WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT CHINA'S LEADERSHIP IN THE WAKE OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500020001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 9, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
PF COPY
RETU~:e4* T IE-61
China's Leadership in the Wake of the Cultural Revolution
Secret
N2 674
9 January 1970
No. 0352/70A
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CHINA'S LEADERSHIP IN THE WAKE OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION
The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which erupted in the spring of 1966,
has had a profound impact on the shape and effectiveness of the leadership in Peking.
The image of unanimity that the Chinese Communist leadership projected for its first 16
years of rule was rent during the Cultural Revolution, revealing a divided elite wracked
by personal rivalries and conflicts over power and policy. During the past three years,
the leadership has gone through a violent convulsion, and the fissures opened and
widened by the Cultural Revolution make it unlikely that the regime will be able to
build a fully cohesive top command for some time to come. In the course of the
struggle, many shif,s have taken place at the pinnacle of power, and the new ruling
politburo produced by the ninth party congress in April 1969 is an uneasy amalgam of
competing interest groups, each striving for power-or survival-at the expense of the
others. Although the politburo may present a facade of unity as long as the venerable
Mao Tse-tung presides over it, its current divisions will be an element of potential
instability for the short term and especially during the post-Mao transition period.
CHANGING THE GUARD IN PEKING
The Cultural Revolution has profoundly
altered the shape and perhaps the function of
Communist China's ruling body, the politburo of
the Communist Party. The new body is a peculiar
creation compared with the previous one. Prior to
the Cultural Revolution, the politburo consisted
of party chairman Mao Tse-tung and a number of
top regime officials, each of whom had a special
constituency that he monitored on behalf of the
party. Thus, one man's primary duty was agricul-
ture; one concerned himself with economic plan-
ning; one with foreign affairs; another with party
business; yet another with military matters, and
so forth. The new politburo does not appear to be
constructed along such lines. There is no sharp
breakdown of responsibilities. No one, for exam-
ple, is clearly assigned to oversee the vital agricul-
ture sector of the economy. Instead, the current
politburo seems to be a fragile balance of rival
groupings that have emerged out of the leadership
struggle of the past three years.
The various terms employed to describe the
leadership groupings-"radicals" versus "conserva-
tives," "extremists" versus "moderates," "ideo-
logues" versus "pragmatists"-are inadequate to
describe the complexities of the situation. Never-
theless, they do serve to highlight the fact that
most, if not all, of the present politburo members
possess political identities that place them to one
side or the other in the political spectrum of the
elite. Thus, those who have clearly identified
themselves with the excesses of the Cultural
Revolution will be referred to in this paper as
"radicals," and those who appear to have been
either active in restraining the excesses or who
have been the victims of personal denunciation by
"radical" elements will be labeled "moderates" or
"conservatives."
The radical "Maoist" group holds the pre-
eminent positions in the new politburo. It com-
prises the chairman himself and his heir-designate
Lin Piao; their wives; Mao's speech writer Ch'en
Po-ta; his hatchet man and security specialist
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K'ang Sheng; a long-time leftist propaganda spe-
cialist, Yao Wen-yuan; and Chang Ch'un-ch'iao,
the political boss of Shanghai. In addition, Mao's
bodyguard, Wang Tung-hying, is one of the four
alternate members of the politburo. All of these
leaders-with the exception of Mao, Lin, and
Madame Lin-belonged to the so-called central
"Cultural Revolution Group," an inner elite fos-
tered by Mao and charged with purging the Chi-
nese Communist Party and pushing his "revolu-
tionary" ideas. Since late 1965 these people have
risen rapidly on the crest of political turmoil, and
they owe their present positions entirely to the
fact that they proved their personal loyalty to
Mao even before the Cultural Revolution began.
They constitute little more than the old man's
personal entourage. Of this group only Lin Piao,
who is minister of defense, and K'ang Sheng, who
is in charge of the political security apparatus,
appear to perform what might be considered
normal politburo functions. The rest-in par-
ticular Madame Mao-are very active in the field
of cultural affairs which was, of course, of major
political significance in the Cultural Revolution.
At present, however, there is little evidence as to
what specific tasks of leadership they may per-
form other than trying to firm up their control
over a restructured Communist Party.
Mao's group also dominates the standing
committee of the politburo, normally the highest
policy-making body in China. It is now composed
of Mao and Lin, Chou En-lai, Ch'en Po-ta, and
K'ang Sheng. The only one of this group not
closely identified with the radical excesses of the
Cultural Revolution is Chou. Mao, however, ap-
pears to trust Chou's personal loyalty completely.
Because the Rill politburo does not appear to
function norms Ily, it is also possible that the
standing committee may not be playing its cus-
tomary role. Some of the programs pursued since
the ninth party congress are those pushed by
Chou En-lai and the more moderate members of
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the politburo, and others bear the imprint of the
radicals, suggesting that the standing committee is
having great difficulty in settling on one set of
coherent policies, let alone in getting them carried
out.
The new politburo is also remarkable for its
unusually large military representation. Along
with Defense Minister Lin Piao, the politburo
now contains the chief of staff of the People's
Liberation Army, the political commissar of the
Navy, the Air Force chief, the director of the
General Rear Services Department, and two re-
gional military commanders. In addition, the
commander of a field army is an alternate mem-
ber. It is doubtful that these men constitute a
unified political faction. On the contrary, because
the military has tended to split along the same
radical-conservative lines that have ruptured party
and goverment, the military figures on the
politburo probably reflect divergent views and
different constituencies. Nevertheless, several of
these military leaders shared one common expe-
rience-heavy attacks from the Red Guards-
which may have caused them to favor more
moderate lines.
Another, smaller group on the politburo
consists of Chou En-lai, Li Hsien-nien, and Hsieh
F.u-chih, the only remnants of what used to be a
substantial representation of the government
bureaucracy. Chou and Li, and perhaps Hsieh,
may share a considerable coincidence of views
with the moderate members of the military
group. This element may also pick up at least two
more supporters from the group of four old-
timers who are still on the politburo. Chu Te and
Tung Pi-wu are octogenarians, and Liu Po-ch'eng
is almost eighty and enfeebled. The fourth mem-
ber of thi:< group is Marshal Yeh Chien-ying, who
still serves on the powerful Military Affairs Com-
mittee. Chu Te and Yeh-both of whom were
heavily attacked in the Cultural Revolution-may
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MAO TSE-TUNG AND HIS ENTOURAGE
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well side with the moderates. Liu is a cipher
because of his age and general debility, and Tung
may well follow whatever Mao dictates.
There are also four alternate members of the
politburo. Le Te-sheng has already been men-
tioned as one of the military representatives and
Wang Tung-hying as one of Mao's entourage. Chi
Teng-k'uei is the vice chairman of the Honan
Province Revolutionary Committee. In addition
to the fact that Chi is said to be a "personal
friend" of Mao, he seems to be on the politburo
as a symbol of those provincial political leaders
who were actively aligned with the radicals during
the Cultural Revolution. Li Hsueh-feng, on the
other hand, lost his post as head of the North
China Party Bureau in late 1966 and was sub-
sequently reinstated in the lesser post of chairman
of the Hopeh Province Revolutionary Committee.
He may be on the politburo as a symbol of the
former party officials who have been rehabilitated
by the "thought of Mao Tse-tung."
If it is correct to view the new politburc as
an uneasy body of competing special-interest
groups, questions are raised about the attitudes of
the members, the interests each represents and
the degree to which the politburo as a whole
reflects Mao's personal power. Two of Mao's pur-
poses in launching the Cultural Revolution were
to remove certain party leaders he believed had
put him on the shelf after the failure of the Great
Leap Forward in 1958-1959 and to regain per-
sonal mastery of the command and control ap-
paratus of the party. He is reported in Red Guard
accounts to have complained that his former
party lieutenants, Liu Shao-ch' and Teng Hsiao-
p'ing, had treated him 'like a dead parent at a
funeral," i.e., revered but no longer to be con-
sulted or obeyed. No doubt Mao intended to
replace Liu, Teng, and the others who fell during
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the Cultural Revolution with people completely
loyal to him and responsive to his directions. The
politburo that emered from the ninth party con-
gress, however, does not appear to fit that mold.
The disparate elements that constitute the polit-
buro and the apparent difficulty the leadership is
having in developing and implementing new na-
tional policies suggest that Mao still has not re-
gathered all the reins of power into his own
hands.
Any assessment of Mao's political strength,
however, is hampered by the lack of good infor-
mation on the manner in which he follows
through in shaping and implementing policies that
are outlined in the brief, Delphic "instructions"
that he periodically issues. During the Cultural
Revolution, Mao's "instructions" were often used
by opposing political forces to their own advan-
tage. Such developments add to the difficulty of
determining when and on what side Mao commits
himself on issues under debate by th' leadership.
The evidence that is available suggests that despite
his advocacy of extreme policies, Mao has prob-
ably managed better than his ,Wore radical lieuten-
ants to keep his lines open tr., those figures in the
army and in the government establishment who
have often attempted to limit the scope of many
of his pet projects.
Because of his advanced age, frequent
lengthy absences from public view, and the lead-
ership's practice of issuing quite contradictory
guidelines in Mao's name, it has often appeared
that his instructions have been manipulated by
rival forces in the elite. Thus, radical elements
have probably pushed some of the excesses of the
Cultural Revolution and carried on personal
vendettas or, grounds that they were acting in
accordance with Mao's will, while conservative
forces have employed the same rationale to coun-
ter policies and personalities to which they were
opposed. This suggests that Mao has not been able
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to control all major events in the Cultural Revolu-
tion and that there has been both considerable
distortion and nonobedience of his instructions as
they have filtered from his inner circle, through
the top leadership ranks, and down to the local
levels.
Mao, nevertheless, is not merely a figurehead
manipulated by some eminence grise behind the
throne. He appears to remain a consummate
politician who, if unable to have his way on all
matters, is still.able to retain considerable leverage
by playing off opposing groups within the elite
against one another. He may, for example, rec-
ognize more readily than some of his radical col-
leagues-who apparently have been supporting
troublesome factionalists in many localities-that
Peking needs to restore national discipline and
establish a greater degree of control over the
provincial situation before many major policy
initiatives can be undertaken. Hence, he has
responded affirmatively to the urging of order-
oriented local military men who have asked
Peking for a freer hand to suppress dissidents in
recent months. At the same time, Mao may well
have doubts about the responsiveness of many
regional and local commanders to his revolution-
ary goals; thus, he may be behind the radical-
sounding press attacks in recent months on the
army's poor performance of its political duties.
Whatever the extent of Mao's influence on
given issues, he remains a charismatic figure of
enormous prestige and, in many respects, the
unifying element maintaining the present fragile
balance at the center. Any open and direct chal-
lenge to his pre-eminence seems highly unlikely at
this stage. The men who have been willing-or
forced-to submerge their major differences to
work under Mao, however, may be unwilling to
accept the leadership of a less revered individual.
The fact that, in a basic sense, no one can really
replace Mao raises great uncertainties about
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China's future, and these uncertainties persist
even though Mao took the step at the eleventh
party plenum in August 1966 of designating Vice
Chairman Lin Piao as his successor.
Totalitarian regimes such as China's histori-
cally have had difficulty arranging for the orderly
transfer of power, and the assiduous grooming of
Lin as Mao's immediate successor has been a
conscious attempt to solve this problem.
Throughout the Cultural Revolution he has con-
stantly been portrayed not only as Mao's "closest
comrade in arms" but also as the foremost inter-
preter and exponent of "Mao Tse-tung Thought"
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Lin has risen in spite of a Ion record of
illness He
was elected to the politburo in 1955 and to its
standing committee in 1958. The following year
he was appointed minister of national defense,
replacing the disgraced P'eng Te-huai. He was also
put in active charge of the party's Military Affairs
Committee, the supreme military authority.
Even though Lin is a civil war hero and has
stood at the center of party and military power
for over a decade, less is known about him than
about any other major Chinese leader. There is a
large body of articles and speeches attributed to
him, but it shows only that he applauds and
echoes Maoist doctrine at every point. Lin's con-
tacts with foreigners have also been limited. He
has never been abroad except for medical treat-
ment in the Soviet Union, and his attitude toward
the outside world is probably suspicious and
hostile.
Apparently the major turning point in Lin's
career came in 1959, when he was charged by
Mao with improving morale and tightening up lax
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political practices in the army. It is clear, in
retrospect, that Mao hoped to exploit a politically
rejuvenated army under Lin as a major instrument
in combating the views of both professional mili-
tary leaders and party apparatus chiefs who he
believed were opposing his various campaigns to
step up "revolutionary fervor" in Chinese society.
On the surface it would appear that the
broader national role of the army in the early
1960s, and its subsequent emergence as the
primary instrument of political and administrative
control in the country, have enhanced both Lin's
power and authority vis-a-vis the other members
of the elite and his ability to consolidate his
position after Mao goes. Nevertheless, there are
other indications that Lin's role since 1959, and
particularly in the Cultural Revolution, has cost
him much support in important military and
civilian circles. His efforts to put "politics in
command" in the army for example, seriously
exacerbated strains between officers oriented to-
ward political action and those more concerned
with long-standing professional military problems.
Furthermore, Lin's support of Mao's purge of
numerous senior officers in December 1966 and
January 1967 aroused dismay among large num-
bers of the military leadership. Again, during
some of the most destructive phases of the radical
Red Guard movement, it was Lin who backed
Mao's orders to the army to intervene on the side
of the "true revolutionaries." This move probably
did not sit well with sonic elements in the army.
There is little evidence that Lin is as astute
politically as Mao Tse-tung, and there have been
recurrent rumors that important, but unnamed,
members of the regime consider Lin unfit to
assume Mao's mantle. Although there is no evi-
dence that other politburo members have directly
criticized Lin, a recent spate of press articles
praising Lin's record as a military leader suggests
that his stature needs periodic shoring up. It
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appears in fact that his own prestige and strength
derive from Mao's confidence in him rather than
from a power base in the military establishment.
The probable future course of China's num-
ber-three man is easier to chart than that of Mao's
second in command. Chou En-lai is as close to
being the indispensable man as any official in
China today, and his death would have a pro-
found impact on the stability of the leadership.
Chou's record over the years suggests that he has
discovered that he can exert much more influence
on the course of events by being number-three
than by entering the lists as a possible successor
to Mao. He has, thus far, managed to retain Mao's
confidence and at the same time project an image
of reasonableness, moderation, and responsibility.
He serves an important function as a loyal execu-
tor of Mao's policies and as a "window on
reality" for the ideologically oriented party chair-
man.
As premier, Chou's chief concern is the gov-
ernment bureaucracy and foreign affairs, although
his interest and capacities apparently involve him
in all major policy issues confronting the regime.
During the Cultural Revolution, moreover, addi-
tional responsibilities devolved on him almost by
default because he is apparently the only member
of the top three with sufficient vigor to engage in
the day-to-day direction of central government
affairs. Chou is a suave, urbane politician who has
reached his key position after decades of savage
struggle and subtle compromise. He has demon-
strated an uncanny knack for emerging on the
right side of issues, and his toughness, caution,
and willingness to use the knife when necessary
have served him well in the vicious infighting that
has been part of the Cultural Revolution from the
outset.
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Chou's ability to retain his powerful position
even though out of step with some aspects of the
Cultural Revolution is a reflection both of his
unrivaled political skill and his indispensability.
Nevertheless, through his efforts to curb radical
excesses, Chou may have incurred the wrath of
some of the radical "Maoists," and they made
several attempts during the Cultural Revolution
to undercut his position. Sometimes they at-
tacked him directly, but -their major onslaughts
were more often made against his vice premiers
and other government ministry officials in an
eff:-)rt to weaken his personal power base.
Red Guard posters have alleged that some of
the attacks on government officials in early 1967
were the work of "ultraleftist extremists" called
the "May 16 Corps." Reportedly supported by
members of the powerful Cultural Revolution
Group headed by Ch'en Po-ta, K'ang Sheng, and
Madame Mao, the May 16 Corps was accused of
pressing a long-range plan to strike at Chou's
subordinates and allies and ultimately to bring
down Chou himsel'. Even allowing for a high
degree of exaggeration In these charges, it is not
surprising that the Cultural Revolution Gro-ap
UNEASY RIDERS...
Ch'en Po-ta, K'ang Sheng, Madame Mao, and Chou Ewlai
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would try to weaken Chou, and the subsequent
purge of some of its second-echelon members in
late 1967 reflected unfavorably on Chen Po-ta
and particularly on K'ang Sheng, whether or not
they in fact were behind-the-scenes backers of the
"May 16 Corps." Chou himself was able to sur-
vive the radicals' onslaughts perhaps because Mao
was persuaded that he was needed to hold the
country together. Nonetheless, Chou's personal
base of power did suffer serious attrition, and,
despite his public defense of some of his key
associates, several failed to survive or were re-
duced to lesser positions after the ninth congress.
Despite the setbacks to his entourage, Chou
still seems to retain considerable room for maneu-
ver within the regime. Several of his proteges are
still around and probably continue to work on
economic planning, for example, even though
rernoved from the politburo, More important,
because Chou has not been identified with the
worst excesses of the Cultural Revolution, he is
probably the only high-ranking official still in a
position to talk with all groups engaged in the
current struggle over power and policy. Finally, at
a time when Peking is under considerable pressure
from Moscow, Chou's unrivaled experience in for-
eign affairs once again reinforces the notion of his
indispensability. The fact that Chou is apparently
content to exercise huge power without trying to
assume Mao's mantle, plus his ability to be all
things to all men, makes it appear that he still has
the best prospect of any Chinese leader to survive
in a position of authority.
CH'EN PO-TA AND WANG SHENG
The remaining members of the standing
committee have ;:peen prominent in the radical
grouping in the central leadership ever since the
beginning of the Cultural Revolution. Ch'en, re-
portedly Mao's ghost writer for decades, headed
up the Cultural Revolution Group, which had
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primary responsibility for the Red Guards and
reportedly continues to play a role in pasty build-
ing. Since the demise of the Red Guards as a
political force, Ch'en has lost an important power
base, and his support from the grassroots mass
organizations has probably been weakened. In
any case, he appears to owe his position entirely
to his close personal relationship with Mao.
K'ang Sheng was long the head of the secret
police and intelligence services, and he has appar-
ently resumed that role in recent years. An
important party figure long before the Commu-
nist take-over in 1949, K'ang was demoted in the
mid-1940s at the time Liu Shao-ch'i emerged as
Mao's second in command. K'ang has risen
rapidly, however, since the beginning of the
Cultural Revolution and served as adviser to the
Cultural Revolution Group. Red Guard accounts
have suggested that K'ang currently has direct
responsibilities in party rebuilding as well as the
principal responsibility for political security
work.
Presumably both men are close to Madame
Mao (Chiang Ch'ing) and other Cultural Revolu-
tion Group members on the politburo, but their
militance in supporting Mao's program for "revo-
lution" has probably alienated the more moderate
and pragmatic forces in the leadership. Although
both Ch'en and K'ang have hastened to identify
themselves with moderate policy lines when
necessary, both have attempted to feather their
political nests where possible by eliminating
actual and potential rivals. As political security
chief, for example, K'ang Sheng has kept exten-
sive dossiers-for use when needed-on other
politburo members. In any case, Ch'en and K'ang
have almost certainly made so many enemies over
the course of the revolution that unless they
succeed in eliminating their opponents or in com-
ing to terms with them, both will probably be
hard pressed to retain much political influence in
a post-Mao regime.
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THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION
GROUP LEADERS
Many of the strengths and weaknesses that
characterize the positions of Ch'en and K'ang also
apply to the remaining Cultural Revolution
Group figures on the politburo: Chiang Ch'ing,
Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Yao Wen-yuan, Yeh Ch'un
(Madame Lin Piao), aad Wang Tung-hsing. Before
the Cultural Revolution these people were politi-
cal nonentities or lower echelon leaders, none of
whom had a firm independent base of support.
Some, and perhaps all, of them are fanatical,
doctrinaire ideologues who actually share Mao's
belief that it is essential to maintain a high state
of tension and ideological fervor in China in order
to sustain revolutionary momentum and ensure
rapid change.
The Cultural Revolution Group leaders are
ambitious underlings who believe that their best
opportunity to consolidate their positions is to
continue to push the radical sociopolitical pro-
grains that Mao wants and to try to weaken their
opponents within the central leadership. There-
fore, they probably consider voices for modera-
tion a real danger to themselves. During the
course of the Cultural Revolution the position of
the Cultural Revolution Group leaders was pro-
gressively weakened by the fall of several of their
middle-echelon adherents, and the moderating
trend evident in recent months probably has
further circumscribed their room for maneuver.
At present, their power base is rudimentary; they
have only tenuous organizational support in the
provinces, and little following among the people.
Once Mao goes, their power is likely to diminish
considerably unless they can develop new sources
of political strength. They may currently be
attempting to undermine the power base of some
regional and provincial military chieftains. But
even if they make some progress along these lines,
they have made so many enemies that their future
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political prospects are dim under any but the
most militant of regimes.
The most fanatical and potentially the most
politically insecure of these individuals is Chiang
Ch'ing, Mao's fourth wife. She first became an
important political figure only in late 1965, when
Mao used her to plant an article in the Shanghai
press attacking a playwright who was to serve as a
symbol of all opposition to Mao's thought and
will. The madame, a one-time bit player in
Shanghai movies, had been occupied for more
than 15 years with an effort to reduce all of the
Chinese arts to propaganda. Until 1965, party
leaders seem to have regarded her as a simple-
minded nuisance not to be taken seriously.
In the early stages of the Cultural Revolu-
tion, however, she emerged as a formidable
opponent. As a leader of the central Cultural
Revolution Group as well as "adviser" to that
body for the conduct of "revolution" in the
People's Liberation Army, she became the most
vocal spokesman for the militants. In all her roles,
she has demonstrated an enormous talent for
mischief-making, and through her incitement of
Red Guard disruptions and her attacks on large
numbers of government and military leaders she
probably earned the undying enmity of those in
the moderate camp in both Peking and the prov-
inces. In recent weeks her contributions to "revo-
lutionary literature and art" have been heavily
praised in the official press in such a manner as to
suggest that her voice may still he influential in
regime councils. Because many of these articles
have been thinly veiled criticisms of the state of
army-civilian relations, there seems little reason to
believe that Chiang Ch'ing has ceased castigating
her military and government opponents within
the leadership.
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CHANG CH'UN-CH'IAO AND
YAO WEN-YUAN
Among Madame Mao's closest allies have
been Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and Yao Wen-yuan. The
latte,, according to Soviet claims, is her son-in-
law, Chang and Yao, almost complete unknowns
before the Cultural Revolution and both young
men by Chinese leadership standards, had worked
with Chiang Ch'ing on cultural matters in
Shanghai and assisted her in preparing some of
the earliest moves in the leadership purge. Chang
and Yao serve as chairmar, and first vice chair-
man, respectively, of the Shanghai municipal
revolutionary committee and have turned that
city into an important power base for radical
forces in the central leadership.
One of Chang's and Yao's reported duties
has been their involvement in moves to revive the
party in a new Maoist image. Several sources have
reported that both men had major responsibilities
in preparing for the ninth party congress, with
Chang allegedly being assigned to rewrite the
party program and Yao being given responsi-
bilities in connection with organizing the con-
gress. Again, both have consistently pressed the
radical viewpoint on the subject of party building.
Over the past year, for example, the response of
Shanghai's Wen Hui Pao (presumably under Yao's
direction) to Peking's stepped-up propaganda on
rebuilding the party has strongly supported the
claims of former radical Red Guard factionalists
to new party membership and has criticized revo-
lutionary committees elsewhere in China for
absorbing too many conservative military men
and former party and government cadres. In all of
this maneuvering, Chang and Yao apparently have
been the chief voices for radical groups seeking to
find an institutional base of support in the re-
constructed party apparatus.
Special Report
Less is known about the importance of the
two remaining members of the Cultural Revolu-
tion Group-Madame Lin, who is known as Yeh
Ch'un, and Wang Tung-hsing. Yeh, like her senior
counterpart Chiang Ch'ing, has acquired political
importance by representing her husband in a
working purge group, the People's Liberation
Army/Cultural Revolution Group. She has proved
to be a fanatic and has a record of attacking
prominent military men. Today Yeh still serves
on the key army political policy body known as
the "administrative unit" of the Military Affairs
Committee, where she presumably serves as a
radical watchdog over her more conservatively
oriented military colleagues.
Wang Tung-hsing, Mao's old bodyguard, also
gained prominence as a member of an important
purge group. After the eleventh plenum in August
1966, he was assigned to take charge of the cen-
tral committee's General Office, and in this office
he played an important role in the continuing
purge within the party. Today Wang remains one
of the more shadowy figures of the elite, appar-
ently owing his position almost exclusively to
Mao's patronage. Nevertheless, because of Wang's
long background in police and security work, he
may he regarded as a dangerous opponent by the
conservative elements in the politburo.
All of the members of the Cultural Revolu-
tion Group may be in a weak position under any
kind of post-Mao regime. Their most formidable
opponents presumably continue to be those
military men in the center and the provinces
whose efforts to maintain order have been repeat-
edly impaired by radical initiatives. Once Mao
goes, the radicals' power will diminish unless they
somehow manage to build up new sources of
strength in the local government structure and in
a newly reconstructed party apparatus.
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Lin and the Military
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and to modify the impact of radical-inspired
social and political programs. By and large this
basic conservatism seems to characterize most of
the military leaders on the new politburo
-including some who owe their rise in large part
directly to the Cultural Revolution-with the
result that they appear to constitute a formidable
opposition on many policy issues to the radical
forces in the leadership. This divergence of
approach to China's problems is compounded by
the fact that many of the military leaders suffered
under severe, radical-inspired attacks in the Cul-
tural Revolution, which no doubt generated much
bitterness and anxiety on their part.
Six of the nine central and provincial mili-
tary leaders came under heavy pressure from
radical forces. These are Huang Yung-sheng, Ch'iu
Hui-tso, Hsu Shih-yu, Ch'en Hsi-lien, Li Te-sheng,
and Yeh Chien-ying. Huang Yung-sheng is chief of.
the army General Staff, which maces him China's
second most important military man behind Lin
Piao. Huang got into deep political trouble in
1967 when, as commander of the Canton Military
Region, he cracked down heavily on Red Guard
extremists in his area who were backed by Chiang
Ch'ing and the Cultural Revolution Group. Be-
cause of his action Huang came under sustained
radical attack, but he was publicly defended by
Chou En-lai.
Huang may have further incurred the enmity
of radical forces after the Wuhan incident in
1967. That incident was precipitated when the
Wuhan Military Region commander defied
Peking's order to cease suppressing a radical Red
Guard faction that was opposing his authority in
the region. The commander was promptly dis-
missed, but his action constituted a major turning
point in the Cultural Revolution Group's effort to
overcome resistance within the military to their
radical measures. Huang Yung-sheng appears to
have played a leading role in a group of regional
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In some respects, alternate politburo mem-
ber Chi Teng-k'uei, a vice chairman of the Honan
Provincial Revolutionary Committee, seems to
represent at the highest level the kind of govern-
ment official the Cultural Revolution Group lead-
ers are backing in the provinces. Little is known
about Chi except that he supported radical forces
in his province throughout the Cultural Revolu-
tion. Presumably through the efforts of stra-
tegically placed supporters such as Chi in Honan
and elsewhere, the radicals also hope to influence
the make-up of the local party organs in their
favor. Eventually, they may hope to use the
rebuilt party apparatus as a counterweight to
their opponents in the military, but at this stage
their chances of long-term success seem slim.
Despite the importance of the Cultural
Revolution Group and its patrons in the standing
committee, the pivotal role in China's power
structure today is played by the People's Libera-
tion Army leaders in the politburo, whose ranks
include more members than ever before from
both the central and regional military establish-
ments. Because the army has become a major
power center during the Cultural Revolution, the
support of this military grouping will be crucial to
any successor, to Mao. Although it may be
assumed that most of these leaders currently
remain loyal to Mao, they do not constitute a
homogeneous body and their future loyalties
remain one of the great uncertainties of the post-
Mao era.
In general terms, the army has exhibited
some of the same divisive tendencies that have
ruptured the party and government. There has
been abundant evidence during the Cultural
Revolution, however, that the great majority of
the leading officers are basically conservative; i.e.,
they have attempted to curb excessive disorders
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military leaders most of whom appeared in Peking
in late July, where they seem to have joined Chou
En-lai in exerting some braking influence on the
radicals' drive to "drag out" their opponents in
the military establishment.
Huang was one of several regional com-
manders who remained in the capital during the
following four months-where they probably had
the opportunity to speak on behalf of their col-
leagues in the provinces. Lin Piao, in a tough
speech to regional army leaders, emphasized the
necessity for the disruptions associated with the
Cultural Revolution and stressed repeatedly that
local officers must seek instruction and guidance
from Peking before taking action regarding Red
Guard factions. Very soon after Lin's speech,
however, both he and Mao began to retreat from
their tough stance.
Huang's role as a spokesman for the regional
military establishment in the aftermath of the
Wuhan incident appears to have strengthened his
position. His new importance was confirmed
when he was appointed chairman of the Kwang-
tung Provincial Revolutionary Committee in early
1968, shortly before his transfer to Peking as
Chief of Staff of the army. The circumstances in
which Huang was elevated to the top of the
military command structure appear to lend addi-
tional support to the notion that he is the leading
representative of conservative military interests.
The trials and tribulations of Hsu Shih-yu
and Ch'en Hsi-lien in the Cultural Revolution
closely paralleled those of Huang Yung-sheng, and
their experiences suggest that they share Huang's
conservative bias and his presumed opposition to
the radical forces. Hsu is the Commander of the
Nanking Military Region and Ch'en is Com-
mander of the Shenyang Military Region. Both
Hsu and Ch'en survived sustained Red Guard
criticism to retain their regional commands, and
Special Report
both were able to enhance their political status by
acquiring provincial revolutionary committee
chairmanships. Their presence on the politburo as
spokesmen for the Interests of regional and pro-
vincial army leaders attests to Peking's-and
Mao's-recognition of the new power relation-
ships emerging out of the Cultural Revolution.
Because both men are long-time professional
soldiers, it also seems likely that they serve as
spokesmen for those who appear to have been
arguing in recent months that renewed attention
must be paid to improving military readiness after
the disruptions of the Cultural Revolution, with
some corresponding easing of the loi -level local
administrative and political burdens the army still
has to bear.
The remaining military members on the
politburo who may share some similarity of views
with Huang, Hsu, and Ch'en are Li Te-sheng and
probably, Ch'iu Hui-tso. Relatively little is known
about Li except that he is commander of the 12th
army and, concurrently, chairman of the Anhwei
Provincial Revolutionary Committee. He is a mil-
itary subordinate to Hsu Shih-yu and, like Hsu,
appears to be a representative of the powerful
provincial military figures who administer much
of China. It should be noted, however, that Li is
just one of a number of tactical officers who are
now running entire provinces. It remains to be
seen why Li was selected over his peers to be
elevated to his present status. His sudden rise
suggests that he may enjoy some special relation-
ship with other powerful figures in Peking above
and beyond Hsu Shih-yu.
Ch'iu Hui-tso is a representative of the cen-
tral military hierarchy. He is a long-time associate
of Lin Piao and was allegedly moved into his
General Rear Services Department post by Lin to
root out remnants of the "anti-Mao, P'eng
Te-huai clique." Ch'iu's record in the Cultural
Revolution, however, suggests that he may have
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played an important role in attempting to blunt
the radical attack on the military establishment.
Ch'iu was severely criticized by radical Red
Guards in late 1966 and early 1967. Moreover,
after he was exonerated, he was named to the
army's Cultural Revolution Group in the wake of
the Wuhan incident at a time when the more
conservative voices in the army successfully
sought an end to the radical activities of that
army purge group.
The rest of the military men on the polit-
buro appear to be at the opposite end of the
spectrum and seem to owe their positions to their
readiness to support the aims of the radical forces
in the leadership. Wu Fa-hsien has been com-
mander of the Air Force since August 1965, and
before that he served as Air Force political com-
missar since at least 1959. Wu played a major role
in the purges within the military establishment
and was head of the People's Liberation Army/
Cultural Revolution Group after August 1967.
Air Force units have sided with radical
forces in several places during the Cultural Revo-
lution, presumably on Wu's orders. Wu was also
one of the top leaders present when Chiang
Ch'ing delivered her inflammatory "stagnant
pools" speech on 12 November 1967, which had
such a strong influence in breaking down the
short-lived period of political sanity in the fall of
1967. All others present on that occasion are
clearly identified as radicals. It seems probable,
therefore, that Wu Fa-hsien's long career as a
political commissar and his seeming lack of com-
mand experience have predisposed him to support
radical political initiatives and that, at the least,
he has proved ready to accommodate to programs
being pushed by the Cultural Revolution Group
leaders in Peking.
Little is known about the political com-
missar of the Navy, Li Tso-p'eng, but his experi-
Special Report
ence in the Cultural Revolution suggests that he
also belongs to the radically oriented wing of the
central military. Li, for example, served as deputy
head of the Navy's Cultural Revolution purge
group and played a prominent part in purges of
the People's Liberation Army in general. Further-
more, as was the case with the Air Force under
Wu, in province after province the Navy lined up
behind the radical forces in their attacks on senior
Army leaders,
By siding with the radicals in attacking
senior Army officers, Wu and Li have not only
enhanced their own positions but have achieved
some increase in the number of provincial govern-
ment posts held by Air Force and Navy officers.
Presumably both leaders will support any future
moves by the Cultural Revolution Group to
utrengthen its position vis-a-vis the Army leaders
on the politburo. The fact that Wu and Li only
+,,epresent the junior branches of China's Army
forces, however, suggests that they will not bring
decisive strength to bear on the radicals' behalf in
any political showdown in the post-Mao period,
THE GOVERNMENT LEADERS
The position of the radical forces in the
politburo seems to be further circumscribed by
the fact that the major representatives of the
civilian government apparatus appear to be
aligned with the moderate camp. Both Vice
Premier Hsieh Fu-chih and Finance Minister Li
Hsien-nien have been supporters of Chou En-lai
and are on record as attempting to curb Cultural
Revolution excesses. Hsieh Fu-chih has been one
of the busiest officials in the regime in most
periods of the Cultural Revolution. When it be-
gan, Hsieh was vice premier and minister of public
security. Since 1967 he has been chairman of the
Peking Municipal Revolutionary Committee, and
he now also serves on the "administrative unit" of
the Military Affairs Committee. The very fact
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SFC:R F'lI
CHOU EN-LAI AND THE GOVERNMENT LEADERS
that he has been so busy in so many sectors of
authority makes Hsieh somewhat difficult to
pigeonhole in terms of political affinities. His
ability to pass relatively unscathed through
periods of radical ascendancy in 1967 and again
in 1968 suggests that at crucial junctures he was
willing to make accommodations to the Cultural
Revolution Group members of the elite.
Nevertheless, it appears that Hsieh belongs
basically to the loose coalition of moderate
bureaucrats and army officers. He has suggested
as much by word and deed at several key junc-
tures, such as the period of moderation beginning
in July 1968 when Hsieh was one of the first to
take advantage of Mao's call for an end to fac-
tional violence. During the period from Septem-
ber 1967 to mid-February 1968, moreover, Hsieh
delivered half a dozen major speeches that pushed
a whole- range of moderate policies, including the
need to form revolutionary committees, to sup-
port the Army, to promote birth control, and to
end the disruptive activities of Red Guard mili-
tants.
There is less uncertainty about the political
affinities of Li Hsien-nien. He has worked closely
with Chou En-lai at the top of the State Council
hierarchy since the mid-1950s. Although Li
occupied a precarious post in a ministry notable
for its political casualties, his talents, and more
importantly, the protection of Chou En-lai,
enabled him to survive the Cultural Revolution.
I i has long experience as a skilled organizer and
administrator and since at least the disestroi's
Great Leap Forward period, it has been clear that
he has taken a relatively moderate position as an
economic planner.
With the Cultural Revolution downgrading
of Li Fu-ch'un, former politburo member and
chairman of the State Planning Commission, Li
now becomes the most important economic
spokesman in China. Since the ninth party con-
gress, evidence also has been accumulating that
Peking has settled on Li as de facto foreign minis-
ter and probable successor to the downgraded
Ch'en I. Although Li himself is no stranger to
foreign policy matters, his assumption of some of
the foreign minister's duties is primarily signifi-
cant because it appears to ensure that his pro-
tector Chou En-lai will continue to exercise direct
influence over the conduct of Peking's interna-
tional relations.
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AFTER MAO, THE DELUGE?
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China's leaders toward the view that, both for
China's sake and for their own self-preservation,
Mac, ought to be restrained in the future.
Although China's present elite tends to be
divided into mutually antagonistic groupings, the
complicated ground rules of politics as played in
Peking preclude a definitive assessment of the
leadership situation. At present, the relative posi-
tions and influence of the radicals, i.e., those
most active in the excesses of the Cultural Revo-
lution, and the moderates, i.e., primarily the
military-administrator groups, still seem to he in
flux. The picture is further clouded because the
various leaders can by no means be identified
with a set pattern of factions possessing carefully
formulated political programs. As in the past, it
can be assumed that some individuals who appear
aligned at one time with one group, will switch
allegiance whenever they perceive this would
serve their self-interest, and accordingly they will
make personal and policy accommodations with
leaders of different political persuasions. More-
over, interrelationships within the elite are
complicated by the consciousness that Mao might
at any time attempt to strike them down should
they oppose him too directly, and, conversely, by
the knowledge that overidentification with Mao's
more radical policies may prove a liability when
he is no longer a living shield.
Under these conditions, it will continue to
be extremely hard for the politburo to formulate
coherent policies on which all elements can agree.
Although certain pressing domestic issues, such as
the need to maintain law and order, and such
foreign issues as the need to respond to Soviet
pressures, have elicited some positive responses
from the leadership, the present uneasy balance in
the politburo is likely to preclude bold moves in
any direction. Mao will certainly fight to avoid
being put on the shelf as he felt he was following
the Great Leap Forward fiasco of 1958-1960. By
the same token, the excesses of the Cultural
Revolution probably have encouraged some of
Special Report
Assuming that the same factors of power,
policy, and personal rivalries will continue to
operate while Mao remains at the helm, the result
of his passing is likely to be even less cohesive at
the top, and the succession could well be dis-
orderly and contentious, The purge of his first
heir apparent, Liu Shao-ch'i, aborted the Chinese
Communists' initial attempt to provide for the
orderly transfer of political power, and Mao's
efforts to groom Lin Piao as successor seem a
less-than-satisfactory solution to the problem.
Partly because of his poor health and partly be-
cause of his close identification with the excesses
of the Cultural Revolution, Lin does not appear
credible as anything more than a short-term re-
placement.
Because Lin has received a clear mandate, he
probably will initially get the post of party chair-
man. It is also true that Mao and Lin have been
industriously attempting to build a structure-
both party and military -designed to be respon-
sive to Lin. Lin, however, does not possess any-
thing like Mao's charisma, and though most key
power positions in China's governing structure
today are held by military men, their fortunes
during the Cultural Revolution suggest that many
of them may not be entirely politically responsive
to Lin.
The policies that Lin attempts to pursue will
also have a crucial bearing on his prospects for
consolidating his position. To a large extent, Lin
must be considered an enigma, who, because he
has operated for almost 40 years in Mao's
shadow, cannot really be known until the shadow
is removed. In view of Lin's record in the Cultural
Revolution, it seems likely that his basic predilec-
tion would be to carry on along the policy lines
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laid down by Mao. Should he attempt to do so,
however, he will probably have to defer much
more to the wishes of others than Mao has done.
Moreover, it is not clear whether Lin Piao, once
Mao is gone, will be able to formulate programs
needed to manage the vast Chinese nation.
If Lin hopes to consolidate and hold his
position, he would have to secure the collabora-
tion or at least the acquiescence of the conserva-
tive-oriented military powerholders as well as the
government bureaucrats led by Chou En-lai, with-
out whom he could not successfully rule the
country. This should entail some modification of
Maoist policies. An alternative to this would be
for Lin to remove swiftly potential opposition
and to launch his own version of the Cultural
Revolution, a venture unlikely to succc?d. Should
Lin in fact persist in playing the role of an unre-
constructed Maoist in all fields, it seems likely
that he would be shunted aside by some combina-
tion of military, party, and government leaders.
In any event, with Mao's death or inca
pacity, the chances of an open split in the leader-
ship will rise sharply. A stormy and possibly pro-
tracted period may ensue in which basic policy
issues will fuel a sharp leadership struggle. The
process of the Cultural Revolution has already
resulted in some diffusion of power at the center,
and in the future, provincial leaders are likely to
play a more important role in the over-all political
picture. Political links with strong regional figures
could become increasingly important to com-
peting personalities at the center, and ambitious
regional leaders may increasingly find opportuni-
ties to use their local power as an important
springboard to eminence at the top.
As long as Mao remains on the scene, it is
possible that he will attempt to give renewed
forward momentum to his drive to revive revolu-
tionary enthusiasm. But it apparently is already
clear to powerful elements in the leadership that
much of his revolutionary dogma has proved irrel-
evant to China's problems in the modern world.
Although China's future course cannot be pre-
dicted with confidence, it is possible that, in the
wake of Mao's passing, Communist China's lead-
ers-whoever they are-will be forced increasingly
to respond to changing conditions and to pres-
sures from men whose drive is toward greater
rationalization of the economy and political appa-
ratus-or at least toward the orderly pursuit of a
more pragmatic version of Mao's romantic vision.
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