brethren to abandon the Arab
cause. The lack of enthusiasm among the Galilee
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Druze, along with some early Israeli military success-
es, convinced the Lebanese and Syrian Druze to
dissolve the battalion. Many of the Druze returned to
their homes, but some chose to fight alongside the
Israelis. These Druze were soon joined by their coreli-
gionists from Galilee, whose leaders had decided that
the community's best interests lay in allying with the
apparent winning side. By July 1948 a Druze unit had
been officially integrated into the Israel Defense
Forces.
Largely because of their record of loyalty, the nascent
Israeli Government dealt more favorably with the
Druze than it did with the other Arab minorities. At
the same time, Druze leaders, unlike Muslim and
Christian Arab leaders, sought to play a full role in
Israeli society. In the early 1950s the Druze asked the
Israeli Government to make Druze males eligible for
the draft, and since 1956 Druze, unlike other Arabs,
have been subject to conscription. In 1957 the Israeli
Government recognized the Druze as an autonomous
community distinct from the other Arab communities
and allowed the Druze to establish their own judiciary
and courts. On their identity cards, Druze are classi-
fied as "Druze," not Arab.
The Druze, however, still did not have the full benefits
of Israeli citizenship. Druze military veterans during
the 1970s began to demand "equal rights for equal
obligations." In 1977 the Likud government made
several changes to remedy the imbalance. Jurisdiction
over Druze villages was taken out of the Arab depart-
ments of the various ministries and incorporated into
the main branches. All ranks of the Israeli civil
service were opened to the Druze, and Druze soldiers
were allowed to serve in almost every branch of the
Israeli military, rather than only in units reserved for
non-Jewish soldiers. It is now not uncommon for
Druze officers to command Jewish units. The govern-
ment also began to redress economic imbalances.
Unlike the situation that existed until the 1970s, all
Druze villages today are connected to the national
electric grid.
and about 8 percent of Israel's non-Jewish population.
The Druze birth rate of 37.5 per 1,000 parallels that
of the Sunni Muslim population and is over twice that
of the Jewish community.
The majority of Druze workers are employed either in
agriculture or in defense-related services. Arable land
is scarce in most villages, and, for many young Druze,
the military or border police offer attractive career
choices. For its part, the Israeli Government is eager
to recruit Druze policemen and career soldiers. Druze
fighters have a reputation for courage on the battle-
field; some academic observers attribute this trait to
the Druze belief in transmigration of the soul. Per-
haps more important, Druze, as loyal Arabic speak-
ers, have proved useful to the Israeli Government in
securing and administering the West Bank and south-
ern Lebanon.
According to Druze spokesmen quoted in the Israeli
press, as many as 80 percent of the males in some
Druze villages are employed in defense-related jobs.
Since the invasion of southern Lebanon in June 1982,
over 30 Druze soldiers have been killed in action, a
figure that represents some 5 percent of Israeli fatali-
ties there. Almost one-fifth of the 4,500-man Israeli
Border Police is Druze. The Border Police shares
responsibility with the Israel Defense Forces for secu-
rity in the West Bank, and, in troublesome cities such
as Nablus, Druze members of the Border Police
outnumber Jews. The military government for the
occupied territories has appointed Druze officers to
replace three ousted mayors in the West Bank.
In addition to Druze citizens of Israel, another 12,000
Druze live in the Golan Heights. Unlike other Syrian
inhabitants of the region, Druze residents did not
leave after the Israelis captured the Golan during the
1967 war. Until 1981 relations between the Golani
Druze and the Israeli Government generally were
good. Economic conditions for the Druze residents of
the area steadily improved, and the military govern-
ment allowed the Druze to take over some of the
agricultural land vacated by departing Syrians.
There are about 45,000 Israeli Druze, most of whom
live in 18 villages in the Galilee region. The Druze
comprise roughly 1 percent of the state's population
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In December 1981, however, the Likud government
won passage of a Knesset bill extending Israeli juris-
diction and administration to the Golan Heights,
precipitating a six-month confrontation between the
Druze and the government over the issue of Israeli
identity cards. According to US Embassy reporting,
most Golani Druze opposed the new requirements to
have identity cards. The Druze initiated a six-month
commercial strike to protest the imposition of Israeli
law, and the government responded by imposing a
blockade of the area
Israeli Druze soon petitioned the government on
behalf of their coreligionists in the Golan. Prime
Minister Begin promised Israeli Druze leaders that
the government would attempt to lower tensions, and
Golani Druze were assured that acceptance of an
Israeli identity card did not imply acceptance of
Israeli citizenship. By the end of 1982 the Israeli press
reported that 90 percent of Golani Druze had ac-
quired identity cards; only 200 Druze have also
agreed to accept Israeli citizenship.
During the confrontation between the Israeli Govern-
ment and the Golani Druze, the government and the
Israeli Druze community sought to minimize strains
in their relationship. Nevertheless, some of the gov-
ernment's actions indicate that it was uncertain
whether the loyalty of Israeli Druze might be affect-
ed; for example, regular Army units were sent to
police the Golan Druze villages during the crisis
because of the preponderance of Israeli Druze in the
Border Police.
The lengthy Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon
and Israeli desires to maintain good relations with
both the Lebanese Druze and Christian communities
also have created tensions between the government
and the Israeli Druze. Most Israeli Druze are sympa-
thetic to the demands of their coreligionists in the
Shuf and are uneasy about Israel's close ties to the
Christian Phalange Party and Lebanese Forces mili-
tia.
When serious factional fighting erupted in Lebanon in
September 1983, many Israeli Druze leaders ex-
pressed public support for the Lebanese Druze. The
Israeli press carried accounts of Druze vandalism
against Christian Arab churches in Galilee. Israeli
newspapers reported that thousands of Druze attend-
ed rallies in Galilee to celebrate the x ictories of their
Lebanese brethren. Several Israeli Druze soldiers
recently were accused of stealing ammunition and
giving it to Lebanese Druze militia members
The Israeli Government has taken pains on several
occasions to reassure Israeli Dru7e leaders of its
intentions toward Lebanese Druze. The national unity
government probably will try to temper its support for
the Lebanese Christians in part because of the impor-
tance of Druze participation in the Israeli military
and police forces
Despite the long tradition of harmonious Jewish-
Druze relations, young Israeli Druze are beginning: to
sympathize more with the complaints of Israeli Arabs.
Electoral results provide evidence of this trend. In the
1973 elections, only 7 percent of the Druze vote went
to Rakah. Since the early I 970s, young Druze have
been voting in greater numbers for R,iKah. Druze
under 30 account for about 70 percent of the Druze
population
This dissatisfaction on the part of young Druze
apparently is also affecting their willingness to serve
in the military. The US Embassy reports that there is
a growing trend among young Druze to register their
nationality as Arab to avoid military conscription.
The number of Druze who have claimed religious
deferments has also risen from 19 for 111 of 1982 to 71
as of November 1983---a trend probably influenced
by Druze reaction to the Israeli invasicn and occupa-
tion of southern Lebanon.
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Appendix B
Zaidan Atashi ... 44 ... member of Shinui Party ... member of Knesset
since 1977... reform minded on most political issues ... pro-Zionist ...
Druze ... native of `Isfiya, a village near Haifa ... apparently has strong
power base among Arabs in the Galilee region ... a reporter and senior
editor of Israeli television Arab-language programs during the late 1960s
... head of the information section at the Israeli Consulate General in New
York (1972-76) ... affiliated with the Labor Party during much of that pe-
Abd al-Wahab Darousha ... 41 ... member of the Labor Party ... serving
first term in the Knesset ... local school inspector ... active in educational
matters ... native of a small Arab village ... founded a local school and
operated it for nine years.
Muhammad Mi'ari . . . 45 ... leader of the Progressive List for Peace ...
serving first term in the Knesset ... native of Sakhnin, a small Arab village
near `Akko ... a lawyer by profession ... has been active in the past in the
Land Movement, banned in 1964.
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Aural Nasr al-Din ... 56 ... Druze ... Herut Party member since 1970
... member of the Knesset since 1977... has strongly encouraged
industrial and commercial firms to locate near Druze villages ... uncon-
firmed Israeli press accounts indicate he may be unpopular within his own
community ... native of Daliyat el Karmil ... served in the Israel Defense
Forces and saw action in the 1956 and 1967 Arab-Israeli wars.
Phalange battling his coreligionists.
Amin Tarif ... 86 ... spiritual leader of Israel's Druze community since
the early 1950s ... loyal to Israel, but openly critical of government
policies seen as threatening Druze interests ... disapproved of Israel's 1982
invasion of Lebanon ... objected to support for the Lebanese Christian
Tawfiq Toubi ... 62 ... longtime Communist activist and current deputy
secretary general of Rakah ... has served in every Knesset ... frequent
critic of the government's domestic and foreign policies ... supports the
creation of Palestinian state in the West Bank ... in 1980 met with PLO
Chairman Yasir Arafat in Bulgaria-first public meeting between an
Israeli politician and Arafat ... is pro-Soviet on global issues ... has
visited the USSR and most of the East European states ... awarded the
"Order of the Friendship of Peoples" medal by the USSR Supreme Soviet
in 1982 ... a native of Haifa and a journalist by training.
Muhammad Wattad ... 47 ... longtime Mapam Party activist, prominent
journalist, and television commentator ... has served since 1981 in Knesset
... member of Mapam's Executive Council ... throughout his career has
worked within established channels to improve the political and social lot of
Israel's Arabs ... native of the village of Jatt near Nablus.
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Tawfiq Zavvad ... about 60 years old ... devout Marxist ind leading
member of Rakah since the early 1960s ... member of Kncsset since 1974
and mayor of Nazareth ... Palestinian nationalist, pro-Sosiet, and a critic
of the government's West Bank policies ... advocates Israel's right to exist
within its 1967 boundaries but supports the creation of an independent
Palestinian state ... considers the PLO the sole legitimate representative
of the Palestinians ... survived three assassination attempts.
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Erratum Notice to recipients of Research Paper: Israel's Arab Population, ;N ESA
362
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Figure 10
Israel: Arab Voting Trends in National
Elections, 1969-84
0 1969 1973 1977
Labor and Arab
? I ish
Progros.sive List
Of Peace
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Confidential
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