CHALLENGES TO THE WESTERN POSITION IN AND AROUND BERLIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86S00588R000100070001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 29, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Challenges to the Western Position
In and Around Berlin
Secret
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February 1985
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=c n =~ Intelligence
Challenges to the Western Position
In and Around Berlin
This paper was prepared b
Office of European Analysis, and
Office of Soviet Analysis. It
was coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.
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Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Western Europe Division,
EURA, or to the Chief, Policy 25X1
Analysis Division, SOVA 25X1
Secret
EUR 85-10023X
SOY 85-10029X
February 1985
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Challenges to the Western Position
In and Around Berlin 25X1
Summary During 1984, the Soviets and East Germans took a series of actions in and
Information available around Berlin that further eroded Western rights based on four-power
as of 3 February 1985 agreements and/or longstanding practice. As a result, the Western position
was used in this report.
in this region is not as good as it was a year ago.
Recent Soviet actions primarily reflect Moscow's long-term goal to change
the status quo to its advantage whenever opportunities arise to do so
without provoking a crisis. The Soviets apparently view an incremental
approach to change in quadripartite arrangements as the best means of
gaining Western acquiescence in their interpretation of the rules governing
access to Berlin. Similarly, they remain motivated by a desire to enhance
the sovereignty and legitimacy of the East German regime, especially when
they estimate that the risks of Allied counterreaction are small. And the
Soviets and East Germans are always watchful to stymie any perceived
West German efforts to strengthen political ties between the Federal
Republic and West Berlin. But the Allies, not the West Germans, appear
to have been the primary target of Soviet actions in 1984.
The Soviet Union took steps in early December apparently designed to
defuse Western protests over its actions last year and to avoid the
appearance of an East-West confrontation over Berlin. This seeming
flexibility may have been timed to influence Allied discussions of Berlin
issues at the December NATO ministerial meeting. It also may have
reflected increasing Soviet interest in smoothing over secondary disputes
with the United States in anticipation of the meeting between Secretary
Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko in early January.
The adverse actions taken during 1984 involved technical matters and have
antecedents in earlier disputes. In addition to supporting the Soviets' long-
term quest for advantage, the steps could also be interpreted as an effort to
remind the West of its vulnerability in Berlin at a time of heightened East-
West tension:
? On 20 February, the Soviets launched their most serious challenge to
quadripartite management of the air corridors in recent years by
unilaterally announcing that henceforth all Soviet temporary reservations
of lower level airspace in the corridors would cover the entire length of
the corridors. Previously, they had only requested reservations for part of
the corridors. Although the new restrictions have not reduced the number
of Allied air flights to Berlin, they have, in the view of Allied authorities,
created a safety hazard.
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? On 16 May, the Soviet military command in East Germany informed the
Allied military liaison missions of new restrictions on their travel in East
Germany that significantly reduced their intelligence-gathering capabili-
ties by making it more difficult to approach areas of military interest.
? On 15 November, the East Germans closed the Glienicker Bridge, the
military liaison missions' primary transit point between West Berlin and
their headquarters in Potsdam. Although the bridge was reopened on the
same day, the East Germans indicated that it would be closed again if the
West Berlin Senat (government) did not agree to their terms for financing
repairs to and maintenance of the bridge.
As a result of seeming new Soviet and East German flexibility in
December, some progress toward ameliorating differences has been made
on two of these issues. Soviet officials in West Berlin "notified" several res-
ervations for less than the full length of the corridors and indicated that
most future reservations will include similar geographic limits. In addition,
the East Germans and the Senat reached an agreement on the Glienicker
Bridge in which the East Germans backed away from their insistence that
West Berlin pay for its maintenance. Because the East Germans had no ap-
parent direct interest in coming to a quick agreement to keep the bridge
open, we believe their retreat probably was at the behest of the Soviets.
But, despite their recent readiness to seek compromises, the Soviets still are
asserting the right to make unilateral adjustments in the air corridor
regime, contrary to the Allied position that the corridors remain a four-
power responsibility.
We believe that Soviet frustration over failing to block INF deployments
contributed to last year's troubling actions on Berlin issues. Soviet
restrictions on the air corridors and military liaison mission travel have an
inherent military rationale suggesting that recommendations by Soviet
military commanders in East Germany-whose military requirements now
differ considerably from those that existed when the access understandings
were established-may have weighed heavily in Kremlin deliberations.
Soviet political authorities may have approved such recommendations as a
convenient way to signal to the West the costs of increased East-West
tensions. Soviet decisionmaking regarding Berlin may also have been
affected by leadership changes in Moscow. The air corridor and military li-
aison mission travel decisions were implemented at a time when the top-
level leadership picture was in considerable flux after the accession to
power of General Secretary Chernenko and may reflect increased influence
on the part of Gromyko.
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The degree of Soviet and East German harassment to date almost certainly
does not in itself endanger the Western presence in Berlin; Western access
has been inconvenienced but not reduced or explicitly threatened. Indeed, a
consensus appears to exist among US experts on Berlin that the West does
not face an imminent crisis in Berlin and that the situation remains
relatively calm, especially when compared with periods in the past and to
the high level of East-West tension in recent years.
The West nonetheless faces a difficult task in responding to Soviet and
East German encroachments. The three Western powers sometimes are not
in agreement on how to respond. Moreover, there would be little public
sympathy in Western Europe for any Allied effort to escalate issues that al-
most certainly would be perceived as minor-such as the extent of corridor
reservations-into a major East-West confrontation.
The prospects for a settlement that restores a greater measure of quadri-
partite management of the air corridors or leads to geographic limits on
reservations more acceptable to the Allies probably would increase if an
East-West thaw leads Soviet authorities to decide that Berlin issues are not
worth the potential damage to improved relations. A more cooperative
Soviet attitude also may come about if President Reagan decides to visit
West Berlin in May: the Soviets, anxious to maintain the perception that
they were not doing anything to disrupt the calm in Berlin, became
unusually cooperative on several issues before the President's last visit in
1982.
The Soviets might also move to satisfy Allied demands if the West, despite
possible problems with Western public opinion, escalates its response to
unilateral actions beyond verbal protests. This would appreciably boost the
potential costs to Moscow of its piecemeal efforts to erode Allied access.
But such Allied reactions are risky since we cannot be certain how the So-
viets will respond. The Soviet response to a specific Allied action would de-
pend on the nature and timing of the action, the local circumstances
leading up to it, the state of East-West relations at the time, and other fac-
tors such as leadership politics in Moscow.
Given the West's vulnerability in Berlin, the Allies have few options in
responding to Soviet behavior, while Moscow has many options for
counterreactions. The Allies could take actions against Soviet interests in
and around Berlin, but these would be largely limited to harassment of
Soviet personnel. Another option would be to take action on a non-Berlin
issue of importance to Moscow, clearly linking such a move to the Soviet
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position on Allied rights in Berlin. For example, the United States could tie
continued refusal to reinstate US landing rights for Aeroflot to the air
corridor issue. The Allies could also make further high-level demarches,
perhaps accompanied by a stated readiness to send demonstration flights
through disputed airspace at the eastern ends of the corridors. These
options would not carry the risk of a military incident in Berlin, but could
nevertheless provoke Soviet counterreactions, including increased harass-
ment of Allied personnel in and around Berlin.
Actual demonstration flights through disputed airspace would be the
riskiest option since they could result in the shooting down of an Allied air-
craft. Even if the Allies were to limit their penetration of reserved airspace
to the disputed miles at the ends of the corridors, the Soviets could increase
military air activity in the area to enhance the risk for the Allies of midair
collisions.
Although risks always will exist, we believe there are conditions and times
when strong Allied responses-including demonstration flights-have a
greater likelihood of successfully deterring the Soviets from abridging
Allied rights, or of forcing the Soviets to acknowledge Western positions.
Ironically, we believe a strong response is more likely to achieve Western
objectives when Moscow has a solidly perceived interest in improved
relations with the West. In such an environment, Soviet leaders probably
would be more reluctant than they are now to permit Berlin issues to pose
an unnecessary burden on overall East-West relations. We also believe the
effectiveness of stronger Allied actions would be greater-and the risks
probably less-if they were taken in the early stages of a dispute.
In the case of the air corridors, a strong response shortly after 20 February
1984 would have demonstrated to the Soviets how seriously the Allies
viewed the situation. Indeed, available evidence shows that the Soviets did
not initially use the disputed airspace, suggesting they probably were
waiting to see how the Allies would respond. We believe that now, however,
the risks are fairly high that stronger actions would undercut-rather than
reinforce-the apparent recent Soviet willingness to compromise on Berlin
issues. The leadership situation in Moscow and the course of East-West
relations remain uncertain, and statements by Soviet officials in Berlin
indicate they believe they already are taking steps to assuage Allied
concerns on Berlin issues. At some point in the future, especially if US-
Soviet relations improve and the Soviets continue to impinge on Allied
rights, stronger actions may stand a greater chance of success at lower risk.
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More serious Soviet challenges to the West in and around Berlin cannot be
ruled out. On the one hand, West German efforts to increase the Federal
Republic's ties to West Berlin could provoke Soviet retaliation. At the
moment, West Germany is a special target for Soviet hostility, albeit for its
alleged drift toward "revanchism," and not specifically for any activities it
is undertaking in Berlin. A perceived Allied failure in the future to contain
assertive West German behavior in Berlin, therefore, could provide
Moscow the pretext for seeking further changes in the status quo in Berlin.
And, West German actions aside, Berlin will remain an arena in which
Moscow can bring pressure to bear on the Western Allies, specifically the
United States. In the event that East-West relations do not develop
favorably from Moscow's point of view, or that US actions are perceived as
dangerous to important Soviet interests in regions less accessible to Soviet
military power, Moscow might be tempted to exploit its inherent leverage
over Western access to Berlin in more direct and threatening ways.
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Challenges to Allied Movement 3
Other Challenges to Air Access 13
The Permanently Restricted Areas (PRAs) 16
Closure of the Glienicker Bridge 20
Differing Allied Perspectives 24
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Challenges to the Western Position
In and Around Berlin
During the early postwar years, Soviet efforts to
eliminate the Western presence in Berlin were a
major source of East-West tensions and a symbol of
the Cold War. Today West Berlin is less visible as a
flashpoint of East-West tension. Soviet attitudes to-
ward the Western presence in that city began to
change as the East German regime became more
stable-a process that began with construction of the
Berlin Wall in 1961. And in 1971 the four occupying
powers-the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom,
France, and the United States-concluded the Quad-
ripartite Agreement (QA) acknowledging the status
quo in Berlin and defining West Germany's ties to
West Berlin.
Nonetheless, West Berlin continues to be a point of
Western vulnerability because of its location 180
kilometers (110 miles) inside East Germany, and we
believe that the Soviets still hope ultimately to reduce
the Western presence in the city. Indeed, the Soviet
Union and East Germany have continued on and off
to chip away at Allied rights. Efforts to halt this
erosion often are frustrated by the complexity of the
issues involved-and sometimes by a simple lack of
awareness that erosion is under way. This paper
focuses in detail on Soviet and East German efforts
since 1979 to erode the Western position in and
around Berlin
times between 1980 and 1982 that Soviet officials
were cooperating on a number of issues of interest to
the Western powers and were going out of their way
to stress their interest in maintaining good relations in
Berlin. The Soviets had, however, stiffened their line
somewhat on matters related to West German ties to
the city, and the Mission thought this probably was a
warning to the new government of Chancellor Helmut
Even during 1983, the "year of INF," the Soviets
generally avoided threats to Berlin. While Soviet
leaders publicly proclaimed that INF deployments in
West Germany would violate the spirit and letter of
Bonn's bilateral treaties with Moscow and East Ber-
lin, they avoided casting similar doubt on the status of
the QA. Indeed, with a few vague exceptions, the
Soviets gave assurances that INF deployments would
not affect the situation in Berlin:
? During Kohl's trip to Moscow in July, Andropov
reportedly assured the Chancellor that the Soviets
would abide by the QA and that they were interest-
ed in maintaining a quiet situation in and around
Berlin.
? In October, a Soviet diplomat insisted in a meeting
with the US Minister in West Berlin that there
would be no difficulty with the three Western Allies
in and around Berlin following INF deployment.
Soviet and East German actions last year against the
Western position in and around Berlin once again
raised questions about the extent to which the East
may take advantage of Western vulnerability during
periods of heightened East-West tension. From a
historical perspective, however, the situation in Berlin
has remained generally stable despite the deteriora-
tion in East-West relations since 1979 resulting from
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Moscow's threats
to Poland, and NATO's INF modernization decision.
The US Mission in West Berlin commented at various
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Since the construction of the Berlin Wall and West
Germany's quasi-recognition of East Germany a dec-
ade later, the Soviets and East Germans appear to
have come to perceive West Berlin to be less of a
threat to the East German regime's stability than
earlier. As a result, Moscow probably feels less pres-
sure to change the "status quo." ' Indeed, since 1961
Soviet actions have focused far less on ousting the
Allies than on constraining West Germany's role in
West Berlin. The Soviets probably realize that mak-
ing direct threats to Berlin historically has weakened
their ability to drive wedges between Western
Europe-especially West Germany-and the United
States. Such threats would risk jeopardizing Mos-
cow's economic relations with Western Europe more
so than aggressive actions elsewhere in the world,
including Afghanistan and Eastern Europe
There also are symbolic, political reasons for the
Soviets to favor the status quo in Berlin: their role in
conjunction with the United States, France, and the
United Kingdom is a symbol of the USSR's status as
a world power and World War II victor. Despite its
efforts to promote the legitimacy of the East German
regime, Moscow also probably sees its interests served
by continuing to have the four powers be responsible
for determining the future of "Germany." Moreover,
its involvement in four-power responsibility for Berlin
gives Moscow some added leverage over the East
German regime, if only because Moscow can claim
ultimate responsibility for East Berlin.
Moscow, however, also has interests that conflict with
those of the Allies. In particular, the Soviets consist-
ently have sought to isolate West Berlin as a separate
' Throughout this assessment, the term "status quo" will be defined
as Moscow's acceptance of an indefinite Western presence in West
Berlin and the means to sustain it. It does not mean that Moscow
does so gladly, or that it accepts the Western view of the legal basis
political entity. Because Moscow wants to promote
East Berlin as the capital of East Germany, it repeat-
edly tries to get the Allies to deal directly with the
East Germans on some matters that in fact are the
responsibility of Soviet authorities. The Soviets have
demonstrated throughout the postwar period that they
will, whenever possible, erode Western rights and seek
to win acceptance of their interpretation of the rules
governing Western access to Berlin. We believe that,
when it senses an opportunity, Moscow will continue
to seek to limit Western military access and rights of
transit in East Berlin and East Germany and to
satisfy the security requirements and sovereignty de-
mands of the East German regime.
Although most experts agree that Allied rights have
stood up to erosion remarkably well given the overall
vulnerability of the Western position in Berlin, the
Soviets and East Germans have made inroads. Some
cases, including the Soviet challenge to quadripartite
management of the air corridors, will be detailed in
subsequent sections of this paper. The only broad area
where the West has accepted the Soviet and East
German position-and the West still refuses to admit
formally that it has-is that East Berlin is the capital
of the German Democratic Republic. The Western
position lost considerable credibility when the West-
ern powers established diplomatic relations with East
Germany and situated their embassies in East Berlin.
In recent years, there have been a few areas where
quadripartite management has prevailed. Although
these cases do not relate directly to Allied access, they
do suggest some Soviet flexibility regarding coopera-
tion with the Allies:
? Agreement was reached in 1982 ending a longstand-
ing dispute over disposal of Rudolf Hess's remains
once he dies.
? The Soviets, to the surprise of US diplomats, avoid-
ed unnecessarily complicating the East German
negotiations with the West Berlin Senat (govern-
ment) that turned control of the S-Bahn in West
Berlin over to West Berlin authorities.
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? Agreements have been reached on tariffs to be paid
by the West German Bundesbahn to the East
German Reichsbahn for passenger and freight traf-
fic transiting East Germany to and from Berlin. F_
There also have been several instances where the
Western position has to a certain extent been
improved:
? Direct air service has been established from West
Berlin to several non-West German destinations in
Western Europe.
? The Soviets and their allies have been raising fewer
objections than in the past about the inclusion of
West Berliners in West German delegations to
international conferences.
Soviet and East German Challenges
The murky legal foundations of Western access rights
to Berlin, as well as differing interpretations of the
status of Berlin, provide the Soviets and East Ger-
mans with numerous opportunities to attempt to
establish new precedents and to test the will of the
Allies. In most cases, the original agreements involv-
ing four-power cooperation remain vague and general
with no specific procedure described. As a result, the
daily life of quadripartite management often has
be able to move freely throughout the city. Such free
access-based on a verbal agreement in 1945 between
General Clay and his Soviet counterpart-was consid-
ered a necessary corollary to Berlin's four-power
status. The Allies also maintain that sector bound-
aries should not take on the characteristics of interna-
tional borders, and that the Soviets themselves are
responsible for ensuring Allied free access. In con-
trast, the Soviets would like to interpret free access as
restrictively as possible and repeatedly have stated
that free access was meant to be limited to persons
who are directly associated with Allied occupation
forces in Berlinl
The Soviets face a dilemma on the free access ques-
tion. On the one hand, they would like to see a
reduction in the Western presence in East Berlin and,
indeed, are under great pressure from the sovereignty-
conscious East Germans to help bring this about.
Moscow also appreciates that Allied acceptance of
East German-as opposed to Soviet-controls at
east/west sector crossings amounts to Western recog-
nition of East German sovereignty over East Berlin
(thereby creating the impression that the sector cross-
ing is an international border). At the same time,
however, the Soviets do not want to provoke the
Western powers to institute similar controls on the
free movement of Soviets into and inside West Berlin.
depended on practices established by precedent.
Challenges to Allied Movement
The exercise of the right of free access to all sectors of
Greater Berlin, while not vital to the security of the
Western sectors, is an important element of such
"established practices." It is the most visible manifes-
tation of the Allied legal position that all four sectors
of Berlin remain under occupation. The only remain-
ing visible distinction between East Berlin and East
Germany is the presence in the former of Allied
soldiers uncontrolled by East German authorities. At
the same time, free access is the most vulnerable of
Allied practices and is not sanctioned in any legal
arrangements undertaken between the Soviet Union
and East Germany.
Problems at Checkpoint Charlie. Until the Soviets
initiated unilateral changes in air corridor reserva-
tions last year, the most serious challenge to Western
rights since East-West relations began to deteriorate
in 1979 was the East German attempt to gain greater
control over diplomatic traffic at Checkpoint Charlie
(see inset and figure 1). In the spring of 1981, East
German authorities began to detain diplomatic pass-
port holders moving west through the checkpoint who
had entered East Berlin from locations other than
West Berlin. This practice frequently has involved
delays of an hour while East German authorities
ascertain the traveler's point of origin. The US Mis-
sion believes that the harassment was authorized by
the Soviets as a result of strong East German pres-
sure. The pressure may have been the result of
Differing Legal Interpretations. The Soviets and
Allies differ in their interpretation of free access. The
Allies maintain that their forces and diplomats should
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In accordance with postwar understandings, uni-
formed military personnel can move through Check-
point Charlie without showing any documentation.
And, since construction of the Berlin Wall, civilian
members of forces show documentation issued by
Allied authorities simply to prove they are members.
Diplomatic and official passport holders show the
cover and picture page of their passports-known as
the diplomatic passport 'flash" procedure.
Between 1961 and 1974, most travelers through
Checkpoint Charlie went from west to east and
returned to the west on the same day. The present
problem developed after the United States estab-
lished diplomatic relations with East Germany in
1974, and the number of people traveling east to west
through the checkpoint increased. Especially offen-
sive from the Soviet and East German perspective
was that more and more official visitors transiting
the checkpoint had no direct association with the
occupation forces in West Berlin. And in 1978 the US
Mission in West Berlin agreed to assist rail transit
travelers from East European posts across the sector-
sector boundary to avoid passport controls.
The number of east-to-west crossings by officials who
entered East Berlin from places other than West
concern by East German security authorities that
they could not control access and entry to East Berlin
by Allied travelers coming from Eastern Europe.
Moreover, an increase in uncontrolled east-to-west
traffic could facilitate attempts to exfiltrate East
German citizens. Finally, for the East Germans this
issue was of great symbolic and practical importance.
The Soviets, for their part, probably were sympathetic
to the East German position in part because they
regarded the increase in Western official travelers
going east to west through the checkpoint as "a new
Western practice" that should be discouraged. The
Soviets presumably estimated that the Allies would
not consider the checkpoint delays as significant
enough to retaliate.
Berlin picked up sharply as a result. For example, in
September 1980, when East Berlin hosted the annual
conference of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the
Allies issued diplomatic passports to their delegates,
and shuttle buses transported them back and forth to
West Berlin. East German authorities, of course,
would have preferred that the delegates arrive at East
Germany's Schoenefeld Airport, submit to East Ger-
man port of entry controls, and spend hard currency
by staying at hotels in East Berlin.
In the period since the East Germans began to harass
diplomats at the checkpoint, the Allies have protested
to the Soviets that no limitations had ever been built
into the diplomatic passport 'Wash" procedure. The
United States had made it clear to the Soviets and
East Germans at the time diplomatic relations were
established that this would mean an increase in
traffic at the checkpoint. According to the US Em-
bassy in East Berlin, 75 percent of those delayed have
had official or personal business with the Embassy.
The Soviets, however, refused to intervene with the
East Germans on the Allies' behalf, suggesting that
the problem might be resolved in direct discussions
with the East Germans, or by routing non-Berlin
diplomatic traffic through the Drewitz crossing point.
The problem of delays continues, albeit at a much
reduced level since US authorities began to limit
opportunities for such incidents by encouraging diplo-
mats from East European countries not to enter West
Berlin from the east. When incidents have occurred,
delays sometimes have been shortened when Allied
authorities sent military vehicles to block all traffic at
the checkpoint until the detainee was released. The
United States demonstrated its unhappiness about the
checkpoint delays to the East Germans by instituting
a policy of having official visitors with business in
East Berlin stay overnight in West Berlin, resulting in
a loss of hard currency for the East Germans. We
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Figure 1
Major Crossing Points in West Berlin
A Controlled point of entry or exit
- Allied occupation zone boundary
S-bahn (electric train)
0 5 Kilometers
0 5 Statute miles
Final borders of Germany have not been established The representation of
other boundaries is not necessarily authoritative. The GDR has located
tome
the ,at of its government in the Eastern tar of Berlin F1ovt9ver Greater
r
Ge n ) Still -Wingll four occupied dons, , re retains is Pour TWO
ju dcaf Stztus-
BERLIN
Waltergdorfei
Chaussee
Sch6 nefeld
Airport
EAST
Bornholmer
Stratus
Prinzen O badthbriicke
strasse: ~
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believe, however, that, from the East German stand-
point, this monetary loss is far outweighed by the
security and symbolic political gains.
This problem is a classic case of Eastern erosion of a
right to which the Allies believe they are entitled. In
effect, the East Germans have been able to hinder a
growth in the number of Allied diplomats moving
freely in an east-to-west direction, and in this sense
they have achieved a victory. It is important to
remember, however, that, despite the delays, no Allied
diplomat has yet been denied access to West Berlin
from the east. From Moscow's view, the risks of
Allied retaliation against Soviet free access to West
Berlin would have been much greater if the East
Germans had been permitted to go so far as to deny
access to diplomats. And, although the Allies have
yielded in practice by deliberately minimizing the
number of east-to-west transiters, they still can main-
tain formally that free access continues to exist.
A second potential Checkpoint Charlie problem
emerged last year when the East Germans informed
the West Berlin Senat that they would begin some
construction work at the checkpoint on 1 August. On
12 July, the Allies made a demarche to the Soviets
and received informal assurances that Allied access to
East Berlin would not be hindered. Although in fact
Allied access has not yet been restricted, the construc-
tion measures threatened to reduce the ability of the
Allies to retaliate for detained diplomats by blocking
the whole checkpoint with a single military vehicle.
Flag Patrol Incidents. The most visible manifestation
of free access continues to be Allied and Soviet
military patrols (flag tours) throughout Berlin. They
no doubt also are the most irritating for East German
authorities. In 1977 the Soviets proposed ending, or at
least severely restricting, the practice of sending
Allied flag tours into East Berlin. The Soviets backed
off when the Allies rejected the suggestion and pre-
pared an elaborate series of countermeasures against
Soviet patrols in West Berlin. Soviet patrols in West
Berlin were stepped up after this episode; currently 10
to 15 US patrols travel through East Berlin every
week.
The Soviets, and in particular the East Germans, have
since continued periodically to discourage Allied flag
patrols, which they probably realize are of limited
practical utility to the Allies anyway. Although ha-
rassment of Allied patrols remains at a relatively low
level by past standards, there has been a handful of
such incidents within the last few months, including
one in which a US soldier was injured. Following an
incident on 19 September, the Soviets informed the
US Mission that they no longer would come to the
scene of incidents and that the Allies would have to
deal with East German authorities. It still is too early
to judge the sincerity of the Soviet threat as there
have been only a few incidents since September. The
Soviets did intervene in an incident involving a British
patrol on 26 September, but failed to intervene in one
involving a US patrol on 5 November and a French
vehicle on 13 November.
The Air Corridors
Soviet behavior during the controversy that emerged
last year over the air corridors linking West Berlin
and West Germany portends more serious problems
for the Western position in Berlin. Since last Febru-
ary, the Soviets have mounted a serious challenge to
quadripartite management of the air corridors by
unilaterally imposing lower level airspace reservations
extending the entire length of the corridors. The
system of quadripartite management established in
postwar agreements gives all four powers equal rights
in the corridors and permits changes in the air regime
only by unanimous consent. Soviet success in unilater-
ally making changes in the air regime, in our view and
those of US officials on the scene, would result in a
2 The following report from the US Mission in West Berlin
describes the way a US flag patrol was harassed by East German
authorities on 5 November: "As the flag patrol vehicle moved to
make a left turn at the intersection, a Vopo (East German police)
backed into the vehicle and began striking at it with his baton. The
US driver got out of the vehicle, demanding that the Vopo stop
banging on it and that a Soviet officer be sent to the scene. The
Vopo, however, ignored the request and began throwing batteries
from his baton at the driver. When a second patrol member took
photographs of his behavior, he (the Vopo) slammed the vehicle
door on that soldier's head. After some further threatening ges-
tures, the US soldiers got back in their vehicle, cleared the
intersection, and then parked to report the incident to superiors by
radio.'
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The three Western powers and the Soviets agreed on
Allied air access to West Berlin in late 1945, accord-
ing to the minutes of the Allied Control Council for
30 November. In February 1946, the four occupying
powers created the Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC)
to regulate air traffic. Three corridors varying in
length from 123 to 226 nautical miles were estab-
lished, connecting West Berlin to Hamburg, Hanno-
ver, and Frankfurt. Following the Berlin Blockade of
1948-49, the four occupying powers again agreed in
the New York and Paris agreements of May and June
1949 on joint management of the corridors and
guaranteed access for the Western powers.
The 1946 agreement also established the Berlin
Control Zone (BCZ), an area with a 30-kilometer (20-
mile) radius around the Allied Control Authority
(ACA) Building in downtown Berlin. The circle is
defined as an area of `free flight "for US, Soviet,
French, and British aircraft. The BCZ specifically
has a 10,000-foot ceiling. The three corridors inter-
sect at a spot 56 kilometers (35 miles) from the ACA
and 24 kilometers (15 miles) from the western edge of
the BCZ (see figure 2).
The 1946 Four Power Agreement on Rules of Flight
remains the basis for Allied air access to West Berlin.
The agreement stipulates that each corridor is to be
30 kilometers (20 miles) wide and that the minimum
corridor cruising altitude is to be 1,000 feet. The
Soviets contend that the base of the corridor is 2,500
feet, but US officials apparently do not believe this a
serious point of contention as Allied planes do not
normally fly below this altitude. The agreement did
not specify an altitude ceiling for the corridors. The
Soviets long have claimed a ceiling of 10,000 feet, the
same as that for the BCZ. The Allies reject this
interpretation in principle, but accept it in practice as
few Allied fights have exceeded 10,000 feet since
1960. Only when Soviet reservations cover lower
altitudes do the Allies fly above this ceiling.
serious derogation of Allied access rights. The prece-
dents established could facilitate further Soviet re-
strictions on Allied use of the corridors because
acquiescence would seem to support Moscow's claim
that the Soviet Union possesses ultimate authority
over air access to West Berlin. This Soviet claim, if it
were publicized and carried far enough, could endan-
ger the continued social and economic viability of the
city in view of the importance of air access and the
Allied role in it.
Evolution of the Reservation Problem. Disputes over
use of the corridors have occurred since the end of
World War II, and the roots of the present controver-
sy go back several years:
? In 1978, the Soviets began to reserve exclusive use
of airspace at low levels in parts of one or more
corridors at infrequent and short intervals.
? In 1980-81, the four powers worked out a modus
vivendi whereby Soviet reservations would be treat-
ed as "requests" instead of "demands." This ar-
rangement allowed the Allies to maintain that
quadripartite management continued to exist.
? After 1981, the frequency and duration of the
reservations increased as the Soviets requested addi-
tional lower-corridor airspace for their military
exercises.
? On 2 April 1983, the Soviets announced the total
closure of one entire corridor-as opposed to simply
reserving lower-level airspace-for the first time in
a decade.
? Throughout the summer of 1983, the Soviets took a
particularly harsh line on Allied deviation from
corridor airspace in bad weather.
? On 20 February 1984, the Soviet air controller in
the Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC) announced
that all future Soviet reservations of lower-level
airspace would cover the entire length of all three
corridors (previous reservations of airspace had nev-
er covered the entire length of the corridors). F_
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Figure 2
The Berlin Air Regime
10
Magdebur
S ~<
1 o<
J
EST Central Corridor
Br nde 6
Ve r'
' ~~-H nnover
Mecklenburger
Bucht
Final borders of Germany have not been established. The representation of
some other boundaries is not necessarily authoritative The GDR has
located the seat of its government in the Eastern S r of Berlin.
However, Greaser Berlin, including all four occupi sections, retains
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Figure 3
Impact of Soviet Reservation Changes on
Approaches to Tegel Airport
14.500
Lt wer it ttf most So i t test r ati xts
50
Miles from the western edge
of the Berlin Control Zone
50 40 30 20 10 0 10 20
Post-8 December 1984 Reservations With Geographic Limits
ke5da
50 40 30
a The eastern lateral limits to reservations most frequently used before 20
February 1984 were lines drawn perpendicular to the corridors through
three East German towns 21 to 31 miles from the edge of the Berlin
Control Zone.
Extent of Soviet reservations
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The Soviet approach announced last February pre-
sents several challenges. The new length-of-the-
corridor reservations create technical difficulties that
could affect the safety of Allied flights. The most
serious aspect is the high altitude at which Allied
flights must approach the Berlin Control Zone (BCZ)
when reservations are in effect, requiring rapid and
steep approaches and departures. US officials note
that, depending on aircraft type and weight as well as
weather and traffic conditions, traffic controllers need
the option for flights to enter or leave the BCZ as low
as 2,500 feet in order to have a normal rate of descent
or ascent to and from Allied airports. With the new
Soviet policy, however, flights often are required to
approach/leave the BCZ at 5,500 feet, and sometimes
higher. On occasion, Western flights have had to
circle within the BCZ to gain the proper altitudes for
arrivals and departures. In addition, the Soviets peri-
odically have given only very brief advance warning-
a half hour in one instance-causing additional prob-
lems in adjusting air traffic patterns. As yet, no
serious safety incidents have occurred involving Allied
aircraft. This can be largely attributed to favorable
weather conditions and successful air traffic adjust-
ments when new reservations have been in effect.
More serious, in our view, are the political implica-
tions of the new Soviet behavior. By acting unilateral-
ly to change the regulation of airspace use in the
corridors, the Soviets have departed from quadripar-
tite management of the air corridors. US officials
have noted repeatedly that reestablishment of four-
power cooperation is the chief goal in the talks
currently under way with the Soviets in the BASC.
Soviet Motivations. The Soviets probably have been
motivated in part by some level of concern for the
safety of all flights in the corridors. Indeed, the new
policy was announced shortly after the Allies com-
plained about a near collision in the southern corridor
between a Soviet military aircraft and a civilian
passenger airliner.
We believe, however, that there are other overriding
motives for the new Soviet policy, including a military
rationale. US officials in West Berlin agree that the
Soviet military probably was responsible for the initial
change on 20 February. Largely due to a change in
training procedure, the number of Soviet military
exercises in East Germany has increased, leading to a
related rise in the number of airspace reservations.
The Soviet military, by excluding Allied flights from
parts of the corridors, has more room for its own
maneuvers. An additional military goal would be to
reduce Allied intelligence-gathering capabilities by
shutting out Western flights from the lower altitudes
of the corridors.
marginal gain in military exercise flexibility
In our view, moreover, Soviet motives go beyond
immediate military objectives. This is suggested in
part by the fact that the Soviets have not used the
airspace during many of their reservations. Indeed,
US officials in West Berlin have concluded that, after
monitoring their actual flight activity on a regular
basis, the Soviets could conduct their training exer-
cises quite well with very few reservations and without
using the disputed space at the end of the corridors
nearest to Berlin. The Soviets, in the view of US
officials in West Berlin, have made the conscious
decision to inconvenience Allied air traffic for a
Although the new reservation policy initially may
have been motivated by military considerations, Mos-
cow's subsequent refusal until December to reverse or
modify this decision was a political one. Soviet politi-
cal authorities clearly were aware of the air corridor
issue-the Allies had raised the issue several times in
Washington, Paris, and London, and with the Soviet
Ambassador in East Berlin. Moreover, Soviet political
authorities in Berlin appeared to be well aware of the
moves of Soviet functionaries in the BASC, and at
times Soviet approaches to the Allies were well coor-
dinated-unlike in the past. Indeed, US officials in
West Berlin believe that Soviet and East German
activity since 1983 suggests that at some point in that
year they made a policy decision to seek changes in
the Berlin air regime.
In rationalizing their new air corridor policy, the
Soviets have used several arguments that clearly
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conflict with the letter and spirit of postwar agree-
ments on air access. Soviet officials have justified
unilateral changes by referring at times to their
responsibility for air safety in the corridors. They also
claim that Soviet military needs take priority over
Allied access. Such argumentation is not new, howev-
er, and has been a regular part of Soviet presentations
on the corridor regime for years. The Soviets have
endlessly repeated this rationale in meetings both in
the BASC and at the political level since February as
justification for tightening restrictions on Allied use
of Berlin airspace
Prospects for Solution. Despite important practical
and symbolic benefits, we do not believe that Soviet
authorities are willing to risk a crisis over the issue.
Indeed, the Soviets probably took the action because
they concluded that the Allies were limited in what
they could do in response. The Allies protested against
the new restrictions, but observed them in practice.
We believe it is possible that the Soviets interpreted
the initial Allied reaction to the restrictions as accep-
tance of the new regime
Rather than reawaken European fears of Soviet ag-
gression, Moscow probably will continue to work
toward achieving its objective in the air corridors in a
quiet and gradual manner. The Soviets have tried to
keep the discussions out of the political and public
arenas, preferring instead "technical" discussions in
the BASC. Yet during BASC discussions for most of
last year, the Soviets appeared to adopt a stalling
tactic. While inefficiency and poor organization may
account for some of the delay, the lack of progress
seemed more the product of design. Soviet representa-
tives in the BASC repeatedly asserted that they did
not have the authority to make decisions regarding
the reservations, and that they could only pass on
information to enable their superiors to evaluate
Allied proposals. At one point, they admitted that the
issue was "political," even though higher officials
continued to insist it was "technical."
The Soviets' unwillingness to accept the validity of
Allied concern will be an obstacle to reaching a
permanent solution. The Soviets reject the Western
argument that the new restrictions present a safety
hazard. They have told US officials that any Soviet
pilot could safely fly any Allied plane in or out of
Berlin with the new restrictions. The Soviets generally
place less of a premium on passenger comfort than
Western nations do. The average Soviet military
commander in East Germany no doubt is far more
concerned about flexibility in training his forces than
about whether Pan Am passengers have their ears
"pop" during descents into West Berlin. It is possible
that nothing short of the publicity surrounding a plane
crash would convince the Soviets that an overriding
safety factor is at issue here.
Ultimately, the prospects for a favorable settlement-
one that brings a return to the appearance of quadri-
partite management and sets geographic limits on
reservations sufficient to eliminate any safety haz-
ards-probably would be enhanced most if an East-
West thaw led Soviet political authorities to decide
that this issue is not worth sustaining as an obstacle to
improved relations. Indeed, the first breakthrough on
the air corridor issue occurred in December when the
Soviets notified reservations for less than the full
length of the corridors and indicated to Allied officials
in West Berlin that "most" of their future airspace
reservations would contain similar geographic limits.
This unexpected demonstration of flexibility may
have been timed to influence Allied discussions of
Berlin issues at the NATO ministerial meeting in
early December. It also may have reflected increasing
Soviet interest in smoothing over secondary disputes
with the United States in anticipation of the meeting
in January between Secretary Shultz and Foreign
Minister Gromyko. f_
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The new Soviet position on reservations is a mixed bag
for the West. On the positive side, the Soviets have
accepted the Western demand for geographic limits
and the notion that these should be greater when
higher level reservations are made. The Soviet con-
troller in the BASC has expressed a willingness to
explore agreement on establishing firmer guidelines
for future reservations, and has referred to the recent
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the problem. The atmosphere of recent BASC meet-
ings on this subject has improved appreciably. On the
negative side, newly proposed reservation-free areas at
the eastern end of the corridor remain less than the
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Allies would like. The most recent reservations termi-
nated 14 kilometers (8.7 miles) west of the BCZ,
whereas the Allies believe that a distance of 25 to 30
kilometers (16 to 20 miles) is necessary for their needs.
Moreover, the Soviets continue to assert that their
reservations are based on military requirements
The new Soviet reservation policy does represent an
improvement over a Soviet proposal made to the
Allies on 29 February 1984. According to the earlier
Soviet proposal, the Allies, on a permanent basis,
would be assigned altitudes between 3,500 and 11,000
feet or between 4,500 and 12,000 feet. The altitudes
below the floors would be reserved for the Soviets,
who would, as a result, need fewer temporary reserva-
tions of the space normally used by Allied flights. The
Soviet controller asked that any new agreement be in
writing and noted that, should the Allies refuse, they
could expect considerably more temporary airspace
reservations for the remainder of the year. In each
case, the new altitude regulations would extend the
entire length of the corridor. When the Allied officers
claimed that, in effect, the Soviets were suggesting a
rewriting of the 1946 agreement, he responded that
such was indeed the case.
On the surface, the Soviets were offering a compro-
mise that for the first time would have given the
Allies the right to use airspace above 10,000 feet.
Western airlines would have welcomed this aspect of
the offer, given that they prefer to fly at higher levels
to conserve fuel and because the ride is smoother.
This earlier Soviet proposal also had numerous short-
comings that would have left Allied rights and prerog-
atives severely circumscribed. Allied planes would still
be forced to enter and depart from the BCZ at
unacceptably high altitudes, thus leaving a principal
Allied safety concern unaddressed. Moreover, the
Soviet "compromise" would have required the Allies
to abandon their claimed right to use the lower
altitudes of the air corridors while still allowing the
Soviets to make unilateral reservations in the upper
altitudes (with only the promise of reduced frequency).
And the Soviet proposal offered no guarantee that the
Soviets would not continue to chip away at Allied
rights in the future.
Despite these signs of Soviet flexibility, Moscow
appears to have no intention of returning to the
pre-20 February geographic limits on reservations
ranging from 34 to 50 kilometers (21 to 31 miles) from
the edge of the BCZ. The Soviets still are asserting
the right to make unilateral adjustments in the Berlin
air corridor regime, contrary to the Allied position
that management of the corridors is a four-power
responsibility.
A more cooperative Soviet attitude could come about
if President Reagan decides to visit West Berlin in
May. The Soviets probably would seek to avoid
handing the United States the potential propaganda
coup that would result from a Presidential visit
coinciding with continuing press reports that the
Soviets are tampering with Allied air access. Before
the President's last visit in 1982, the Soviets unexpect-
edly became cooperative on a number of Berlin issues.
The Soviets might also move to satisfy Allied de-
mands if the West, despite possible problems with
Western public opinion, escalates its response to
unilateral actions beyond verbal protests. This would
appreciably boost the potential costs to Moscow of its
piecemeal efforts to erode Allied access. But such
Allied reactions are risky since we cannot be certain
how the Soviets will respond. The Soviet response to a
specific Allied action would depend on the nature and
timing of the action, the local circumstances leading
up to it, the state of East-West relations at the time,
and other factors such as leadership politics in
Moscow
Given the West's vulnerability in Berlin, the Allies
have few options in responding to Soviet behavior,
while Moscow has many options for counterreactions.
The Allies could take actions against Soviet interests
in and around Berlin, but these would be largely
limited to harassment of Soviet personnel. Another
option would be to take action on a non-Berlin issue of
importance to Moscow, clearly linking such a move to
the Soviet position on Allied rights in Berlin. For
example, the United States could tie continued refusal
to reinstate US landing rights for Aeroflot to the air
corridor issue. The Allies could also make further
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high-level demarches, perhaps accompanied by a stat-
ed readiness to send demonstration flights through
disputed airspace at the eastern ends of the corridors.
These options would not carry the risk of a military
incident in Berlin, but could nevertheless provoke
Soviet counterreactions, including increased harass-
ment of Allied personnel in and around Berlin.F_
actions may stand a greater chance of success at lower
risks
Other Challenges to Air Access. The Allies continue
to encounter corridor problems with the Soviets apart
from the issue of reservations. For example, the
Soviets periodically revive their argument that the air
corridors of 1946 were established to supply Western
Actual demonstration flights through disputed air-
space would be the riskiest option since they could
result in the shooting down of an Allied aircraft. Even
if the Allies were to limit their penetration of reserved
airspace to the disputed miles at the ends of the
corridors, the Soviets could increase military air
activity in the area to enhance the risk for the Allies
of midair collisions.
Although risks always will exist, we believe there are
conditions and times when strong Allied responses-
including demonstration flights-have a greater like-
lihood of successfully deterring the Soviets from
abridging Allied rights, or of forcing the Soviets to
acknowledge Western positions. Ironically, we believe
a strong response is more likely to achieve Western
objectives when Moscow has a solidly perceived inter-
est in improved relations with the West. In such an
environment, Soviet leaders probably would be more
reluctant than they are now to permit Berlin issues to
pose an unnecessary burden on overall East-West
relations. We also believe the effectiveness of stronger
Allied actions would be greater-and the risks proba-
bly less-if they were taken in the early stages of a
dispute.
In the case of the air corridors, a strong response
shortly after 20 February 1984 would have demon-
strated to the Soviets how seriously the Allies viewed
the situation. Indeed, available evidence shows that
the Soviets did not initially use the disputed airspace,
suggesting they probably were waiting to see how the
Allies would respond. We believe that now, however,
the risks are fairly high that stronger actions would
undercut-rather than reinforce-the apparent re-
cent Soviet willingness to compromise on Berlin is-
sues. The leadership situation in Moscow and the
course of East-West relations remain uncertain, and
statements by Soviet officials in Berlin indicate they
believe they already are taking steps to assuage Allied
concerns on Berlin issues. At some point in the future,
especially if US-Soviet relations improve and the
Soviets continue to impinge on Allied rights, stronger
military garrisons only and that civilian flights are
illegal. Unlike civilian surface transit and Allied air
access, civil air traffic in the air corridors remains the
only significant element of Berlin access-outside of
free access throughout Greater Berlin-that has no
legal basis as far as the Soviets and East Germans are
concerned since it is not based on any written agree-
ments. In contrast with other modes of access, West
Germans and other non-Allied air travelers can com-
mute to West Berlin under the auspices of the Allied
access regime without submitting to East German
border or transit controls. The Allies maintain that
the postwar agreements on air access do not restrict
the purpose of Allied aircraft transiting the corridors.
In line with their view of limits to Allied air access
rights, the Soviets are protesting about the number of
Allied civilian flights. Last April, Soviet officials in
the BASC complained that the number of civilian
flights recently had increased, even though Allied
records show that they in fact have diminished in
number over the last decade.' The Soviets demanded
that, contrary to previous practice, the names of
civilian companies be registered on flight cards pre-
sented in the BASC.^ On 7 April, the Soviets threat-
ened to have a civilian flight-a small corporate jet-
shot or forced down. The Soviet controller in the
' The number and duration of nonmilitary flights through the
corridors has declined by more than one-third since 1970. This can
be attributed to use of higher capacity, faster flying aircraft.
Moreover, with the improved conditions for ground transit resulting
from the QA and transit agreement in 1971, the number of
passen ers choosin to fly to Berlin has declined by more than one-
third.
? Airplanes owned by private US, British, and French companies
have flown to and from Berlin through the air corridors for many
years. Currently, such flights number about 10 per month. Flights
of aircraft owned by private individuals of Allied nationalities are
even less frequent. When the Allies notify the Soviets in the BASC
of impending flights, they provide only that information needed to
ensure safety of flight. In addition, the British and French routinely
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BASC claimed that refusal to name the company
would force the Soviet command to "assume that the
aircraft may be a combat or personal aircraft and this
runs counter to the QA." The US officer relented
once it became clear that Soviet fighter aircraft were
circling in the center corridor waiting to intercept the
unsuspecting jet. The Soviets have not repeated that
particular approach, but the Allies basically have
yielded to the Soviets by allowing them to examine
the books available in the BASC that list the owners
and registration numbers of all planes.
The Soviet threat to shoot down the plane was an
attack on long-established practice and quadripartite
management and almost certainly was well coordinat-
ed. In the view of the US Mission, Soviet behavior on
this and prior incidents showed that it is the provision
of the information by the Allies, as opposed to the
information itself, that is the Soviets' main concern.
The Soviet approach-strong statements in the BASC
and through political and military channels, combined
with the threat to the aircraft and the actual launch-
ing of interceptors-showed the extent to which they
were prepared to go to force Allied acquiescence in
this matter and to demonstrate their authority over
flight traffic in the corridors.
The Soviets also have sought periodically to enhance
the prestige of the East German regime by proclaim-
ing its sovereignty on certain issues and tolerating
East German violations of the air access regime. For
example, East German helicopter flights in the BCZ
increased in 1983. And, in early October 1984, the
East Germans flew helicopters in the BCZ during the
celebration of the 35th anniversary of the founding of
the East German regime. From the Allied perspective,
these flights not only violated the demilitarized status
of Berlin, but also the provisions of the 1946 rules of
flight that all four powers must agree on any changes
to the air regime. Soviet officials, for their part, claim
the East Germans have the right to fly over East
Berlin because it is East German territory
Last February, the East German parliament passed a
new law giving East Germany "exclusive sovereignty"
over all East German airspace. The East German
legislation does include some wording that could be
interpreted as providing formally-if obliquely-for
the continued exercise of Allied air rights. About the
same time, Soviet officials in the BASC asserted that
smaller airlines of the Allies would be required to
obtain East German permission to fly in the corri-
dors.' In this case, the Soviets once again sought to
distinguish between flights supplying the garrisons
(over which the Soviets would retain responsibility)
and all other Allied flights. In practice, the Soviet and
East German threats appear to be more bluster than
anything else. It is highly unlikely that the Soviets
would yield authority over the corridors or BCZ
(outside of East Berlin) to the East Germans.
Relations Between Soviet and Allied Military Liaison
Missions
Liaison relations between the United States Army
Command in Europe (USAREUR) and the Group of
Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG) definitely have cooled
since 1983. This has been evident in new travel
restrictions on Allied military liaison missions
(MLMs) operating in East Germany, the Soviet mili-
tary's rejection of proposals for a CINC-to-CINC
meeting, increased harassment of the MLMs by
Soviet and East German military forces, Soviet com-
plaints about the Allied procedure of "exchanging"
credentials, and, possibly, by the temporary closure of
the Glienicker Bridge. Although the relationship be-
tween the Soviet and Allied MLMs does not techni-
cally constitute a "Berlin issue," we believe that an
examination of this issue can help explain the environ-
ment in which Berlin problems now are being dis-
cussed.
According to the Chief of the USMLM, the downturn
in relations between USAREUR and GSFG appears
to be the result of a deliberate Soviet policy and, in his
view, can be traced to the fallout surrounding the
KAL shootdown. In November 1983, for the first
time in 10 years, no Soviet general attended the
' US officials in West Berlin have sustained regular contacts with
Soviet officials in forums such as the BASC. As a result, personal
relationships develop, and it sometimes is difficult to tell when
statements reflect personal factors (such as the mood of the
individual on a particular day) or specific instructions. US officials
suspect that Soviet statements alleging East German control over
small Allied airlines may not have been made under specific
instructions, as they were not followed up in subsequent meetings.
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Soviet Airspace Reservations:
A Numerical Summary
According to BASC records, despite substantial
Soviet changes in the air corridor regime last year,
the total number of Soviet reservations notified and
implemented in 1984 was almost identical to 1983.
From 20 February to 16 October 1984, the Soviets
notified 76 reservations, of which 59 were implement-
ed. During the same period in 1983, the Soviets
notified 75 reservations and implemented 56. ~
There have been significant fluctuations in Soviet
reservations and flying activity since the length-of-the
corridor reservations went into effect (see figure 4):
? From 20 February until mid-April, the Soviets
made reservations and carried on a normal level of
exercise activities, but avoided flying through the
reserved airspace.
? On 15 November, the Soviets flew through reserved
space adjacent to the BCZ for the first time since
29 June. This reservation also was the first ever
implemented by the Soviets in the month of Novem-
ber. The level of overall flight activity, however,
was low even by November standards.
? The number of reservations increased again in
December along with the level of Soviet flight
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activity.
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The total duration of reservations also has fluctuated
considerably, from 87 hours in March to five hours in
November (see figure 5). In April, May, July, August,
September, and December the total duration of reser-
vations was less than for the same months in 1983.
? From late April until early June, the Soviets made
only two reservations and did little flying.
? In June, the Soviets filed reservations regularly and
used the airspace.
? In July and August, the Soviets did a lot of flying
but seemed to be making a conscious effort to fly
above or below Allied altitudes.
The Soviets in recent months have been doing better
in terms of providing advance notification of reserva-
tions, but still are below the 24 hours that Allied
controllers would prefer. Between June and October,
the average hours of advance notification consistently
was above that for 1983 (see figure 6).
? In September, there were frequent reservations,
some at higher levels than normal, and many last-
minute changes.
USMLM Thanksgiving dinner in Potsdam. Moreover,
the Soviets have since turned down several invitations
for a CINC-to-CINC meeting. In contrast, following
such a meeting between General Kroesen-the outgo-
ing US CINC-and General Zaytsev earlier in 1983,
the Soviets had indicated they would like similar
meetings in the future.' The US invitations for a
6 Until the Kroesen-Zaytsev meeting, the United States, believing
that such high-level contacts were inappropriate in the aftermath of
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, had been the main obstacle to a
CINC-to-CINC meeting. The new Soviet reluctance to attend
Allied functions could be a belated, post-INF reciprocation of our
own post-Afghanistan boycott. Until recently, Allied MLMs had
kept down attendance at Soviet functions
meeting between Zaytsev and the new Chief of
USAREUR, General Otis, were intended to respond
to this perceived Soviet desire. Although the Chief of
Staff of GSFG did attend last year's Thanksgiving
dinner at the USMLM Potsdam facility, he indicated
that a CINC-to-CINC meeting was unlikely given the
steady deterioration in US-Soviet relations
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Figure 4 Figure 6
Number of Soviet Airspace Reservations Advance Notification of Soviet Airspace
Implemented, 1983 and 1984 Reservations, March-October 1983 and 1984
1983
1984
10 M A M J J A S C
Figure 5
Duration of Soviet Airspace
Reservations, 1983-84
Level desired by
Allied controllers
The Permanently Restricted Areas (PRAs). On 16
May 1984, the Soviet military command in East
Germany informed the Allied MLMs of new travel
restrictions in East Germany.' At first glance, the
changes do not look like much (see figure 7) because
the amount of territory included in the new PRAs
remains roughly the same as in 1978.
' Since the inception in 1951 of PRAs-those areas which are off
limits to the MLMs-the Soviets have redefined the PRA borders
nine times. The most extensive changes-in terms of an increase in
area covered-occurred in 1974. Minor adjustments were made in
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OVUM
Figure 7
Permanently Restricted Areas in East Germany
Permanently restricted to travel by US
Military Liaison Mission
Formerly restricted to travel by the US
Military Liaison Mission (prior to
16 May 1984)
Autobahn
Other road
0 5OKilometers
0 50Miles
Schwa
t