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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
DATE OF INFO.
PLACE ACQUIRED
DATE ACQUIRED
REPORTI
DATE DISTR.
NO. OF PAGES 8
REQUIREMENT NO. RD
16 June 1955 25X1
Soviet Army Security and
Intelligence Activities
ARMY review completed.
C-0-N-F-I-D-i-N-T-I-A-L
STATE
INFORMATION REPORT FORMAT . . . ?
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CONFIDENTIAL REPORT
COUNTRY Austria DATE DISTR. 20. Nay 1955
SUB3ECT Soviet Army Security and Intelligence NO. OF PAGES 7
Activities
DATE OF INFORMATION
PLACE ACQUIRED
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
Unit Desi'?nations
REFERENCES:
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2 The only equipment in either unit that carried the unit desi?nat ons
were the ,2r%4+: a,-c%%Aa-A-
?weve was a aonnon prat ce among
soldiers to nark equipment, such as caps, spoons, and belts, with
the unit numerical designation, contrary to standing orders that
such information was secret.
_QWIDE=1AL
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CONFIDENTIAL
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Security Duties
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water r duty included guarding an unidentified Soviet Army
um
i
t
t
p
p
n s
a
ion about 15 km from garrison at 25X1
Goetze
do
f (
n
bad one s
r
N 48-,01, E 16-35) , Austria. Th
entry on duty and wan 11-Am" -1,U-
is pump station always
civilian
rvision of an Austrian
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.Required Identification
In theory, EM needed their service book and a copy of orders directing
them into the area to enter a military compound. For officers, only
their identification book was reavirpn
described above was required by officers and EM too en er othertion
military areas and maneuver areas in Austria.
Foreign Nationals
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the security of the Militar
C
t
y
ommuni
y of
uvezzenaorr was very lax. It was not unusual to see Austrians who
had business with the unit come into the community area, and there
was no fence or any other type of enclosure around the installation..
Further, ''he lack-of security and easy access to the units was a sore
point;with the political officers. Austrians had been known to enter
the battalion headquarters building and,on these occasions, no
individual had the right to detain them but the staff duty officer
who was called and asked them to leave. 2
There were two types of A
t
i
us
r
an civilians who were in the employ
of the 55th Separate Tk Tng Bn:. the regular employees who worked
each~day and the temporary employees. All of these persons were 25X1
hired through the Battalion Deputy Commander for the Housekeeping
Section, Major MAYNKO (fnu), who was responsible for battalion supply
and utilities. Clearance was obtained for the Austrian help through
Sr Lt Vladimir Ivanovich ZHUKOV who was an osobnyak (counterintelligence
officer) in the unidentified mortar regimen a was Stationed in the
camp.
sold beer, wine, canned i YiiV i t1~r a , girl ? nameu who
goods ch
ocolate, candy, and pastries to
officers and their dependents in the mess of battalion officers'
c nitznal dwefing'and two cleaning women, from Mannersdorf (N k7-58,
E 16-36.), who cleaned the officers' communal dwelling building in
the 55th -Separate Tk Tng Bn every day but Sundays from 0600 to 1400
hours; all other buildings were cleaned by the soldiers. These women
came in a group with other Austrian employees by bus from-Mannersdorf
and entered the camp on a foot path fro .the highway,
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Other employees also came from Mannersdorf and worked at the Auto
School Quarters as cleaning women. Temporary employees consisted
of persons on contract, such as chimney sweeps and carpenters,but
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Soviet Army Mil itary Intelligence Activities.
Counterintelligence
q~..vv Ld .,..L h7 Val6dGi
-7was Sr Lt Vladimir, lyan?virh ZMTTKMT.
11. Sr Lt ZHUKOV wore an artillery officer's uniform;" his office was
a
1 t d
said "Chemical Laboratory"and the-door toZIi.UKOV9o alleged room 25X1
in the 55th Separate Tk Tng Bn was unmarked and was always looked,
A. L .,~Y~
J - _&g. - ___
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mortar regiment 4 There was another room in the 25X1
attic of the ba uaar ers of the 55th Se a at
that was also reputed to belong to this officer. 25X1
4.1.w ?LLJ -
oc
a in an attic room of the building of the unidentified
no one in the garrison at aoetzendorf. $ res onsi le to
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unier
o Special Section, 13th ads Meez Div andwas_
/this officer had no known subordinates in the garr son and
worked directly with officer secretaries of the Komsomol organization
in each unit,
12. At one time
Aleksandr Mikhailovich KOZLOV,9 if~everything~was+R in order. ~rTheL
.lieutenant replied in the affirmative and added that only one man,
Pvt. DAROV (fnu), had been found drunk in Mannersdorf.
13. On several occasions late in the evenin
g, Lt ZHUKOV
in civilian clothes riding a bicycle back ro, garrison roM.the direction
of Mannersdorf;
14.
15...
5th leaving
n ome n anners or The rumor in the ZHUKOV
ate T
Tng Bn was that this officer had a net of local civilianinform
ersk
to spy on Soviet military personnel who had the occasion to go into
town.
7 ZHUKOV could override the wishes of the battalion
CO Tin some respects. As an example., at one time,
Austrian civilian women were used to clean the battalion headquarters
building. The Special Secti-on-officer ordered the Battalion CO to
cease this practice and to have soldiers do the cleaning. On another
occasion, he was known to have interfered with the, punishment of a
soldier who was charged with being absent from duty. The soldier was
not punished although he later admitted that he had been
sleeping in the projection booth in the battalion theater. Officers
had- nn nn.-~na..,.d ..__s,____~ --__-- .
+-=l =i-r.Lng yo nim as the most powerful man in the garrison.
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16. From spring 1955 until fall of the same year, battalion
had an osobnyak of its own, Capt FEDUROV fnu : This officer also
wore an ar ery officer's uniform
OV had
coxe o ~e)lliunit rom the 1r-1:1111 ads Med Tk Re t and up
onDleavin6,
,
was assigned to the 44th ads Mecz Regt. g '
17.
18. There were specific instructions on what was forbidden to be sent
through the unit mail in a directive of the Supreme Soviet, dated
199. These forbidden subjects were the location of units, names
of commanders, strength figures, listings of equipment, and photo-
graphs of military installati
ons and equipment. - inf arm&t,4_7 The on,.these instructions was given to new arrivals by
platoon commanders-
19. there were instances 25X1
when mail that contained forbidden information had been intercepted.
The writers of the letters were not identified but the letters them-
selves were read to0an assembled battery formation by the zampolit,
Capt MURAVYEV (fnu) as an object lesson. The first letter explained
ta,a soldier's mother in detail how she could reach her son's unit.
The second letter complained that the writer was being mistreated by
his squad sergeant.
20. Although there were no rules against camera ownershi
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p
this officer often calla n ual soldiers of the battalion staff
into a conference. He interrogated them on relatives and conditions
at home and asked such leading questions as, "You are truly happy
serving in the great and glorious Soviet Army, aren't you?".
b Unit Security
Alth
ough there was no censorship of outgoing mail within
unit
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the Special Section Officer of 25X1
the arr son ssue nstruotions to
to hold lett
ers written by certain individuals to speoifie add
resses, only if these were mailed.
personnel was developed in an illegal photoelaboratorymlocated in
the training-aid section and operated by the three battalion
training-aid men (laboranti). Although the battalion CO was probably
aware of this photo laboratory, he took pains not to notice it.
- --- - ----/ ..v,, v + v+-u1U.{.iCt7
military equipment or installations GO praOtiOgrapn
Fil
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LJA I
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22.
regulations was five years athard4labor.vi, vioiazing censorship
The Secret Documents Section was part of the
Battalion Headquarters. In were safeguarded all
classified orders, classified manuals, secret instr otions,1eand maps.
This section was subordinate to the Battalion C/S.
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" 5 .
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24.
sergeant then told all the men that this set was undoubtedly meant
for spies or saboteurs who were in the vicinity and ordered most
of the men to start beating the rushes along the river to locate
theee.spies. Two of the men were dispatched to the battalion to
.report the find.
26. After assuring himself that the "spies" were not then in the area,
the.junior sergeant placed the men in strategi,e'positions to catch
them when they arrived. This position was maintained by platoon
guards in a secret watch for 48 hours. Finally, the battalion CO.
decided that the "spies" were not coming and put the junior sergeant
in the guard house for a week because he bad not used his head in
bringing up the tank; the battalion CO claimed it was the tank's tracks
on.the river bank that had warned the "spies". After the. watch was
relieved, the radio set and the parachute were picked up and brought
to the battalion where an English-speaking officer laboriously trans?-
_
lated the
rinti
ng on the
p
_.MVDActiyities
Zone of Austria.
any evidence of MVD personnel in the Soviet
tour of dut y was four their
years and their a es di fe
from the personnel in the Soviet Army.
MVD personnel could arrest Soviet servicemen in the USSR but
this wag handled strictly by komepd.ati. r . patrols :t,rj the occupy on .
zones,
Case of SeouriMConsciousness
c1?se~tcs tbegarrieonar aca~s.Ltl on yae Aanxs or the,,. Leitha River
The entire first
platoon was following behind a unit tank and was operating. as
infantry. At one point in the training session, the tank nearly
bogged down in the soft soil on the. bank of the river and all
personnel worked to extricate it. Not too far away, someone-in the
platoon noticed a brilliant red spot. The tank commander, Jr Sgt
Ragim Ibr.agimovich SABITOV of the Tank Supply Co, then ordered all
personnel to advance-'to the red spot and drove his tank to the Bite
at full speed. upon arrival at the aIte, they saw a red parachute
and the fragments of a balloon. In the middle of the debris was
an object which looked like a radio set..' The junior sergeant.'warned
all meta that this txixht be a bomb and to stay away from it. F_
indicative of the seeurity_aenan i n1,R
co
et.
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- 4-spring 1952, an inusual event occurred ?9uring a tank
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Security for New Weapons 3
27. A new Soviet carbine, the 7.62 mm SKS semi-automatic model, and.a
new Soviet 7.62 mm SMG arrived 2.5X1
At that time they had only been issued to the 1st Train- 25X1
ing Company of the battalion. The weapons were kept in a locked
room on the first he barracks of the let Tng Co. 25X1
the key to the room was kept by the
sergeant w.o was responsible for the safeguarding
and issue of these weapons.
28. Each weapon had a metal tag bearing 25X1
the serial numer o the weapon. The tags for the carbines had the
Cyrillic letters "KP" indicating carbine (karabin) and the tags for
the SMOs had the Cyrillic letters "AST" indicating a submachine gun
(avtaaat). These tagsF were issued to each soldier who was assigned
a weapon. In order to draw his weapon, the soldier had to turn in
the tag to the first sergeant who issued hint the weapon with the
corresponding number. When the weapon was returned the soldier wait
given back his tag and was expected to keep it on his person at all`
times. In addition, the first sergeant maintained a master roster
in his office of all the men in the company and the serial numbers
of their respective weapons.
29. Manuals dealing with the ballistics and nomenclature of the two
weapons were kept in the Secret Documents Section of the battalion
headquarters building. This section was located on the -second floor
of this building in a room with barred windows and a 21-hour guard
in the corridor. During duty hours, the guard did not stop any one
from entering or leaving this room, after duty 25X1
hours there was ff c o e room 25X1
The manuals were located in a
imrse en cabinet against the wall opposite the door to the room.
The cabinet had two doors and was kept looked with a large padlock
during off-duty hours. The key to this cabinet was kept by Sgt
Vladimir Ivanoviob BUCHNEV who was the Secret Documents MA"k
(Sekretchik).
Informers
30. Once having taken the oath of service in the Soviet Army, EM could
not, in theory, withhold any information from a superior officer.
On this precept, the informer system of the Soviet Army is founded.
Most EM who are reluctant to inform on their comrades are generally
threatened with a trial for not fulfilling their oath of service.
They are informed that it is their duty as military personnel of the
Soviet Army to inform on any violators that come within their ken.
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