ITALIAN COUNTERTERRORISM: POLICIES AND CAPABILITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85S00316R000100120006-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 31, 2011
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: May 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

Directorate of
Intelligence
Italian Counterterrorism:
Policies and Capabilities
EUR 84-10106
May 1984
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 Intelligence
Italian Counterterrorism:
Policies and Capabilities
European Issues Division, EURA
are welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
Office of European Analysis. Comments and queries
This paper was prepared by
Secret
EUR 84-10106
May 1984
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Italian Counterterrorism:
Policies and Capabilities
Key Judgments Italy's counterterrorist effort has improved markedly in the last few years.
Information available The assassination of former Prime Minister Aldo Moro in the spring of
as of I April 1984 1978 sparked important changes in policy on counterterrorism. The rescue
-was used in this report.
of General Dozier in January 1982 was the result of better tactics and
methods and the cause of further improvements. The more effective
investigative, analytic, and operational counterterrorist capabilities that
have emerged since 1978 include:
? Significant institutional reforms, such as the development of special
counterterrorist units and an overhaul of the intelligence and security
services.
? Extraordinary legal measures broadening police powers, mandating stiff
penalties, permitting lengthy detention, and encouraging terrorists to
"repent."
Such changes have gone far, in our judgment, to offset the administrative
inefficiency, interservice rivalries, and political indecision which previously
hindered a coordinated counterterrorist effort. In addition, public support
for a stepped-up government campaign against terrorism proved important
in a society conscious of civil liberties and long familiar with politically mo-
tivated violence. As a result of these factors-along with dissension among
the terrorists themselves and a deterioration in the quality of new
recruits-the power and capabilities of terrorist groups have eroded, and
the level of terrorist violence has declined.
Although public and party support for tough counterterrorist measures
remains strong, opinion.polls show that terrorism has slipped in the
hierarchy of perceived national problems. Moreover, political parties have
begun to disagree over the legality of some antiterrorist measures, and the
government is showing signs of diverting resources from counterterrorism
to other programs. Nevertheless, we believe that the terrorism problem will
remain serious enough to maintain public support, political consensus, and
government funding for tough and effective counterterrorist programs.
Secret
EUR 84-10106
May 1984
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Contents
Key Judgments
Catalysts for Counterterrorist Advances
Counterterrorist Components: Functions and Capabilities
4
Policy Formulation and Oversight
4
Principal Operational Units
5
Competition and Competence
6
Legal Measures: Effectiveness and Implications
7
Troubling Trends
12
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Italian Counterterrorism:
Policies and Capabilities
Catalysts for Counterterrorist Advances
Among West European countries, Italy has experi-
enced an unparalleled level and intensity of indige-
nous, urban political terrorism. The spate began in the
late 1960s, peaked in 1978, and abated sharply after
some 2,100 recorded terrorist incidents in 1979 (figure
1). The violence was instigated in part by neofascists,
but the Red Brigades and other groups of the radical
left quickly outstripped the extreme right in organiza-
tional efficiency, frequency of incidents, and particu-
Figure 1
Italy: Terrorist Incidents, 1969-83 a
larly the significance of their targets.
Institutional and operational responses to domestic
terrorism evolved initially in a halting and piecemeal
way owing to a lack of agreement among political
parties and the public that terrorism threatened the
stability of the state. Complacency turned to concern
only when the Red Brigades tried to "strike at the
heart of the Italian state" in 1978 by abducting one of
the country's most prominent political figures, former
Prime Minister Aldo Moro. Moro's death enabled the
Christian Democratic-controlled government of
Prime Minister Andreotti to enlist the parliamentary
support of the major political parties, including the
Communists, for expanding, upgrading, and refining
Italy's counterterrorist effort.
The abduction of US Gen. James Dozier in December
1981 provided the first thorough test of the legal and
institutional innovations. Dozier's kidnaping, the first
targeting of an important non-Italian, was a profound
embarrassment because it impugned Italy's image as
a competent ally. It galvanized Italian counterterror-
ist resources more decisively than had any attacks
against Italian targets. The effort to recover Dozier
led to an unprecedented manhunt and dragnet that
paid handsome and unexpected dividends well beyond
his rescue. Not only were hundreds of suspects arrest-
ed and imprisoned, but the new laws encouraging the
cooperation of arrested terrorists netted additional
arrests, as well as information on safehouses and arms
caches. A subsequent decline in the caliber of terrorist
recruits and the emergence of internal disputes in
a Italian statistics on terrorist actions vary considerably
from one source to another. These figures, compiled for
the Italian Communist Party and covering all types of
terrorist actions, have been considered valid by
non-Communist experts. Source: Mauro Galleni,
Rapporto Sul Terrorismo, 1981, supplemented by press
many groups contributed to the success of bolder
counterterrorist initiatives.'
This assessment examines the steps taken by the
Italian Government to combat domestic terrorism and
weighs their significance and overall effectiveness. It
also considers the outlook for continuation of special
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measures and laws which have proved useful against
terrorism but are the subject of juridical and political.
controversy.
Institutional Reforms
The Italian Government first formally signaled its
intention to resist the spread of terrorism by establish-
ing the Antiterrorist Inspectorate in June 1974. At-
tached to the Ministry of the Interior, the Inspector-
ate combined investigative and operational elements
drawn mainly from the ranks of the national police
(Polizia di Stato). Many officials, however, had no
experience in their new areas of responsibility, accord-
ing to US Embassy and military reports. We believe
this inexperience, coupled with organizational prob-
lems, accounted for the Inspectorate's limited initial
effectiveness.
The government's recognition that terrorism demand-
ed special measures was a major impetus for its
decision in July 1977 to build supercarceri, or maxi-
mum security prisons, under the direction of Carabi-
nieri Gen. Carlo Alberto Dalla Chiesa. Italy's poorly
managed, obsolete, and overcrowded prisons were
experiencing an average of one escape per day, ac-
cording to Italian press reports, with convicted or
suspected terrorists among the escapees. Another
concern was the prospect of terrorist assaults on
prisons to free incarcerated terrorists. In view of
several assaults and escapes at regular prisons, the
supercarceri were designed to be resistant to breaches,
and we know of no successful escapes from them.
Most supercarceri are in isolated areas-such as the
Alcatraz-style Asinara prison just off Sardinia. The
inmates include other dangerous criminals, as well as
unrepentant terrorists and terrorists who need protec-
tive isolation because they testified against former
A desire to improve overall counterterrorist capabili-
ties was part of the reason for Parliament's decision in
1977 to restructure Italy's intelligence and security
services. As late as 1976, after several years of urban
terrorist activity, US Embassy reports indicate that
economic intelligence had a higher priority than
counterterrorist measures for the intelligence service
that had primary authority in terrorist matters. F
Parliament's decision abolished the scandal-plagued
services and created two new intelligence and security
agencies: the Servizio per le informazioni e la sicur- 25X1
ezza militare, known as SISMI, and the Servizio per
le informazioni e la sicurezza democratica, or SISDE
(figure 2). SISMI, under the command of the Minis-
try of Defense, is charged with collecting intelligence
on international terrorism in Italy and any terrorist
operations aimed at the Italian military. As the
service responsible for foreign intelligence collection,
however, SISMI has a broad mandate of which
counterterrorism is only a part. SISDE, the domestic
intelligence service, is technically part of the Ministry
of the Interior and is responsible for investigating all
other aspects of terrorism in Italy. As such, SISDE
allocates the preponderance of its resources to coun-
terterrorism. Neither service per se, however, has the
authority to conduct police actions. Both are account-
able to the cabinet and to Parliament for their
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The government was slow to implement the reorgani-
zation, despite its obvious significance for combating
terrorism. Authorities dragged their heels so much
that, a year and a half after SISDE's creation
the organization suffered from unqualified lead-
ership, was understaffed by 50 percent, and had failed
to carry out its mission. SISMI was similarly cen-
sured and was reported, furthermore, to be using most
of its resources illegally in trying to encroach on
SISDE's antiterrorist domain. Moreover, SISMI re-
portedly accepted tasking from other agencies in
violation of the law.
The appointment of General Dalla, Chiesa to head all
the counterterrorist forces in spring of 1978 signaled
the government's determination to try to upgrade
further its operational capabilities, particularly
against leftist terrorist groups. With terrorism on the
rise and the newly reorganized security services not
yet functioning, the government bypassed normal
lines of authority by turning to Dalla Chiesa, who
reported directly to the Prime Minister. Dalla Chiesa
had established a reputation for effectiveness in com-
bating terrorism while leading an anti-Red Brigades
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Figure 2
Italy: Principal Counterterrorist Components
Service for Intelligence
and Democratic
Security (SISDE)
Analytic/investigative
Executive Committee for the
Intelligence and Security
Services (CESIS)
Policymakingladvisory
Interministerial Committee Defense Ministry
for Intelligence, and Security ---- Policyrnakingladvisory
(CIIS)
Advisory
I
Central Office for
General Investigations
and Special Operations
(UCIGOS)
lnvestigativel
operational
Regional Offices (20)
(DIGOS)
Investigative
Provincial Offices (95)
(UIGOS)
Investigative
L Central Operational
Security Unit (NOCS)
Operational
National Police
(Polizia di Stato)
Investigative
Note: Solid line indicates formal lines of authority. Broken line indicates
informal communications, advisory (but not binding) contacts, or ad hoc
consultations. Other informal contacts undoubtedly exist-for example,
between the Carabinieri and the National Police-but for clarity we have
not denoted all of those relationships.
Service for Intelligence
and Military Security
(SISMI)
Analytic/investigative
Carabinieri Corps (CC) I
Investigative/
operational
Special Intervention
Group (GIS)
Operational
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squad with the Carabinieri Corps in Turin, and his
handling of the supercarceri had proved successful.
According to US Embassy and press reports, his
approach to counterterrorism included:
? Abandoning the improvised and violent "blitz" for-
merly used to nab terrorist suspects in favor of
extended surveillance designed to yield more arrests
and greater insights into terrorist methods and
operations.
? Requiring his agents to become familiar with the
revolutionary literature of leftist terrorist groups.
? Persuading regular criminal inmates to be "recruit-
ed" by Red Brigades' prisoners and, upon release
from prison, to act as informers.
? Working outside the law when necessary-particu-
larly with regard to obtaining evidence-and back-
ing his people fully in such activities.
The general's appointment itself was seen by some
Italian officials as
having a salutary effect on the forces under his
command, and as showing both the public and terror-
ists a new seriousness of purpose. In fact, his style of
operation led to the arrest of the chiefs of the Turin
and Genoa columns of the Red Brigades and the
recapture of Red Brigades' founder Renato Curcio
after he had escaped from prison in 1975. A sweeping
operation by Dalla Chiesa's forces in Padua in the
spring of 1979 netted leading members of the leftist
Autonomist group, including Antonio Negri and
Oreste Scalzone.
Counterterterrorist Components: Functions and
Capabilities
Responsibility for the formulation and execution of
counterterrorist policy is shared by three committees
at the national government level, the two intelligence
and security services created under the reform law of
1977, and special components of the national police
and the Carabinieri for the formulation and execution
of counterterrorist policy. Two coordinating commit-
tees of cabinet ministers and senior officials have
advisory and supervisory responsibility for counterter-
rorism, intelligence, and security policies, as well as
for the services charged with executing them; a third
parliamentary committee has an oversight function.
The two intelligence and security services established
by the reform law are responsible for collection and
analysis of intelligence on domestic and international
terrorism. Specialized units within the intelligence
services, the national police, and the Carabinieri are
charged with carrying out counterterrorist investiga-
tions and operations, such as the freeing of General
Dozier. Most of these antiterrorist units, after uncer-
tain starts, have developed considerable competence.
F
Policy Formulation and Oversight. Three governmen-
tal entities currently have legal authority to develop
and monitor counterterrorist policy:
? The Comitato Interministeriale per le Informazioni
e la Sicurezza (Interministerial Committee for In-
telligence and Security, known as CIIS) advises the
Prime Minister on the general directions and funda-
mental objectives of the services, including their
counterterrorism missions. Members of CIIS are
the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Interior, Justice,
Defense, Industry, and Finance.
? The Comitato Esecutivo per i Servizi di Informa-
zione e Sicurezza (the Executive Committee for the
Intelligence and Security Services, known as
CESIS) consists of officials appointed by the Prime
Minister or by an under secretary of state named by
him. The directors of the two services are committee
members ex officio. CESIS members assist the
Prime Minister in carrying out his supervisory
responsibility for intelligence and security matters.
By law, CESIS must submit a written report to
Parliament every six months on intelligence and
security policies and. their results.
? A parliamentary oversight committee of four depu-
ties and four senators is appointed by the speakers
of both chambers roughly proportional to the major
parties' representation in Parliament. Membership
thus includes legislators from the Italian Commu-
nist Party (PCI), which enjoys the support of some
30 percent of the electorate. The committee moni-
tors the services' compliance with their legal man-
dates and may also make recommendations to the
Prime Minister and the CIIS regarding intelligence
and security procedures
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As the highest level permanent working committee
and the more task oriented of the two coordinating
committees, CESIS has emerged as the overall head
of the revamped intelligence system and the organ
most responsible for counterterrorist policy formula-
tion. In addition, CESIS is less likely to have to
contend directly with the vested interests or "turf"
sensitivities of individual ministries which may cause
disagreements or rivalries among the members of the
interministerial CIIS.
The Role of the Intelligence Services. Both SISMI
and SISDE are charged with collection and analysis
of counterterrorist information. The mandate for
SISDE's staff of approximately 800 is almost exclu-
sively counterterrorism. SISMI, however, has addi-
tional intelligence responsibilities and thus devotes
only part of its 2,200 personnel to counterterrorist
matters. Most of SISMI's personnel are military and
Carabinieri officers on rotation from their services,
but SISDE's staff is mainly civilian, with some Cara-
binieri on temporary assignment.
Although neither service has the authority to arrest,
detain, search, or interrogate terrorist suspects, both
may engage in domestic surveillance.
? Second Division (Divisione Operativa) is responsible
for police activities.
? Third Division (Divisione Anti-Terrorismo di Sinis-
tra) is responsible for investigating leftist terrorism.
? Fourth Division (Divisione Anti-Terrorismo di Des-
tra) is responsible for investigating rightist
terrorism.
The Third and Fourth Divisions investigate specific
terrorist activities and personnel, and they employ the
Second Division for arrests, searches, seizures, and
surveillances. The First Division collects and analyzes
intelligence on terrorism. The regional DIGOS offices
are structured similarly, but the provincial UIGOS,
with smaller staffs, distinguishes less among responsi-
bilities.
UCIGOS, with its operational and investigative sec-
tions, is one of the most effective counterterrorist
forces in Italy. The "SWAT" unit, in particular, has
demonstrated competence and dedication. The Nu-
cleo Operativo Centrale di Sicurezza (Central Opera-
tional Security Unit, or NOCS) is the squad that
freed General Dozier (figure 3). The NOCS is based
at the Central Police Barracks in Rome and consists
of 40 to 50 men from the ranks of'the national police.
NOCS agents, who range in age from their early
twenties to late thirties, undergo rigorous medical and
psychological evaluations before receiving extensive
training in terrorist psychology, weapons, explosives, 25X1
martial arts, climbing buildings, rappelling from heli-
may detain suspects and turn them over immediately
to the police for formal arrest. Prior to this arrange-
ment, some SISDE agents reportedly arrested sus-
pects who were led to believe the agents were regular
police.
Principal Operational Units. The Ufficio Centrale
Investigazioni Generali ed Operazioni Speciali (Cen-
tral Office for General Investigations and Special
Operations, or UCIGOS) is the antiterrorism and
antisubversion section within the Interior Ministry
and has bureaus throughout Italy. UCIGOS, estab-
lished in 1978, has 20 regional offices (known as
DIGOS) and an office (known by the name UIGOS)
in each of the 95 provincial capital cities. UCIGOS is
structured into four divisions:
? First Division (Divisione Informativa) is responsible
for intelligence and reports.
SISDE agents
copiers, and evasive driving.
The Carabinieri Corps has the largest, best trained,
and best equipped operational counterterrorist unit in
Italy, according to US Embassy reports. The Gruppo
Intervento Speciale (GIS), which is headquartered at
Livorno under cover of the First Airborne Carabinieri
Battalion, was organized in May 1978, and selected
members have trained with the West German GSG-9,
the British SAS-22, and Israeli counterterrorist units.
The GIS's three commissioned and 47 noncommis-
sioned officers are organized into four 10-man reac-
tion teams-each with an assault group and snipers-
and one 10-man cadre-and-training team. The GIS is
strictly volunteer, and, like the NOCS, all members
undergo extensive physical and psychological testing.
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Training for a range of terrorist situations includes
marksmanship, demolition, explosives, breaching and
obstacle clearance, hand-to-hand combat, rappelling,
and mountain climbing. Teams are capable of assault
and rescue operations against many types of aircraft
and are armed with a variety of weapons. Despite
such exhaustive training, each man may serve only
four years, presumably because of the rigors of the job
and the risk of "burnout." This limit results in an
approximate 25-percent annual turnover in force.
Competition and Competence. Rivalries among min-
istries and security services with counterterrorist mis-
sions took a toll on overall effectiveness for several
years from the mid-1970s until the early 1980s.
Recently, these rivalries have abated somewhat be-
cause of:
? The maturing of young institutions, such as SISDE
and SISMI.
? A greater political willingness on the part of the
government to exercise control over the services.
? Increased confidence among all concerned as a
result of antiterrorist successes.
At the same time, rivalries have not disappeared
altogether. Institutional loyalties and some overlap-
ping of mandates will continue, in our estimation, to
be the basis for turf disputes. Indeed, the US Embassy
stated last summer that Carabinieri officers assigned
counterterrorist duties with other services frequently
pass leads and information to their own organization
and delay dissemination to their rotational service.
Similarly, multiple units may converge on the scene of
a terrorist incident in an unnecessary duplication of
What one military observer has called "healthy if not
fratricidal" competition among counterterrorist ele-
ments nonetheless may occasionally have a positive
outcome. During the final stage of the operation to
free General Dozier, for example, competition among
forces was so keen that the operation's commander
informed one tactical unit it had one hour to show
results or another unit would be called in-an option
that proved unnecessary. We believe that the services
have learned to accommodate such competition as a
circumstance of their work, but that the effect of so
much rivalry often is still counterproductive
The efforts of counterterrorist analytic and investiga-
tive elements have shown a particular improvement in
quality and timeliness in the last few years. A study
on the status of terrorism in Italy at the end of 1982
by the Carabinieri General Command concluded-
correctly, as events showed-that elements of the Red
Brigades militarist wing were reorganizing and were
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We believe the ability of the services to make inroads
against terrorism has been enhanced not only by
greater experience and the confessions of "repent-
ants," but also by the use of informers who, according
to press accounts, infiltrated groups as far back as the
early 1970s. Indeed, informers contributed to the
capture in 1976 of first-generation Red Brigades
leaders Renato Curcio and Alberto Franceschini.
The use of infiltrators remains a legal "gray area,"
however, and recent Italian press accounts of infiltra-
tion efforts reflect continuing controversy. Infiltrators
are legally accountable for any crimes they might be
required to commit to establish their terrorist creden-
tials. Members of the parliamentary oversight com-
mittee have said in the past that they would be hard
pressed to condone criminal actions committed in the
interest of the state. Nonetheless, the services proba-
bly will continue to make use of infiltrators, in our
view, so long as some protection can be discreetly
arranged.
Legal Measures: Effectiveness and Implications
Extraordinary and innovative legal measures have
played an important role in shaping a more aggressive
Italian antiterrorist posture. Beginning with the first
of the so-called emergency laws in March 1978, a
number of measures were developed specifically in
response to terrorism: provisions permitting extended
preventive detention; broader police powers for
search, seizure, and wiretapping; stiff penalties for
specific crimes; and incentives for cooperation with
authorities. Some of the special laws used in the
prosecution of suspected terrorists were temporary
and have since lapsed. In addition, preventive deten-
tion laws have become controversial and may be
altered as a result of parliamentary debate.
Penalties and Incentives. The kidnaping of Aldo
Moro prompted an emergency decree law z in March
1978 which increased sentences for anyone found
guilty of kidnaping and mandated life imprisonment
in kidnaping cases where the victim dies. It also
allowed lighter sentences for kidnapers who dissociate
themselves from their comrades and assist the police.
Although this decree law-the first of the emergency
laws-did not deter the Red Brigades from killing
Moro, it ensured the harshest penalty for all involved
and introduced the concept of plea bargaining. The
March 1978 measure, which subsequently passed into
law, also:
? Broadens the powers of investigative authorities by
easing restrictions on wiretapping.
? Permits anyone to be detained until his identity is
confirmed.
? Requires that landlords notify the police as to the
identity of purchasers or renters in order to root out
properties used as terrorist safehouses.
? Allows police to interrogate suspects without a
defense lawyer present.
The emergency law enacted in December 1979, often
referred to as the Cossiga Law, signaled the govern-
ment's willingness to use plea bargaining-a legal
innovation foreshadowed in the March 1978 decree
law-and the threat of additional mandatory stiff
sentences as counterterrorism tools. The Cossiga Law
came at the end of Italy's two worst years of terrorist
violence and laid the groundwork for subsequent
"repentant" laws used in terrorist cases. It set forth
specific penalties for a range of criminal acts commit-
ted in the context of terrorism and, moreover, detailed
the amount by which particular penalties may be
reduced in exchange for information and cooperation
with authorities.
Under the Cossiga.Law, which is still in effect,
murders committed during terrorist acts are punish-
able by life imprisonment, as are the killings of law
enforcement personnel and magistrates. The sentence
for any lesser terrorist offense is automatically dou-
bled. The law also bars provisional liberty for terrorist
suspects awaiting trial and extends the limit for
pretrial detention to 10 years and eight months. On
the other hand, the law provides the terrorist suspect
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with incentives .to plea bargain by "repenting" for
crimes and helping police with information on terror-
ist comrades and their activities. Thus, a life sentence
may be reduced to 12 to 20 years, and incarceration
for other crimes diminished by a third to a half. F_
By criminalizing subversive associations as well, the
Cossiga Law ensures that, even if a suspect is not
convicted of another crime, simply belonging to a
terrorist group will result in a four-to-eight-year
sentence; organizing or leading such a group is pun-
ishable by seven to 15 years. This point and others in
the Cossiga Law updated and enhanced the terms of a
1975 law regarding the criminalizing of subversive
associations which had been inspired by episodes of
neofascist terrorist violence.
Subsequent "repentant" laws reaffirmed the govern-
ment's decision to address terrorism by encouraging
suspects to collaborate or face tough prosecution.
Separate decree laws enacted in September 1981 and
May 1982-each in force for only a few months
because of their controversial nature-outlined in
detail what is required to diminish set penalties for a
variety of offenses, and advised that false information
and refusing to cooperate were punishable.
terrorists have been rounded up as a result of the
revelations of "repentants," and valuable information
about the functioning of the Red Brigades and other
groups obtained as well.
The "repentant" laws-since their inception the sub-
ject of public and judicial controversy-have been
applied for the most part with care.
member of a far-left organization, Prima Linea, was
sentenced in August 1982 to 12 years in prison despite
the prosecution's request that he be given only three
years because of his cooperation with authorities. In
contrast, a Red Brigades member who confessed to
the murder of prominent Milanese journalist Walter
Tobagi and who subsequently "repented" received a
sentence of probation in November 1983, thereby
generating a public outcry at an apparent distortion of
the law's intent. Use of the "repentant" laws has been
accepted by a majority of the public, however, accord-
ing to the results of a December 1983 poll in which 51
percent of respondents believed the overall effect of
the laws was positive, in contrast to the approximately
34
ercent who vi laws' impact negatively.
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Preventive Detention. As significant as the Cossiga
and "repentant" laws have been for the counterterror-
ist effort, such laws alone could not have overcome the
inertia and inefficiency of the Italian judicial system.
We believe the effectiveness of counterterrorist and
other criminal laws has been dependent to a great
extent on generous provisions for pretrial preventive
detention. The average time for completion of crimi-
nal cases (from arrest to final verdict) is currently four
to five years, according to Italy's chief prosecutor. So
overburdened is the court system that the state's
ability to detain defendants legally is crucial for cases
in which a suspect would likely flee if not held.
Although it has been a key factor in counterterrorism
enforcement, preventive detention-as might be ex-
pected-has drawn considerable public and political
criticism.
At the beginning of 1983, some 43 percent of prison
inmates-including an unspecified number of terror-
ist suspects-were being held in extended pretrial
detention, according to official figures. The popular
view that suspects are entitled to prompt trials has led
to opposition to the emergency law enacted in 1979
that allows up to 10 years and eight months of pretrial
detention. Thus, the small Radical Party last year
listed Antonio Negri, the leftist political theorist who
had been detained for four years without a trial, as a
candidate for Parliament in order to focus attention
on the perceived abuse of preventive detention.3 The
length of Negri's detention was not exceptional, and
civil libertarians continue to press for legal revisions.
One of the goals of the Socialist-led Craxi govern-
ment's bill on legal reforms presented to Parliament
early this year is to place greater limits on the
authority of magistrates to use preventive detention
and reduce its maximum allowable duration
the reform bill,,which
includes stiff penalties for terrorism and Mafia-relat-
ed activity, is designed to maintain the effectiveness of
the government's antiterrorist powers while signaling
a move away from the "state of emergency" of the
Impact of Reforms on Terrorism
The government's successes in combating terrorism
have substantially eroded the power and capabilities
of indigenous terrorist groups and stemmed the tide of
terrorist violence (see figure 1). This has been possible,
in our view, primarily because of the improved train-
ing and testing of specialized counterterrorist strike
forces; the reorganization of the security services and
formation of special analytic and investigative coun-
terterrorist units; the adoption of extraordinary legal
measures and the means to enforce them; and a 25X1
political consensus that terrorism unchecked is a
threat to Italy's social and political stability.
These measures, however, only partially explain coun-
terterrorist successes. The internal weaknesses of ter-
rorist groups have also helped official antiterrorist 25X1
efforts There 25X1
has been a decline in the quality, dedication, and
ideological conviction of terrorist recruits. In many
cases, new members moved from smaller, less disci-
plined terrorist groups to larger, better organized
ones, but lacked the loyalty and commitment of other
longtime group members. Subsequent factional and
ideological disputes, particularly among leftist terror-
ists, have seriously debilitated the operational capaci-
ty of many groups. 25X1
Internecine disputes and rivalries about strategy and
tactics also have prompted confessions by terrorists
willing to implicate former comrades. Even terrorist
chiefs have not been immune to the temptation to
"repent"; the Turin column of the Red Brigades and25X1
the Prima Linea organization, for example, were
devastated by the revelations of their own "repentant"
leaders. Along with official moves, the confessions of
participants in the Dozier kidnaping alone contributed
to more than 1,000 arrests of terrorist suspects. The
increased risk of apprehension as a result of involve-
ment in terrorist activities probably made association
with groups like the Red Brigades less attractive to
prospective recruits.
last several years
' He was subsequently elected, released on the basis of statutory
immunity, had his immunity rescinded by Parliament, and fled to
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Nevertheless, we believe there is still a terrorist threat
to Italian targets, and to US and other foreign
personnel and interests as well. The assassination of
Hunt, claimed by reactivated Red Brigades remnants
in Rome, may portend renewed attempts against
politically symbolic, poorly guarded targets in gener-
al, and I
We believe Italian counterterrorist and law enforce-
ment authorities are sufficiently experienced and have
the intelligence capabilities to inflict once again sig-
nificant losses on reactivated terrorist groups. Within
a month of the Hunt murder, police rounded up
nearly 40 suspects, gained leads on others, and
searched more than 80 locations-including possible
safehouses, where they reportedly seized incriminat-
ing material. Although solution of the Hunt case
probably will prove more difficult as time passes, the
investigation itself may yield-like the Dozier case-
for terrorist groups, which were documented in Italian
polls during the mid-to-late 1970s, have all but, evapo-
rated. Recent opinion polls show that, while many
Italians still say they understand the societal and
political grievances that compel terrorists to act, the
public roundly condemns terrorist violence and is
more supportive of government attempts to.rout ter-
rorism. 25X1_'
Nearly 40 percent of respondents in a December 1983
poll, for example, indicated that the most important
factor in the decrease in terrorist acts has been the
increased effectiveness of police and security forces,
while nearly one-fourth of respondents gave primary
credit to the innovative "repentant" laws. We cannot
estimate with assurance the number of terrorists
arrested and imprisoned as a result of "repentant"
comrades,
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We believe that, to justify so many abbreviated
sentences, Italian authorities had to have gained
considerable information for use against terrorists.
additional, incidental antiterrorist gains
Prospects for Counterterrorist Policies
The government has a vested interest in maintaining
its tough counterterrorist policies, -which have earned
it political capital both at home and abroad; Wide-
spread public and political party support for tough
counterterrorist measures has been the foundation of
government policy. In a significant evolution, the
reservoirs of overt public sympathy and tacit support
In our view, the broad political consensus among the
principal political parties in favor of a strong counter-
terrorist posture will remain intact. Prime Minister
Craxi has too much at stake politically to appear less
than resolute in the face of a possible renewal of
terrorist activity-as do the Christian Democrats who
hold the Interior Ministry portfolio in the current
cabinet. Moreover, although the opposition Commu-
nists are at odds with the Socialist-led government on
many issues, the PCI firmly favors stern action
against terrorism of the left and right and has repeat-
edly cautioned against complacency. Indeed, in the
wake of the Hunt assassination, the PCI's official
newspaper criticized the Italian press for dismissing
the perpetrators as "amateurs and suggesting that a
new wave of terrorism is unlikely. As long as the PCI
believes itself to be threatened by terrorism as much
as-or more than-other Italian, institutions and feels
the political need to distance itself from the terrorists,
we believe it will maintain a tough stance.
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Troubling Trends. Despite significant government
inroads and a decline in terrorist activity from previ-
ously high levels, recent events and reports indicate
that the terrorist problem is far from solved. A period
of enforced clandestinity apparently has allowed re-
grouping in several'regions and enabled some groups
to regain operational capability. Moreover,
fugitive Italian ter-
rorists in Paris, who operate through various front
organizations and are not subject to extradition,
maintain contact with leftist terrorists in Italy and
probably provide them some degree of support, details
of which are obscure
There are signs that the Italian public as well as
political and law enforcement officials have become
somewhat complacent. Although terrorism is still
viewed as a serious national problem, the public's
perception of a grave terrorist threat has diminished
somewhat. According to a reputable polling firm,
terrorism ranked as the leading problem confronting
the country in a series 'of seven national polls from
early 1980 through early 1982, but fears of terrorism
began to decline as early as 1981. Perceptions of a
terrorist threat increased slightly in early 1982 after
General Dozier's rescue, but, by late 1983, after the
counterterrorist successes surrounding the Dozier case
and some highly publicized trials of "repentants,"
terrorism receded somewhat in the hierarchy of per-
ceived national problems. In the most recent poll last
October, only 31 percent of respondents named terror-
ism as one of the three most pressing national con-
cerns, for an overall ranking of fourth place after
unemployment, drug abuse, and health care. A dilu-
tion of public support and pressure may hinder the
efforts of authorities to muster additional resources, if
necessary, for a stepped-up counterterrorist offensive.
reports.
An exception to the across-the-board, nonpartisan
support for a tough counterterrorist policy is public
opinion about preventive detention. Mainstream par-
ties have joined those of the far left and right in
calling for restraints on abuse of preventive detention
laws out of concern for civil liberties. While some
reform is required and probably inevitable, passage of
the current legal reform bill before Parliament could
lead to the release of as many as 300 terrorist
suspects, according to Italian press and US Embassy
A pending judicial challenge also has implications for
counterterrorist policy. In February, a Genoa court
referred the cases of four Red Brigades members to
the Constitutional Court for a decision on the consti-
tutionality of several provisions of the "repentant"
laws and their possible conflict with the penal code.
Although the "repentant" laws have been criticized
before, this is the first time they have been challenged
in the courts. Should the Constitutional Court strike
down specific articles of the laws, the provisions of
any such future laws would be similarly circum-
scribed.
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In sum, the greatest potential threat to the Italian
counterterrorist effort is the impression that there is
not a clear and present terrorist danger. Under such
circumstances, the public is tempted to shift its
attention to other issues, parties begin to squabble,
and the government gradually diverts resources to
other programs. While these trends are present now,
they are not so highly developed as to undermine
counterterrorist policy. Such events as the Hunt slay-
ing may be sufficient to maintain public and party
support for tough counterterrorist measures and to
ensure ample funding for counterterrorist programs.
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