ESTIMATE OF THE MILITARY-POLITICAL SITUATION WITH RESPECT TO THE YUGOSLAV-COMINFORM RIFT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R003500690001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 20, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 20, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

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CLASSIFICATION s ;T
CENTRAL IN ELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT NO.
ONFORMATION REPORT CD NO.
COUNTRY Yugoslavia/Albania/Hungary/Rumania/Bulgaria/
Austria
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DATE DISTR. 20 Oct. 1949
SUBJECT Estimate of the Military-Political Situation NO. OF PAGES 10 r
With Respect to the Yugoslav-Cominform Rift f
PLACE
ACQUIRED
DATE OF INF~
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25X1 This zuniaary gives observations and conclusions on the conflict
between Yugoslavia and the Cominform countries as seen from a
military-political point of view. It is divided into the fol-
lowring units:
I4 Relation of military forces
Ii. Iilitary and political estimate of the situation of
Yugoslavia'
III" Indications for and against military action by the
Cominform countries
IV. Conclusion.
I. Relation of iii litar_y orces
;a`trenrth of the Armies of the Cominform Countries Around Yugoslavia
a. Soviet. Troops
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Combat Units:
1 LLtz Rifle Div
1 eoz Div
GHQ troops
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
'ightin' qualities and Activities
Of great fighting; power,
excellently trained, amount-
ing to 80 to 90 percent of
war strength. Believed to be
engaged in maneuvers at
DOE L':'.iit:;H# IM.
Western-- Lecz Div.., Of same fighting power as
Hungary GHQ troops units in Austria. Believed to
be on maneuvers at Lake Balaton
and possibly southeastern
Hungary.
Rumania 2 Meez Dive) Of same fighting power as
1 Tank Div 'estimated units in Austria. A contin-
IQHQ troops ) gent of these troops apparent-
ly went to the Banat for maneu-'
very in mid-August 1949.
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CLASSIFICATION s
to (1i- u8PAY
STATE Ev x NAVY NSRS DiSTRIEUTION
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Bulgaria No combat units reported.
Only liaison staffs observed.
Albania No combat units reported.
Large liaison staffs, part:scularly of the navy
are believed to be located there.
The :joviet forces in the areas bordering on Yugoslavia are
estimated at one motorized rifle division, four mechanized
divisions and one tank diviolon with GHQ ti-cops (apparently
without any major contingents of GHQ artillery). A joint
high co,_-.hand for theas forces has not been identified.
by Armies of the satellite Countries
Area: Combat Units:
Fighting Qualities and
Activities
Hungary 2 Inf Divs, . Tank Div Still in the stage of
(still in training - initial organization;
cadre units) extremely low fighti ~
Few GHQ troops qualities; fit only for
operations within the
country. 100 "T 3411
tanks assumed. No maneu-
vers reported.
Rumania 6 to 8 Inf Dive Fighting power still low
2 mountain Dive because: of lack of heavy
1 ,tz Inf Div weapons and the question -
I Tank Div able reliability of the
officer corps. " T 341: tanks
and tanks of old German
types. Maneuver o in the
STBIT TARGU area, with the
Rumanian lst Tank Div par-
ticipating.
Bulgaria 8 to 10 Inf Dive .r ell disciplined but of
3 . ' a.nk Brigs low fighting quality for ope-
rations outside the country..
Armament chiefly of Soviet
origin; about 200 "T 34(1
tanks. No information on
present disposition avai-
lable.
A1bt,nia tarmy roughly estimated Fighting
erocl
qvnlities at 50,000 (status of _.nsignificantfl undercover
a partial mobilization), opposition within the army;
perhaps 3 Dive no infori. a--ion on disposltiop_
available.
The coribinod strel h Z of the armies of the oatellite countries
is estiiAated at 22 to 26 infantry divisions, one motorized in-
fantry division and armored forces of two tank divisions, At
loL st six divisions (those in Hungary and Albania) of these
Satellite forces are assumed to have very, low fighting power if
employed in operations outside their home countries.
2., Air Forces of the Cod 3nfora Countriee Around Yu: oe1aviaa
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Area:
Combat Aircraft:
Claosif .cation : o s
Austria & Western 600
Iiur;ary (Second
it J. .r .ray)
230 fighters
280 bombers
30 reconnaissance aircraft
60 transport aircraft
Rumania (remainders 3C0 100 fighters
of the Seventeenth 200 bombers
Asir :rmy)
b. Air Forces of the 0a.telli~;e Cou~.tries:
Area:
Combat
lircraft:_. Cla:3sifica Lion alto Type:
IIun;ary
50 (training aircraft oa].y)
Rumania
95
50 fi hters
Bulgaria
200
45 around atta
80 fihters
ck aircraft
Czechoslovakia
160
60 ground atta
60 bombers
140 fighters
ck aircraft
(aircraft nay be
20 bombers
employed against
Yugoslavia)
Yu-;osla- Armed Forces
a. The Yu oslav Army is estimated at 32 to 36 infantry divi-
lions and 10 to 12 tank briuades. The ; rmy personnel is con-
sidered well-trained and mostly pro- TITO. The critical shortage
of space parts and ammunition for the heavy weapons which had
been delivered by the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia prior to
the Com.iilform crisis cannot be overcome by the Yu3oslav industry,
not even in a proton; ed period of time. --Without supply of
imported ammunition and wcapzns, the Yugoslav army will be ca-
pable of lame-soole defensive coimitment for only a few months.
b. The YuCoslav Air Force is estimated at 230 fie'aters ("YAK it'
and "YAK..3"), 180 ruund attack aircraft ("TL-211) and 120
light bombers ("PEm2") 0 The fi htima~ quality of the air force
is characterized by its obsoloecent aircraft types, the lack of
a domestic aircraft and aircraft accessory industry and its pre-
vious complete dependence on deliveries from the soviet Union.
There is no trained personnel to operate aircraft which may pos-
sibly be delivered by western countriese
.. Weimhin- of ?ts.ie 1 elr tiori of litar farces
a. The Yugoslav Army ;?aith about 35 infantry divisions and an
estimated 400 tanks is confronted by pro-0ominform forcob of the
noiGhborin0 countries about 25 infantry divisions and an
estimated 500 tanks,
/ith the exception of the Danube and Tisza-'iiiver area to the
north, there a:ce natural barriers which favor the defense of
Yugoslavia. Dieregardiin the possibility that the Yugoslav
:fi ;Ming power may be decisively reduced by political dcfeetion,
the armies of the Satellite countries are believed to have no
chance of overthroviinu the TITO-vo imc by military action w,-with--
Out soviet aid. 25X1
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Jith the Soviots joinin; the :,atallite countries in military
operations agaanut Yugoslavia, the otren,,th of the army
foreou a.;sembled around Yugoslavia would increase to about
30 divisions and 1,700 tanks, the excellLntly.trained and
rrell supplied ooviet forces then bsinC of decisive importance,
puVticufarly in the event of a otrong armored thrust through
the Voivodina.
b. A nuaerical comparison between the about 450 aircraft of
the atollite countries and the a;pproxiaa rely 500 aircraft
of Yugoslavia does not indicate the actual relation of fighting
power because the Oatellite air forces will presumably receive
considerable amounts of supply and possibly dis;Muisod personnel
also from the boviut Union in the event of wary.
The co...mitment of the technically superior Soviot 1iir Force
with its a pp,roximately 1,000 aircraft stationed in the Balkans
alone would establish an absolute air superiority on. the side
of the Cominform forces.
c. The Uovi;;=t high Co=}and, which will generally avoid unneces-
sary military risks, would presumably streng then its forces in
the Balkans (particularly its G?IIQ artillery and air force).
Stronger forces must be expected to be employed for the oouurity
of the supply routes leadii.g from the 'oviot Union through
Hungary, 'x.uraanlia and possibly Bulgaria in case of a soviet
participation in military operations a.ain:t Yugoslavia.
11. L1ilita t nd Political :'u;-tim.ate of the situation of -yu gslavi
Notes on the Uitation ofu')oslavia
a. Yugoslavia represents a strate-;ic~al key position, by. the
firia powoec ion of which the SU would become a state adjacent
to the 'LL editorranoun See and would have access to the plain of
the Po giver. i O'0OV -Controlled Albania rou:1d no to ns?er be
barred by Yugoslavia from laud communication with the countries
of the La stcsr'n Bloc.
Seen politically, a subservient Yugoslavia would be of equal
impol-tance fo:- the penetration of Greece 2nd Upper Italy as
would be an independent and disloyal Yugoslavia for the
strong a.enin ; of the opposition in the Balkans.
Seen economically, YugoelaviaQs production of copper (one
fourth of the Soviet production), lead (one fifth of the
Soviet production), ., chromium ore and bauxit, would un-
doubtedly' contribute considerably to increase the Uoviet pro-
duction, though the 3ovic t Union does not depend on imports
of raw material from Yugoslavia, As for transportation,
complete, instead of the no,-i interrupted, control over tie
Danube iiivor would be of value, especially as after the opening
of the communication Baltic ;ea - Black sea by the Oder-
Danube Canal, the Danube 4liver '-uld provide an important water-
way in the rear of the Eastern Bloc Front.
b. Yugoslavia?s defense is militarily favored by natural ob.
stacle;s on nearly all of her borders w~:ritb the exception of the
area of the 1)anube.>J'isca iUvor^s in northjxn Yugoslavia. The
Dinaxic mountain system 'rile. facilitate a long ruerilla warfare
by ',f.'I'1'0 after a poosib3 collapse as well as favor infiltration
of sabots-:e groups and activation of partisan groups against
Trl'0.
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? CENTRAL flflELLIGEME AGENCY
Politically, the self-assured national policy of the BEWRADr.
Politbureau apparently managed to influence the masses of the
people if not in its favor,at list against Cominform.
From TIT0 o speech in SKOPIJE it can be inferred that his ;?olJ-
cy influenced underground opposition groups in BUlgaria and
Albania..
Yugoslavia?s economic dependence upon large-scale imports of
coal, oil, smachincry, heavy weapons anc! ammunition from the
countries of the Eastexn Bloc is of decisive importance in the
present conflict. Even without the blockade of deliveries of
production from the countries of the Easte n Bloc Yugoslavia
after having attained the vast goal of the 5-..Year Plan in 1951
would still have to import, for example, about 750,000 tons of
coal and coke to meet her peacetime needs. In addi'n to dril-
ling material, a refinery capacity of nearly 200,000 tons is
needed to bring about the 450,000.-ton production set for 19514
c. In view of Yugoslavia?s strategical position and political
importance, the Soviet Union pressed the conflict between the
Cominform and Yugoslavia to such a degree that for reasons of
prestige alone the gremlin is required to liquidate ?21TO. An
economic blockade by the :'astern Bloc against Yugoslavia will
not be a success if Yugoslavia manages to obtain from the
lectern Powers production means, weapons and technical person-
nel in addition to the present imports of coal and oil. 'It
mutt be to the interest of M0 COW to solve the Yugoslav question
prior to the beginning of extensive western impo.-?U
s and an ensu-
inL change for the better in Yugosslavialu economic situtition0
Intensified activities by the Cominform are therefore to be
expected in the course of this yeas..'
Possibilities for the Solution of the Conflict in Pavor of the
C oman ern
',Titre economic aid by the Western Powers increasing, the liqui-
dation of TITO will only be attainable by military action of the
Cominform. Three possibilities and their possible effects are
discussed:
aQ In view of the present relation of pow~wer. s and the lacking
armursenta industry of Yugoslavia, it is to be assumed that an
attack by the Soviet and Satellite f or cess concentrated on Yugo-
slavia's borders and by some reinforcements from the Soviet
Union will lead to success by the Comzrfform., although a long
and time-consuming guerilla warfare may follow the breakdown
of the Yugoslav Army. The Soviet operations plan vould pre-
s u-iiably provide for a strong main-attack army from southern
Hungary and southwestern Rumania into the area of DELG DE and
a second attack group from western Hungary in the direction
of PIUi to cut off the land communication with the ,'/extern
Powers, A third attack group may be assigned the mission to
penetrate from Bulgaria in the direction of Albania and ea.tab-
lish a firm land connection with this cousr. try. The 'oviet Union
would, however, run the risk of unleashing a worldwide conflict
by any direct military intervention - a risk which the Soviet
leaders apparently try to avoid at present.
b. An attack by the satellite armed forces without Soviet mili_
tary inter.vention does not appear to be prom'! sin because of
the relation of forces, the advantageous defensive position of
Yugoslavia and the love morale of the attackers. As compared
with the Satellite forces which would have to fight outside
their countries for the benefit of the Kremlin and its largely
unpopular regime, the Yugoslav forces would undoubtedly have a
far superior morale and better fighting spirit. The` supply
situation may, in the long rim, favor the Satellite forces, if
Yu- osla.via failed to obtain from the extern Powers military
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c. Penetration of irregular vora.inform forces, i stilt Lion
of armed riots and l rge--scale sabota`;o acts in conjunction
military domonstratins a>,pear to be least dangerous
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