INDIA AFTER INDIRA: THE SUCCESSION QUESTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83S00854R000200150001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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STAT
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Directorate of
Secret
India After Indira:
The Succession Question
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Secret
NESA 82-10619
December 1982
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Directorate of
Intelligence
India After Indira:
The Succession Question
Asia Division,
This paper was prepared byOffice of
Near East-South Asia Analysis. It was coordinated
with the National Intelligence Council and the
Directorate of Operations. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief, South
Secret
NESA 82-10619
December 1982
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India After Indira:
The Succession Question
Key Judgments Prime Minister Indira Gandhi at 65 is healthy and seems determined to
Information available maintain. her highly centralized form of personal rule, at least until the
as of 30 November 1982 general elections scheduled for 1985. When the prime minister dies, the
was used in this report.
President, of India will appoint an interim prime minister-the senior
Cabinet member-until the majority party in parliament selects a new
leader. Gandhi's purge of Congress Party politicians with a potential
national constituency will probably make the selection of a successor less
smooth than similar transitions in her party in 1964 and 1966. India's
strong democratic institutions and traditions, however, should ensure
political stability, at least in the immediate post-Gandhi era.
Gandhi is preparing for the eventual succession of her son Rajiv. She has
made Rajiv her chief adviser and confidant, given him authority and
responsibility in the Congress Party, and introduced him to the world's
most important leaders
Although many Indians seem willing to accept Rajiv, his chances of
retaining power are less certain. His position in Congress Party affairs
depends entirely upon his mother. He has occasionally abused his preroga-
tives by treating Congress Party politicians with contempt. His perform-
ance on the political hustings and in parliament has been lackluster.
Rajiv's chances are enhanced by the dearth of credible challengers. 25X1
Gandhi's estranged daughter-in-law, Maneka, who also claims to be an
heir to the Nehru political legacy, is a focus of Congress Party dissidence.
But she lacks broad political support to succeed Gandhi as prime minister.
The Cabinet includes several well-known politicians, but they have no
national constituencies.
Gandhi's successor, in our view, will probably continue to seek a balance in
its foreign policy as India reasserts its leadership in the nonaligned
movement, but Moscow is likely to retain a central place in India's foreign
affairs strategy. India's preoccupation with the potential security threat
from Pakistan, New Delhi's perception of the Soviets as reliable arms
suppliers, and the economic relationships between India and the Soviet
Union are powerful inducements for continued close ties. Gandhi's succes-
sor, however, may prove receptive to opportunities to improve and expand
relations with the United States
iii Secret
NESA 82-10619
December 1982
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Secret
India After Indira:
The Succession Question
The Setting
Returned to power by the "Indira Wave" of 1980
after a three-year hiatus, Prime Minister Gandhi is
the dominant political personality in India today.
Despite growing factionalism and dissent in her party,
Gandhi's Congress Party remains the nation's largest
and strongest political organization. In contrast, the
opposition is fragmented among numerous small par-
ties and appears incapable of posing a credible threat
to Gandhi in the near future.
Most political indicators point to the continued su-
premacy of the Congress Party over the next two to
three years. It controls about two-thirds of the seats in
parliament, and Congress Party chief ministers pre-
side over the legislative assemblies in most of India's
22 states. The Congress candidate for president, Zail
Singh, was elected in July for a five-year term by a
wide margin. Singh is known for his long service to
the Nehru family and his loyalty to the Prime Minis-
ter. We believe Gandhi and her son Rajiv view him as
a potential ally should a parliamentary crisis over the
next five years threaten the Prime Minister's tenure.
Prime Minister Gandhi's death or incapacitation
would pose no immediate threat to India's political
stability, in our view. In contrast to many developing
countries, India has maintained effective democratic
institutions that have weathered the death of Nehru,
the Emergency of 1975-77, and the tumultuous Jan-
ata period. The Indian public values law and order,
and the nation's still stable democratic institutions
would probably ensure a calm transition during and
after the anticipated public grief for the popular
Prime Minister.
Sources of Concern
Still, some signs suggest uncertain times for Gandhi's
party because the Congress has become essentially a
one-woman organization. Gandhi has increased her
personal power since 1980, but at the cost of weaken-
ing the Congress and some government institutions.
Public speculation is widespread that unless she re-
builds the grass-roots party organization and restores
at least a modicum of authority to leaders outside
New Delhi, Congress could begin to fade-perhaps
even before the 1985 parliamentary elections-as the
predominant political force.
Gandhi, in our view, fears that delegating authority
will lead to challenges to her control of party and
government affairs. Gandhi clearly wants to dominate
party affairs and control appointments of central and
state legislative party elites. She has aggressively
intervened in the affairs of the state units of her party.
Gandhi has broken the hold of the state Congress
Party bosses and has suppressed the emergence of
independent regional power centers. Their place has
been taken by Congress chief ministers without a
state power base who owe office solely to Gandhi's
good graces.
Gandhi has isolated potential challengers from the
center of power, but in so doing she may have
weakened government institutions. The Prime Minis-
ter has surrounded herself with a largely incompetent
Cabinet that rubberstamps her policies more than it
weighs and advises on policy options. Gandhi has
directly controlled, at various times, some key portfo-
lios-such as Defense and Atomic Energy-and she
has supervised key government functions such as
security and intelligence to monitor the opposition as
well as dissidents in her Congress Party
Indian Succession Mechanisms
According to the constitution, the president appoints
the prime minister, but the constitution is vague on
how the president should make the selection. We
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The president of India holds a primarily ceremonial
office with important discretionary powers of appoint-
ment and the authority to dissolve parliament. Most
importantly, he appoints the prime minister and, on
the prime minister's advice, the Cabinet. Except when
no political party singly or in coalition is in a clear
majority in the lower house of parliament, the presi-
dent must invite the leader of the majority party in
parliament to form a government. The president can
dissolve parliament-as Sanjiva Reddy did in
1979-when no one party or coalition of parties can
command a majority. The president is also empow-
ered by the constitution to declare a state of emergen-
cy, on the advice of the prime minister in the event of
? War, external aggression, or internal disruption.
? Collapse of the constitutional machinery in any
individual state.
? Financial breakdown of the federal government or
any state government.
believe if the prime minister dies in office, the senior
Cabinet member would become interim prime minis-
ter until the majority party in parliament selects a
new leader
Before Gandhi's election as Prime Minister in 1966,
the Congress Party had both a strong central leader-
ship under the prime minister and a second tier of
strong regional leaders who, while deferring to the
center, maintained an independent power base. .
Gandhi's father, Jawaharlal Nehru, ran his party and
governed India with solid, regional leaders. These
party bosses-often known as the Syndicate-were
largely responsible for selecting Lal Bahadur Shastri
as Prime Minister in 1964 and Indira Gandhi over
Morarji Desai for the office in 1966.
Gandhi's Succession Plans
Gandhi's actions since the accidental death of her son
Sanjay in 1980 have left no doubt that she wants her
elder son Rajiv to succeed her as prime minister.
Rajiv Gandhi.
US officials in New
Delhi report that Gandhi considers most issues from
the standpoint of their impact on her domestic posi-
tion and particularly on the chances for Rajiv to
succeed her. The Prime Minister has stated publicly
that the people will follow India's democratic tradi-
tion and ultimately decide who is to lead them, but
she is obviously making every effort to make sure they
choose her sonJ
Gandhi's intentions for Rajiv's succession are clear to
the diplomatic community, the Congress and opposi-
tion parties, and the Indian public. Rajiv accompanied
his mother on her celebrated visits to Washington and
Moscow in July and September. Ambassadors posted
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to New Delhi openly curry favor with Rajiv in
Gandhi's presence at diplomatic functions. Several
fawning state leaders of the Congress Party have
urged Gandhi to appoint Rajiv to more responsible
positions in the party. Opposition parties criticize
Gandhi in parliament and query her why a mere
member of parliament is given special treatment by
Indian Government officials. They also ask why, on
trips abroad, Rajiv is always listed second to Gandhi
on protocol lists when more senior government offi-
cials travel with the Prime Minister
Rajiv's Chances
If Gandhi dies in office within the next two or three
years, we believe that Rajiv will probably be appoint-
ed prime minister. Most Congress politicians probably
view Rajiv's succession as an important element of
continuity in what is likely to be a rapidly changing
political environment. Few challengers to Rajiv exist
within the Congress because Gandhi has systematical-
ly weeded out experienced politicians with a national
constituency who could become a possible alternative
to Rajiv. 25X1
Most Congress Party members seem to have already
accepted the notion of Rajiv's succession. Among
Congress members in a key southern state, for in-
stance, the US Consulate in Madras found Rajiv to be
the only political contender after Gandhi. Congress
members of parliament largely believe Rajiv is the
sole party official who could replace Gandhi and
maintain Congress's position as the principal national
party. Rajiv's supporters in various positions in the
party also view him as the logical successor to the
single-leader tradition in the Congress. They see
India's unity and maintenance of a strong central
government as synonymous with Congress Party unity
under the Nehru family.
Some of Rajiv's lukewarm supporters, however, have
nagging doubts about his abilities and political in-
stincts. Reports appear in the press with notable
frequency that a growing minority in the Congress
Party is apprehensive about Rajiv's ability to lead the
party after Gandhi and contends that he is an unsuit-
able candidate to succeed his mother. In our view, a
number of these restless and unhappy politicians-
most of whom do not hold important positions within
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the party-see the grooming of Rajiv as further
weakening the party by suppressing the talent within
it. The dissident element of Congress is angered by
Rajiv's perceived arrogance and roughshod treatment
of some state party leaders and government officials,
according to reputable Indian journalists
We believe that Rajiv's eminence in Congress Party
affairs is entirely derivative. He has-yet to establish a
clear public image, a record of performance independ-
ent of his mother, or a political base of his own. Rajiv
lacks both his mother's flair and an insight for politics
and may prove incapable of defending his leadership
after Gandhi's departure from politics. His sole cre-
dential may be the fact that he is Indira's son.
Rajiv's reserve frustrates many Congress politicians,
who complain that he is too inaccessible to ever appeal
to the wide spectrum of the Congress electorate. One
Congress politician from Rajiv's home state of Uttar
Pradesh claims that Rajiv's close aides are bureau-
cratic and officious even by Indian norms and go to
considerable lengths to shield him from the public.F_
but there has been a notable absence of inspiration or
substance in his public statements. He reportedly
engineered the successful farmer's rally in New Delhi
in March 1981 to support his mother's policies, but
beyond that. Rajiv has shown a palpable lack of talent
in political affairs.
in the campaign.
Rajiv mismanaged the Congress campaign in three
North Indian state assembly elections in May 1982.
He alienated a number of veteran Congress politicians
and denied places on tickets to others in two states,
causing them to leave the party. These defections
jeopardized the formation of Congress ministries in
Haryana and Himachal Pradesh. He predicted Con-
gress would win at least 100 seats in West Bengal, but
it won only 49. Gandhi's Congress did best in Kerala,
where Rajiv failed to campaign. According to the US
Embassy, voters were indifferent to Rajiv despite
extensive public exposure and his heavy involvement
the support of various party factions.
Alternative Contenders
Should Congress reject Rajiv, it could turn to a
"syndicate" of a small number of prominent Congress
members of parliament in Gandhi's Cabinet. Finance
Minister Pranab Mukherjee, Foreign Minister
Narasimha Rao, Industry Minister N. D. Tiwari,
and Defense Minister R. Venkataraman are all gener-
ally respected in the party, but none has a national
political constituency. This shared characteristic, in
our view, makes it likely that a prime minister chosen
from the Cabinet would be a caretaker unable to win
A political personality with a potential national fol-
lowing and name recognition is Gandhi's estranged
daughter-in-law Maneka. Ambitious and ruthless-
some Indian political observers say she is much like
the Prime Minister-Maneka has increasingly be-
come the focus for Congress Party dissidents who
were selected by her deceased husband Sanjay for
office and since his death have been cast aside.
We believe RRajiv's performance as a member of
parliament has been lackluster. His maiden-and
only-parliamentary speech earlier this year was po-
litely received by the press and the opposition parties,
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emerges in the post-Gandhi era, aspirants for national
leadership might try to build coalitions out of the rival
factions within the Congress and from the opposition
parties. Many opposition leaders, such as H. N.
Bahuguna, have moved in and out of Congress in the
past and maintain ties in the Congress Party. Coali-
tion governments, however, would probably be unsta-
ble and subject to fragmentation. Coalitions such as
those during the Janata rule (1975-77) have been
weak and short lived, and a succession of governments
unable to complete their full five-year term would be
A
Gandhi family (Sanjay, Rajiv, Indira, Rajiv's
children, Maneka, and Sonia)
We believe Maneka is not a serious threat to Rajiv's
succession, but she represents a possible obstacle to
him. To become a serious rival to Rajiv, Maneka
would have to join the Congress Party and serve as a
member of parliament.
the probable result
Possible Role for the Military. The military has
always prided itself on its obedience to the civilian
government, but, in the absence of strong leadership
in the post-Gandhi period, a power grab by the
military cannot be ruled out. In our view, only if a
series of weak, incompetent governments-probably
coalitions in which no party had decisive influence-
failed to handle a political, economic, or security crisis
would the military consider stepping in to restore
order. Prolonged political incompetence by a civilian
government could mobilize not only the military, but
also elements of the political community that would
begin to demand military involvement.
US Embassy officers in New Delhi believe that
Maneka could erode public support for Rajiv by
making an issue of his wife Sonia's refusal to become
an Indian citizen. Indian journalists also ask how a
prime minister privy to national security information
could be married to an Italian citizen
Should the Prime Minister decide over the next few
years that Rajiv is ill suited to politics, she could turn
to another relative-perhaps her distant cousin Arun
Nehru-rather than Rajiv, as her designated political
heir. Some Indian journalists have noted that
Maneka's 3-year-old son, Varun, is the only full-
blooded Indian grandchild of the Prime Minister, and
perhaps for that reason they speculate that Gandhi
could eventually make her peace with Maneka.
Coalition Leadership. If, as prime minister, Rajiv
fails to assert strong control over India's pluralistic
democracy, or if no strong political personality
Implications for the United States 25X1
Despite Gandhi's strong and decisive role in foreign
affairs, we do not expect significant changes in Indian
foreign policy after her departure from politics. We
believe Indian Government policies generally reflect
basic national interests upon which most or all poten-
tial successors agree. We do not expect a sudden
change in Indian foreign policy, regardless of who
succeeds Gandhi. The Indian leadership probably will
attempt to maintain a balance between the Commu-
nist and Western countries while enhancing India's
stature in the nonaligned movement
Moscow is likely to retain a central place in India's
foreign policy. A core of shared interests is likely to
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endure any change in government in New Delhi.
Indo-Soviet ties rest on a firm foundation that in-
cludes Soviet diplomatic support against Pakistan and
China, military supplies and equipment on easy terms,
and a broad commercial relationship under which
India essentially trades low-quality consumer goods
and agricultural products for Soviet arms and oil.
In the longer term, however, Gandhi's successor may
prove open to opportunities to strengthen relations
with the United States. Rajiv Gandhi, for example, is
commonly known to have upper middle class values
and to admire Western culture and democratic insti-
tutions. US diplomats in New Delhi report that his
education, personal lifestyle, and political views are
Western oriented.
F_
is
essentially capitalist and pro-Western in international
orientation. Rajiv surrounds himself, moreover, with
advisers who advocate free enterprise.
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Appendix
President of India Zail Singh owes his political career
to Indira Gandhi. Gandhi considered her choice of
Singh, a Sikh, to be an overture to the militant Sikh
community. India's first President without a com-
mand of English, Singh has been quoted as saying the
Nehru family should be "worshipped."
Singh's election as President in July 1982 strength-
ened Gandhi's already strong control over Indian
politics. She undoubtedly believes that she can count
on Singh's loyalty to keep her family-in power.
Although his office is largely symbolic and ceremoni-
al, India's President is potentially powerful. As Com-
mander in Chief of the Armed Forces, he could call
out the Army in times of political instability. The
Sikhs form a critical element of the military, and
Singh and Gandhi can depend on their support.
Minister of Finance Mukherjee is the senior and
perhaps one of the more competent members of
Gandhi's Cabinet, and we believe he was appointed to
office both for his proven loyalty to Gandhi and his
Cabinet experience. Mukherjee advises the Prime
Minister on domestic political matters. During her
visit to the United States in July-August 1982,
Gandhi entrusted him with presiding over Cabinet
meetings.
industry.
According to US Embassy sources, Mukherjee de-
pends entirely on Gandhi for his political future.
Mukherjee's continued influence and favor in the
Cabinet depend largely on the success of Gandhi's
liberalization policies. As senior Cabinet member,
Mukherjee is in line for appointment as interim prime
minister should Gandhi die in office. Although leftist
critics accuse him of a proindustry bias and of
promoting the private sector, as Minister of Revenue
and Banking in 1975-77 he was regarded as anti-
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Minister of External Affairs Narasimha Rao has
limited power in the Cabinet and lacks a national
constituency, but he is widely admired and respected
in the Congress Party. For that reason he could
emerge as a darkhorse candidate for prime minister
after Gandhi's unexpected death or retirement. Rao's
impact on Indian policy formulation is minimized by
Gandhi's direct involvement in foreign affairs deci-
sionmaking. Although critical of what he perceives as
the developed nations' failure to implement economic
proposals, Rao favors India's move away from the
Soviet Union
Rajiv Gandhi's chief adviser and a member of parlia-
ment from the traditional Nehru family seat of Rae
Bareli in Uttar Pradesh, Nehru wields considerable
political power. According to published reports, "he
summons ministers, sometimes with a wave of his
finger ... to discuss governmental matters with him."
Because of his influence with both Rajiv and Gandhi,
he is often described as "third prime minister."
with a Nehru, not a Gandhi
Nehru's flamboyant style contrasts sharply with that
of his cousin, Rajiv, whose 1981 parliamentary cam-
paign Nehru managed. According to political analysts
in the US Embassy, Nehru has assumed a more low-
key role since the Indian press began to compare
Rajiv unfavorably with him. Nehru was reportedly
blamed by Gandhi after Congress's lackluster show-
ing in the 1982 state assembly elections in which
Nehru played an important advisory role. A main
theme on the New Delhi cocktail circuit is that the
Nehru dynasty will continue after the Prime Minister
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President of the newly formed Democratic Socialist
Party, Bahuguna at 63 is perhaps the most capable,
experienced, and crafty of Gandhi's non-Communist
adversaries. Bahuguna is a key figure in Indian
politics because of his former standing in the Congress
Party and past close relationship with Gandhi. Before
his resignation as Commerce Minister from Gandhi's
Emergency Government Cabinet in 1977, Bahuguna
presided as chief minister over Uttar Pradesh, India's
most populous state, where he has retained a popular
following.
Bahuguna bitterly opposes Gandhi and has led parlia-
ment against the Congress Party. His election to
parliament in May 1982 was a sharp disappointment
for Gandhi, who campaigned hard against him.
Bahuguna's natural leadership, organizational ability,
personal charisma, and populist image almost surely
bother Gandhi, who must see him as a potential
architect of a united coalition against Congress in the
1985 parliamentary elections and a rival of Rajiv.
Bahuguna's name is often mentioned as a figure likely
to return to the Congress fold and a position of
leadership in the post-Gandhi era
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