NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY WEDNESDAY 30 JULY 1980

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82T00466R000400010086-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 4, 2008
• Sequence Number: 86
• Publication Date: July 30, 1980
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of Top Secret
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Wednesday
30 July 1980
Top Secret
CO NID 78
July
Copy 23 5
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Contents 25X1
Briefs and Comments
Bolivia: New Regime's Prospects . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
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Cuba : Castro's Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
USSR: Oil Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 25X1
mcnnFn
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30 July 1980
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BOLIVIA: New Regime's Prospects
Argentina's recognition on Monday of the Bolivian military
government may improve the new regime's chances for international
legitimacy and financial support.
The decision could induce other nations, partic-
ularly Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay, to recognize
the Garcia Meza government. These nations also have
military governments and are more likely to accept the
Bolivian military's claim that it seized power to pre-
vent a Communist from being elected. Bolivia's Andean
Pact neighbors to the north, however, as well as most
other nations, so far seem disinclined to accept Garcia
Meza's claim.
The Argentine move and its continued material sup-
port to Bolivia may also dishearten the regime's oppo-
nents. Civilian resistance now appears limited to
several scattered mining districts. Hernan Siles Zuazo,
who had been expected to be elected president, is in
hiding and so far has not been able to unify the resis-
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CUBA: Castro's Speech
President Castro apparently has decided on a Zess aggressive I)r-vl
The content and tone of Castro's remarks concerning
the US in his annual 26 July speech were similar to his
statements made the previous week in Nicaragua. By fail-
ing to repudiate recent US media reports that Havana was
seeking improved ties with the US, Castro implied that he
On past occasions when Havana had no interest in
normalization, Castro was quick to squelch such specula-
tion. In the short term, therefore, Cuba probably will
not carry out new schemes to increase the refugee flow
or otherwise provoke the US.
The Castro regime is sensitive to the impact its
actions may have on the US election campaign. Havana
strongly believes a change of administrations would be
highly unfavorable to its interests.
Castro presented a detailed critique of the Repub-
lican Party platform, warning that if fulfilled it would
lead to war between the US and Latin America. By con-
trast, the Cuban leader generally avoided denunciations
of President Carter's administration, virtually ignored
the refugee issue, and made no reference to Cuba's con-
ditions for negotiations with the US.
Commenting on his visit to Nicaragua, Castro re-
asserted that true revolutionary progress can only be
gained through armed struggle. He pointed to the late
President Allende's overthrow in Chile in 1973 and the
recent coup in Bolivia as proof that the only viable
formula for liberation was that used by Cuba, Nicaragua,
and Grenada. Castro's strong attacks on the Salvadoran
junta and the Guatemalan Government--and on US backing
for these regimes--indicate that Cuban support for insur-
gents in those countries will continue.
30 July 1980
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Soviet oil production during the first half of this
year averaged about 11.9 million barrels per day. Oil
production from July through December will have to
average almost 12.3 million barrels per day to reach the
1980 daily production goal of 12.1 million barrels. The
goal could be met if 1980 production follows the pattern
of the past six years, when second half output accounted
for 51 percent of total annual production. Declining
well productivities, sharply increased drilling require-
ments, transport problems resulting in shortfalls of oil-
field equipment deliveries, and a serious lack of infra-
structure at the new oilfields in West Siberia indicate,
however, the target for 1980 will be difficult to achieve.
30 July 1980
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