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77?W/7 A A 717--
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Herb Hetu
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,INC.
Meeting in honor of
ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER, USN
Director of Central Intelligence
SECRECY AND MORALITY IN INTELLIGENCE
Wednesday, October 5, 1977
5:15-6:30 pm
McGeorge Bundy.
President, The Ford Foundation
Presiding
:
Admiral Turner's Personal Staff
STAT
Admiral Turner's Personal. Staff
AS A COURTESY TO THE SPEAKER
MEMBERS ARE REQUESTED TO REMAIN UNTIL THE TERMINATION OF THE SESSION
THE MEETING WILL END PROMPTLY AT 6:30 PM
Members and Staff of the Council
Elie Abel
Robert J. Alexander
F. Alley Allan
Charles Allen
James B. Alley
Graham T. Allison
Richard C. Allison
Arthur G. Altschul
Norbert L. Anschuetz
Anne Armstrong-
William Attwood
William B. Bader
Charles W. Bailey, II
Charles F. Baird
Robert R. Barker
Deborah Barron
Whitman Bassow
Philip Bastedo
Alan Batkin
Louis Begley
?Robert Bernstein:
John P._Birkelund
r 3
To encourage forthright discussion in Council meetings, it is a rule of the Council that participants will not
subsequently attribute to other participants, or ascribe to a Council meeting, any statements that are made in
the course of the meeting.
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Joseph E. Black
Stephen Blank
John A. Blum
Richard Blystone
Robert Bond
J. Dennis Bonney
Dudley B. Bonsai
Paul J. Braisted
Henry C. Breck
Henry R. Breck
Donald G. Brennan
Lorna Brennan
Mitchell Brock
George P. Brockway
Judith Bruce
John C. Bullitt
William A. M. Burden
Benjamin J. Buttenwieser
William D. Carmichael
Chace
W. Howard Chase
Patricia Hewitt Christensen
Robert C. Christopher
Edgar M. Church
Kenneth B. Clark
Harlan Cleveland
Richard M. Clurman
James S. Coles
Emilio G. Collado
Sydney M. Cone, III
John T. Connor, Jr.
Cordes
usins
Gardner Cowles
Winthrop Crane
Robert D. Crassweller
Charles F. Darlington
Eli Whitney Debevoise
Jose de Cubes
Christopher DeMuth
Charles S. Dennison
Lucy Despard
Thomas j: Devine
Henry P. de Vries
Bita Dobo
Arnold Dolin
J. R. Drumwright
James H. Duffy
Kempton Dunn
-2:
Julius-C. C. Edelstein
Irving M. Engel -
John Exter.--:=
Larry L. Fabian
Mark C. Fear
Mary Frances Fenner
Glenn W. Ferguson
Thomas K. Finletter."-1
Paul B. Finney
Joseph G. Fogg
Nevil Ford '
Doris Forest --
Joseph C. Fox
Albert Francke, III
George S.. Franklin, Jr.
Gerald Freund ' ?
Henry J. Friendly
ton Frye -.
?:William R. Frye.
Stephen Fuzesi, Jr.-
,'Robert Gard
eurray Gart
-Richard L. Garwin
Patrick Gerschel
Patsy Gesell
William T. Golden
Harrison J. Goldin
Maurice R. Greenberg
James R. Greene
Joseph N. Greene, Jr.
Thomas Griffith
Peter Grimm
Najeeb E. Halaby
orton H. Halperin
George Hampsch
Selig Harrison
Richard Head--
H. J. Heinz, II
Robert C. Helander
Jean Herskovits
Charles M. Herzfeld
William M. Hickey
Keith Highet..
James T. Hill; Jr.
Frances P. Himelfarb
Susan Hirsch-
George Hoguet
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C
Robert Hoguet
y--dohn Hughes
',,-Thomas L. Hughes
J. C. Hurewitz
John K. Jessup
William Josephson
Arnold Kanter
Gail Kay
Robert Kleiman
David Klein
Antonie T. Knoppers
Winthrop Knowlton
Robert P. Koenig
Louis Kraar ?
Betty Lall
Raymond A. Lamontagne
David E. Langsam
Eugene Le Baron
zdohn V. Lindsay
Kenneth Lipper
Thomas H. Lipscomb
Amy Litt
Edwin A. Locke, Jr.
Natalie Lombard
Winston Lord
Edward C. Luck
David L. Luke, III
? John J. McCloy
Elizabeth McCormack
Walsh McDermott
Bruce K. MacLaury
Robert .Macy
August Maffry
Manning
John Masten.
Lawrence A. Mayer
Dana G. Mead
John Merow
Herbert E. Meyer
....-715iew Middleton
John Millington
Leo Model
Judith H. Monson
Jan Murray
Forrest D. Murden
Daniel Rose
Robert D. Murphy/
Anne R. Myers
-3-
Zygmunt Nagorski.,
Clifford C. Nelson
Rodney W. Nichols.,.,
,,Richard Nolte
Alfred Ogden
Michael J. O'Neill
Andrew N. Overby
George R. Packard
Maynard Parker?
Hugh B. Patterson, Jr:'
Robert M. Pennoyer
James A. Perkins
Roswell B. Perkins
Hart Perry
Gustav H. Petersen
E. Raymond Platig
Francis T. P. Plimpton'
Joshua B. Powers
Thomas F. Power, Jr.
R. Price, Jr.
George E. Putnam, Jr.
Leonard V. Quigley
Jack Raymond
Jay B. L. Reeves
Michael M. Reisman
Marshall A. Robinson
Jane Rosen
T. W. Russell, Jr.
Dankwart A. Rustow
Mildred Sage
Richard E. Salomon
Howland Sargeant
John E. Sawyer
,--Warner R. Schilling
Enid Schoettle
Harry Schwartz
Nancie Schwartz
Stuart N. Scott
John 0. B. Sewall
Ronald K. Shelp
Walter V. Shipley
Benjamin R. Shute
,./taurence H. Silberman
Adele Smith Simmons
Datus C. Smith, Jr.
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.?.?...--Theodore C. Sorensen
Elinor Spalten
Kenneth Spang
John H. Spencer
Harold E. Stassen
James H. Stebbins
Daniel Steiner
Charles R. Stevens
J. B. Sunderland
James S. Sutterlin
Francis X. Sutton
Eric Swenson
John Temple Swing
.,8tanley M. Swinton
Arthur R. Taylor
William J. Taylor, Jr.
Evan Thomas ?
Martin B. Travis
Tuchman .
Maurice Tempelsman
Robert Valkenier
Sandra Vogelgesang
Paul A. Volcker--
Alfred H. Von Klemperer
William Walker
T. F. Walkowicz
Martha R. Wallace
Bethuel M. Webster
George B. Weiksner
Jasper A. Welch, Jr.
Richard W. Wheeler
Taggart Whipple
Donald M. Wilson
John D. Wilson
Henry S. Wingate
Philip S. Winterer
Donna Ecton Young
Ezra K. Zilkha
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4 October 1977
e.Ci
Secrecy and Morality in Intelligence
Union League, NYC, 5 October 1977
Council on Foreign Relations, NYC, 5 October 1977
Atlanta City Forum, Atlanta, 6 October 1977
In the past seven months
Good bit of my time spent looking/explaining past intell
activities.
Not here to condemn or condone or praise past practices -
Would like to say that on balance the CIA has
served us well and still does.
But if there is value in looking at the past it certainly
makes you want to find ways to ensure that the mistakes or impressions
of mistakes do not reoccur.
All of us in authority want very much to ensure that the
hindsight of 1987 or 1990 does not condemn the way we are operating
today.
Not fixation on what history will say aboutus/agencies
But because we recognize that our intell organizations can
only serve our country well if they are attuned to its morals, its
ethics, its values.
How though, can an intelligence organization ba,effective and at
same time reflect the moral values of the nation?
- Problems:
1. Moral values nation wants followed sometimes
hard to pin down - interpretations of ethics
change with time and circumstance.
In our lifetimes -
1. Language
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Obscenity 10 years ago -
Commonplace
2. Pornography - literature and art 10 years ago - passe today
3. Same true more weighty areas like
Foreign affairs -
1903 literally signed treaty with French to acquire
rights to build Canal in country of Panamanians
in terrority neither French nor American.
Today negotiate as equals and have plebiscites and
congressional votes.
Very public and equitable
Second, it is difficult to test whether a given intelligence
activity will be acceptable even today let alone tomorrow simply
because much of our intelligence activity must be kept secret -
you simply can not try it out against public opinion - Consequently,
we must often estab-lish our own standards as best we can, attempting
to judge what the nation wants today and will continue to approve of
tomorrow. It's not easy.
We do have some guidelines however - for instance on the
Domestic side that is, activities involving U.S. citizens,
in U.S.A., have easiest time. Easy, first because almost
all our intelligence activity is concentrated overseas.
1. Beyond that some relationships with public in U.S.
are closely controlled by law, e.g., new wiretap
legislation. Assure you none of us want to go to
jail any more than any other citizen.
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2. In other cases in relations w/U.S. citizens we
have our own regulations:
a. Correspondents/public media representatives
No contractual relationships are permitted.
We don't use them as agents. However, do
respect journalists as citizens. They have
right to assist the U.S.G. by passing on
observations/information if they so desire.
b. Clergy/missionaries
No secret, paid or unpaid, contractual relationships
permitted. None exist.
c. Academia
Do have paid relationships - e.g., engage professors
to write or do research for us. Afraid, however,
the popular but unreasonable view that any
relationship between the academic community and
the world of intelligence is improper and has
led to unhealthy reduction in the amount of contact.
I hope to expand those relationships.
Let me dwell on this a bit as it is important,
controversial, and not well understood.
I don't want to undermine academia:
1) By influencing curricula/teaching;
2) By tarnishing image
Thus we will not enter into paid or unpaid
relationships which would prejudice teaching
responsibilities nor will we use academic
1
status of one of our associates to conceal
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C
his identity.
But within those limits still lots of room for
association with the IC which need not call into
doubt the authenticity and credibility of our
educational institutions.
The enormous intellectual resources in our universities should
be free to interact with government. This has two fundamental
benefits.
Recently, for instance, I asked an imminent Sovietologist to
do some work for us. It would be a shame if he could not because
of unresponsible pressures within the academic community. He will
provide a degree of depth and perspective on the Soviet Union which
it is difficult to find outside the academic community. At the same
time he will become more valuable ?to his students by improving the
depth of his understanding of how government actually operates in
the Soviet Union. Even if he is not able to relate to his students
the classified information he might acquire in this kind of exchange,
unquestionably his insights and improved understanding will make his
teaching more relevant and enhance his ultimate worth on the campus.
This raises the question -
If a relationship exists between an individual on
campus for example, and the IC should the IC be obliged
to reveal that relationship to the administration
of the school and perhaps even to the public?
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I believe it is the individual professor's right to
associate with whomever he deems appropriate and I also believe
it is his prerogative to reveal his relationships to his institution
or not; just as you and I, he should be the final arbiter of who
knows his personal business. Clearly the professor must have
a conscience and perhaps the university some rules about what level
of outside activity constitutes interference with his professional
duties, but such rules should apply to all extra-teaching activities
not just those with the CIA or other intelligence organizations.
Let me also point out that the benefits of IC and AC
working together is not a one way street. For instance in the
field of archaeology, some parts of the world are inaccessible
to archaeologists due to either geography or political climate.
Aerial photographs can not only provide access to the unaccessible
they can reveal features which are either invisible or distorted
to an observer at ground level. Ancient cities, fortifications,
villas, roads, and other structures which have been eroded by time,
destroyed by war, or in many cases vandalized can be revealed to
the aerial camera. The Intelligence Community, because of its
particular needs, has acquired a massive amount of photography
useful to the academic community.
It would be a shame if this knowledge could not be shared
because universities chose to levy rigid prohibitions on their
faculty.
So, in the United States, the extremely circumscribed
activity of the IC is conducted within a framework of both
laws and regulations which protect?the citizen, but it vitally
depends on the willingness of American citizens to openly
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support its efforts.
o Overseas and with respect to non-U.S. citizens, the
problem of reflecting our nation's moral values in intelligence
operations becomes much more of a judgmental question and one
where the trade-offs must be weighed judiciously.
- In open societies like ours it is relatively easy
for any one to keep abreast of trends/attitudes, foreign
policy initiatives, and to be prepared for future events.
Intelligence operations are largely a matter of shared
confidences, reading the newspapers and journals, and
keeping one's eyes open.
- In closed societies our need for good information
about trends, policies, and intentions is just as great,
while our ability to acquire that information openly is
severely limited.
Most extreme example, of course, is Soviet Russia,
the archetypal closed society.- First society in our
history with potential to literally destroy us.
SALT need gain access closed - obtain info
pertains wider sphere than purely military
Much more mundane and practical than that - 1972
grain deal.
Good decisions with respect to our relations with
Soviets, as with any counfry, depend on good knowledge
Here the benefits of gaining vital
could affect our military posture,
negotiating positions, ()lir foreign
intelligence which
our SALT or MBFR
policy, must be
weighed against our fundamental preference to deal
openly and horlAriv-
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solicitous of the individual rights of foreigners
as we are of our own citizens.
When does the need for good information outweigh
the need to reflect all-American values?
I suggest that any serious consideration of how we are to
deal with other countries must begin with our basic need for
survival, or to put it less dramatically, for protecting the key
interests of the state and its citizens, in that context.idealism
must sometimes give way to pragmatism
o Should the U.S. refrain from trying to determine the kinds
and numbers of weapons the Soviets are developing because to do so
would pry into another society?
o Should we be caught by surprise the first time terrorists
divert plutonium from a nuclear reactor into a bomb in any one of
a growing number of countries now using nuclear energy?
_
1 L. .J. a -L.-
- I don't think so.
- I do think, however, that clandestine gathering of
informati6n)Ark3i-s-Ver. y special
They
are
/used sparingly. Consequently, there is
always
,a necessity for ascertaining that this information -
\
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is not available through overt sources. Contrary
to the spate of revelations over the past years,
clandestine activity has been relied pn primarily
when information or results could be achieved in
no other way. I assure you, however, that with
all we have today clandestine spying is still a
vital tool in our quiver of intelligence gathering
techniques.
- To what lengths, however, should we go in pursuing
information
_
manner? To what limits should pragmatism override
idealism? On whose judgment in these matters should
we depend?
, are there adequate-controls to ensure
the IC does not go too far? :To ensure that what
the IC does abroad does-not undermine fundamental
American values or undermine our various foreign
policy objectives. -
- Recalling - beginning
we operate largely in secret, the public's scrutiny can
not be our own guide; we must find a surrogate process of oversight.
One major res Ult of past several years of scrutiny & criticism of our
past intell activities has .been just that.
- Oversight - provides assurances to you that although
secrecy must exist even in an open democracy like ours,
your elected officials know. atall times all the secrets.
(1) Personal interest of President/VP
(2) Senate Select Committee
- relations with IC are close and excellent
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(3)
New House Committee
benefits of 1 committee in House and 1 in Senate
(4) Legal requirement for approval for covert operations
(5) I0B.
Risks in all of this:
(1) Timidity - least common denominator
(2) Security leaks
But I believe in balance - next few years critical
- Beyond this, I am diligently working to write a
definitive Code of Ethics for IC. Trying to emulate
some examples from industry.
o Extremely difficult but, whether succeed or
not valuable exercise to think through ethical
implications and determine standards, limits, etc.
o Whole IC very sensitive to these issues.
Public Oversight - More sharing - more in touch within
limits of secrecy
Both - process of intelligence - how to do it -
And - Product - Energy - Soviet Economy
As indicated previously, values are hard to pin down;
changing - hence must stay in touch with society, through Congress,
elected executive branch and public relations.
- Where does this all lead?
- British model
- New American model of intelligence
(1) Openness vs. seesrecy
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- less classified (studies, etc.)
- tighter security around secrets (increased respect)
(2) Better informed electorate - the ultimate
scrutiny/arbiter of the morality of IC.
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OFFICE OF T'-'7DIRECT0R
TO: ?Oar
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Date: al
40,e.c",14_
REMARKS:
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OFFICE OF TJ DIRECTOR
Date:
TO:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
REMARKS:
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J. H
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DCI INVITATION (SOCIAL)
DATE RECEIVED: 21 September 1977
1 INFORMATION REGARDING THE INVITATION:
a. Source:
b. Type of Event:
Telephone call from
L.
DATE OF EVENT:
fs"-
5 October 1977
STAT
Mr. Rockefeller's apptSTAT
Drinks
SeLretary
c. Special Occasion: DCI in New York City
d. Hosted By:
e. Date/Time:
f. Location:
g. Attire:
h. Significant Info:
2. SCHEDULE:
David Rockefeller
1900 hours/5 October 1977 1/415-
Not specified.
aZiAL?,*,
3. RECOMMENDATIONS:
Accept Regret Remarks
AIDE
EA
4. DCI DECISION: (MRS. TURNER INVITED - Yes XX No)
a. ACCEPT
b. PASS TO: DDCI
5. AIDE FINAL ACTION:
REGRET SEE ME
D/DCl/IC D/DCl/NI
6. INFORMATION ROUTING:
a. COMMENTS:
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S TAT
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Council on Foreign Relations
o McGeorge Bundy will introduce you
o Requested format:
- Speak for 15 minutes without text.
- Discussion/Questions & Answers for 45 minutes.
o Mr. Nagorski requested you "maintain informality
of last appearance."
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I I I
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COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
THE HAROLD PRATT HOUSE 1.58 EAST 68TH STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10021 I TEL. (212) 734-0400 I CABLE: COUNFOREL, NEW YORK
The Thomas J. Watson 3VIeetings
You are cordially invited to attend
A .7Vieeting
in honor of
ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER, USN
Director of Central Intelligence
at the Harold Pratt House
Wednesday, October 5, 1977
5:15-6:30 pm
SECRECY AND MORALITY IN INTELLIGENCE
McGeorge Bundy
President, The Ford Foundation
will preside
MEMBERS ACCEPTING THIS INVITATION WILL BE EXPECTED TO STAY UNTIL THE END OF THE SESSION.
MEMBERS ARRIVING AFTER 5:30 ARE REQUESTED TO REMAIN IN THE MARBLE HALL
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"
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T
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STAT
STAT
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4 October 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
See Distribution List
New York City/Atlanta Trip
1. Official Party.
DCI
Herb Hetu
2. Schedule.
Wednesday, 5 October
0800 DCI arrive AgcncyO?
0930 Hetu depart Agency for WNA
0940 DCI depart for WNA
1000 Party depart WNA for New York City (1 hr.
1100 Arrive La Guardia Airport
1145 Arrive Union League-Club (37th St.)
Cocktail s/Reception/Lunch/Address/Q&A
1400 Depart Union League Club
1430
1530
1645
1715
flight)
Depart for Council on Foreign Relations
Arrive Council on Foreign Relations (68th
Tea/Address/Q&A
1830 Depart Council on Foreign Relations
STAT DCI - Car #1; H. Hetu,
STAT - Car #2 (proceed to airport)
1845 DCI meet with David Rockefeller
2000 Depart La Guardia Airport for Atlanta;
(2 hr. 50 min. flight)
2250 Arrive Atlanta
2315 Arrive Peachtree Plaza Hotel
St.)
dinner enroute
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STAT
STAT
STAT
STAT
STAT
STAT
STAT
rr T-
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2
Thursday, 6 October
0740 Meet "J .D. " Humphries of Atlanta City Forum
at Main Reservations/Check-In Desk of Peachtree
walk to Equitable Bldg.
0745 Arrive Equitable B1 dg. , meet Atlanta City Forum
and Advisory Board
0800 Take seats for breakfast
0820 DCI Address
0850 Questions and Answers
0910 Adjourn to Executive Room for Press Conference
1000 Depart Equitable Bldg. for Airport
1020 Enroute WNA
1205 Arrive WNA
1230 Arrive Agency/Lunch
E
Distribution:
DCI
Mr. Hetu
C/DCI Security
Plaza Hotel;
Worki nq
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