THE THAI-LAO BORDER DISPUTE: CONTINUING TO FESTER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001000960001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 19, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 15, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
15 October 1984
The Thai-Lao Border Dispute:
Continuing to Fester
Sumnary
Thailand has announced that it will withdraw
Army units from three isolated villages on the Thai-
Lao border to defuse a six-month territorial dispute
with Laos. Such a move by Thailand may founder,
however, because of Vientiane's efforts to exploit
the issue. Laos, with Vietnamese and Soviet
encouragement, has taken the dispute to the UN in an
effort to discredit Thailand's bid for^a Security
Council seat when the voting takes place later this
month. Although we do not expect Vientiane's
efforts will permanently damage Thailand's chances
for Security Council membership, the Lao strategy
may prevent Thailand, and especially he Thai Army,
from backing away gracefullly.
The Dispute Until Now
Last March Lao troops began harassing Thai crews building a
d near the contested area. In mid-April,Lao forces attacked
roa
Thai border defense units a cu ied the villages of Ban Mai,
Ban Klang, and Ban Sawang. the
Lao wanted to halt construction of the road', which Vientiane
This memorandum was prepared by Southeast Asia
Division, Office of East Asian Analysis, an was coordinated with
the Office of Soviet Analysis and the Office of Global Issues.
Information available as of 9 October 1984was used in its
preparation. Comments and, queries are welcome s d may be
directed to Chief, Southeast Asia Division, OEA,
_jL
Copy of
EA M 84-10188C
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claims is on its territory, designed to link Nan, Uttaradit, and
Udon Thani Provinces to an existing road system in Nong Khai
Province.
Bangkok raised the stakes in June following a border visit
by Army Commander-in-Chief General Athit Kamlang-ek when element?
of three regular battalions, reportedly dispatched to protect
road crews, seized the villages. Lao troops have harassed Thai
positions but they have made no serious effort to reoccupy the
disputed territory.
Rnth sides have reinforced the area in recent months.
New Developments
The border dispute has divided senior Thai officials in
recent months. Foreign Minister Siddhi contended the Army should
withdraw to avoid damaging what had been slowly improving
relations with Laos. National Security Council and Army
officials, however, argued against moving unilaterally. They
feared action suggesting Thai capitulation, would weaken or even
bring down Prime Minister Prem's government. Nonetheless, Siddhi
Ministr
i
F
t
gn
ore
he
apparently prevailed because on 2 October
ithdraw
ll
.
y w
announced that Thailand would unilatera
Until then, diplomatic efforts to resolve the dispute had
failed. The issue of demilitarizing the contested area, with
Vientiane insisting upon a unilateral Thai, withdrawal and Bangkok
calling for a bilateral withdrawal, was the primary impediment.
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Despite Siddhi's announcement, the Army's withdrawal plans
unclear and it may be engaged in delaying tactics. The Thai
are
UN'Ambassad indicated that the withdrawal would be completed by
6 October. however,
General Athit ordered Army units in the disputed villages to
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withdraw by 31 October but did not specify how far the troops
should pull back or the new deployment positions. Army
commanders, confused by Athit's order, reportedly plan to pull
back two kilometers and probably will assume, positions on high
ground in the area with Thai volunteer troop's remaining in the
r-lo- the conflict
t
o p
villages. Continuing Lao efforts
robabl would halt the Thai withdrawal.
the Army has retained the option of
tries to seize vacated areas.
,retaliating 1 Laos
The UN Angle
The Indochinese countries, with Soviet. support, have
attempted to gain maximum propaganda value out of the conflict.
Vientiane launched a concerted propaganda campaign against the
Thai actions. Vietnamese influence also is apparent in Lao
propaganda which portrays Laos as the victim of Thai aggression
orchestrated by China. Vientiane's release last month of a
"White Book" on Thai-Lao relations, alleging the resurgence of
historic "pan-Thai tendencies" and collusion with China,
resembled a Vietnamese-insoired effort by the Heng Samrin regime
in Kampuchea in 1983.
Laos, probably with Vietnamese encouragement, has taken the
dispute to the UN in an effort to defeat Thailand's Security
Council candidacy. The Security Council President granted
Vientiane's request and convened a council meeting, on
9 October. In additon, we believe Vietnam has seized upon the
dispute to try to strengthen its negotiating position at the
United Nations on the Kampuchean issue. Hanoi probably will use
the border dispute to try to weaken support for the ASEAN UN
resolution condemning the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea. We
expect the Lao and the Vietnamese manuevers will have little
impact other than temporarily embarrassing the Thai. Bangkok
remains in a favorable position to defeat the Soviet-sponsored
uncil
C
it
h
o
y
e Secur
Mongolian candidacy for the Asian seat on t
is resigned to-
and Hanoi
defeat on any UN initiatives involving its puchea policy.
Looking Ahead
We expect Thai forces will gradually vacate the three
villages but remain in the disputed area. For its part, Laos
probably will continue harassing Thai units to keep the dispute
alive for a few more weeks. Press reports! indicate Lao troops
attacked Thai positions in Ban Mai and Ban Klang on 7 October.
Nonetheless, once Thai Army units withdraw and the UN General
Assembly ends its session, we expect Laos to moderate its
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position on the issue. Although renewed.negotiations are
unlikely, Laos may cease harassment of Thai forces clearing the
way for Bangkok's exit.
nn t...:lnn.4 in any f-ARP probably is preparing to concede the 25X1
L 11 tt I I a l14 . A. -j J --- - r - - - -- -
disputed territory. General Athit's withdrawal order instructed
Army units to prepare -the villages for inspection by unspecified
L II L L1 L I V vvu... ...- -- --I - - - -
the road is being directed away from
ll
the contested area. a
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disputed area in August, points to Lao ownership and this 25X1
suggests to us.the Thai have recognized that their position is
untenable.- The inspection by international observers probably is
meant to provide a way out for Bangkok without embarrassing the
Thai Army. 25X1
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CH fNG RAI
o LUUANGFHRAEANG
LAOS
DISPUTED AREA
kV1ENTIA
UDON THANI
THAILAND
THAILAND-LAOS BORDER
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SUBJECT: The Thai-Lao Border Dispute: Continuing to Fester
Distribution:
Copy 1-2 - OEA/SEA/ITM
Copy 3 - Richard Childress, NSC
Copy 4 NSA/B542
Copy 5 - NSA/B509
Copy 6 - Nicholas Mauger, State/Thailand Desk
Copy 7 - Alan Kitchens, State/INR
Copy 8 - Alice Straub, State/INR
Copy 9 - John Moh'enko, State/INR
Copy 10 DIA/JSI-3
Copy 12 1 I DIA~DE-2
Copy 13 - John Sloan, DIA/DIO
Copy 14 DIA/AT-3
Copy 15 - Lt. Col. William Wise, Pentagon
Copy 16 - Lt. Col. Denny Lane, Pentagon
Copy 17 - George Thomas, FBIS/NEA
Copy 18 - Hollis Hebble, FBIS/AG
Copy 19, - Leslie Koch, OCR/EA
Copy 20 - Nancy Simons, SOVA/TWAD
Copy 21 - OEA/SEAD
Copy 22 - OEA/SEA/IB
Copy 23 - OEA/NEA
Copy 24 - OEA/CH
Copy 25 - D/OEAA
Copy 26 - OEA/Research Director
Copy 27 - PDB Staff
Copy 28 - C/NIC
Copy 29 - NIO/EA
Copy 30 DDO/EA/
Copy 31 - DDI
Copy 32 - Executive Director.
Copy 33 - CPAS/ILS
Copy 34-38 - CPAS/IMD/CB
Copy 39 - C/PES/DDI
Copy 40 - OCR/I G
Copy 411,- C/EA/
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