TEXT FOR (SANITIZED) PRESENTATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R002403940003-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 22, 2009
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 9, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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CONFIDENTIAL
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC #06033-85
9 December 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: Chairman, National Intelligence Council
Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council
FROM: Fritz W. Ermarth
National Intelligence Officer for USSR
SUBJECT: Text for Harvard presentation
Bob Gates approved my making a seminar presentation to the faculty of
the Harvard University Center for International Affairs. The session will
be informal and off-the-record, but I've preparted a text (attached). The
seminar will occur on 11 December.
74000.4
~71
Fri
Ermarth
)X-
Attachment: As stated
cc: D/SOVA
D/OPA
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"THE PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF THE GORBACHEV REGIME"
-SEMINAR PRESENTATION TO HARVARD'UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Fritz W. Ermarth
11 DECEMBER 1985
I. Introduction
The Soviet Union has always been an interesting country.
Now it is more interesting than ever, because much is in
flux and there is a tinge of uncertainty about almost
everything. As Tocqueville once said about a situation
sufficiently anologous to make it worth recalling: "No
moment is more dangerous -- let us here simply say uncertain
-- than when an incompetent dictatorship seeks to mend its
ways." I want in these remarks to survey what is being done
by. and what lies before the Soviet dictatorship, which is
remarkably competent at some things but even more remarkably
incompetent at things it regards as very vital, as it seeks
to mend its ways.
Although my opinions are informed by all the information at
my disposal and the experienced judgments of my colleagues,
I want you to understand that these opinions are my own, not
those of the US government or any of its components.
Further, in order that these institutions be spared the
necessity of having to explain or justify or repudiate what
I have to say, my comments are off the record. I hope,
nevertheless, that they are worth remembering.
II. The-Essential Problems
---------------------
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There is no doubt that the new Gorbachev regime is trying,
as the cliche has it, to get the Soviet Union moving again.
What that regime is now attempting to do is fairly clear.
What it may decide to do in the near future as it pursues
its professed goals is rather less clear. Far less clear is
how well it will fare, and how it will. respond to the
unpredictable problems of failure or, perhaps even, of
success in its policies. In my opinion, least clear but
most important of all is the response of Soviet society to
the proddings of a regime whose tools have become weak and,
even more so, seemingly irrelevant to its avowed objectives.
If there is any message I wish to leave it is that there is
in the USSR a society to be a concerned about, an
obshchestvo as distinct from gosudarstvo, a society worthy
of official as well as scholarly attention.
The essential problems of the Gorbachev regime are three:
First, the legacies of a moribund top political
leadership, the most important of which is a lethargic
and parasitic ruling apparatus which is a far cry from
the mobilizational tool it is supposed to be, but
rather an obstacle to progress on all fronts. And
therefore, dialectically, a potential threat to its own
legitimacy and survival in the long term.
Second, a stagnant or very sluggish economy operating
in the context of a disgruntled society.
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Third, a foreign policy which has in the recent-past
proved unable to exploit its opportunities fully,' to
adapt to new challenges, and to apply satisfactorily
the power available to back it up.
This stress on the problems of the Soviet system should not
obscure its great sources of strength: A vast, if backward,
economic base; remarkable political stability; opportunities
to extend its influence in world affairs; and great military
power. We are reminded of another hoary aphorism: "Russia
is never as strong or as weak as she looks." Perhaps the
reverse is true now: Russia is stronger and weaker than she
looks.
III. The Roots of Gorbachev
----------------------
The political personalities of Gorbachev himself and of his
leadership cadre are certainly important factors in the
shaping the Soviet future. Much has been made of the
proposition that Gorbachev and his emerging cadre of
appointees represent a new leadership generation in the
USSR. What kind of a generation it is, how and how much it
differs from its predecessors remains to be seen. As this
leadership cohort takes its positions, we shall find that
they are certainly products of the system in its mature and
stable years. They reached adulthood generally in the late
Stalin period. Their careers were generally launched in the
organizational and ideological turmoil of the Khrushchev
years, from which they appear to have profitted. Then they
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were held back by the stasis of the Brezhnev period, from
Which they acquired the impatience that characterizes
Gorbachev and policies.
In Gorbachev we see a curious mixture of orthodoxy and
pragmatism, of the doctrinaire and the flexible. His
admirers proclaim that he is a new leader of the Leninist
type. Some of his detractors as well as admirers see a
Stalinist profile under the new style of frankness and
openness he is clearly trying?to cultivate. Gorbachev's
specific political antecedents are still somewhat obscure.
There are some suggestions that his roots go back to the
corps of Komsomol types which Shelepin was trying to build
as his political base in the late 1950s and early 1960s.
To the extent Gorbachev views himself as a reformer, it is
certainly within the framework of the system's established
structure and political features. He is in no way an
Alexander Dubcek or even a Deng Tsiao-ping. It is probably
a mistake, in any case, to attribute to Gorbachev and his
colleagues an integrated vision, much less a complete
political program, for achieving their aims. Gorbachev
appears to believe that the pretenses of the system with
regard to growth, modernization, welfare, and power in the
world can be realized. And he seems further to believe that
the top-down formula for managing society, on which the
system is based, will provide the realization... with some
allowance for stimulating the creativity of the masses.
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But, to repeat'my earlier point, what Gorbachev and. his
regime want to do may be a less interesting question 'than
what the society, the obshchestyvo, stimulates or obliges the
regime to do in the years ahead.
IV. Leadershie
Let me turn now to Gorbachev's political agenda, the first
item of which -- in some ways the easiest -- has been
getting a hold on the power structure.
Looking back on it it with not-very-much hindsight,
Gorbachev's accession to the General Secretaryship appears
to have been a shoe-in, or almost so. He had a lot going
for him: Andropov's patronage, formidable maneuvering
skills of his own, and the elite's almost universal
conviction that -- painful though it might be -- the rule of
old duffers had to end. But it was not automatic.
Chernenko's elevation after Andropov's death indicated that
the transition did not come easy. In the fall of 1984,
Chernenko showed his ability to block Gorbachev. When
Chernenko died, there were ten full members of the
Politburo. Only one of them, Vorotnikov, looked like a
clear Gorbachev partisan. Grishin, Romanov, Tikhonov,
Kunayev, and Shcherbitskiy looked like clear opponents, but
Shcherbitskiy was conveniently tied up getting back from a
trip to the US. Aliyev had the reputation of an
opportunist, but seems to have gone for Gorbachev.
Solomentsev, for some reason or other, did so as well.
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Gromyko may have been the swing and crucial vote; this old
duffer went for the young blood, it seems. Perhaps there
was a deal involving his prospective elevation to the
honorific presidency. Perhaps it was a family connection
via Raiisa. Perhaps because old Gromyko is something other
than the man he seems to be. Other voices, such as that of
the KGB and, perhaps, the military were probably heard from.
In any case, Gromyko nominated Gorbachev to the Central
Committee in a remarkably eloquent statement -- so eloquent
in fact as to sound slightly ironical. Bottom line: It may
have been easy, but it was not automatic. There were left
,.changes to make and scores to settle.
Gorbachev's first priority has been to build his power base
in the Politburo and the central party apparatus. This he
has done with remarkable dispatch. He has brought in two
new full members of the Politburo without putting them
through candidate status: Nikolai Ryzhkov, the new Chairman
of the Council of Ministers, and apparently a Gorbachev
associate; and ggor Ligachev, the chief Central
Committee Secretary for ideology and cadres, effectively the
Second Secretary. Gorbachev and Ligachev appear to have
worked closely together during the Andropov and Chernenko
periods to push cadre renewal and the campaign against
corruption. As the heir to Suslov's mantle and ascetic
image, Ligachev will be a man to watch.
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Two new Politburo members have been elevated from candidate
status: Chebrikov, the KGB chief, and Shevardnadze, the new
Foreign Minister. There are two new candidates, Marshal
Sokolov, whose status represents a downgrading of the
military which may not last, and Talyzin, the new first
deputy premier and planning chief. And there are three new
Central Committee secretaries: Nikonov, Yel'tsin, and
Zaykov.
Gorbachev's treatment of the Old Guard has testified to his
power and his skill in avoiding protracted confrontation.
He unceremoniously removed and banished Romanov, ostensibly
his most powerful rival, a man made vulnerable by a history
of high-handed management, corruption,' and alcohol abuse.
Somewhat more decorously he retired -Tikhonov, the aging
Premier, but this interestingly only after Tikhonov had been
identified at the April Plenum as the man who would present
the next five year plan to the coming party congress. And
he kicked Gromyko upstairs to the largely honorific post of
President the latter appears to enjoy. Thereby Gorbachev
got full control over foreign policy and solved the Gromyko
problem without a bloodletting. But he also foreswore the
President's title for himself, which only a year before he
had proclaimed should by combined with that of the General
Secretary.
If it came to a vote in March, the split could have been as
narrow as five to four, or five to five with Shcherbitskiy
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in town. Now, only eight months later and without any
publicly evident showdowns, Gorbachev appears to enjoy the
support of four prior members and four more elevated since
his accession. The remaining Brezhnevite party old guard --
Grishin, Shcherbitskiy, and Kunayev -- appear vulnerable and
not long for this political world. Although not automatic,
this has seemed to go very easily for Gorbachev, like Al
Capone in an old folks home. Were Gorbachev to stumble
badly,, one can imagine anti-Gorbachev coalitions of
remaining Old Guardists and younger figures who got to the
Politburo prior to his accession. But since political line-
ups are generally made by corridor politicking, not
showdowns at the table, it is hard to see such a coalition
taking shape. And it will be even less likely after the
27th CPSU congress.
Further down in the power structure, the bare statistics of
the Gorbachev cadre renewal program are impressive:
8 new Central Committee department heads
2 new republic first secretaries (Georgian and Kirgiz)
33 new obkom first secretaries
2 new first deputy premiers
3 new deputy premiers
22 new ministers or state committee chairmen.
The bottom line is that there could be a 507 turnover in the
composition of the Central Committee elected by the party
congress, the biggest change in this body since 1961.
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Gorbachev's age and apparent good health give him 'the
prospect of being the most long-lived and powerful General
Secretary since Stalin, reversing the_law of diminishing
General Secretaries operating since 1953.
But we have to step back from all this and remember some
basics. Policymaking goes hand in hand with political
struggle, and did so even under Brezhnev, although not so
visibly as under Khrushchev.. The tough policy problems lie
ahead, most important and difficult the development and
implementation of a whole range of organizational and
resource allocation decisions aimed at revitalizing the
economy. These will place great stress on the leadership
and the apparatus. We should not imagine that the new
generation of leaders advanced by Gorbachev represent a
tightly unified political phalanx utterly detached from the
interests and habits that made for the Brezhnev stasis.
Having finally arrived, they too may wish to live peacefully
and enjoy their privileges.
Finally, there is a political demographic factor to which I
believe more attention should be paid. I haven't done the
research to confirm my hypothesis, but let me lay it out in
hopes that some enterprising Sovietologist will test it.
The Brezhnev stasis was not simply a product of his policy
of cadre stability. It was an echo of the great purges by
which Stalin eliminated several leadership generations and
elevated a post-Bolshevik generation who reached the
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pinnacles of their careers in their thirties and forties and
then stayed there for several decades. The youngsters of
the Gorbachev generation are not replicating this pattern.
They are reaching the top in their mid-fifties and early
sixties. They can expect to be around for only ten years or
so. More frequent cadre changes seem likely to become the
norm. This suggests to me that there will be more
turbulence in the Soviet nomenklatura class and its politics
than, its members have been used to as participants, and we
as observers. That is, unless there is a new purge that
repeats the Stalinist experience, which is another kind of
turbulence.
V. The_Economy_and_the_Society
Let me turn now to the big problems, those of the economy
and those of society in which economic problems are
imbedded. Neither the economy nor the system are threatened
with collapse. What we see is an economy that is
underachieving, in large part because of the nature of the
system, the tangible consequence of which is pervasive
obstruction of the system's own goals for growth in the
service of power, modernization, and welfare. By some path
we cannot readily foresee, and only over the long term, if
at all, the semi-stagnation of the system could conceivably
threaten the stability of the system itself. This is a
problem for political philosophers and futurologists. For
now it is a problem for intelligence only insofar as it
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animates the current concerns of the Soviet elite, which to
a noticable degree it has.
The picture of Soviet economic slowdown is generally
familiar. I shall only sketch it. In the last five years
of Brezhnev, GNP growth averaged 27 or less per annum,
industrial growth about 2.5%, agriculture minus 4.5%, and
consumption per capita about 1.5%. Since the mid-1970s, the
productivity of capital and labor has not only failed to
grow, but appears to have declined. The causes of this
dismal performance, and the secular decline of growth rates
since the 1950s and 1960s have been:
The rising cost of new raw materials and energy
Stagnation in the size of the labor force owing to
demographic factors
An aging and increasinly backward capital stock.
Thirty to forty percent of Soviet equipment is over 20
years old.
And the inhibitions imposed by the nature of the system
-- constipated central planning, lack of incentives,
etc. -- on innovation.
Since the death of Brezhnev the economy has rebounded
somewhat largely as a product of disciplinary measures and
better luck in agriculture. GNP growth has averaged nearly
3%, industrial growth about 3.5%, agriculture nearly 2%, and
per capita consumption about 1.5%. Note that the
consumption picture has not broadly improved, although the
very important food situation has somewhat.
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Although they appear modest by historical standards, the
Gorbachev regime has set growth goals for the next five year
plan and out to the year 2000 that are really quite
ambitious. Average annual GNP growth.is to be`3.57 through
1990 and 5% for the following decade. The Gorbachev
strategy for intensive rather than extensive development --
which is incidentally rhetoric taken from Brezhnev and not
new -- implies rates of growth in productivity which the
USSR has'not achieved the the post-war period.
As I said, the slowdown of economic growth is imbedded in a
set of societal and systemic problems which are both cause
and effect of poor economic performance:
A lethargic bureaucracy, and an unmotivated workforce
A whole array of social pathologies spanning alcohol
abuse, rising crime rates, deteriorating public health
conditions, and corruption embracing all quarters of
the population.
Patterns of attitudial alienation including
nationalism, both Russian and anti-Russian, increasing
adherance to religion, and youth alienation.
None of these problems are unique to the recent-period. But
they seemed all to get worse. And they engendered during
the late Brezhnev and the brief Chernenko periods a genuine
apprehension within the Soviet elite that the system was
running dangerously out of steam. Those in the top
leadership of the Andropov-Gorbachev persuasion were
particularly concerned that these pathologies, especially
rampant corruption, were undermining the moral and political
authority of the party itself.
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Gorbachev has a three part strategy for addressing these
problems. It seeks to address the society-systemic as well
as the strictly economic. As yet, this strategy is not
completely formed. But its shape is apparent.
First, come the so-called "human factors," basically
increased discipline and moral motivation: cadre renewal,
improved propaganda efforts and more frankness (or
glasnost), anti-corruption measures, and the big campaign
against alcohol abuse, which is probably the most profound
single intervention by the Kremlin in the lives of Soviet
people since de-Stalinization. By getting a sustained boost
to economic performance simply through better work,
Gorbachev hopes to boot-strap the economy into position for
attaining his more ambitious growth and modernization goals,
while maintaining a satisfactory consumption picture.
The second element of the Gorbachev strategy is
technological modernization spurred by concentration of
investment in the civil machinebuilding and related sectors.
He hopes to dig Soviet industry out of smoke-stack
backwardness at a rapid rate. Fifty percent of Soviet
industrial equipment is supposed to be renewed by 1990.
The third major element, on which technological
modernization depends, is some kind of reform of the
planning, management and incentive system. Although the
regime has implemented some management and structural
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reforms, such as spreading the hybrid experiments througtout
industry and consolidating the top management of
machinebuilding and agroindustry, the full shape of
Gorbachev's program here has yet to be seen. By all
indications it is not yet decided, and it will occasion a
lot of bureaucratic and political controversy in the
deciding. So far Gorbachev has indicated that he wants his
cake and to eat it too: He wants streamlined, more
discipline, and effective central planning, particularly
targetted on technological innovation. And he also wants
more autonomy and responsibility, again mainly for
innovation, at the enterprise level. Here, of course, is
the rub. The progressive economists, some of whom appear to
have Gorbachev's ear, know there must be farreaching
devolution of authority to lower levels of the economic
system. This means market mechanisms to some degree and
reduced power for central party and ministerial magnates.
The.latter are, not surprisingly, not applauding.
How will Gorbachev do on these fronts? The uncertainties
and risks loom large.
It is not sure that the human factors element can be
sustained, especially if consumption levels appear to
wallow.
The payoff to modernization via a revitalized
machinebuilding sector will come only in the 1990s and
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it would seem to depend on economic reforms not yet in
place.
While not faced with any general crisis, the Soviet
economy has some crisis-prone sectors that could pose
real trouble. Agriculture's dependence on weather is
one. Declining oil production is another, pinching
Soviet hard currency earnings needed for industrial
modernization and also, possibly, Moscow's ability to
keep East Europe tranquil, on one hand, and pinched by
Gorbachev's aim to channel new investment way from the
energy sector. The plan calls for overall growth in
energy production at a rate of 3-4%; the reality is
likely to be more like 2%.
These warning signs should not be taken as predictions of
failure. The regime is right in claiming that there is a
lot of slack to be mobilized for economic revival.
Determined leadership and whipcracking from the top can make
a difference.
I find it equally interesting to speculate about some of the
problems which might attend success rather than failure in.
the Gorbachev strategy. For example, both increased
disciplinary measures throughout the apparatus and work
force and any degree of decentralization are going to
introduce new kinds of insecurity and tension within the
system and society. As the regime gropes for its preferred
reform formula, although its instincts and preferences are
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generally conservative, it will find it hard to define and
enforce all the boundaries of permitted political and
ideological debate. Elements of the intelligentsia seem
likely to test what they can get away with.
V. Foreign_and_Mi1itary_Po1icy
Gorbachev is trying to revitalize Soviet foreign policy in
something of the same manner he is trying to revitalize the
economy and the society. He clearly wants to see what
"human factors", i.e., changes of style and technique, can
do for him before he considers fundamental shifts of goals
and priorities.
In East-West relations, the basic goal of Soviet foreign
policy is quite candidly stated and has remained relatively
stable for some time: the restoration of an environment of
detente like that which prevailed in the 1970s, wherein the
Soviets can pursue both domestic and other foreign policy
objectives with greater confidence and serenity than they
can in an environment of tension, explicit hostility, and
incipient confrontation.
In the mid- to late-1970s, the Soviets looked forward to a
period of relatively easy foreign policy success during the
1980s. They had. acquired a new order of superpower status
based in large part on military power:
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Parity plus at the strategic intercontinental level,
which undermined both the credibility of US security
guarantees and the confidence of US foreign policy.
Military dominance of the peripheral Eurasian theaters
around them, which they expected to encourage a pattern
of supplicant behavior on the part of their neighbors.
A new ability to project power in the Third World, not
so much by conventional means where the US continued to
be superior in such things as naval forces and air
lift, but by political and military support to
Leninist-style movements and regimes, such as we saw in
Ethiopia, Angola, and Nicaragua, plus the use of the
Cuban and perhaps other surrogates.
At the same time, the Soviets saw in the 1970s domestic and
international trends which eroded the foundations of US
superpower status, the cohesion of its alliances, and the
credibility of its commitments. Detente was supposed to
facilitate a low-risk, if not amiable, transition to Soviet
preeminence.
The very late 1970s and early 1980s produced new trends,
however, which challenged and disappointed these
expectations. The US became disillusioned with detente and
produced an administration committed to reversing the trends
in the "correlation of forces" through increased military
spending, reassertion of alliance leadership, and
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reinvolvement of US power in third area security problems,
all with a distressingly anti-Soviet policy rationale.
Political, developments produced governments in London, Bonn,
Paris, Tokyo, and Beijing much more in harmony with US aims
than the Soviets could find comforting. The Soviets found
it much more difficult than they expected to turn impressive
military power in being into tangible political influence.
Their failed INF campaign in Europe is one example. The
stalemate in Afghanistan is another.
Meanwhile, the economic slowdown and social malaise at home
underminded Moscow's confidence that it could count on an
inexorably favorable shift in the correlation of
international forces.
The Soviet reaction to all.this was counter-confrontational
and aimed at jolting or frightening the US and especially
its key allies into a return to the preferred pattern of
behavior. In support of their efforts, the Soviets cranked
up a war-scare propaganda campaign to lend credibility to
their diplomacy and to mobilize internal cohesion.
Relatively ineffective abroad, this campaign appears to have
been counterproductive at home and in East Europe. Key
elites began to believe that Moscow was mismanaging its
America problem.
Both Andropov and Chernenko sought diffidently to change
course, to reach out to an increasingly pressing political
incentive on the part of the Reagan Administration to temper
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its anti-Soviet policies. This was thwarted by KAL in the
first case and by a combination of tactical miscalculation
and political indecision in the second, specifically in the
summer of 1984 when the Soviets proposed talks on space but
refused to take yes for an answer. But by the fall of 1984,
during the reign of Chernenko and the rule of Gromyko over
Soviet foreign policy, the Soviets were on a course of
diplomatic reengagement with a newly willing Washington.
Gorbachev has brought fresh energy and new style to this
course. Underlying it is, I believe, a fairly strong
consensus in Moscow -- including the redoubtable Gromyko --
that Soviet foreign policy has a much better chance of
influencing Western governments, parliaments, and publics in
favorable directions if it is willing to engage even the
most uncooperative partners than if it limits itself to a
pugnacious, defiant stance. At the same time, however, so
long as the US and its allies tend to view the engagement as
largely competitive, and resist the resurrection of old-
style detente, the Soviets must balance reengagement with a
fairly harsh element in their propaganda and a credible "or
else" component to their diplomacy.
This is the balance which Gorbachev is now seeking to
strike. It is proving somewhat tricky. -
The basic aim of Gorbachev's foreign policy toward the US
now is to delegitimize the main elements of the Reagan
national security agenda from the first term: defense
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buildup and the anti-Soviet thrust of US policies generally.
If possible he would like the present administration itself
to shift its priorities. At a minimum, he wants to
encourage political forces within the US and the alliance
which thwart' administration aims and prevent their
institutionalization in the next administration. The arms
control process is the principal medium for pursuing these
aims, and SDI is the main point of attack toward larger
goals, in addition to being an urgent target in its own
right.
So far, the Soviets have been unwilling to offer real
concessions in the central strategic relationship -- where
Soviet proposals and demands would leave the basic
architecture of the balance intact and unsatisfactory from
the US point of view -- or in the so-called regional
security issues, the points of conflict that have arisen
where the Soviets are seeking to consolidate Leninist
regimes with Soviet arms. 'This is not to say that the
Soviets will not show some flexibility on these issues in
the future. There is considerable pressure for them to do
so. But for now they are trying to see what they can get at
no or low cost, through changes of style and playing on
Western opinion.
With respect to the latter, the Soviets have much to learn.
They want to exploit their remarkable access to Western
political arenas. But here a will does not automatically
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make a way. They have not adapted to the incredibly short
attention spans of Western media and the volatility of
active political agendas in open societies.
Some of our Sovietological comrades assert that the Soviets
are ready to shift to a European strategy if the US proves
uncooperative in this new period of reengagement. In my
view, there are limits to Soviet discretion here and they
appreciate them. Soviet ability to influence US allies is
not the greatest when US-Soviet relations are in the deep
freeze. Their approaches to US allies depend on some
measure of promise in the direct US-Soviet relationship.
Let me quickly make a number of specific points:
The name of the game in arms control is get the Reagan
Administration to sign up to some constraint on SDI
which undermines the program politically. The Soviets
probably do not expect the President to repudiate this
program. They are not looking for one breakthrough
so much as a politically influential process.during the
rest of his term in office. A sequence of summits
gives them a good shot at this. But this is still a
gamble, as one suspects some in the Kremlin are
pointing out.
The Soviets are going to show new energy in pressing
other foreign policy accounts, with the Chinese, the
Japanese, and in the Middle East. Again one can expect
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an effort to get what is possible on style before
substantive flexibility is shown.
There is no sign that the present Soviet regime is
prepared to back away from any of its Third World
enterprises from Afghanistan to Nicaragua'. It faces an
uncomfortable degree of resistance in many of them.
But so far, the costs,-and especially the risks, have
appeared tolerable.
Let me say a word about strategy and military policy. US
policies have done more than just raise the ante of
competition. At the core of the Soviet difficulty is that
US initiatives, especially SDI and some conventional weapons
innovations, will have a tendency to challenge the structure
of Soviet strategy and forces at the intercontinental and
theater levels... if those initiatives bear fruit. However
the Soviets choose to respond to these initiatives, they
will put new stress on the capacity of the system for
technological innovation just at the time when that capacity
is most needed in the civilian sector. The timing of these
challenges is awkward for the Soviets to say the least.
They are looking to the arms control process and to
ancillary political constraints in the US to limit these
challenges and to allow them to keep their strategic
architecture fundamentally intact, quite possibly and even
desirably in the context of reduced but more modernized and
survivable nuclear strike forces.
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VI. Conclusion
Having left many loose ends and important points untouched,
let me conclude with an observation about Western and US
capacity to influence Soviet policy. I have myself
.characterized both domestic policy and foreign policy as
currently in somewhat of an exploratory phase. Clearly
Soviet domestic economic plans depend to a considerable
extent on expectations regarding the course of US-Soviet
relations, particularly the military competition. This
would suggest an unusual degree of US leverage over Soviet
perceptions and choices. Perhaps that leverage is higher
than usual.
But it should not be exaggerated. The USSR is going to
remain an assertive and powerful adversary even if its
policy priorities are adjusted. Especially in the Third
World it can pose severe challenges at little cost. The
fact of competition is lodged in the nature of the systems
and their conceptions of mission, responsibility, and
security -- as Soviet ideologues are prompt to insist in
their own idiom.
I want, however, to make a further point about leverage. It
has to do with the Soviet style, the Bolshevik code, or
whatever you want to call it. Soviet rulers do not regard
national priorities and strategic directions as something
they bargain with adversaries about. They make an
assessment of the objective situation, of which the policies
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and preferences of adversary states are among the factors,
and chose their basic course. If necessary and profitable,
they bargain about the terms at the margin. There is little
reason to think that Gorbachev is going to change this not
unreasonable way of doing business. We cannot make his
strategy and goals in the West. But it will matter to us
what they
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