00.5260 TAYLOR QUESTIONS: NORTH VIETNAM LOGISTICS ACTIVITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 52
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 8, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1968
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
NSC Review Completed.
00.5260
Taylor Questions: North Vietnam
Logistics Activities
April 1968
21 Feb 68 I/L Blind Memo re Techniques and Problems Relative to
Monitoring Enemy Traffic into and Through Laos
25:0 26 Feb 68
No Date
NO Date
11 Mar
23 Mar
68
68
25X1
24
Apr
68
26
Apr
68
2
May
68
15
May
68
?No Date
DIA review
completed.
informal note re number of people working on
enemy. logistics; comments on cables re lack25X1
of adequate air support for allied operations throughout
Laos
Handwritten Tables re Estimate Full Time Transport Workers,
559 Transportation Group, Laos (strength); Organized
Battalion Transport, South Vietnam (strength)
Map: Cambodia and South Vietnam Area (showing Base Areas)
Patrick Coyne to John Bross memo re North Vietnam
Logistic Activities forwarding list of questions from
Maxwell Taylor added after Taylor briefing of 26 Feb 68
Maxwell Taylor to Pat Coyne informal note .requesting
briefing on enemy OB in South Vietnam
to AD/DCl/NIPE memo re Questions Raised by General
axwell Taylor (response to questions attached) --
Project 00.5260
TOP SECRET Blind Memo re Intelligence on the Enemy
Logistics System, What is the logistics system?
Attachment: TOP SECRET Parrott Memo for Record, dated
29 Apr 68, re Discussion with General
Maxwell Taylor on North Vietnamese
Logistics
TOP SECRET John Bross to Lt. Gen. Joseph Carroll letter
General Maxwell's Taylor's request that more attention
be given to logistics intelligence
Lt. Gen. Carroll to Patrick Coyne letter forwarding
piece on Training of North Vietnamese Armed Forces
Personnel
Distribution list for Project 00.5260
PFIAB/NSC Review Completed.
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
S-3079/AP-4A
i
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON. D. C. 20301
Mr. 3. Patrick Coyne
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
The White Rouse
Washington D. C 20501
1 5 nrjAY 1968
Dear Mr. Coyne:
(C) Reference is made to your memorandum of 30 April, Training of
North Vietnam Armed Forces Personnel, in which you requested the
Central Intelligence Agency to obtain additional data on the joint
CIA/DIA paper entitled "The Attrition of Vietnamese Communist Forces,
1963-1969" on behalf of General Taylor.
(C) On 2 May, Mx. Thomas A. Parrott of the Central Intelligence Agency
requested DIA to respond to your memorandum. The information at
enclosure 1 is keyed to the specific questions posed by General Taylor.
Geographic references are shown on map at enclosure 2.
Sincerely,
JOSEPH F. CARROLL
Lieutenant Goxieral, 1..TSAY
Directox ?
2 Enclosures
I. Training of NVN Armed Forces
Personnel (C), 1 cy (S)
2, Map of NVN, 1 cy (U)
cc: Mr. Thomas A. Parrott , CIA
yDAR
DOWNCTLOTI:T,
1 ,
INTERVALS; fOT 3ATTCALLY
DECLASSI'f'iT'
J. . ?-
po, DT2 5200.10 1
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
W
25X1 Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
4k/S
A,
Qe
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
AJO:,U
Or X j
:Training Of North Vietnamese Armed Forces Personnel (C)
(S) Summary. Since 1964, NVA induction standards have been lowered
and terms of service extended because of the increased commitment in South
Vietnam. This commitment has also resulted in an expanded training
establishment and lower training standards. A shortage of competent
leadership has developed from the squad leader to the company-grade level.
Strengths and weaknesses of VC and NVA units derive primarily from the
quality of their leadership, the area in which they operate, and the
tactics they?are:.farced_to.:employ?Over.-all,-VC and .NVktxDop,s_ar,e
regarded by Free World forces as determined and tenacious adversaries.
2. (s) 2: How and where is the NVN recruit enlisted or inducted into
the Armed Forces? How long does he serve? How many candidates are
rejected for military service?
A: NVA recruiting and induction standards appear to be the
responsibility of the military region, with the province andits
subordinate districts tasked to meet quotas set by the military region
headquarters, the NVA High Command, and the National Defense Council.
Administrative committees have been established in all cities, villages,
districts and provinces to oversee the implementation of conscription
policies. They register all available male personnel from 17 to 45; for
example, upon reaching 17, the male is given a written 'order to report to
his district headquarters for a physical examination, tests, and to fill
out a biographic questionnaire. He is then assigned a draft category.
When new recruits are called up, they are sent to a provincial induction
center for final'Proces'sing'and assignment to training units.
The recruitment system has changed since 1964. In that year,
A-
callups were its,tituted on a quarterly rathef than a semiannual basis;
some areas have been calling up met on a monekly basis since then.
The length of enlistment has been changed from three years to
an indefinite period. Of the estimated 120,000 personnel who come of
draft age each year, an estimated 100,000 are drafted. The remaining
20,000 are rejected or exempted from service. Lower, induction standards
due to increased manpower demands are evident in prisoner-of-war statements.
One stated he had not been allowed to fire his squad's machine gun because
he was blind in one eye. Another repotted that he knew of an NVA soldier
who had suffered a heart attack but was not released from active duty. A
third related that he was inducted in 1967 after having been rejected for
health reasons in 1964 and 1965. Other prisoner-of-war statements indicate
that persons previously deferred or exempt from the draft are being called
to active duty.
DOTNGRADED AT 12 YEAR
--gTZRVALS.; 'NOT AUTOMATICALLY q
.1N4T4SInED. DOD DIR 5200.10
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
4114 A I 10 0
?
iriall,.-11?...11 A Jo , irok
3 X j
,.00AX
3. (S) 2: How and where does he receive basic training? How long?
Of what does it consist? What evidence of reduction in duration or
quality in recent months?
? A: The NVA training program has apparently been changed several
times since 1964, primarily because of the expansion of the army and
increased troop commitments in South Vietnam. In 1964, basic infantry
training -- from four to six months for the infantry soldier -- was
conducted by division training battalions. In 1965-1966, however, the
basic infantry_traininegcycle was apparently reduced to three.t.o_fPur._
months and was conducted by both training battalions subordinate to
divisions and independent training battalions and regiments subordinate
to the military region. Moreover, infiltration training was largely
shifted to the 338th Infantry Brigade. (In late 1966/early 1967, the
NVA established at least three basic infantry training centers at
Hoa Binh, Tho Xuan, and Phu Binh.)
A review of prisoner-of-war reports indicates that some
personnel drafted into the NVA during the late 1966 to mid-1967 period
infiltrated into South Vietnam after receiving six weeks or less basic
training in training units or centers. Prisoners-of-war trained by
regular NVA units during 1966-1967, however, reported that they
received six to eight months of basic and advanced infantry training
prior to their infiltration training.
Known basic training units are: the 320B or 320th Garrison
Infantry Division at Hoa Binh; the 250th Training Group at Ha Bac; the
338th Infantry Brigade In Thanh Hoa Province, and the 42d Infantry
Regiment of the 350th Division in Haiphong. A number of prisoner-of-
war reports indicate, that basic, advanced, and infiltration training
is also conducted in regular army units throughout North Vietnam. It
is believed that infiltration training, once 'given separately, is now
integrated into the regular basic training cycle:
Analysis of prisoner-of-war reports indicate that most
training units have vacated their permanent facilities in favor of areas
offering cover, concealment, and a realistic environment for combat
instruction. The reports also indicate that troops are usually quartered
in houses in adjacent villages and that training normally takes place six
days a week. The recruit's day begins with physical exercise followed by
political indoctrination and such military training as grenade and bayonet
practice, hand-to-hand combat, map reading, individual-weapons training
and marksmanship, and infiltration techniques. Infiltration training
includes the use of camouflage and forced marches, with heavy packs.
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
_
.0ta'AX
, Od3X
ALItl-AX
- 4. (S) Q.: What analogous information is available regarding the .
training of officers and NCOs?
A: The more formal NCO and OCS schools, as well as the military
academy at Son Tay, have ?been abandoned following severe US airstrikes.
Officer training is now conducted in division OCS classes of two-three
months' duration; classes are composed of senior NCOs who have been
recalled or those who have completed at least seven years of formal
schooling. NCO training is no longer mandatory, but some divisions
offer short courses. Soldiers who have good records and exhibit
political zeal are eligible to hold NCO rank.
The NVA apparently has a shortage of properly trained
personnel.to fill platoon leader, platoon sergeant, and squad leader
positions.. The over-all competence of the company-grade officer has
declined during the past two years because of demands of the expanding
air defense effort, the upgrading of several brigades to divisions,
.and the necessity to create additional divisions, regiments, and
supporting elements for infiltration into South Vietnam.. This quali-
tative decline will probably continue despite attempts to accelerate
the officer and NCO training program.
5. (5) 0: What do our troops think of the comparative combat capabilities
of VC and NVN units? What are their strengths and weaknesses?
A: VC and NVA units that are well trained and led fight extremely
well and are respected by our troops. In I and II CTZ, NVA units are
better equipped, trained and led than enemy elements farther south and
are more highly regarded. Contact with a VC unit will frequently result
in a point-to-point engagement whereas an'NVA unit will usually deploy
on line and attempt to assault through the position. Also the NVA will
pursue, wherea&the VC will break contact. Itis important to note,
however, that oUr troops generally find VC for_ces somewhat more difficult
to cope with since their unconventional tactics seem to concern the
individual Marine or soldier to a greater extent.
On occasion, particularly when they occupy well-prepared .
defensive positions, VC troops fight with considerable skill even though
they have less staying power than their NVA counterparts. In III CTZ,
VC units, especially those with large percentages of filler personnel
from the local forces, will offer a more determined and effective
resistance than the NVA since they are very familiar with the areas in
which they are fighting. The units which are all NVA will probably
perform the poorest if their officers are lost in battle. They also
have to depend on the VC for supplies and guides, and once out of touch
can become lost and demoralized.
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
In general, VC units are better able to fight a guerrilla
war and in battalion-.size actions of a limited nature where surprise
is essential but massive fire support is not. NVA forces are better
.equipped to fight more conventional battles, where they can use their
fire support to good advantage, use prepared positions, and employ
large numbers of troops in a concentrated area.
Major VC weaknesses derive from hurried local recruitment,
the adverse psychological impact on the people of the upsurge in
.terrorism since the Tet offensive, their dependence on food, supplies,
and money from .the South Vietnamese:Rpoale?the#_gener.p.ljack
and their need to rely, on detailed planning
that reduces flexibility. NVA units are strong during initial contacts,
i.e., before their new replacements have faced the realities of the.
military and political situation in South Vietnam, and before they
have been.exposed to our overwhelming fire support. The political
-officers' propaganda lectures are difficult to reconcile with the
realities of the situation in South Vietnam.
Inflexibility of reaction on several occasions suggests
shortcomings in Communist training and leadership as well. Many
experienced VC cadre were lost during Tet, losses which may be
qualitatively irreplaceable in the near future. To a certain extent,
this was also true of NVA units. Hanoi can infiltrate cadre from the
North, but the apparent lack of training and poor motivation of lower-
ranking soldiers cause us to suspect that most of the NVA units lack
effective low-level leadership.
Our troops have considerable respect for the enemy's capability
for intense short.termmortar/rocket fire.and, at the small unit level,
intense automatic-weapons fire. Tactical movement is skillful, and units
are very goodjat. concealment and utilizing strong defensive positions.
The enemy's effeCtive use of surprise and hisN,4bility to fight at night
are worthy of note-as well.
e/?
7 17. i"-72
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
A
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
r ? A LI 0
4 ?
083X
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
AdOO 1
102:113X 1
AdO
uat!
,ER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM
.iCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
1
DEVI
1,4
3
4
5
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks:
For your information and file. You
have a copy of Mr. Parrott's letter to
Gen. Brown, dated 2 May (ER 68-1918/2).
_
, -
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATEt
0/DCVNIPE
9k
21 May
7E 22
SECRET
'?; q),) J;10,q)1A,
-
(4O)
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
Lt. General Joseph Ir. Carroll
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20301
Dear Zoe:
2 May 968
As you no doubt know, DU, along with
and Torn Parrott had a discussion with General
Maxwell Taylor last Friday with the object of trying to settle once
and for all exactly what it is that General Taylor wants us to do in
the field of logistics intelligence.
As will have undoubtedly passed along,
General Taylor reiterated his conviction that logistics intelligence
has not been given as much attention as have various other fields
and that he feels strongly that something has to be done to improve
this. He stated that he believes this if 98% a military problem and
? thus one of primary concern to DIA.
I-re had prepared a one-page paper which outlines succinctly
the intelligence problems that must be addressed on a continuing
basis and which also clarifies exactly what he hopes to get from
improved intelligence In this field. A copy of this paper is attached.
With respect to the specific steps that he expects the com-
munity to take, General Taylor said that he wants CINCPAC to be
told that the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board feels
that logistics intelligence is not receiving enough attention and that
more effort must be put on it, particularly along the lines of his
brief memorandum. Specifically. he wants to make sure that these
topic are included in interrogation guides at all levels. 1 assume
that this is something you will want to handle. I would think that
It would fit very well into the responsibilities of CINCPAC's new
Intelligence Coordination Group.
LEuue
TOP. SECRET. Excluded hid automatic
dalT3311itatin
dowdgrating Ind TS t1310153/2
Je.s
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
25X1
25X1
? Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
.TOP SECRET
Incidentally, General Taylor also informed Torn that he was
going to speak to the Secretary of Defense about giving what
it needs in the way of zonfigured aircraft. He says that
he believes it is in the national interest to do so.
Sincerely,
ThirgneaT
John A. Bross
Attachment
TS No. 189053
NIPE:TAP:dm
Distribution:
#1 and #2 w/cy #10 at 11 of att. - Addressee
#3 w/o att. - ER
#4 w/o att. - NLPE/PFIAB
#5 w/o att. - NIPE/chrono
#6 w/o att. - NIPE/ TAP chrono
ew/o att. - DD/I
crrDr.1
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
Approved For Release 2009/05/08 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
SENDER WILL CHE
UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
'OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
1
DD/OER

4F19
to
2
3
4
5
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION'
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
XXX
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks:
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME. ADDR
DATE
C/DDI Exec Staff
3 May
UNCLASSIFIED
___...._
I cumelDENTIAL I
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
"214
-rim r"D CT
Approved For Release 2009/05/08 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
-UNCLASSIFIED when blank ?TOP SECRET when attached to Top Secret DOCUMerit ?
to SECRET when filled in form is detached from controlled document.
CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT
REGISTRY
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION
SOURCE
Albek-rs
DOC. NO. - 9j
DOC. DATE 71/-0-.?
CIA CONTROL NO.
06-3?..
/s2. 4
DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED
7-27 19G,S" 1
LOGGED BY
COPY NO. i3
..
NUMBER OF PAGES
NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS
ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency
or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or
transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official
duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form
and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and
indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.
RECEIVED
RELEASED
SEEN BY
REFERRED TO
OFFICE/DIV.
DATE
DATE
TIME
DATE
TIME
SIGNATURE
OFFICE
SIGNATURE
5X1
--a-- MAY
1968
,
NOTICE OF
DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below
to Central Top Secret Control for record.
and transmitted
DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA)
DOWNGRADED
DESTROYED
TO
By (Signature)
TO
BY (Signature.)
WITNESSED BY (Signature)
BY (Signature)
OFFICE
DATE
OFFICE
DATE
OFFICE
DATE
NM&
FORM 215 US! PREVIOU Approved For Release 20097.0%/687'6-rA-RD 78T0i0V5iR0006 0260001-5
0
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
. eb
V0046?1
40 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
S1ENCER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM
1 UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
D/ OER 4F 18
AI
D b i 0 CA
31'1\01
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks:
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
AD/DCl/NIPE
[J
7E 22
1 May
SECRET?
UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
FORM NO. 9R7 Use previous editions (40)
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
TOP SECRET
- Approved For Release 2009/05/08 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5 tded
14CLASSIFIEb when blank?TOP SECRET wnen abrac
_Lieu vcp a up 40......a.,..,.,aa?bs..??... ? .?--
3 SECRET when filled In form is detached from controlled document.
i CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT
REGISTRY
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION
CIA CONTROL NO.
JRCE
11-.; 1.69053
JYTAB
::. NO. TS 1.84:305A
DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED
1 My 6P
=. DATE 26 Arvia?
FY NO.
LOGGED BY
l---- "2
%ABER OF PAGES
sf
*ABER OF ATTACHMENTS
IcC-.1,77?
"TENTION: This form will be placed on top ol and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency
classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or
ansmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official
ties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form
d indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and
zlicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.
=ERRED TO
RECEIVED
RELEASED
SEEN BY
OFFICE/DIV.
DATE
OFFICE
SIGNATURE DATE
TIME
DATE
TIME
SIGNATURE
25X1
7e, ar
(
tttps 1968
VOTICE OF
and transmitted
DETACHMENT: When this form is deta 'lied from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below
to Central Top Secret Control for record.
DOWNGRADED
DESTROYED
DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA)
By (Signature)
TO
Y (Signature)
WITNESSED BY (Signature)
BY (Signature)
OFFICE
DATE
OFFICE
DATE
OFFICE
DATE
I ',Dell ID 1 I
DRM 26 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. TOP SECRET Excluded from automatic
- Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
64
0
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
" bturcci
ORAND
RECORD
49 AtrU 1968
UBJECT: Diicussion with General Maxwell Taylor
on North Vietnamese Logistics
25X1 I. PC14 DIA and
1 met by prearrangement with Genera/ Taylor on Iriday the 26th
of April. to discuss the North Vietnamese logistic situation. Our
purpose was firs* to have General Taylor meet the two individuals
ho hallVO been designated as being responsible for following materiel
and personnel infUtrstion, by DIA respectively; and to
discuss with. General Taylor exactly whet it is that he wants to get
from the intelligence community which he quite clearly has not been
getting.
2. The dicussiou was frank end friendly. No one she was
present. As a result of my telephone discussion with General Taylor
the previous week, in the course of setting this meeting up. he had
prepared a written sheet (copy attached) which outlines succinctly
what it is that he is searching for in the intelligence field.
3. In the course of the discussion General Taylor reiterated
f the points that he has made a comber of times before. Among
the statement that he finds it disturbing that there is no
point of "undivided responsibility" for logistics in the community
and that in hie opinion not enough effort has been expended in getting
logistics intelligence. as contrasted to the effort in other fields.
He felt that the logiettcs problem is 98% a military one and that DIA
should thus be the agent for all of this kind of intelligence. He again
reverted to & familiar theme to the effect that F?Seerrus to be
duplicating what should properly be a DIA function, and that the Agency
appears to be going beyond what it is "authorised by lave" to do.
4. This led to a detailed discussion of why this situation exists.
tided out that unless gets deeply enough into matters of this
it is not going to be in a position to make a very useful
button to the assessment of intelligence. We cited, for example
umbers game" in which the Agency has been able to exert
p ?
TS 189053/1
Copy #5
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
gEGRET
considerable weight in arriving at reasonable figures- -which would
not be possible if officers Were not thoroughly familiar with the
situation. We spoke also of the matter of continuity of personnel.
the lack of which makes it difficult for DIA to produce really useful
intelligence in such fields as strategic research; the special
situation which obtains with respect to Free World versus Bloc
economic intelligence; etc. None of this had much effect on General
Taylor and he reterned to the proposition that it would be enough for
to "spot chock" what DLA was doing and that this would be in line
with what as an agency should do. We then left this subject
about where it started (and about where many people have come out
In previous sienilar discussions with General Taylor).
5. After examinting General Taylor's attached list and discuss-
n ItOrT14 detail, I said that this seemed to indicate that he did
ed t us to produce a "model" of the logistic system. He said
not interested in a model?that this is a term used by the
scientiets and not one that would appeal to Mm. He acknowledged
that perhaps he had been so close to the scientiets that he had said
something of this sort, but he really was not expecting us to produce
a model. With respect to exactly what he did want us to do, he felt
that the most important thing was for DIA to notify CINCPAC and
MACV that the President's Board feels strongly that logistics are
not receiving enough attention and that special efforts alUat be devoted
to catching up in this area. He wanted his net of questions to be
3assed along to CMCPAC and to have the principal responsibility
centered there for assuring that these questions are on all interrogation
lists. He thought that almost any prisoner or defector would have
knowledge of some part of the logistic system even if it were only
connected with his own personal training, and that it should be standard
,Jeocedure to cover questions of this kind in all interrogations.
6. General Taylor said that he had read with interest the
answers to the nine questions which he had submitted to which
had just been received that morning. tie said these take care of many
of his worries and that he really had no further questions now. He
thought that if we continued to examine the list of intelligence desired,
ehich is shown on the sheet he gave us, this would accomplish a good
deal of what he is trying to do.
7. He also said that he would have to talk to the Secretary
of Defenseabout giving NSA what It needs
as he believes it is in the national Interest to do
expressed some exasperation that "someone half way around
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
TOP
like ki nimAtif
and 1-awsade eons.
a
a chore. He solict
8. 1 will draft a letter to General Can't!, giving the g4at of
w and palming along General Taylor's written statement
ea for action an expressed in paragraph 5 above.
cc: DC!
DDC!
DD/1
DDiP
Di OEM
DloC1
TOP
(Signed) Thomas A. Parrott
Thornae A. Parrett
AD/Da/ N1PE
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
ADlflCIIautive Staff; 0 DD/I
kiRU chief,
24 April 68
DD/OER
tuestions Raised by General Naxvell Taylor
Attached. are the responses to the nine cpestiOne
raised by General 14axvell Taylor.
lttachment:
As stated above
Distribution: (Project 00.50)
Orig. & 1 - Nadressee v/3 cys att.
1 - Ch/EXec. Staff, 0/DD/I w/1 cy att.
wd=DD/OF2w/att.
25X1 DD/OER:PVW:ajs
Copy Alt of 4
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
Approved For Release 200970E/08 7CIA-RD1578T02095R000600260001-5
Question 1.
What assurance is available that CIA and DIA are
pressing intelligence collectors sufficiently to obtain
necessary information on the Viet Cong/North Vietnam
logistic system? Is it not feasible for CIA and DIA to
sit down with MACV and work out the intelligence collec-
tion program required to meet this intelligence need,
or is this already being done?
1. CIA has maintained an active intelligence collection pro-
gram designed to obtain necessary information on the enemy logistic
system. In addition, there are frequent exchanges and contacts
between the collectors and the requesters of the information.
These contacts are carried out at all levels and among all relevant
parties. Thus, for example, there are contacts among the DD/I
representative, the Chief of Station and J-2, MACV in Saigon;
among logistic analysts in DD/I, DIA, and ACSI; between the
analysis group in the Saigon Station and CIVC (Combined Intelligence
Center, Vietnam); between CAS and Military intelligence personnel
in the field; and between responsible levels in CIA and NSA. CIA,
DIA, and MACV have met in conference to discuss the collection,
processing and analysis of intelligence on enemy logistics, the
last such meeting having taken place in May 1967. A conference
scheduled for February 1968 was cancelled because of the TET
offensive.
2. Despite these programs, important gaps in intelligence
remain. Some are unavoidable. Gaps may result from enemy security
precautions; the questionable reliability of some clandestine
informants; the limited number of POW's/ralliers with detailed
knowledge of the enemy logistic system; a lack of planes to devote
to more extensive reconnaissance directed against enemy logistics
or to serve as communications platforms directed primarily against
logistics intelligence; and even, in some cases, from the multi-
layered, multi-agency collection effort itself, where "the word"
on intelligence needs may be lost, misconstrued or yield to other
priorities on its way through channels.
3. CIA has produced many requirements -- specific and general
directed to the acquisition of intelligence on the VC/NVA logistic
system. These requirements, which are assigned a high priority,
are levied on various intelligence collectors. The primary sources
of information on enemy loaisticsl
A comprenensive listing or W.A. requirements with respect to enemy
logistics in Southeast Asia is found in the Current Intelligence
Reporting List (CIRL). The CIRL -- an updating of which has just
HIP SFP,RFT
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
ur ar.W1E 1
been published -- is distributed throughout the intelligence
community and supplements specific requirements levied against
one particular phase or source of logistics information. The
IPC List on North Vietnam, published by for the Interagency
Clandestine Collection Priorities Committee, has a. section devoted
to questions on logistical support. At the highest level, the
Priority National Intelligence Objectives include a requirement
for evidence of Communist use of Cambodia as a sanctuary, operating
base, or source of supply. A description of requirements on
enemy logistics is attached to this response.
4. believes that some gaps in intelligence on enemy
logistics could be reduced by more intensive collection efforts.
We agree that it certainly would be feasible for a future meeting
of DIA, and MACV to place greater emphasis on an improved
intelligence collection program vis-a?vis processing and analysis.
The February conference on logistics would have been precisely
such a step. We presume that this conference will be rescheduled
as soon as MACV finds it possible to do so. In the meantime, we
are able and do keep in touch with MACV on collection problems
through outestablished requirements programs, through communi-
cations handled by Agency representatives in Saigon and through
TDY visits of to MACV J-2 and CICV.
TPP SEr7qET
_ 2 -
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
R
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/0576-6767A7RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
Question 2.
What are the estimated figures on the interdicted
capacity of the various transport systems over which supplies
are introduced into North Vietnam and over which they sub-
sequently move south (in contrast to the theoretical un-
interdicted capacities)? Also what are the figures on the
amounts and kinds of supplies which actually pass over the
roads over which distribution is made by North Vietnam to
Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces (in contrast to the
theoretical capacity of the road net).
A. Interdicted Capacity
The capacity of a. transport system is a theoretical concept
that is dependent on a wide variety of factors, including the
extent and condition of facilities, and the availability of equip-
ment, labor, and managerial skills. It is a highly useful concept
in analyzing logistical systems and permits our analysts to judge
how one transport system compares to another, and how intensely a
road or railroad is being used. It indicates how much a. road or
railroad can be expected to move, on the average, over an extended
period of time. However, the methodology behind estimates of
"capacity" is not sensitive to short-term changes or variations.
While the original theoretical capacity of a railroad may be reduced
temporarily by bombing, simple expedients and coUntermeasures may
prevent any extended decline in the overall capacity of the system.
Interdicted capacity becomes critical only when the actual traffic
on a road or railroad approaches its theoretical capacity and the
possibility of further countermeasures has been exhausted. These
conditions have seldom been met in North Vietnam. For these
reasons we believe that estimates of interdicted capacity would be
tenuous at best, would need constant revision, and would be poten-
tially misleading.
The North Vietnamese ability to counteract interdictions is
illustrated by the numerous alternates around the Hanoi Railroad/
Highway (Doumer) Bridge over the Red River. This mile-long bridge
provided the only direct rail and highway access into Hanoi from
Haiphong, Dong Dang, and other northern areas, but 800 feet of the
Bridge was destroyed by air strikes in December 1967. However,
there are now 6 highway pontoon bridges, 7 highway vehicle ferries,
and 3 pairs of railroad car ferry slips with a combined capacity
estimated at 19,000 short tons each way per day. This alternate
capacity exceeds the 16,600 ton combined capacity of the rail lines
and highways that formerly had been dependent on the Doumer Bridge.
Another example of "interdicted" transport capacity in
North Vietnam occurred in the summer of 1966 when the railroad/highway
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
bridge at Viet Tri between Hanoi and Lao Cal on the Chinese border
was destroyed. Before the destruction of the Viet Tri bridge, this
line had a. capacity of 3,300 tons each way per day. Immediately
after the interdiction the through capacity of the railroad was
zero because it was impossible to run a train from Hanoi to Lao
Cal. A railroad car ferry was later installed that permitted about
800 tons of traffic to move across the river each way per day and
we have since carried the capacity of this line at this figure.
However, the reduction in capacity from 3,300 tons to an "inter-
dicted" capacity of 800 tons has no significance, because one
ferry can carry the total small volume of traffic that moves on
this railroad. If another ferry were added the capacity of the
railroad would increase to 1,600 tons each way per day, and if
4 ferries were put in operation -- a feat well within North Viet-
namese capabilities -- the capacity of the line would be restored
to its preinterdiction level.
B. Supply Movements Over Roads
There is insufficient intelligence to estimate reliably
the actual traffic flow within the transport system -- that is,
the number of trains, trucks, or watercraft moving along specific
routes over a given time period. Nor can we estimate on the basis
of hard intelligence the composition of the goods moving over the
transport system. However, we can make estimates based on firm
intelligence of the total volume (but not the composition) of
goods moving from North Vietnam into Laos. These estimates were
made available in our recent briefings.
Our estimates of supply flows are heavily dependent on
our knowledge of the tonnages and types of supplies that enter the
country (on which there is good intelligence), requirements for
these supplies in various parts of the country, and the impressions
of traffic movements gleaned from photography, pilot reporting, and
While the precise flow on the individual LOG s can not be quantified
we are confident that only a mall percent of the theoretical capa-
city of any major LOC is actually being used.
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
Tim orrinrr
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
Question 3.
Is it not possible at this time to obtain better
figures on the size and mission of the various enemy Trans-
portation Groups spotted on the chart used in the briefing
by a representative?
B. The Thanh Hoa Rear Services Headquarters, located in the
vicinity of Thanh Hoa, is believed to be at the major distribution
point for materiel destined for tactical areas in Laos, South
Vietnam, and the DMZ. Thanh Hoa is strategically situated at the
confluence of major rail, water, and land routes leading into the
southern Panhandle of North Vietnam.
II. Mission of Transportation Groups in Laos
The 559th Transportation Group, with headquarters located near the
entrance of Routes 137/912 into the Laotian Panhandle, controls the
Laos/Cambodian logistical corridor. It is directly subordinate to
the Directorate of Rear Services. Vehicle count in the 559th Group
is unknown. The strength of the entire 559th Group, with subordinate
elements, is estimated at 5,000 men; the strength of specific sub-
ordinate units is unknown. Subordinate elements and their responsi-
bilities are listed below:
IINP SFPRIT
Approved For Release 2009/05/08 CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/05/08 :-CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
VI 11.11106P1%.1
A. The 559th Transportation Group Forward Headquarters controls
logistical movements along Laotian Routes 911/914 and 92/922 leading
into I Corps.
B. The 70th Transportation Regiment is responsible for all types
of logistical movements, including the operation of the first 17
way stations in the personnel infiltration system in the Tnotian
Panhandle leading southward from North Vietnam.
C. The 71st Transportation Regiment is believed to be located
in the general vicinity of Ban Bac. In addition to controlling
truck and boat operations, the 71st Regiment is responsible for
the operation of 12 personnel infiltration way stations in the
southern Laotian Panhandle south of the 17 way stations controlled
by the 70th Transportation Regiment. The dividing line between
the 70th and 71st Regiments appears to begin at a point in Laos
opposite the Quang Nam/Thua Thien border area and extends to Attopeu.
D. The 98th NVA Regiment is responsible for the movement of
supplies up the Se Kong River from Stung Treng, Cambodia, and
along Route 110 in Laos to the Tri Border Area. The Headquarters
of this unit was extremely active during the recent fighting in
Dak To, South Vietnam, indicating it may have responsibility for
supplying NVA units operating in that part of South Vietnam.
E. The A Shau Rear Services Headquarters has the responsi-
bility for coordinating the movement of men and supplies along
Route 922 in South Vietnam, supplying infiltrators transiting the
border area, and providing a rear service depot for NVA units
operating in I Corps. Route security as well as road maintenance
and the movement of supplies are among the functions of this unit.
F. Station 70 is the final preparation point for elements
enroute to South Vietnam through the DMZ.
III. Mission of Transportation Groups in South Vietnam
I Corps
Conscripted labor and transportation units organic to combat
units move the supplies over trails or along streams to the receiving
unit's base area. In addition, there are four known transportation
battalions operating in the I Corps - the Bac Son, the Binh Son,
the 500th, and the Tay Son. The Bac Son Battalion is believed to
be operational in Quang Tri Province and the northern part of Thua
Thien. The Binh Son Battalion is in the eastern half of Thua
Thien and Quang Nam provinces. The 500th Battalion is unlocated,
but believed to be responsible for Binh Dinh, Quang Ngai, and part
TOP Ver
Approved For Release 2009/05/0'8 : uIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
JVI vAU11101
of Kontum Province. The Tay Son Battalion has been reported
operating in the eastern half of Kontum Province and parts of
Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh Provinces.
II Corps
In the highlands, the B-3 Front has established a logistical
support system in which combat units are required to transport a
portion of their own supplies from secure storage areas located
in Cambodia. In addition, the Prong has two identified trans-
portation battalions - the 19th Battalion located in Pleiku and
Darlac Provinces, and the Nam Son Battalion located in the western
portion of Kontum Province along the Cambodian border. In the
coastal area, locally recruited personnel obtain foodstuffs and
medical supplies for NVA combat units by local purchase or taxation.
III Corps
The VC/NWA logistical effort in III Corps is supported by the
Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN) Rear Service Groups. Six
of these groups (Numbers 81-86) operate in the eleven provinces in
III Corps, supplying the VC/NWA units operating in its area:
Group Number Area of Responsibility
81 War Zone D in northern Long Khanh
Province.
82 Northern Tay Ninh Province.
83 Binh Long, Binh Duong, and Gia
Dinh Province.
84 Region E (Bien Hoa, Long Khanh,
and Phuoc Tuy Provinces).
85 Unknown.
86 Phuoc Long Province.
IV Corps
In IV Corps, in country military region depots and base supply
areas have been established for logistical support, and supplies are
transported from these depots and base areas to regimental and
battalion supply points. Three battalions have been identified
providing support to Communist forces: The 518th Coastal Security
(infantry) in the coastal area of Kien Hoa Province, The A101 Trans-
portation Battalion in Kien Hoa, Vinh Binh, Ba Xuyen, and An Xuyen
Provinces, and The TN3175 Battalion in An Xuyen Province. These
battalions avoid enemy contact, but they are reported to be active
on the eastern shore of the Ca Mau Peninsula?
TAP unn.
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
25X1
25X1
Approved ForRelease2009/05/08 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5 25X1
IV?SLUM
IV. Size of Communist Transportation Groups in Laos and South Vietnam
Personnel strength of Communist Transportation Groups in Laos
and South Vietnam are estimated below. The estimates are consistent
with MACV Order of Battle except where noted. The estimates do
not include conscripted laborers who perform transportation duties
on a part time or full time basis for up to 90 days a year, personnel
in transportation units for which there has only been fragmentary
reports, and many other personnel engaged in transportation func-
tions who are not assigned to formally designated transportation
units.
Communist Transportation Elements in Laos
Units Strength
559th Transportation Group 5,000 (MACV estimate
4,000)
559th Transportation Group Forward
Headquarters
70th Transportation Regiment
71st Transportation Regiment
98th Regiment
A Shau Valley Rear Services (not confirmed
by MACV)
Station 70 (not confirmed by MACV)
I Corps
Communist Transportation Elements in South Vietnam
Units Strength
Binh Son Tran Bn.
Bac Son Tran Bn.
500th Tran Bn.
Tay Son Tran Bn.
Total
II Corps
19th Tran Bn.
Nam Son Tran Bn.
400
400 (no estimate
made by MACV)
400 (no estimate
made by MACV)
400
300
400
Total 700
11MP SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
25X1
Approved ForRelease2009/05/08 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5 25X1
I Ur 0E1141E1
Communist Transportation Elements in South Vietnam
(continued)
Units
III Corps
Rear Service Group 81
Rear Service Group 82
Rear Service Group 83
Rear Service Group 84
Rear Service Group 85
Rear Service Group 86
48th Tran En.
Total
IV Corps
518th Coastal Security Bn.
A 101 Transportation En.
TN 3175 Transportation En.
Total
Strength
500
1,500
1, 000
1, 000
150
1,000
300
5,450
400 (no estimate
made by MACV)
250 (no estimate
made by MACV)
450 (no estimate
made by MACV)
1,100
Total - South Vietnam 8,8o
VW arm'
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
Question 4.
Has not someone studied available intelligence on the
movement of North Vietnamese forces, as the basis for an
understanding of what takes place when a division moves
south?
Question 9.
What do we know about the enemy's replacement system?
How, when and for how long are replaced trained? How moved
South? How incorporated into units?
The answers to these questions are contained in the following
statement on the infiltration process.
1. 1 January 1968 has indicated
that more than 60,000 regular and replacement personnel of the
North Vietnamese armed forces have been deployed toward South
Vietnam. It is not known how many have actually entered friendly
territory, but this movement represents a. dramatic increase in
the level of infiltration as it has existed since the US troop
build-up and bombing campaign began in 1965.
2. Over the years, Hanoi probably has committed more than
a quarter of a million men to the conflict in the South. To
accomplish troop deployments of this magnitude in a clandestine
manner -- and in spite of allied military action both North and
South -- has required the development of extraordinarily effective
procedures for personnel infiltration.
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
The Infiltration Network
8. Infiltration groups originate from different parts of
North Vietnam and take a variety of routes to different points
in the south. Most infiltrators, however, are drawn from estab-
lished units or training centers in the Red River valley area
and are transported by truck or by train at least as far as the
Thanh Hoa region at the head of the North Vietnamese panhandle.
9. From this point south the great majority of the infil-
trating personnel have proceeded on foot.
prisoner interrogations have suggested that a substantial
percentage of first quarter infiltration in 1968 has been accomplished
by truck. If true, this may only be a temporary measure adopted
by Hanoi to radically alter the balance of forces in its favor as
part of a new "fight-talk" strategy. Over the years, infiltration
by vehicle has been confined to high ranking cadre or individuals
with special skills -- such as medical or weapons techniqians.
Prisoners have indicated that infiltration by truck can be accomplished
in two to three weeks; by foot at least eight weeks are required.
10. From Thanh Hoa south, all infiltration groups are supported
and controlled by a highly effective organization of administrative,
logistic, communications and transport personnel. This system
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1 Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
25X1
extends over a complex network of trails which as far south as
the delta region below Saigon and through lengthy portions of
eastern Laos and Cambodia. Way stations are scattered along all
the infiltration trails at intervals of no more than a day's march.
In much of North Vietnam these stations are established in or
around villages or hamlets, but as the infiltration routes approach
the North Vietnamese border and pass into friendly territory, sites
are selected in remote jungle areas.
11. Way stations have two major functions: to provide rest
and replenishment areas for infiltrating personnel and a base for
the individuals who control and support the infiltrators. The
stations vary in their facilities from mere stopping points in
the jungle to major depots equipped to provide food, shelter and
medical care.
12. Compartmentation is a. security measure applied to all
phases of the infiltration process. The way station control bases
are usually located about a kilometer away from the bivouac areas
used by the infiltrating troops. Prisoners have reported that
only the commanding officer, communications personnel, and occasional
supply carriers from the infiltrating groups are permitted to go to
the base area. The same principal is applied in keeping base
personnel at adjacent way stations from knowing the locations of
each other's sites. Those who are assigned to guide infiltration
groups customarily meet their opposite numbers from the next sta-
tion at some intermediate point along the trail and pass over
control of the groups at that time.
13. Interrogation of captured personnel has revealed the
efficiency of the infiltration network. Boats ranging from small
sampans to larger ferries are provided at every waterway which
the infiltrators cannot ford. Prisoners have reported little
delay or confusion at these potential bottlenecks and have re-
marked on the competence of the network personnel. We have no
firm information on how many men are involved in running the in-
filtration routes, but it is apparent that the North Vietnamese
have given the system a high priority in personnel and logistic
planning.
Infiltration Group
14. Infiltration groups have ranged in size from about 20
to 2,000 men, depending upon Hanoi's needs in the South. The
smaller groups probably are composed of personnel whose unique
training or responsibilities justify the formation of a special
infiltration unit. The larger ones appear to be made up of
regular army formations or groups of unassigned replacement per-
sonnel. Apparently there is no standard size for an infiltration
group, but prisoners have reported that normally they marched in
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
units of about 100 men. This figure probably represents a
practical number in moving personnel on the infiltration trails
and suggests that large groups are subdivided into marching
elements of about this size. In the case of a regular North
Vietnamese battalion -- about 500 men -- the component companies
appear to move separately at intervals of a few kilometers between
each unit. Infiltrating battalions are normally separated by at
least a day's march.
15. When the infiltrators begin their march in North Vietnam
they move only at night. In the daytime they rest in the homes of
villagers who are out working. The marchers normally set out at
about 6:00 p.m. and then, depending upon terrain, continue for six
to nine hours. While moving south in their own territory, the
infiltrators seem to use normal lines of communication such as
main roads or levees along river banks. As they turn West toward
Laos, however, they abandon these established routes for special
infiltration trails and shift from a night to a day march schedule
This is probably because US air interdiction efforts are less
intense in Laos and because of the concealment afforded by heavy
jungle growth in this region. The group normally sets out about
6:00 a.m. and will march for about six to nine hours, depending
on terrain.
16. In foreign territory infiltration groups are careful to
keep away from main lines of communication. Every effort is made
to conceal the presence of the unit, including the use of temporary
planking when crossing dirt roads in order not to leave footprints.
As the infiltrators move through Laotian territory, opposite
South Vietnam, they are occasionally subjected to mining and ambushes
initiated by guerrilla forces. Several sources have recounted being
bombed by US strategic and tactical aircraft, but there is little
evidence that major losses have come from air attacks.
17. The infiltrators are not accompanied or supported by
supply vehicles on the trip south. Although bicycles may be employed
to carry some items of heavy equipment, such as communications
gear, they are seldom reported. Each man carries his own food,
medicine, field equipment and weapons and is periodically resupplied
from depots along the route of march. Basically, the infiltration
groups have been kept apart from the supplies which they will
eventually use in South Vietnam. Prisoners have reported hearing
supply trucks on parallel routes, but for the most part, the in-
filtrators move on trails which are a safe distance from the often
bombed supply roads.
18. The infiltrator moving toward South Vietnam faces a
number of difficulties other than air raids and guerrilla action,
including hunger, harsh terrain and disease. Malaria is the most
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
frequent problem encountered by the infiltration groups. Most
reports from captured troops indicate that about 75 percent of the
infiltrators contact this disease in varying intensity at some
point during the march south. Each man is supplied with anti-
malaria medication, however, and most are able to complete the
trip. Dysentary, ben-ben, and respiratory diseases also are
reported to plague the infiltrators.
19. There appears to be a clear correlation between the
incidence of disease and the weather. If the soldiers are scheduled
to infiltrate during the rainy season, the difficulties of the
march are markedly increased. As a result, morale declines and
the number who become sick or desert grows. The proportion of
personnel lost to these causesvaries widely in captured documents
and prisoner reporting from five to fifty percent. It is likely,
however, that very few casualties along the trails are permanent
and that after a period of recuperation or re-indoctrination the
detained individuals join another group and continue south.
Disposition of Infiltrators
20. When infiltration groups arrive in South Vietnam, their
assignments depend upon whether they are intended as regular or
replacement personnel. If they are regulnr North Vietnamese
Army units, the company-size groups will normally rejoin their
battalions and regiments and operate\as an integrated unit. If
they are replacement personnel who never were part of any organic
North Vietnamese command, they will probably be assigned on an
individual, company or battalion basis to existing North Vietnamese
regiments to fill vacancies.
21. There is, in addition, a third disposition of infiltration
groups which increases allied difficulties in attempting to maintain
a consistent picture of the enemy order of battle. On occasion,
units, which were subordinate to a regular army division or regiment,
have been reassigned or redesignated upon arrival. This variation in
procedure is as confusing to the North Vietnamese soldier as it is
to his captors. Replacement personnel often can only report the
designation of their infiltration group or the unit that trained
them in North Vietnam. If they are captured shortly after their
arrival in the south, they sometimes appear unaware of the outfit
to which they have been assigned. The distinction between regular
and replacement personnel is not clear in their minds, making them
poor sources of information on the time and effort Hanoi is currently
expending on the training of replacement personnel.
Infiltration Training
22. Manpower studies indicate that North Vietnam has the
capacity to train 145,000 to 175,000 men a year for infiltration.
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
By shortening current training cycles or increasing the number of
units involved in the training of new recruits, this number could
be substantially increased. In the past, basic training for North
Vietnamese infantry personnel has averaged about three months,
although increasing numbers of prisoners report only about one
month's training prior to moving south. This level of training
prepares them to serve as filler personnel in established units,
but does not provide them with the group training required to
participate in a. newly formed company or battalion.
23. There is evidence of a growing deficiency of properly
trained personnel to fill the ranks of squad leaders, platoon sergeants,
and platoon leaders. There are indications that the normal source
of platoon leaders--the Infantry Officers School near Son Tay--has
reduced its two-year course to eight months. The bulk of the
reserve officers and noncommissioned officers have been recalled
to active duty. The largest single source of junior officers
is now from battlefield commissions.
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
. ?
Approved ForRelease2009/05/08 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
wed,.
Question 5.
Can it be determined with more particularity as to what
is the mission and function of the twelve base camps spotted
in Cambodia on the map displayed by the briefer?
We believe that the Vietnamese Communists utilize all of their
bases on Cambodian territory for the infiltration of men and
supplies into South Vietnam, and that they take refuge in these
bases whenever this becomes necessary. Additional functions have
been associated with certain base areas, however, and some differ-
ences in the relative importance of functions at the various bases
have been detected. Information on the base areas is spotty,
being derived largely from PW reports, low-level agent observa-
tions, and recently, from reconnaissance team penetrations. Our
intelligence on the mission and function of twleve Vietnamese
Communist base areas located in whole or in part on Cambodian
territory is summarized in the following pages. The base areas
are discussed in north to south order, and their approximate
locations are given in terms of the U.T.M. grid systems.
Base Area 609
Base Area 609* is a major base for the infiltration of men and
supplies into South Vietnam. In recent weeks a road connection
from Laotian Route 96 has been extended through the base area,
from which one branch extends eastward to link with Route 512 in
South Vietnam. Another branch now under construction run south-
ward to South Vietnam and closely parallels the Cambodian border.
Reconnaissance team penetrations of the area have revealed addi-
tional imporvements, such as the expansion of storage facilities,
the preparation of AW/AA positions, foxholes and trenches, and
the laying of barbed wire. New parallel north-south trails also
are being developed, some of which lie as much as fifteen miles
west of the South Vietnam border. A headquarters element of the
1st NVA Division and elements of several other units of the B-3
Front have been located within or near the 609 Base Areas since
November 1967.
Base Area 702
Base Area 702XX is a. principal rest and resupply base for
Vietnamese Communist troops infiltrating into South Vietnam. It
* Base Area 609, as currently defined by MACV, includes the DAK
BRANG Base, which at one time was listed separately. Base Area 609
has also been referred to as the Tri-border Base, because it encompasses
portions of Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam (approximately the area
bounded by YB 6423; YB 7125; YB 5260; YB 6220.
**Base Area 702 has also been called the Tonle San Base and the Se San
Base.
errira
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
has also been used by combat units preparing for action as well
as by units recovering from action. Base facilities include numerous
prepared bivouac sites -- some of which contain well-made shelters
at least two hospitals, underground bunkers for the storage of
munitions, general storage shelters, practice ranges, defensive
positions, and a. well-developed trail system. The base area extends
for about 18 miles in a north-south alignment, from YA 562562 to
YA 640245. It lies almost wholly within Cambodia, generally within
ten miles of the border. The base is well-positioned for the
receipt of supplies from CaMbodia. The Tonle San River is navigable
by small craft to the south side of the base, and Cambodia's Route
19 lies less than 2 miles away, also to the south. Ferry service
across the Tonle San is available at several points on the periphery
of the base area.
Twelve or more native villages lie within the 702 Base Area.
Most of them house Montagnard tribes. A number of reports indicate
that the Vietnamese Communists exercise some degree of control over
the tribes, and use them for labor. Some recruitment of Montagnards
into irregular units has also been reported. At least five
Cambodian military and/or border police outposts are located on
Route 19 and on the Tonle San River, within's., few miles of
Base 702, but there have been no reports, as yet, of clashes with
the Vietnamese forces.
Base Area 701
Base Area 701* is used by the Vietnamese Communists for the in-
filtration of troops into South Vietnam, for the collection, storage
and forwarding of supplies, for training, and for refuge. The 701
Base Area covers a 12 mile wide strip of Cambodia's eastern border
region that extends 15 to 20 miles southward from Route 19 (from
approximately YA 6822 to YV 8292). Vietnamese Communist presence
is concentrated in the northern half of this strip, an area that
encompasses about 20 villages, most of which are Montagnard settle-
ments. Nearly all of the villages are controlled by the North
Vietnamese Army, and some have been completely taken over for the
housing of troops and the storage of supplies. Many of the Montagnards
are employed as porters and some have been recruited into combat units.
Supplies from Cambodia are trucked into the villages and are carried
to VC/NVA forces in South Vietnam by porters,Itcycles, and pack
animals. VC/NVA units occasionally remain within the base area for
extended periods while receiving replacements, supplies and training.
Cambodian military and border police units located along Route 19
apparently do not obstruct the Vietnamese Communist activities.
* Base Area 701 also has been called the Chu Pong Base and the Frek
Drang Base.
7041
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
Undesignated Base in Mondolkiri Province
An undesignated base area, located at about YR 0535 in Cambodia's
Mondolkiri Province, has been used for infiltrating men and supplies
into South Vietnam and for a staging area for VC units moving against
Allied positions in South Vietnam's Phuoc Long Province. Numerous
trails cross the border, and a truck park and areas for the storage
and transshipment of supplies have been tentatively identified.
Supplies from Cambodia are delivered to the base over Route 14.
Headquarters elements of the VC 5th LID moved into this area after
attacking the U.S. Special Forces Camp at Bu Dop in early December
and remained there until late December when they returned to
South Vietnam. Elements of the 88th Regiment of the VC 5th LID
were also in the area from about 10 December to 10 January, when
they also returned to South Vietnam.
War Zone C - Four Undesignated Base Areas
War Zone C, encompassing the northern parts of Tay Ninh and
Binh Long Provinces, has been used extensively by VC/NVA forces
as operations bases. Communist activities have extended into
Cambodia all along the roughly 100 mile section of border covered
by War Zone C. Although MACV has not assigned specific base
designations to portions of Cambodian territory that lie on the
periphery of War Zone C, a heavy degree of VC/NVA activity has
been observed in at least four areas. All of these areas apparently
are used for the infiltration of men and supplies into Cambodia
and for refuge. Some also include POW camps and/or hospitals.
An area of Cambodia on the northern edge of War Zone C,
about 3 miles east of the point where Route 13 crosses the border
into South Vietnam (XU 7235), has been heavily used by VC/NVA
forces as a base of operations, for the hospitalization of sick
and wounded, and for the infiltration of men and supplies across
the border into South Vietnam. Several encampment areas have
semi-permanent thatch-roofed shelters protected by systems of
trenches and bunkers. Three hospitals are located there. There
have been frequent changes of units using this base area; but
from October 1967 to January 1968 the number of troops there
apparently averaged between one and two thousand. Headquarters
elements of the VC 9th Light Infantry Division, which attacked
the Loc Ninh Special Forces Camp in September and October 1967,
were repeatedly detected in this base area from September 1967
until February 1968, when they moved into the area around Saigon.
Another area of concentrated Vietnamese Communist activity on
the northern edge of War Zone C is that portion of Cambodia south
of Mimot that is approximately centered on XT 4595. Although newsmen
who accompanied Cambodian officials to this area in December 1967
found only a single vacant camp containing some rudimentary shelters,
Approved ForRelease2009/05/08 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
Approved ForRelease2009/05/08 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
Zir 1:1i id: 1
reliable sources indicate that from one to two thousand men --
mostly elements of COSVN -- were located within this area from
October 1967 until January 1968. Some of the COSVN elements moved
into South Vietnam in January to participate in the TET offensive,
but the command element remained in Cambodia.
There have been additional concentrations of VC force activity
on the southwestern edge of War Zone C within Cambodia's Svay
Rieng Province. One of these is about 20 miles north of Route 1
on the Prek Ta Te River at'about VT 9262. A 1,500 man unit is
reported to have infiltrated into South Vietnam from this area in
October 1967. VC facilities at this location include a hospital
and supply caches. To the south, an area about 3 miles north of
Route 1 at about XT 2524 has been used as a supply depot and also
has contained a POW camp. The delivery of supplies to the base
is facilitated by its proximity to Route 1. There are numerous
bivouac sites in this area. During Operation Yellowstone (a U.S.
sweep) in Tay Ninh Province in the period December 1967-February
1968, several small VC units moved into this area from South
Vietnam.
Ba Thu Base
The Ba Thu village (XT 1218) area of Cambodia supports VC/NVA
operations by providing facilities for training, the production,
storage and distribution of weapons, the infiltration of weapons
and equipment into South Vietnam, the treatment and evacuation of
wounded, and for other ancillary activities such as the publication
of propaganda. At least 35 of the village's buildings have been
associated with VC/WA activities. Some armaments, such as grenades,
mines, and mortars, are manufactured in Communist workshops at Ba
Thu. Several Communist soldiers captured during the recent TET
offensive, reported that many recruits were trained and equipped
with new AK-47 rifles at Ba Thu in the few weeks preceding TET.
Fifty recruits at a time undertook 15 day training programs. In-
struction covered military tactics and doctrine, medical treat-
ment, reconnaissance, and the maintenance and use of the AK-47
and CKC rifles.
The detection of Vietnamese Communists in this area is particu-
larly difficult. PP Thu is an ethnic Vietnamese enclave into
which the Vietnamese Communists readily merge. Furthermore, there
are indications that Vietnamese Communists located in and around
Ba Thu village are on good terms with a nearby Cambodian border
outpost, and may have received advance notice of impending visits
by the ICC.
Base Area 703
We have no current information on the nature of the facilities
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
at the 703 Base, which is located at about WT 1413, but it was
occupied as recently as last November by two VC units totalling
about 600 men.
Base Area. 704
Base Area 704 supports the infiltration of men and supplies to
Communist forces in South Vietnam, a training center, a POW camp,
a facility for medical treatment, and bivouac areas. Base 704 is
located at approximately WT 1410. Its proximity to the Mekong
River and other smaller waterways facilitates the infiltration of
supplies. Shelters within the base area are temporary structures,
consisting of crude frames draped with green nylon and camouflaged
with branches, and in at least some bivouac areas, they are dis-
mantled and moved every few days to reduce the risk of detection.
The headquarters of VC MR II has been located in the 704 area.
A PW has reported that in preparation for the TET offensive, at
least one VC/NWA combat unit conducted field exercises within
the base area in early January, and that a new camp was constructed
to house prisoners.
Base Area 705
Base Area. 705 (at about VS 7065) is used by the Vietnamese
Communists for the infiltration of men and supplies into South
Vietnam, for the evacuation of wounded, for refuge, and for
training. A recently captured VC supply officer stated that even
though local Cambodian officials have been bribed to overlook
the Vietnamese Communist presence in the 705 Base Area, the
Vietnamese are required to comport themselves unobtrusively, and
are not permitted to build permanent structures. Supplies, in-
cluding some arms, are delivered to the area by Cambodians, and
are smuggled into South Vietnam by the VC. Training programs
identified with Base 705 include weapons familiarization, mine
laying techniques, and assault tactics. Guides carry mail and
escort troops between Base 705 and Base 704, which lies about 40
miles to the northeast.
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
r?r, fror7rIer
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
Question 6.
A report is desired as to the outcome of attack which
have been made by US/SVN forces on enemy base areas in the
Saigon area. For instance, now that the old COSVN area
has been overrun, what was found there, particularly what
increased intelligence was obtained which was of value for
further military operations?
Question 7.
What intelligence efforts are now being made by US/South
Vietnam elements to obtain information on the forward dis-
tribution system utilized by the enemy for the support
of its military operations, as the basis for interdiction
of such distribution by our military forces?
does not produce reports analyzing US/SVN military operations.
We have, however, queried MACV J-2 on the outcome of attacks against
enemy base areas in the Saigon area. MACV J-2 informs us that
they have found no enemy base areas in the Saigon area. They have,
however, retaken areas which were occupied by the enemy. The
intelligence taken from these operations was sparse -- some docu-
ments were found which enabled MACV to break enemy codes which
were written into his messages and documents. The operations
also discovered a few caches of weapons and other equipment.
MACV also reports that Operation Yellowstone (9 December 1967-
24 February 1968) in Tay Ninh yielded several tons of documents
that were useful in his analysis of the enemy's post-TET strategy
and will be of help in future operational planning.
MACV further reports that operations such as Quyet Thang
(Resolve to Win) have yet to produce any significant intelligence
MACV notes that friendly operation over the past year in the
Saigon area have not uncovered sizeable enemy base areas of the
type containing the large collections of valuable documents un-
covered in the Cedar Falls and Junction City operations.
The principal intelligence effort to process information on
the enemy's forward distribution as a basis for interdiction
operations is carried out by the Targets Section of the Combined
Intelligence Center, Vietnam (CICV).
This is the unit that produces the basic base areas studies
for MACV, J-2. It also produces Base Area Study Update Maps on
a periodic basis. These maps are prepared on an all-source basis
and include all available intelligence on base facilities, LUC's,
trails and waystations. These reports are made available to MACV,
J-3 for operations planning.
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
Question 8.
What intelligence is available to the US as to the
extent of destruction of enemy trucks as the result of US
interdiction of logistic supply routes?
The basic source used to determine the number of enemy trucks
destroyed or damaged by air attacks is post-strike operations re-
ports (OPREP-)4.1s). These reports include the targets attacked,
the estimated results, ordnance expended, and other operational
data. The number of trucks destroyed or damaged is compileti from
this raw data by a process which attempts to eliminate duplication
in reporting.
Pilots reports of truck destruction in Laos are cross-checked
with reports from the forward air controllers (FAC's) and the
results plotted on maps according to the time of attack. For
operations in North Vietnam, the data are recorded by location
and time in order to eliminate duplicate reports, but the cross-
check with FAC reports is limited because FAC's are used only in
Route Package 1.
The criteria used by pilots in their reporting are significant
in determining the number of trucks destroyed or damaged. (1) The
pilots normally report a truck as destroyed when it is seen to
explode or burn. (2) A truck is reported damaged when there is an
obvious weapons impact without conclusive evidence of destruction.
(3) If strikes produce large secondary explosions or fires in an
area under tree cover where trucks are seen to have disappeared,
the trucks are reported as probably destroyed or damaged. In the
first two cases the numbers of trucks are accepted as reported,
but in the latter case the "probable" number is not included in
the compilation of total trucks destroyed and damaged.
After the total number reported destroyed and damaged in
North Vietnam and Laos is determined, the "effective losses" are
calculated to take into consideration the fact that trucks reported
damaged could be repaired and that because of operational conditions
pilot reports may be overstated. Effective losses are derived,
therefore, by estimating that 75 percent of the trucks reported
destroyed and 25 percent of those reported damaged were in fact
lost and were not repairable. This number is deducted from the
North Vietnamese truck inventory. In addition six percent of
the estimated inventory at the beginning of the year is deducted
for retirements of trucks due to normal wear and tear.
Substantial imports of trucks have been received by North
Vietnam beginning in 1965 from other Communists countries. These
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
.7.n.7r1'
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
trucks arrive in North Vietnam by overland and sea routes. Import
data are firm except for imports from Communist China, and are
carefully compiled from all sources of intelligence.
The following tabulation shows the inventory of trucks available
to North Vietnam at the end of 1966 and 1967, and the impact of
effective losses of trucks and the importation of trucks during 1967.
End of 1966 Inventory
12,598 a/
Retirement (6 percent)
- 755
Imports during 1967 a/
+4,686
Effective Losses
North Vietnam
-2,683
Laos
-2,072
End of 1967
11,942
Rounded to
11,000 - 13,000
a/ Including an estimated 1,200 trucks from China.
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
25X1
25X1
? ?
Approved ForRelease2009/05/08 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
ulApin. I
0
Pat:
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 23, 1968
I would like to get a combined briefing on enemy order
of battle in South Viet-Nam which wi ring out any differences of
opinion which exist on this subject in the intelligence community.
I would like the briefing to include a discussion of military man-
power capabilities of North Viet-Nam. Specifically, what is the
basis for the statement on Page A-7, paragraph 25, The Situation
in Viet-Nam? "Manpower studies indicate that North Viet-Nam has
the capacity to train 75,000 to 100,000 men a year for infiltra-
tion."
M. D. T.
I Enthe.:.: 4)1 atanatIc
:Ling and
u::::,s'azilon
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
'NE WHITE HOUSE
' . WASHINOTON
would like to get a cembined briefing on enemy order of
'battle in South Viet-Nam whloh will ?r ng out any differences of opinion
whieh exist on, this subject in the intelligenee community. r would like
the briefing to include a disounsion of military manpower capabilitiee or
North Viet-Nam, Speoifieally, what is the basis for the statement on
Page A-7, paragraph 25, The Situation in Viet- ? Manpower studies
indicate that North Vietl:ggrairtIraigarrte rain 75/0D0 to 100,000
mon a year for infiltrationfil
41,
4.
a)/4-
014,1-13.0, 0/4-
TOP SIZOWNTRIM
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
AdOC,
Oti3X
TOP SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
March 11, 1968
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John Bross
Central Intelligence Agency
SUBJECT: North Vietnam Logistic Activities
Attached hereto is a list of questions raised and
requests for additional information made by General Maxwell
D. Taylor, when he was briefed on aspects of the above subject
by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence
Agency representatives on February 26, 1968. The list contains
two questions (Nos. 9 and 10) which were added by General Taylor
subsequent to the briefing.
It would be appreciated if you would plpase have the
desired information written up.and forwardecito this office
for delivery to General Taylor.
for J. Patrick Coyne
HANDLE VIA COM1NT CHANNELS ONLY
Attachment
111AJO,"
.0213X
TpP SECREZ 25X1
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
01:13%
PE SECRET
iiiiittc10.
003
1. What assurance is available that CIA and DIA are pressing
intelligence collectors sufficiently to obtain necessary informa-
tion on the Viet:Cong/North Vietnam logistic system? .Is it not
feasible for and DIA to sit down with MACV and work out the
intelligence collection program required to meet this intelligence
need, or is this already being done?
2. What are thecstimated figures on the interdicted capaclty
of the various transport systems over which supplies ?are intro-
duced into North Vietnam and over which they subsequently move
south(in contrast to the theoretical un-interdicted capacities)-.
Also what are the figures on the amounts and kinds of supplies
which actually pass over the roads over which distribution is
'made by North Vietnam to Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces
(in contrast to the theoretical capacity of the road nets).
3. Is it not possible at this time to obtain better figures
on the size and mission of the various enemy Transportation Groups
[
spotted on the chart used in the briefing by a CIA representative?
4. Has not someone studied available intelligence on the ,
movement of North Vietnamese forces, as the basis for an under-
1
. standing of what takes place when a division moves south.(e.g.,
how is it transported? does it move at night? etc.)
5. Can it not be determined with more particularity .as to
what is the mission and function of one of the 12 base camps -
spotted in Cambodia on the map displayed by a CIA briefer? --
Training mission? Supply? Hospital?
\
6. A report is desired as to the outcome of'attacks which
,
have been made by U.S./SVN forces on enemy base areas in the Saigon
area. For instance, now that the old COSVN area has been over-run
what was found there, particularly what increased intelligence was
obtained which was of value for further military operations?
7. What intelligence efforts are now being made by U.S./South
Vietnam elements to obtain information on the forward distribution:
system utilized by the enemy for the support of its military oper-
ations, as the basis for interdiction of such distribution by our
military forces?
8. What intelligence is available to the U. S. as to the
extent of destruction of enemy trucks as the result of U. S.
interdiction of logistic supply routes?
9. What do we know about the enemy's replacement system? How,
when and for how long are replaced trained? How moved South? How
Incorporated into units?
--.10. What is the status of the project to provide more COMINT-
equipped aircraft to monitor traffic in North Vietnam?
25X1
-HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
A JOI
Otl3
Oti3X
SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
1
Mr. R. J. Smith, DEVI
2
3
4
'
5
,
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE
REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks:
Confirming the discussion at the
staff meeting this morning, would you
kind enough to take whatever action is
appropriate in connection with the annexed
request from Mr. J. Patrick Coyne.
JABROSS
be
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME.
ADDRESS AND Pi-IONE NO.
D/DCl/NIPE
DATE
k-124eg
SECRET
John A. Bross,
C
?I UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL
FORM NO. ()Q 1-67 Gal Use previous editions
7
(40)
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5
. eb
V0046?1
40 Next 15 Page(s) In Document Denied
Approved For Release 2009/05/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5