WEELKY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT MOBUTU'S NEW CONGO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500020035-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2009
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: July 17, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Mobutu s New Congo
DSO '' COPT
RLTL ~ t j IL 61.
Secret
N2 699
17 July 1970
No. 0379/70B
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MOBUTU'S NEW CONGO
Joseph Mobutu, President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Congo
Kinshasa), assumed control of the government in 1965, and has given his country
better internal security and political stability than it hart known since gaining
independence from Belgium in 1960. He has gone far toward remaking an unruly
army into a fairly effective counterinsurgency force, and the once-formidable rebel
bands have been whittled down to small groups of fugitives. Still, Mobutu's hold on
power depend) on his constant manipulation of key army officers; military disci-
pline remains dubious, and the army is the prime power base.
So far, Mobutu has merely made a
good start toward transforming the Congo
into a modern national state, drawing
power from a reasonably effective admin-
istrative structure and a popular political
party as well as a loyal army. Presidential
and legislative elections scheduled for late
1970 will offer a good maasure of Mo-
butu's attempts to develop broad popular
support for his government, but they will
not give voters a real choice of candidates.
Moreover, his ability to achieve mass sup-
port probably depends ultimately on com-
pleting the hitherto uneven recovery of
the economy, which at the time of inde-
pendence was among the most advanced
in black Africa.
President Mobutu will make his first
state visit to Washington in early August.
Side-stepping the Army
Although Mobutu has held command of the
Congolese Army since early 1961, he derived a
nonmilitary outlook from his early experience as
a student and journalist in Belgium. Although he
believes that his people need and expect an au-
thoritarian leader, he also recognizes the army's
well-earned reputation for brutality toward civil-
ians. Accordingly, he has cultivated an image that
dissociates him from the army and embodies the
African traditions of chieftainship.
Special Report
President Joseph Mobutu
spect or the Belgian colonial administration, he
gave first priority in 1966 to reasserting the su-
preme authority of the national government over
the numerous semiautonomous provinces. He has
largely succeeded in restoring a centralized admin-
istrative structure, staffed almost exclusively with
civilians. His undisputed power to appoint, rotate,
Retaining a grudging re-
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17 July 1970
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or dismiss government officials has enabled him
to dominate the small minority of educated
Congolese who aspire to careers in public service.
Mobutu's control of the governmental struc-
ture has not resulted in effective administration,
however. An adequately trained and disciplined
civil service is yet to be developed, and Mobutu's
practice of rotating field administrators out of
their own tribal areas has barely begun to reduce
endemic corruption. Because most personnel serv-
ing in the provinces are unreliable, Mobutu must
depend heavily on the more effective provincial
governors and also on a few aides in the office of
the President who tour the provinces as trouble-
shooters.
At the cabinet level
he has replaced in luentialpoliticians with people
selected primarily for their administrative com-
petence.
Supplanting the Parliamentary System
Mobutu's determination to retain all real au-
thority, while giving the populace a sense of par-
ticipation, stems from his recollection of how the
Special Report
Congo's European-style parliamentary system
broke down in 1960. Mobutu assumed power in
1965, and declared himself president of the Re-
public, to end a stalemate between then-president
Kasavubu and ousted premier Tshombe. The con-
stitution promulgated in 1967 formalizes the su-
preme executive authority that Mobutu has as-
serted since his take-over. The constitution also
provides for a reformed National Assembly. This
body, which has not yet bean elected, is subordi-
nated to the presidency to such an extent that
Mobutu will retain control of the legislative
process.
Mobutu's instrument for activating the new
political system is the Popular Revolutionary
Movement (MPR), the official party formed in
1967. Although the constitution authorizes two
political parties, recent electoral ordinances
stipulate that both presidential and National
Assembly candidates must be approved by the
MPR Political Bureau. In the elections for the
National Assembly, voters are to choose between
two ballots, signifying approval or rejection of the
MPR slate of candidates for each electoral dis-
trict. In the presidential elections, each voter like-
wise is to cast a ballot for or against Mobutu,
whose candidacy for a second five-year term was
announced at the MPR national congress last
May. Although the present electoral procedure
allows the voters no real choice of candidates, it
may be the first step in a gradual process of voter
education.
Presidential and legislative elections are
scheduled, respectively, for 28-29 November and
12-13 December of this year. All indications are
that Mobutu intends the pre-election campaign to
be the most intensive effort in public indoctrina-
tion since he assumed power. Voting is manda-
tory for all citizens aged 18 and over who qualify
for the franchise, and getting out the vote will
require more extensive contacts with the rural
populace than most local officials have ever at-
tempted. Since late 1969, Mobutu has spent more
time than usual touring outlying areas to stress
the importance of the elections, and the recent
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MPR national congress was concerned primarily
with preparations for carrying the campaign to
every village.
Striving for Mass Support
Although the MFR will have no visible op-
position in the upcoming elections, other factors
apparently have convinced Mobutu that the party
must campaign vigorously. He wants to placate
the minority of educated Congolese who under-
stand the European parliamentary system and still
hope that the Congo may eventually attain a truly
representative government. There is speculation
that in 1975 the MPR will nominate twice as
many candidates as there are seats in the National
Assembly, and voters can then select which depu-
ties they prefer from the party slate. Meanwhile,
the directive that higher educa4ion is a criterion
for selecting candidates is expected to mollify the
more soph?sticated critics of the present proce-
dure.
Mobutu's broader objectives may be inferred
from the rule that individuals on active duty with
the army or police are ineligible tc vote or to hold
elective office. His "temporary" separation from
the army, announced when he accepted the presi-
dential nomination, likewise highlights his deter-
mination to keep the army out of politics. An-
other indicator of possible future directions is the
fact that the members of the MPR Political
Bureau-all Mobutu appointees-have been as-
signed to manage the election campaign in their
home districts. As a majority of these people have
some prominence outside the governmental hier-
archy, their roles in the local campaigns may go
far toward developing a party structure that
reaches deeper into the hinterland than the cen-
tral government's administrative hierarchy.
Such a result would be highly significant, as
Mobutu's earlier efforts to build a mass organiza-
tion were largely unsuccessful. Although the MPR
has been in existence since 1967, the party's
lower echelons in the provinces are still operated
by central government officials, who have seldom
succeeded in gaining grass-roots support. A basic
obstacle is the traditional tribal or regional orien-
tation of the rural populace. Mobutu apparently
believes that his control of the modern levers of
power is now so firm that he can counteract
traditional influences in a mass party and a re-
formed National Assembly.
The Populace -Apathetic or Discontented?
Although the 1970 elections are expected to
produce an almost unanimous vote of confidence
President Joseph Mobutu Greets Katangan Populace (L) and Meets With Chiefs in Bandundu Province (R)
Special Report
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for Mobutu, it is conjectural whether the MPR
will garner continuing mass participation, or
whether a broadly based party will remain subject
to control from Kinshasa. Concrete indications of
popular attitudes toward the regime are lacking
because most rural Congolese have had minimal
contact with the central government since the
breakdown of the Belgian administrative system
in 1960. Concerted efforts to dispel this pro-
longed isolation and to evoke political conscious-
ness presumably will encounter much apathy and
some latent hostility.
Except for refugee rebels, Congolese univer-
sity students have been the most vocal critics of
the regime. In June 1969, a student demonstra-
tion in Kinshasa resulted in the killing of at least a
dozen students by troops, followed by sympathy
strikes at other universities and schools. No appar-
ent support, however, was forthcoming from
other elements of the population. Most students
have sullenly complied with orders to join the
youth wing of the MPR and disband their own
organizations.
Uneven Recovery of the Economy
Although the great majority of Congolese
have remained politically inert, material priva-
tions are so widespread as to provide ample am-
munition for anyone who dares to challenge Mo-
butu on economic grounds. Only a small minority
of Congolese have benefited from the extremely
uneven recovery of the economy since the disrup-
tions of the early 1960s. Since 1967, increasingly
favorable trade balances have brought substantial
accumulations in the Congo's gold and foreign
Special Report
exchange holdings, which passed the $200 million
level in early 1970. The favorable balance, how-
ever, is due largely to rising copper earnings, while
other sectors of the economy have not yet re-
covered from years of deterioration.
The Congolese who live in urban areas are
directly afflicted by the continuing shortcomings
in the modern sector of the economy. According
to 1969 estimates, fewer Congolese were then
regular wage earners than had been in 1959, and
wage earners in 1969 comprised barely 12 percent
of the total labor force. Although the urban un-
employed suffer the most severe privations, wage
earners are continually hurt by the rise in the cost
of living. Periodic increases in official wage scales
have not kept pace with rising prices, and real
income for many urban workers has declined al-
most 50 percent since 1960.
In 1959, a large portion of the rural popula-
tion was getting some cash income from a highly
productive commercial agriculture, but much of
the countryside was reduced to virtual anarchy in
the early 1960s. By 1969, production of cash
crops remainer; 10 percent below the 1959 level.
Most subsistence crops are at or near 1959 levels,
although the population has increased by roughly
a third during the past decade. Surpluses of tradi-
tional food crops, formerly sold to obtain manu-
factured goods, have all but disappeared. Agricul-
tural recovery has been impeded by the govern-
ment's failure to maintain or extend the ex-
tremely limited network of paved roads. The
usually impassable dirt roads also prevent the
extension of social services to outlying areas. Con-
sequently, most rural inhabitants have suffered an
appreciable lowering of their living standard sir. :e
1959.
Rural inhabitants are less likely than urban
dwellers to blame the authorities for their ma-
terial privations, as they are more inured to primi-
tive conditions and less politically conscious.
Nevertheless, intensified efforts to involve the iso-
lated villagers in MPR activities and to show Mo-
butu's concern for their welfare may create
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expectations far exceeding the government's ad-
ministrative capabilities to deliver. Resulting frus-
trations might give new impetus to the sort of
tribal or regional consciousness that Mobutu has
been striving to overcome.
Indispenscble Foreign Parti :ipation
The government's capabilities for meeting
the material needs of the people depend largely
on continuing infusions of foreign capital and on
the talents of foreign personnel working through-
out the country. Although financial aid from for-
eign governments and international agencies has
declined from well over $200 million annually in
the early 1960s to less than $100 million in 1969,
the country still has thousands of highly qualified
foreigners-executives, educators, military offi-
cers, and technicians who remain indispensable
for the foreseeable future. Mobutu has not only
extended the use of foreign experts in various
government components, but has also engaged
foreign firms to operate a number of public utili-
ties and nationalized industrial plants.
The intensive grass-roots campaigning that
the MPR is planning for late 1970 may tempt
.iome party spokesmen to exploit latent Congo-
lese resentment against foreign residents in order
to curry public favor. Mobutu himself has placed
great emphasis on various "Congolization" meas-
ures, and as recently as August 1969, a widely
publicized drive was initiated to expel all foreign-
ers who were not performing essential services.
The targets of this drive, however, were mostly
West African and Asian traders. Perhaps an under-
lying motive was to distract popular attention
from Mobutu's extensive utilization of skilled
Europeans.
Most indicative of Mobutu's increasing re-
ceptivity to foreign participation is the pattern of
his dealings with Belgium and Belgian interests in
the Congo. The latter were the prime targets of
Congolization in 1966, and Belgians residing in
the Congo bore the brunt of the hostility aroused
by the mutiny of white mercenaries in 1967. The
President Joseph Mobutu with King Baudouin During Visit
to Brussels
net result was a sharp cutback in Belgian technical
assistance. Since early 1968, however, Mobutu
has striven to attract Belgian capital and to secure
the services of additional Belgian technicians. The
dispute over nationalization of the Belgian-owned
copper industry in Katanga was settled amicably
last September, and the renewal of cordial rela-
tions between the two nations was dramatized
through King Baudouin's atteidance at the
Congo's tenth independence anniversary this
June.
The question remains whether foreign re-
sources will be used effectively to promote bal-
anced economic and social development. Mobutu
has tried to counterbalance the Belgian presence
with increased technical assistance and capital in-
vestment from other countries. A multiplicity of
foreign-sponsored prc acts has intensified the
need for over-all devel^,,mental planning, which is
scarcely feasible under Mobutu's personal rule.
However genuine his determination to promote
effective administration, Mobutu instinctively
uses material resources as largesse, to bond per-
sonal loyalties and to counterbalance rival power
groups.
Mobutu views his relationship with the US as
a special one and regards Washington as one of his
major foreign backers. He looks forward to
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continued US support for his country's economic
recovery and expects the US to continue to pro-
vide him with essential equipment for the Congo-
lese armed forces. He is particularly anxious to
acquire large US transport aircraft. These topics
will undoubtedly be discussed when he visits
Washington in August. Mobutu strongly believes
that such US support is necessary if the Congo is
to play a stabilizing role in Central Africa after
years as a disruptive force, and if he is to counter
what he regards as an increasing threat to the
Congo's security from externally directed Com-
munist elements.
Nine Worrisome Neighbors
Mobutu also has been preoccupied with the
Congo's exposed location, surrounded by eight
independent states and Portuguese Angola. He has
taken a more active role in the Organization of
African Unity (OAU) than an".t of his predecessors
and has made gestures to dr0li::.tize Congolese
solidarity with southern African nationalist move-
ments. For instance, the Congo provides sanc-
tuary for Holder. Roberto's Angolan Revolution-
ary Government in Exile (GRAE) and for its
guerrilla army. By thus repudiating former pre-
mier Tshombe's "neocolonialism," Mobutu has
been able to induce most of the surrounding
independent governments to curtail support for
Congolese refugee rebels.
The Portuguese authorities in Angola, how-
ever, have reacted to GRAE guerrilla thrusts from
Congolese territory by repeatedly blocking cop-
per shipments on the rail line from Katanga to
Benguela. Mobutu, in turn, has veered toward
unpublicized collaboration with Portuguese au-
thorities, and the Congo's vaunted aid for GRAE
guerrillas has been offset by unexplained obstruc-
tion of their border-crossing operations. In March
1970, two Portuguese representatives were bc-
cepted in Kinshasa with the provisos that they be
located in the Spanish Embassy and conduct
themselves unobtrusively.
Mingled with Mobutu's primary concern for
the Congo's security is a persona' ambition to
achieve recognition as an international leader. Al-
though the Congo is a member of the French-
sponsored Afro-Malaoasy Common Organization,
in early 1968 Mobutu drew Chad and the Central
African Republic info a mini - common market,
apparently to challenge France's economic pre-
dominance in central Africa. His efforts to forge
economic links with Burundi and Rwanda were at
least partially motivated by a desire to supplant
Belgian influence. IN'eithzr venture, however, has
produced solid link., while Mobutu's exaggerated
fears of subversive it fluences from radical Congo
(Brazzaville) have dri,'en him to complicity in two
abortive coups agains-i President Ngouabi.
Although the elections later this year are
expected to produce a one-sided vote of confi-
dence for Mobutu and his party, the grass-roots
campaigning and the efforts to generate mass par-
ticipation in the MPR may have unforeseeable
side-effects. If the plan to herd all adults to the
polls is carried through, tho more isolated tribes-
men might naturally look for miracles, and cam-
paign oratory may lead more sophisticated voters
to expect more roads, clinics, or schools. If MPR
local cadres remain active following the elections.
they may generate continuing pressures to distrib-
ute largesse much more widely than the regime
has hitherto attempted.
The intensified emphasis on the MPR and its
activities will rankle many army officers, who
have long resented Mobutu's keeping the army in
the background. Nevertheless, Mobutu has con-
stantly shown such an alertness for fluctuations in
morale that he may forestall serious disaffection
among ranking officers or troops by granting ad-
ditional material benefits. Still obsessed with in-
surgency threats, Mobutu does in fact have his
own plans for beefing up the armed forces during
the next few years, even though there are no
foreseeable threats of external aggression. In-
creased military expenditures, however, might
preclude meeting popular expectations that the
new political order will bring improved living con-
ditions. Mobutu seems capable of finessing the
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dilemmas of heightened expectations for awhile;
Still, pressures for grass-
roots economic prog+ess and responsive leadership
may build up as traumatic memories of the vio-
lent years fade.
Meanwhile, the question of how Mobutu's
sudden demise would alter the Congo's prospects
for political stability and economic prcgress re-
mains essentially unfathomable. The constitution
of 1967 does not provide for a vice president;
instead, successor is to be elected within 90
days of the president's death. Mobutu's strategy
of counter) alancing actual or potential power
blocs does nit favor the formation of a cohesive
ruling group; nor is he likely to sponsor an one
who might be capable of filling his shoes
Special Report -8-
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