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Some Implications of De ilo ,r ri t, oi' US B-52 Bombers fn
S. 'y
Deployment of USAF B-52 bombr~rr, i.n Thailand would increase only sli, htiy
the level of US Air Force operation,i from Thai bases, which have been
averaging over 4,000-sorties a month against targets in North Vietnam.
contrast, B-52 operations from Guam against targets in Vietnam (mostly
South Vietnam) have been averaging only 400 sorties a month. USAF has been
flying strikes against North Vietnam from Thai bases since March 1965. More
than one-fourth of the US attack air O.B. is currently operating out of
Thailand. Abo4t 300 fixed wing combat-reconnaissance aircraft, comprising
about one-fourth of US attack air O.B. in Southeast Asia, currently operate
out of Thailand. Deployment of the B-52 bombers alsoPwould not add much to
the total US military presence in Thailand, which .has grown from 4,000 to
35,000 men during the last three years.
The use of a base in Thailand for B-52 strikes in South Vietnam would
shorten the present 12-hour round trip from Guam to about 2-1/2 hours, decrease
the aircraft operating costs from ten million dollars to two million dollars
a month, and would permit a much more rapid reaction time for ground support
operations in South Vietnam.
USAF review completed.
Except for the TOP SECRET data on projected deployments of US military
personnel in Thailand (Table IV), they information in this memorandum is
SECRET.
*USAF Declass/Release Instructions On File*
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I. USAF Use of Thailand
A. Early Decision Likely
With respect to the proposed deployment of B-52 bombers to Thailand
several cogent'points should be considered.:
1. The US has not yet officially requested the government of
Thailand for use of Thai bases for the B-52 bombers.
2. The Secretary of Defense has yet to make a decision on this
matter but a decision probably will be reached before the weekend (31 December
1966) to propose this to the President.
3. The President and the Secretary, of Defense will discuss this
matter over the weekend (31 December 1966) and possibly make a decision
concerning the request of B-52's using Thai bases.
4. Speculation that 15 of the 50 B-52's currently stationed on Guam
will be deployed to Thailand for quick reaction purposes comes from press
sources and can't be substantiated.
B. USAF Operations in Thailand
1. The US Air Force currently operates 420 aircraft (including
300 fixed wing combat-reconnaissance aircraft) out of seven airbases in
Thailand. (See map.) The US has been using Thai bases to launch strikes
against North Vietnam (and Laos) since March 1965. During the first nine
months of 1966, 36 percent of all US sorties flown over North Vietnam originated
from Thai. bases (see Table I). According to unofficial estimates, 55 percent
of the JCS targets struck during 1966 were hit by USAF aircraft based in
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Thailand. More than one-fourth of the current US attack air 0.B.'in
Southeast Asia is currently operating out of Thailand, as shown in
Table II below:
Distribution Total Sori.i Flown Against North Vietnam
by Launch Base, Jrnuary-September 1966
Percent
Sorties
USN (Carriers)
44
46,6oo
USAF (Thailand)
36
38,200
usao (SVN
20 .
21)200
100 lo6,ooo
* Also includes VNAF, USMC which amount to approximately percent of total
sorties flown.
Southeast Asia Fixed Wing Combat-Reconnaissance, Aircraft OB - bye
December 1966 o,
Type
Aircraft
Thailand
USAF
South Vietnam
(USAF-USMC)
Carriers Guam
(USN) USAF
T
t
l
o
a
F-4
4
40
183
50 -
273
RF-
22
4o
- -
62
F-5
-
15
- -
15
F-8
-
15
25 -
4o
RF-8
-
4
7 -
11
F-100
-
205
- -
205
RF-101
17
13
30
F-102
12
12
- -
24
F-104
'
17
-
- -
17
F-105
135
-
- -
135
A-l
18
21
12 -
51
EA-1
-
-
3 _
3
A-3
-
12 -
12
A-4
-
81
-
9
176
RA-5
-
5
6
A-6
-
12
9 -
21
EA-6
-
5
A-26
8
-
_
- -
5
.T-28
11
8
B_52
-
-
11
B-57
- 50
50
-
20
-
20
RE-57
-
3
_
3
EB-66
21
-
- -
21
Total
301
629
219 50
1
199
.
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C. US Deployments and Expenditures in Thailand
1. The number of US troops in Thailand has grown from some 4,200
in June 1964 to some 34,781 by 26 December 1966. USAF forces presently
account for 77 percent of the US :Jxr^n th. Army forces, which constitute
most of the remainder of US strength in Thailand, consist of two engineer
battalions, a logistical command, and various other units that serve as
advisers to the Thai military and fly helicopters that transport Thai troops.
See Table III for additional information.
U.S. Military Personnel in Thailand by Service
Array
Navy -
Airforce
Total
1964
January
2,946
152
1,116
4,214
June
3,052
180
1,103
4,335
1965
January
3,357
187
3,134
6,678
June
3,556
201
6,039
9,796
966
January
5,204
227
10,130
15,561
June
6,909
512
17,222
24,643
December
7,695
360
26,726
34,781
Includes Coast Guard and Marines.
The Current Plan (DOD deployment schedules) indicates that US troop strength will
not subttantially increase over current levels by 1968. See table IV below:
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Arx
T ablte IN
ents of us Military Personnel in Thailand
Current Plan N.A N.A 6.3 8.6
3.6 4.8 6.9 N.A
Navy ' I
Current Plan N.A N.A N.J\ .3
Actual
N.A
Airf_ orce
Current Plan N.A N.A 20.8 25.6
Actual 6.0 9.1
17.2 ' N.A
=a__= 27.1 34.5
Current Plan N.A N.A
Actual 9.8 14.1
* Includes Coast Guard and Marines.
24.6 N.A
10.3 10.5
N.A N.A
27.4 27.5
N.A N.A
37.7 38.3
N.A N.A
10.6
N.A
38.4
2. Construction expenditures for military facilities in Thailand are shown
Countr
S. Vietnam
Thailand
United States
Okinawa
Philippines
Taiwan
Guam
Japan
Midway
Wake
Cuba
Puerto Rico
Summar of U.S. Military Construction
Thousands
As of 1 November 1
Current Working Estimate
1,211,582
228,367
165,7214.
73,301
71,156
26,265
14,875
12,855
1,576
1,626
173
130
1,807,570
67
13
9
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D. Use of B-52's.
Since 1965 B-52's based on Guam have bombed targets in.South Vietnam, Laos,
and North Vietnam. These raids primarily have been against suspected enemy troop
emplacements and base areas. Td date the 13-52's in South Vietnam have not been
used in a strategic bombing role. Only 4 percent of the.B-52 flights have been
flown over North Vietnam, and about 10 percent over Laos. Table VI gives a more
Distribution of B-52 Strikes - Southeast Asia
17 June 1965 -,27 December 1,9
Country
Missions
Sorties
North Vietnam
15
224
Laos
86
663
South Vietnam
640
5,568
Total
769
6,712
Fear of SAMs have restricted B-52 operations to infrequent
raids over the extreme southern portions of North Vietnam. These raids, much like
the raids over Laos, struck against the road network. It has become general prac-
.tics to restrict B-52 raids to areas where the giant bombers are not within range
of SAMd. Currently there are 50 B-52's operating out of Guam, future plans indi-
cate that ultimately 70 B-52's may be used in the Vietnam war. It would appear
that any future use of B-52's would be largely restricted to operations within
South Vietnam. The use of a Thai base for B-52 strikes against South Vietnam
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runways and parallel tax ,
Fuel and lubricant lines are bean
runway, became operational last summer*
will berth several ships will be bu~.l
f that
laved to the portp where a what
ulf of Siam. The new airfields with two 11, 50
facilities on the G
sways 75 feet wide and nearly the length of the
complete with port, airf ields and connecting petrol
American-built facility comp n
0 foot
more, cortvenie 1 Operati
st of B-52 operations also would be reduced sharp sharply.
The co
from Guam at the current level of 1+00 sorties Per
costs of the B-52 raids
dollars. The same number of sorties flown from
month are. lo.4 million
dollars-
Thailand would cost about 2.2 million dollars. an
+ would be based at the U-Tape-Ban Sattahip complex,
The R_92, s
from Guam to about 2-1~2 hoax's and Pert
would shorten the 12 hour round trip
for ground support operations in South Vietnam.
a more rapid ruction time
from Guam to DMZ' is 5,200 s.tatute~mile"; from
(The round trip distance
DMZ is about 1,000 mile".) The security
Ban U-'T`aPo, the 'T'hai base, to
area
from mortar attacks and VC raids) of Thai bases make" this
(freedom
in South Vietnam' similar facilities
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P'u?erh
C?H N
BURMA)
Prachin Burl
0K
INDOCHINA
usAF a-I~~tt; j,t~
ThzEt~.s~ p:~ t`i'4 ?
nternational boundary
Road
50 1Q0 1 ~0 Miles
i
50 160 150 Kilometers
s y
Y/-- Pshony
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Muong Luong ~.~.`~ ??.~'
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(Vietnam)
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Vinh
Loit
ho
M)
Vinh
Long
NAMEt ANO BOUNDARY RtPREEENTATION
ARE NOT MECERSARILV AUTHORITATIVE
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'?~ i;ao Bang
N ~O R 7
%Tuyen
, n
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no/ //. ///./'./'v ..rte '/ ./'' O .r .-'' Z - de ,-, .,'' e 'e .f t, / " .< , .s y / N .r i ..r' .+ .' i .r" r Jr e 1 ,P ,,. >?
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