SOVIET UNCONVENTIONAL FUELS: LITTLE GROWTH AHEAD

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• Publication Date: April 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence 25X1
Directorate of
Little Growth Ahead
Soviet Unconventional Fuels:
Confidential
GI 85-10097
April 1985
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Directorate of Confidential
Intelligence 25X1
Soviet Unconventional Fuels:
Little Growth Ahead
This paper was prepared by Office
of Global Issues. Comments and queries are welcome
and may be directed to the Chief, Petroleum
Resources Branch, OGI,
Confidential
GI 85-10097
April 1985
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Soviet Unconventional Fuels:
Little Growth Ahead
Overview A detailed analysis of Soviet literature suggests that Soviet unconventional
Information available energy sources will not significantly increase Soviet energy output through
as o l April 1985 the end of this century. Development costs for unconventional fuels are
was used in this report.
high, many of the processing technologies for large-scale production have
yet to be fully developed, and the Soviets probably will need to direct a
larger portion of their overall energy investment to prop up sagging sectors
Unconventional fuels such as oil shale, peat, and wood-which accounted
for about 2 percent of Soviet fuel production in 1983-will continue to
account for a slowly declining proportion of the national total. Oil shale is
the only fuel source in this group with realistic possibilities of expanded
production within the next 15 years. Despite official Soviet claims, we
believe renewable energy sources such as solar, geothermal, tidal, and wind
probably will remain primarily on the drawing boards and contribute little
to Soviet energy needs.
Soviet plans specify that unconventional fuel production from renewable
energy sources will increase by about 20-40 million metric tons of standard
fuel equivalent annually from the 1983 levels-the energy equivalent of
about 420,000 barrels of oil per day at the midpoint of the range-by the
year 2000. Given the technical problems yet to be overcome and the
comparatively low investment priority this sector will have, we believe the
Soviets are unlikely to come close to meeting this goal.
Although unconventional fuels are of minor significance overall, the
Soviets have made some important applications:
Oil shale production-concentrated in Estonia and Leningrad Oblast-
fuels local heat and power stations and is a source of lubricants.
Peat fuel is used in some of the more heavily populated and economically
developed parts of the Soviet Union, even if costlier than alternative fuels
brought in from the outside.
Firewood production-although slowly decreasing in recent years-
remains a significant fuel for households and for many local industries
close to lumbering areas.
Confidential
GI 85-10097
Anril 19R S
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Contents
Overview iii
Scope Note vii
Introduction 1
9
10
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Scope Note This research paper is part of a continuing CIA effort to examine in detail
energy resources of the USSR. The unconventional fuels program is one of
the few parts of the Soviet energy picture that has not been studied by CIA
in any detail. This type of study improves our ability to estimate long-range
Soviet energy potential.
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Soviet Unconventional Fuels:
Little Growth Ahead
Oil shale, peat, and fuel wood together compose about
2 percent (in metric tons of standard fuel equivalent)'
of the total primary energy production of the Soviet
Union and about the same share of domestic energy
use (see table 1). In 1983 peat and oil shale each
accounted for less than 1 percent and fuel wood
slightly more than 1 percent of total energy produc-
tion (see table 2).
Although relatively insignificant on a national level,
all three energy sources are economic for many
localities where consumers are far from sources of
cheaper energy. These three energy sources are used
principally by households, thermal electric power
stations, and local industries such as lumbering and
construction.
According to Soviet press reports, the USSR has
shown-increased-interest in the prospects for new
renewable sources of energy such as solar, geother-
mal, wind, and tidal power. All of these sources
together contribute only marginally to Soviet energy
production totals. However, Soviet planners have indi-
cated in their long-term energy program published in
1984 that they intend to construct the physical infra-
structure and technical base for the widespread use of
nontraditional energy sources. According to the plan-
ners, these renewable new energy sources are expected
to contribute 20-40 million tons of standard fuel
equivalent by the year 2000, the end of the planning
period.
This paper assesses current production trends and
prospects for Soviet unconventional fuels through
2000. An overall assessment of Soviet unconventional
fuel sources is presented together with an evaluation
of their contribution to and future impact on the
entire Soviet energy program.
' According to Soviet definitions, a ton of standard fuel has the
energy equivalent of 5.1 barrels of oil or 844 cubic meters of
Table 1
Minor Fuels: Soviet Production,
in Standard Fuel Equivalent
1960
4.8 20.
4
28.7
53.9
1965
7.4 17.
0
33.5
57.9
1970
8.8 17.
7
26.6
53.1
1975
10.8 18.
5
25.4
54.7
1980
11.8 7.
3
22.8
41.9
1981
11.7 12.
6
22.9
47.2
1982
11.2 8.
3
23.3
42.8
Table 2
Minor Fuels: Share of Total
Soviet Fuel Production
1960
0.7
2.9
4.1
7.7
1965
0.8
1.7
3.5
6.0
1970
0.7
1.5
2.2
4.4
1975
0.7
1.2
1.6
3.5
1980
0.6
0.4
1.2
2.2
1981
0.6
0.6
1.2
2.4
1982
0.6
0.4
1.2
2.2
1983
0.5
0.4
1.1
2.0
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Administration of Soviet
Unconventional Fuels
Responsibilities for the organization and manage-
ment of Soviet unconventional fuels are divided
among many governmental ministries and academic
and planning bodies. These various organizations are
responsible for the various stages of planning, devel-
oping, and implementing the energy-related project.
As with the overall Soviet energy economy, there is
no "energy czar"for the unconventional fuels sector.
Several of the main branch ministries responsible
for important parts of overall energy policy are
also directing much of the unconventional fuels pro-
gram. The Ministry of Power and Electrification
(Minenergo) oversees tidal power and, with the Minis-
try of the Gas Industry, geothermal power. The
Ministry of Coal supervises the production of both
peat and oil shale. The Ministry of Land Reclama-
tion and Water Resources (Minvodkhoz) plans and
develops wind energy projects. The Ministry of the
Timber, Pulp and Paper, and Wood Processing In-
dustry has nominal control over the diverse activities
involving the cutting and delivery of firewood to
industries and households. Finally, a host of organi-
zations are involved in various aspects of solar energy
research and development including Minenergo; the
National Academy of Sciences; several research insti-
tutes under regional branches of the Academy of
Sciences in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Armenia, and
the Ukraine; and the USSR State Committee for
Science and Technology.
of small units and organizations. This is especially
true for the renewable sources of energy. A good
example is the allocation of operational responsibil-
ities for geothermal energy projects. The National
Academy of Sciences is responsible for basic geother-
mal research; while the Ministry of Gas is in charge
of drilling geothermal wells and developing the ener-
gy resources. Major potential users of this resource
promote geothermal development. These organiza-
tions include Minenergo (power generation), the Min-
istry of the Chemical Industry (extraction of chemi-
cals from geothermal brines), and the Ministry of
Agriculture (use of geothermal resources for heating
greenhouses, fish farming, and other agricultural
uses).
This organizational complexity has, more often than
not, resulted in programs being advanced only halt-
ingly under various halfhearted leaderships with no
serious interest or commitment to developing not only
geothermal, but the entire spectrum of renewable
resources.
There are also substantial problems with the develop-
ment of such nonrenewable energy sources as oil
shale and peat, seemingly placed in a more efficient
organizational setting under the Ministry of Coal.
Both shale and peat development efforts suffer con-
siderably because they are considered sidelines to the
Coal Ministry's primary mission of producing coal.
Almost without exception, coal development and
extraction efforts have been assigned higher priorities
for receiving allocations of investment resources, with
Most of the unconventional fuels programs are rela-
tively limited and are scattered over a large number
Shale
Soviet geologists have estimated oil shale 2 reserves in
the USSR to range from 190 billion to 220 billion
tons.3 Soviet reserves of oil shale in the proved catego-
2 Oil shale is a layered sedimentary rock rich in an organic material
known as kerogen. When heated to above 480?C, the kerogen in
the rock decomposes, releasing a liquid oil product
' Estimates of world and US oil shale reserves vary enormously.
One UN report estimated potential world reserves at some 26
shale and peat having to settle for leftovers.
ries (A + B + C,) are 6.6 billion tons with three-
fourths concentrated in the Baltic shale basin, which
extends from Estonia (3.9 billion tons) into adjacent
Leningrad Oblast (1.1 billion tons).' The only other
large proved shale reserves are in Kuybyshev Oblast
on the Volga River (0.72 billion tons). The Soviet
' We define "A" category reserves as roughly equatable to the
Western category "proved." "B" category reserves equate to
"proved on hold or in reserve," while "C," category reserves equate
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connaennai
Figure 1
USSR: Oil Shale Production,
1960-85
0 1960 65 70 75 80 85
Union contains about 100 known shale fields, the
majority concentrated primarily in the European
USSR.
Soviet oil shale production, reflecting the distribution
of reserves, is concentrated in Estonia and Leningrad
Oblast, with the rest being mined in the Kashpirovka
strip mine near Syzran' by the Volga River (see map
following text, figure 7). In 1983, out of a total
production of about 33 million tons, Estonia account-
ed for almost 28 million tons, Leningrad Oblast for
more than 5 million tons and the Kashpirovka area for
less than 1 million tons, (see figure 1).
Until almost 1960, Estonian shale was used as a solid
fuel in small local heat and power stations and was
processed at Kohtla-Jarve, the center of the mining
district, to produce fuel oil, shale gas, gasoline, coke,
and lubricants (see figure 2). This pattern changed
sharply in the 1960s with the construction of two
large shale-burning thermal power stations. The Bal-
tic station opened west of Narva and reached its
projected capacity of 1,600 megawatts (MW) in 1966.
The Estonian central station, southwest of Narva,
opened in 1969 and reached its designated capacity of
1,600 MW in 1972. The two stations, using almost 80
percent of expanding Baltic output, raised Estonia's
electric power from 2 billion kilowatt-hours (kWh) in
1960 to 19 billion kWh in the late 1970s. They. have
provided an ample electricity supply for Estonia's own
economy and leave a surplus of some 10-11 billion
kWh for transmission to Leningrad Oblast and the
Latvian SSR. The great need for a rapid shale mining
expansion for power generation sparked the develop-
ment of strip mines in Estonia after 1960. Four strip
mines supplied more than half of Estonian production
by the late 1970s.
totally unrealistic.
The Soviets planned to increase oil shale production
substantially in the Baltic region as part of the 1981-
85 Five-Year Plan. By 1985 the Soviets had intended
to increase production to as high as 68-70 million tons
per year by expanding surface and underground min-
ing. The task of increasing Baltic shale production by
such a significant amount (approximately 30 million
tons) relatively quickly now appears to have been
The Soviet press reported cutbacks in the generation
of shale-fueled electric power and heavy accumula-
tions of shale stockpiles, causing in turn a cutback in
mine production. Stockpiles of 6-8 million tons were
reported in 1983. The Soviets had also planned to
build a 2,500-MW shale-fired power plant in Estonia.
Construction of this plant, slated to be the world's
largest shale-fueled station, was scheduled to begin
sometime during the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (1981-
85). However, the total lack of press reporting on this
project in recent years indicates that the Soviets have
apparently canceled or indefinitely postponed plans.
Soviet expectations of a swelling Baltic regional de-
mand for shale as an energy feedstock seemed to have
soured because of a decline in demand by important
industrial customers and changing patterns of energy
use in the Baltic region.
Difficulties were also caused by technical problems
associated with a program to develop a new retorting 5
process that would yield both oil and gas. Soviet press
articles indicate that the emphasis in the Estonian
retorting pilot program has been on the UTT-3000
units, which are retorting units with a daily through-
put capacity of 3,000 metric tons of shale. Two such
retorting units, each with an annual capacity of close
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Figure 2. Oil shale processing
plant at Kohtla-Jarve, Estonia.
to 1 million tons of oil shale, had been counted on to
increase the efficiency of Estonia's two oil shale power
stations, which now use shale in direct combustion
with extensive emissions of ash and sulfur compounds
and heavy residues of spent shale in boilers. Construc-
tion of the two UTT-3000 units began in 1976. The
Soviet units were developed by ENIN, the Krzhizha-
novskiy Power Research Institute. Tests began in
1980, proved unsatisfactory, and required the recon-
struction of the two retorts, which were then retested
in 1982. Aside from these technical difficulties, strong
opposition to the retorting experiments were advanced
by supporters of the direct combustion process. F_
There also appears to be a decline in demand by the
Estonian shale industry's two most important custom-
ers-the two large Estonian shale-fired stations. The
function of these stations appears to be changing since
the installation of nuclear generating capacity at the
Leningrad power station at Sosnovyy Bor. The avail-
ability of nuclear power, especially since the construc-
tion in 1980 and 1981 of additional capacity at the
Leningrad station, has reduced the hours of use of the
shale-generated stations, which are being used in-
creasingly to cover daily peak loads. This general
decline in use appears evident in the production trends
of both oil shale and electric power in Estonia (see
table 3).
In recent years the Soviets have mentioned plans for
developing and expanding shale mining in several
other parts of the USSR, including Belorussia, Oren-
burg, Komi ASSR, and Kuybyshev Oblast. Soviet
sources claimed that the opening of two large open-pit
mines in the Kuybyshev area alone would permit
recovery of about 100 million tons per year of oil
shale.
Soviet engineers have claimed that approximately 20
million tons per year of shale oil could be retorted
from raw oil shale in Kuybyshev Oblast and that most
of this oil would be directly combusted in local
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Table 3
Estonia: Production Trends in
Oil Shale and Electric Power
Oil Shale Production
(million metric tons)
Power Generation
(billion kWh)
1979
31.0
19.4
1980
31.3
18.9
1981
30.7
17.8
1982
29.3
18.5
1983
27.7
19.1
1984
27.4
18.3
1985 (Plan)
26.4
19.4
regional power plants. The conversion of these power
plants from residual fuel oil to shale oil reportedly
would save the Soviets about 92 million barrels of
crude oil yearly. Soviet scientists have claimed that
the processing of Estonian shales alone into shale oil
would amount to some 750 million tons of syncrude.
So far there have been no indications that this or any
other shale expansion scheme has yet gotten off the
ground.
Peat
The USSR has over 60 percent of the world's peat
resources with a total potential peat area estimated at
690,000 square kilometers, with proved and probable
reserves of over 150 billion tons.' Some 25 billion tons
of reserves in the A + B + C, categories have been
identified, extending from Belorussia and the Baltic
Republics in the west to Siberia and Kamchatka in
the eastern USSR. Although the greatest reserves are
situated in West Siberia (25 percent) and the Urals
(35 percent), most production is concentrated in cen-
tral Russia, which has only 8 percent of the reserves,
and in Belorussia with but 1.5 percent of total nation-
al reserves. The USSR is by far the world's largest
producer of peat, both for fuel (figure 3) and agricul-
ture, accounting for over 95 percent of total world
6 World peat resource estimates range from 230 billion to 250
billion tons. US resources are estimated to total almost 14 billion
Figure 3
USSR: Fuel Peat Production,
1960-83
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0 1960 65 70 75 80 83
production.' Normally, annual production capacity is
about 230 million tons. Over two-thirds of this total is
used in agriculture.
Soviet interest in the use of peat fuel is derived from
the scarcity of fossil fuels in some of the more heavily
populated and economically developed parts of the
Soviet Union, notably central and northwestern 25X1
USSR. The Soviets also use local resources, even if
costlier than alternative fuels brought in from the
outside. In terms of heat value, peat has an average
calorific content of about 3,700 Btu's per pound. The
poorest grade Soviet brown coal mined at the Moscow
basin has a calorific value of 4,550 Btu's per pound.
Despite the apparent drawbacks of using low-calorific
peat for power generation, further expansion of peat-
fueled power stations was ordered in the late 1960s
' Agricultural uses of peat include organic fertilizers, cattle bed-
ding, poultry litter, and insulation packing for fruits and vegetables.
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and 1970s because of fuel shortages in central Russia.
In recent years Soviet planners have felt increasingly
that no more peat-fired power stations should be built,
especially in light of the potential agricultural and
chemical uses of peat. A section in the Soviet Long-
Term Energy Program released in 1984 stated that
the use of peat for fuel will be substantially reduced as
early as the "next few years." Another 1984 Soviet
report indicated that the processing of various chemi-
cal products from peat is 15 to 20 times more
profitable than using peat as an energy source. A
1984 UN symposium report evaluating peat as an
energy source concluded that no significant expansion
in the use of peat in the power industry is expected
and that the major use for peat in the future would be
in agriculture.
Wood
The USSR has one-fifth of the world's forests,
stretching over 7.5 million square kilometers, or about
a third of Soviet territory. Since 1965 the area of
forest in the USSR has risen by almost 450,000
square kilometers and total timber reserves by about
4.5 billion cubic meters. During the 1980s, the lum-
bering industry has averaged a yearly total cut of over
350 million cubic meters of timber. Between 20 and
25 percent of this has been designated as firewood.
Firewood production has been slowly decreasing since
1965 but has remained a significant fuel for many
small-scale local industries close to lumbering areas in
the north and northwestern USSR and for house-
holds. Indeed, according to Soviet open sources, fire-
wood accounts for about one-third of the fuel supply
for Riga. Presumably, firewood accounts for a similar
share of the fuel needs of other Baltic cities as well.
Official national figures do not include wood burned
by individuals, so total real consumption is actually
much higher. Total private use may nearly equal the
firewood cut by the lumbering industry. Overall, wood
contributes 23 million tons of standard fuel equiva-
lent, slightly more than 1 percent of the national
energy total.
literature, large areas of the Soviet Union containing
substantial geothermal resources have already been
surveyed. These regions include West Siberia
(Tobol'sk, Omsk), the Pavlodar and Karaganda re-
gions of northern Kazakhstan, Central Asia, the
Carpathian Mountains, Kamchatka, and the Kuril
Islands (see map, figure 7). Because of generally high
development costs, however, the Soviets apparently
plan to exploit geothermal resources only in especially
suitable locations that lack other energy sources.
The Kamchatka Peninsula has been the site of all
Soviet efforts to use geothermal energy for electricity
production. The first area to be developed for geother-
mal energy was at Pauzhetka, near the southern tip of
the Kamchatka Peninsula. The Pauzhetka pilot plant,
which operates on wet steam driving a turbine, went
into operation in 1967 with 5 MW of capacity (see
figure 4). In 1981 the Soviets expanded the station,
more than doubling its rated electrical capacity to 11
MW. Power from the plant is transmitted to a nearby
fish cannery on the southwest coast of Kamchatka.
Soviet figures released on Pauzhetka indicate that its
investment cost was over 900 rubles per kW, eight to
nine times more than the cost per kW usually indicat-
ed for thermal power stations. The Soviets claimed,
however, that the operating cost per kWh at the
Kamchatka site was three to five times less than that
at diesel-powered stations elsewhere in Kamchatka.
In another Kamchatka geothermal project, a pilot
plant was constructed at Paratunka, a hot springs
area near Petropavlovsk. After starting up in 1967,
Geothermal
The USSR, along with several other countries, has
been investigating geothermal energy as a renewable
substitute for fossil fuels. According to the Soviet
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the plant-using a Freon-driven turbine system-
operated for several years before being shut down
because of operational difficulties. According to Sovi-
et open press reports, however, hot water from the
wells drilled at the site continue to be used to heat
60,000 square meters of greenhouses at the nearby
Termal'nyy state farm. The Soviets planned to double
this greenhouse area by the end of 1985.
A more ambitious geothermal project proposed for the
Kamchatka Peninsula is a 200-MW plant at the
Mutnovskaya volcano some 80 kilometers south of
Petropavlovsk. The first stage of this project, already
under construction according to a 1985 report, is
scheduled for completion sometime during the late
1980s and will give the station a capacity of about
50,000 kW. According to the Deputy Minister of
Power and Electrification, "in the foreseeable future,"
the Soviets will be able to install geothermal power
plants on Kamchatka with a total output capacity of
up to 2,000 MW.
Open-source reports indicate that the Soviets are also
planning to construct power plants at three sites in the
western part of the country-Dagestan, Stavropol'
Kray, and the Carpathian Mountains. Construction
has reportedly started on the Dagestan site at
Tarumovka, north of Makhachkala. These pilot in-
stallations will use a closed-cycle underground circu-
latory system, which will eliminate environmental
pollution-reportedly a problem at the Paratunka
site. Soviet sources estimate that the potential re-
serves of such power in the USSR at depths down to
4,000 meters will make it possible to construct geo-
thermal power stations with an aggregate capacity of
150,000 MW. About half of this capacity is in the
European USSR-primarily in the Northern Cauca-
sus, Armenia, the Crimea, and the Carpathian Moun-
tains. The heat reserves in the Carpathians alone
equal 5 billion tons of standard fuel equivalent,
according to one Soviet report.
The Soviets have asserted that the cost of using
geothermal power in these areas would be substantial-
ly less than with coal or diesel-fired stations. Soviet
open-source reports also maintain that, in the North
Caucasus, 1 million calories (1 Gcal) of heat from
geothermal sources is considerably less expensive than
heat from thermal power resources. These reports also
stated that, in certain areas of Kazakhstan, Central
Sovphoto
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Asia, and West Siberia, costs for geothermal heat
would be less than the rates for thermal heat. In
recent years Soviet geothermal specialists have opti-
mistically estimated that geothermal power stations
could supply up to 5 percent of the USSR's electrical
energy supplies by the year 2000. According to a
USSR Academy of Sciences member, the expanded
use of geothermal energy could save up to 140 million
tons of standard fuel equivalent per year.
Solar
Solar research is coordinated by the USSR Academy
of Sciences and the State Committee for Science and
Technology. Research and testing are conducted
mainly at institutes in regions of the Soviet Union,
such as Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan, where this
energy source is most likely to be used. In 1979 the
Turkmen Academy of Sciences established the Scien-
tific Research Institute also known as Solntse (sun).
Solntse is developing solar energy equipment to meet
small-scale energy needs in and regions.
The Soviets believe that solar energy is not competi-
tive with fossil fuels for any large-scale utilization.
Soviet officials have indicated that they did not see
solar energy as being of much importance except for
water and space heating of individual houses in
southern rural regions of the USSR (see figure 5).
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Some Soviet energy researchers believe, however, that
solar energy may be competitive with conventional
sources in a few situations. These uses include small-
scale solar power supplies in and or remote regions for
irrigating pastures and watering stock; pumping and
desalinating water; supplying power for communica-
tions and cathodic protection of pipelines; and water
heating, supplementary space heating, and air-condi-
tioning for housing. According to a recent 1985
report, the USSR has over 90 installations using solar
energy for heating.
Despite the fanfare devoted to planning solar energy
applications, implementation has been halting. Al-
though between 30 and 40 organizations participate
in the solar energy applications program, there is
still-according to critical Soviet press reports-no
substantial serial production of equipment for solar
installations, and no ministry has accepted responsi-
bility for directing such production efforts. A small
factory at Bukhara in Uzbekistan is the only known
commercial producer of solar equipment, and it re-
portedly has been unable to meet its production goal
for solar collectors. A 1985 open source indicated,
however, that units under the USSR Ministry of the
Construction Materials Industry have begun to pro-
duce solar-powered water heaters.
In the realm of large-scale production of solar elec-
tricity, the Soviets are still largely in the planning
stage. Work commenced, however, in 1983 on the
USSR's first solar power station in the Crimean
village of Lenino by the Sea of Azov. Soviet press
reports have stated that the station will have a
capacity of 5,000 kW and will supply electricity to
several nearby settlements. It will have 1,600 helio-
stats (movable mirrors), each with an area of 25
square meters, arranged in concentric circles around
an 80-meter-high tower. The steam generators will be
installed in the top of the tower. The total area of the
field of mirrors is 40,000 square meters, ranking it as
one of the world's largest solar installations. The site
has over 230 sunny days a year. The plant will also
contain a heat accumulator, which will store solar
energy for use at night and during cloudy weather.
The Soviets plan to extensively expand this initial site
by constructing four more power units, each with a
capacity of 50 MW.
The Soviets are also planning to construct another
solar power station, tentatively sited at Talimardzhan
in Uzbekistan, with a final capacity of 300 MW.
Initially, the station, which will contain over 5,000
heliostats, will have a capacity of about 100 MW. A
gas-burning standby unit will add another 200 MW to
the station's capacity. The station could reportedly
generate 2 billion kWh annually. A 1985 Soviet open-
source report indicated that this project was still in
the design stage.
Tidal
The USSR is one of only three countries generating
electricity from tidal currents. With French assis-
tance, the Soviets constructed a small 400-kW experi-
mental tidal power station in 1968 at Guba Kislaya
near Murmansk on the Barents Sea (see figure 6). The
station uses a very small, bulb-type, reversible gener-
ating pumping unit supplied by the French company
that designed the much larger units used in the La
Rance power station in Brittany, France. Although
operational data and costs were not released, the
Soviet chief engineer for the Guba Kislaya project
said that it demonstrated the success of the concept
and that the project's objectives were attained.
A number of potential sites for tidal projects have
been surveyed throughout the USSR. The most favor-
able sites-those possessing the largest differences
between high and low tide-occur along the northern
coasts of the European USSR and around the Sea of
Okhotsk in the Soviet Far East. The most recent
project appears to be a larger experimental installa-
tion, with a generating capacity of 38,000 kW,
planned for the Lumbovka area near the eastern end
of the Kola Peninsula. This projected plant, scheduled
for completion sometime in the late 1980s, would
operate in tandem with a hydroelectric plant to be
installed on the lokanga River, just northwest of
Lumbovka.
Several other proposed installations are much larger,
such as a 15,200-MW site on the Mezen' River that
flows into the White Sea. The Soviets have estimated
that a tidal station constructed at this location could
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Figure 6. Guba Kislaya experi-
mental tidal power plant near
Murmansk on the Barents Sea.
generate an annual output of 50,000 million kWh.
Feasibility studies have also been prepared on the
construction of two large stations on the coast of the
Sea of Okhotsk in the Soviet Far East. Soviet esti-
mates of the capacity of one of these sites, Penzhin-
skaya Guba, run as high as 100,000 MW. A Soviet
source stated that USSR tidal power could eventually
produce 350 billion kWh a year. These projects, if
carried out, however, would be the world's largest and
most expensive hydropower installations.
The general absence of large energy consumers near
most areas suitable for the construction of tidal power
stations suggests that a substantial development of
this energy source by the year 2000 is unlikely. At
best we expect the construction of a few plants with a
maximum capacity of a few megawatts by the turn of
the century.
Wind
The USSR has extensive areas suitable for windpower
sites. The Arctic coastlines, Ural Mountains, Baltic
and Black Seas, and the steppes and mountainous
regions of Kazakhstan and Central Asia are all
regions with average wind velocities ranging from 18
to 25 kilometers per hour.
Windpower has been used for many years in agricul-
tural and remote areas of the USSR. Over 10,000
small windmills are used in rural areas to pump water
or to serve as auxiliary and sometimes autonomous
sources of electric power. These Soviet-constructed
wind generators have generally been small with power
capacities ranging from 1 to 10 kW, although in 1931
the Russians constructed a 100-kW wind tower near
Yalta on the Black Sea with an annual output of
280,000 kWh. During the 1930s, the Soviets consid-
ered building a much larger 5-MW system but never
implemented the project. Since the 1950s, other units
with up to 400 kW in power capacity have since been 25X1
installed at sites in Kazakhstan and the European
Arctic.
In 1975 according to Soviet open source reports, a
national company named Tsiklon (cyclone) was creat-
ed under the Ministry of Land Reclamation and
Water Resources, with the goal of developing and
bringing windpower items into the Soviet economy.
Tsiklon engineers reportedly have designed a series of
windpowered electrical generators with capacities
ranging from 1 to 100 kW. In 1984, preparations were
said to be under way for series manufacture of
Tsiklon units combined with electric generators of
some 2 to 8 kW of capacity. These devices were to be
used for radio communications, automatic meteoro-
logical stations, signaling equipment, and cathodic
anticorrosion protection of oil and gas pipelines.F_
A small plant in Astrakhan' reportedly has an annual
production capacity of 20,000 wind units. Soviet press
articles stated, however, that the 1976-80 Plan called
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for just 10,000 units to be produced and that only
about 4,500 had been constructed by 1980. In the
early 1980s, reports indicated that the plant was
poorly equipped and that 80 percent of its capacity
was engaged in producing items other than windpower
devices. According to an open source, no more than
150 to 200 wind units were being produced yearly,
and a 1984 report stated that this production volume
had risen only slightly to about 250 units annually.F-
To solve the inherent drawback of fluctuating energy
production associated with windpower, the Soviets are
considering establishing combined wind- and solar-
powered installations at sites near Lake Balkhash in
southern Kazakhstan and Kara-Bogaz-Gol in western
Turkmenistan. The Soviets also hope to construct
much larger windpowered stations than the current
Tsiklon series. Some of their engineers feel that
generators with capacities of 2 to 4 MW and larger
(up to 40 MW) are technically and economically
feasible. The prevailing view of most Soviet energy
planners, however, is that current prospects for wind-
power plants of this magnitude are highly uncertain.
We believe that prospects are bleak for Soviet uncon-
ventional fuel sources providing any substantial pro-
duction increments by the end of the 1990s. Many of
the requisite processing technologies for large-scale
production, especially for solar, geothermal, tidal, and
wind, are likely to remain on the drawing boards for
the near future. Although the processing technologies
for oil, shale, and peat are better understood, in our
view, developing these fuel sources would be costly
and would add further problems to Soviet planners
already faced with sharply rising costs for oil and
coal. Finally, the Soviets probably will need to direct
an even larger share of investment resources to prop
up sagging oil and coal production, leaving compara-
tively minor amounts available for unconventional
fuel development. Oil shale appears to be the only
unconventional energy source likely to achieve any
meaningful long-term production increase. In the
short term, it is doubtful that oil shale will show any
increase in output, given the operational difficulties
and slackness in demand for Estonian shale produc-
tion and the slowness in opening up Volga shale
resources because of technical shortcomings and
bureaucratic inertia.
In our view, chances are slight that peat will register
any production upswing for energy purposes; Soviet
planners are increasingly devoting their complete
attention to expanding the use of peat for agricultural
activities. The use of wood for fuel will continue to
slowly, but steadily, decline by the end of the century.
The growing use of bottled natural gas in rural and
remote areas should hasten this trend.
The Soviets have stated in their long-term energy
program published in 1984 that nontraditional energy
sources will substantially increase their production of
energy resources by the year 2000. They expect the
bulk of this production to come from the solar and
geothermal sectors. Both these sectors have suffered
in recent years from poor coordination in planning
among the government agencies and research insti-
tutes responsible for planning, designing, and imple-
menting scheduled projects. Indeed, organizational
inefficiencies and technical shortcomings have
plagued efforts to develop the entire spectrum of
unconventional fuels. Many Soviet energy experts
have expressed doubt in Soviet publications that any
of the renewable technologies will make a lasting
impact on the Soviet energy scene. At the same time,
the Soviet energy bureaucracy has consistently been
reluctant to risk any significant amount of investment
resources on the relatively expensive, technologically
risky long-term energy projects that need to be pur-
sued before these new energy sources can be placed on
a sound technological and operational base. These
serious organizational and technical drawbacks asso-
ciated with the entire field of unconventional Soviet
fuels make it highly unlikely that (1) renewable
energy sources will supply the planned annual produc-
tion totals of 20-40 million tons of standard fuel
equivalent expected by the 1990s, or that (2) uncon-
ventional fuels will supply more than the current
2-percent share of Soviet fuel production.
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Figure 7
Soviet Unconventional Fuel Sources
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