COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080023-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 26, 2009
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: April 6, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
NSA review completed
Seventh Report
COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF
THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
(This report covers the week from
30 March through 5 April 1973)
This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense
Secret
6 April 1973
DIA Review
Completed.
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SPECIAL NOTE
Tentative evidence received from communications
intelligence too late for inclusion in the body of this
report has identified a new NVA combat infiltration
group in the Dong Hoi area of North Vietnam, about 35
miles north of the DMZ.
this group, with personnel, was being
re-routed and sent northward., The identifying number
of the group indicates that it was originally scheduled
to go to the northern part of South'Vietnam. Further
analysis will be required to determine the significance
of the detection of this new group and its apparent
northward movement.
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6 April 1973
Seventh Report
COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF
THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS*
(This report covers the week from
30 March through 5 April 1973)
The Key Points
We have detected no new North Vietnamese infil-
trators--not even small groups of specialists--
starting the trip south during the past week.
North Vietnamese military supplies continued to
move through southern Laos toward and into South
Vietnam, and the, volume of supplies entering
Laos at the top of the Ho Chi Minh trail system
was somewhat above last week's level.
Extremely heavy North Vietnamese logistic ac-
tivity continued throughout the week in Quang
Tri Province of South Vietnam.
The number of combat incidents initiated by
the Communists remained at a moderate level
in South Vietnam and at a low level in Laos.
* This report has been prepared jointly by the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department
of Defense.
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The Details
NOTE: This is the seventh in a series of reports de-
tailing recently received evidence of (a) Communist
efforts to infiltrate new manpower and military ma-
teriel toward and into South Vietnam, and (b) Commu-
nist-instigated combat activity in a~ion of the
Vietnam and Laos settlement agreements.
A. Infiltration and Redeployments of North.Viet-
namese Personnel.
1. We have no evidence that any new infiltra-
tion groups--not even any special purpose groups--
started the trip south from North Vietnam during the
past week. Farther down in the infiltration pipe-
line--in southern Laos--we did detect for the first
time a few additional small groups of specialists
who had left North Vietnam sometime in February or
March. Because these groups are small, our estimates
of total infiltration since the ceasefire remain un-
changed. (The estimated total of North Vietnamese
personnel is 35,000, of whom some 25,000 were in
the pipeline as of 28 January and some 10,000 began
the journey south thereafter.)
2. Since most of these 35,000 personnel have
now reached their destinations in South Vietnam or
adjacent border areas, the infiltration of combat
troops during the current dry season may now be
coming to an end. The Central Intelligence Agency
believes that there are probably less than 5,000
infiltrators still remaining in the pipeline, and
most of them are civilian and military specialists
and stragglers from previously reported regular in-
filtration groups. The Department of Defense believes
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that the majority of infiltration groups in the pipe-
line since the ceasefire have reached their destination
by now, but that approximately 10,000 are still in
the system. Both agencies agree, however, that unless
new infiltration groups start the journey south in the
coming days, the infiltration system will be cleared
of combat replacement troops within several weeks.
3. During the past week an additional North
Vietnamese SA-2 site was established near Khe Sanh.
There are now a total of nine SA-2 sites in the Khe
Sanh area which have been constructed since the be-
ginning of this year. At least two of these were
occupied Two other sites were known
to be occupied but we have no more
recent evidence on their status. In addition to
the SA-2 sites, a cluster of four antiaircraft ar-
tillery sites, two of which are radar-controlled
57-mm batteries, have been identified some ten miles
east of Khe Sanh. Identification of radar-controlled
AAA batteries in South Vietnam is rare and suggests
a qualitative increase in Communist antiaircraft
defense capabilities in this area.
B. Movement of Military Equipment and Su lies To-
ward and Into South Vietnam and Laos
4e. North Vietnamese logistic activity in
southern Laos and South Vietnam continued during
the week at the same high levels detected through-
out March. Heavy vehicle activity was observed
over the length of the Laos Panhandle, the greatest
traffic volumes occurring west of the A Shau Valley
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and in the tri-border area. From these locations,
NVA logistic units shipped large quantities of mili-
tary supplies toward the central and southern parts
of South Vietnam. Within South Vietnam itself, NVA
logistic units also continued to move large quan-
tities of materiel into and out of supply bases in
Quang Tri Province. The major logistic buildup of
the Communists in this area equals or exceeds the
buildup which was observed just before and during
the North Vietnamese offensive of 1972.
5. On the entry corridors from North Vietnam
into the Laos Panhandle, truck traffic moving south-
ward through the passes increased slightly over the
previous week's level. Within southern North Viet-
nam itself, we received little new evidence during
the week of southbound logistic movements, but our
coverage in this area is weak. At the same time,
we did continue to detect substantial supply ship-
ments from North Vietnam to northern Laos.
6. The following instances of Communist lo-
gistic activity were observed in South Vietnam during
the reporting period. Activity observed in South
Vietnam probably reflects supplies which have re-
cently entered the country. (The map on the following
page shows the roads and route numbers which appear
below.)
(a) On 30 March, 26 vehicles reportedly
delivered 93 tons of TNT, rocket and
mortar ammunition to a logistic
entity in northern Quang Tri Prov-
ince. After the receipt of this
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 Rach Gi:
Udoe
Ratchatheni
-Warm
Chain rap
Camh`o~dia
'V. C r ?t.P ~_e1 fY
~ ex, si ao Lac
hu V,nh
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Names and boundary representation
are not necessarily authoritative
Vung Tau
South Vietnam
and
North Vietnam Panhandle
-^--?-^^- Province boundary
OW MW Military region
4 International Commission
of Control andSupervision
region boundary
Railroad
Road
POL pipeline
25 50 75 Miles
50 75 Kilometers
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cargo, the unit was observed to have
over 900 tons of ammunition and con-
struction-related explosive material
in storage.
(b) I 1137 cargo trucks were
observed along Route 9 in western
Quang Tri Province. Some were headed
east; some were headed west.
(c) In the Khe Sanh area, 23 cargo vehi-
cles were observed halted on Route
608 (north of Khe Sanh) and 30 cargo
vehicles dispersed along Route 616
(to the south)
(d)
(e)
(f)
Khe Sanh area. There were also 65
North Vietnamese cargo vehicles--35
of them parked--on Route 608 north.
of Khe Sanh on the same day.
served moving west on Route 9 in the
18 cargo trucks were ob-
March through 5 April. Also in this
area, 14 northbound cargo trucks were
seen on Route 1032E on 3 April.
hicles were observed on Route 1033
in the western DMZ, and a total of
98 cargo vehicles moved south. over
this route during the period 30
27 southbound cargo ve-
the North Viet-
namese are making contingency plans
to move some supplies across the
border from Laos into Quang Tri Prov-
ince camouflaged as civilian traffic,
if and when planned ICCS checkpoints
in that area become operational.
7. During the reporting period the following
indications of North Vietnamese logistic activity
in north and south Laos and northeastern Cambodia
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were noted. Historical precedent would suggest that
much of the activity in the Laos Panhandle and Cam-
bodia probably involved supplies destined for South
Vietnam.
(a) On 29 March, a North Vietnamese lo-
gistic unit active in the Nam Ou
River area of Luang Prabang Province
received over 400 rounds of rocket
and mortar ammunition, plus signif-
icant quantities of mines, grenades
and other associated hardware.
(b) From 29 March through 1 April, at
least 370 vehicles were observed
moving between two Communist lo-
gistic units in the southern Laos
Panhandle. About 200 of these ve-
hicles were headed for a destination
in northeastern Cambodia adjacent to
Pleiku Province, South Vietnam.
(c) One NVA logistic unit active in the
area northwest of Ban Bac moved 690
cargo-loaded vehicles into the A Shau
Valley region during March, according
to reliable evidence.
(d) On 29 March, a North Vietnamese lo-
gistic unit operating in the Tchepone
area received 42 cargo vehicles and
dispatched 71.
(e)
(f)
were observed halted on Route 23
south of Mu Gia Pass.
ten NVA cargo trucks
trucks were observed on Route 912
southwest of the Ban Karai Pass?
26 southbound cargo
th-
bound trucks were observed transiting
the Pass.
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(g)
heavy truck movement was
more than half were loaded and heading
south. This is the highest level of
activity observed in this area since
12 March.
observed on routes 99 and 920 in the
central Laos Panhandle. In all, over
200 NVA trucks were seen, of which
8. There is additional evidence of the con-
tinuing movement within North Vietnam of military
and other supplies which are probably destined for
South Vietnam and northern Laos.
(a) a storage facility near
Vinh was observed dispatching toward
northern Laos 11 tons of cargo, in-
cluding 8 tons of explosives.
(b) 53 tons of supplies--
were shipped from Vinh over Route 7
toward northern Laos.
including six tons of ammunition--
(c) The major NVA POL transshipment fa-
cility located in Thanh Hoa Province
pumped nearly 7,000 tons of POL during
March, according to reliable informa-
tion. Past experience would indicate
that nearly all of this amount was
being moved southward.
C. Combat Activity Instigated by Communist Forces
In South Vietnam Since the Ceasefire
9.. In South Vietnam, the total number of Com-
munist-initiated ceasefire violations reported by
the South Vietnamese Armed Forces since 28 January
and for the last week (30 March - 5 April) are shown
below:
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Military Total Since Ceasefire Last Week (30 Mar-5 Apr)
Region Level of Action Level of Action
Major Minor Major Minor
MR 1 686 2,455 33 107
MR 2 172 1,038 7 116
MR 3 225 1,489 28 93
MR 4 336 3,123 34 281
Totals 1,419 8,105 102(118)1/ 597(527)1/
1/ Denotes totals of previous week.
10.. Some of these violations may have been in-
itiated by GVN forces rather than Communist forces,
and it is impossible in all cases to determine the
actual instigator. The table above and the chart
on the following page, however, do show fairly ac-
curately the trend in the amount of combat that has
occurred in South Vietnam since the ceasefire. The
fact that a combat incident occurred at a particular
time and place is generally reported accurately by
the South Vietnamese, even though the question of
who started it may not always be treated in objective
fashion. In some cases, the Joint Military Commission
(GVN/PRG) also reports violations of the ceasefire.
11. The following is a chronological listing
of only the most significant "major" Communist vi-
olations of the ceasefire in South Vietnam that were
reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces during
the past week.
MILITARY REGION 1
(a) On 2 April, west and southwest of
Hue a total of 270 82-mm mortar
rounds were directed against ARVN
infantry units.
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CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF
JAN-FEB
(28 JANUARY 1913 TO THE PRESENT)
Red line .....Total violations
MAR
417
APR
MAY
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(b)
On 2 April, elements of the 1st ARVN
Division west and southwest of Hue,
received a total of 396 rounds of
mixed ordnance.
(c)
On 4 April, 10 miles west of Hue,
elements of an ARVN infantry bat-
talion received an enemy ABF of
785 rounds of mixed ordnance.
MILITARY REGION 2
(a) On 31 March, 15 miles southwest of
Pleiku, an element of an ARVN ranger
battalion was hit by an ABF of 500
mixed 60-mm/82-mm mortar rounds.
MILITARY REGION 3
(a) On 29 and 30 March, enemy elements
fired a total of 519 rounds of mixed
ordnance during four attacks by fire
into the Tonle Cham Base Camp eight
miles southwest of An Loc.
(b) On 30 March, enemy forces attacked
an element of an ARVN infantry
battalion 16 miles southwest of Lao
Khe.
(c) On 30 and 31 March, Tonle Cham Base
Camp received 256 rounds of mixed
ordnance.
(d) On 1 April, Tonle Chain Base Camp
received an ABF of 275 rounds of
mixed ordnance.
(e) On 2 and 3 April, the Tonle Cham
Base Camp received 495 artillery
and mortar rounds.
(f) On 3 and 4 April, the Tonle Cham
Base Camp received 231 rounds of
mixed ordnance.
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(g) On 4 April, four miles west-south-
west of Song Be, elements of an ARVN
ranger border defense battalion re-
ceived an enemy ground attack.
(h) On 4 April, five miles southeast of
Tay Ninh City, elements of an RF
battalion received an enemy ABF of
100 mortar rounds followed by a
ground assault.
(a) On 3 April, 18 miles northeast of
Chau Doc, enemy forces attacked
elements of an ARVN armored cavalry
squadron and an infantry battalion.
(b) On 4 April, 10 miles northeast of
Vinh Long, elements of an ARVN in-
fantry battalion received an enemy
ground attack.
D. Combat Activity Initiated by Communist Forces
In Laos During the Week From 30 March through
Apri I
12. During the week, significant Communist-
initiated incidents were recorded in the Ban Houei
Sai area of Laos Military Region I, southeast of the
Plain of Jars in MR-II, and in the area between
Khong Sedone and Saravane in MR-IV. Minor skirmishing
continued near several contested villages south of
Thakhek in MR-III.
13. Activity in all other areas of Laos re-
mained at a low level, although there have been re-
cent indications of Communist preparations to launch
major attacks against Government forces southeast of
the Plain and at the Sala Phou Khoun road junction in
MR-II. There is strong evidence that elements of a
North Vietnamese Army regiment have moved southeastward
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from the Plain and are preparing to attack.Government
forces which thus far have thwarted Communist ef-
forts to reopen Route 4 south of Xieng Khouangville.
There is also evidence that local Pathet Lao and.Dis-
sident Neutralist forces intend to attack the Route
7/13 intersection at Sala Phou Khoun in the near
future, although their ability to capture and hold
this road junction is questionable.
14. Following is a brief account of significant
combat incidents which occurred between 30 March and
5 April and which were clearly initiated by Com-
munist forces in violation of the Laos ceasefire
agreement:
(a) On 30 March, North Vietnamese Army
forces conducted an attack-by-fire
and a two-company ground attack
against a Royal Lao Army (FAR) posi-
tion near the former Royal Lao Gov-
ernment irregular base at Pha Dong,
southeast of the Plain of Jars. The
FAR defenders were forced to with-
draw from the position.
(b) On 31 March, there was a low level
of military activity throughout Laos.
(c) On 1 April, there was no significant
activity countrywide.
(d) On 2 April, again there was no
significant activity throughout Laos.
(e) On 3 April, the position of a RLG
battalion northeast of Khong Sedone
in MR-IV was attacked by an estimated
Communist battalion supported by
approximately 350 rounds of mortar
fire. The RLG force deployed in
this sector also received about 160
rounds of mortar fire in its reg-
imental command post area. Despite
the reported intensity of this action,
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casualties were light and RLG forces
apparently lost no positions. A
series of Communist ground and mortar
attacks against a RLG battalion
located north. of Ban Houei Sai in
MR-I forced the friendly unit to
withdraw 20 kilometers westward to
the Mekong River, and possibly across
it into Burma.
(f) On 4 April, only light contact was
reported throughout Laos.
(g) On 5 April, again only light activity
was reported.
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