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X-,
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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Communist Economic and Military Aid to Syria
Secret
ER IM 72-111
July 1972
Copy No..
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WARNING
't'his document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmis ;ion or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
July 1972
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
COMMUNIST ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO SYRIA
Summary and Conclusions
1. Despite shifting Syrian domestic politics and periodic
Syrian-Soviet difficulties, Communist economic and military aid has
continued. Since early 1955, Syria has been extended more than $675
million of military aid and almost $485 million of economic aid. Damascus
is currently the fourth largest Third World recipient of Communist arms,
and the Communist countries (mainly the Soviet Union) are practically the
sole source of military equipment and training. Marshal Grechko's May visit
to Damascus, which probably ended in the signing of an arms agreement,'
suggests that substantial Soviet arms shipments will continue.
2. The Communist countries also are the chief source of foreign
capital for Syria's economic development. During 1966-70, their share of
Syria's total public investment was about 17%. Large sums were spent on
agriculture, industry, and transportation. Communist aid may represent an
even larger share of the present development plan because the Euphrates
River project has been accelerated, and Western capital continues to be
reluctant to move into Syria. It is also likely that the level of Communist
aid will increase.
Magnitude of Military Assistance
3. Military aid was Moscow's first vehicle for establishing its
influence in Syria; significant economic aid was not extended until the
military aid program had become well entrenched. From early 1956 to date,
Note: This memorandum was prepaied by the Office of Economic Research
and coordinated within the Directorate of lrncelligenec.
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Communist arms aid commitments have totaled more than $675 million
(see Table I below, and Table 6 in the Appendix). Moscow accounts for
more than 85% of this amount. Only Egypt, India, and Iraq now rank
larger as Third World Communist arms recipients.() l More than $645 million
had been delivered by the end of 1971, about 45% since the June 1967
Arab-Israeli War. Syria has signed several small military agreements with
Western countries,(2) but, for all practical purposes, it is completely
dependent on Soviet arms.
Communist Military Aid Extended to Syria
Total
1956-71
1967-71
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
USSR
582
255
100
75
-
40
40
Czecho-
slovakia
82a
37
10
-
12
15
-
Poland
10
10
-
-
-
10
-
China
2
2
-
-
2
-
-
East Ger-
many
Negl.
Negl.
Negl.
-
-
-
-
a. Excluding a $2 million downpayment in 1956.
Early Agreements, 1956-66
4. Syria's first Communist arms accord was a $37 million agreement
with Czechoslovakia signed early in 1956. As with Egypt a year earlier,
Prague acted as Moscow's agent, shipping Soviet-made arms from
Czechoslovakia. In late 1956, Syria concluded a $42 million agreement
directly with the USSR and signed a $75 million accord in 1957. After
1. Indonesia also has received more arms than Syria, but that program has been
dormant since 1965.
2. Agreements signed in 1968-69 include $9 million with West Germany (for vehicles
and .;ommunications equipment); $1 million with Spain (for truck-mounted recoilless
rifles and ammunition); and $t million with Italy (for land mines).
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Egypt "I'd Syria formed the United Arab Republic (UAR) in February 1958,
Cairo assumed control of Communist arms procurement for both regions.
When the union broke up in September 1961, Moscow halted shipments
to Syria but negotiated a $60 million agreement with Damascus early the
next year.
5. By June 1967 the USSR had extended more than $325 million
of military aid to Syria under six separate agreements and had delivered
at least 124 MIG jet fighters, nine SU-7 jet fighter bombers, six IL-28 light
jet bombers, 550 medium tanks, 90 self-propelled assault guns, and 550
armored personnel carriers(3) (see the photographs, Figures 1 and 2). The
Y5~ ;+
r'e'f
Soviet-built Syrian tank captured by Israel in the June 1967 war
Figure 2. Syrian-manned Soviet-built SU-100 asse'jlt gun
3. Fox a list of major equipment delivered to Syria see Table 7, in the Appendix.
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SA-2 surface-to-air missile system listed under a 1965 accord was not
provided until early in 1969. Soviet naval vessels delivered included six
Komar-class guided missile patrol boats, two T-43 minesweepers, and 16 P-4
class motor torpedo boats. These vessels still constitute most of Syria's naval
inventory.
Agreements Since the June 1967 War
6. From mid-1967 through 1971, Syria signed military aid
agreements with the USSR totaling about $255 million.(4) An August 1967
accord for $100 million included replacements for Syria's substantial
equipment losses during the June 1967 War. Damascus lost nearly two-thirds
of its combat aircraft and a large part of its land armaments, but large-scale
Soviet deliveries in the second half of 1967 replaced most of these losses.
7. Procurement since 1968 has been directed tow.:rd expanding and
modernizing Syria's armed forces, particularly its air defense system. In 1969
the SA-2 missile system was introduced. A $40 million agreement concluded
in February 1971 provides for the delivery of ZSU-23-4 radar controlled
antiaircraft guns and the SA-3 system, in addition to MIG-21 jet fighters,
MI-8 helicopters, and various ground forces weaponry. By the end of 1971,
Syria had received 179 MIG jet fighters, more than 25 SU-7 fighter
bombers, 22 MI-8 helicopters, about 575 tanks, 150 armored personnel
carriers, and 785 artillery pieces. (For examples of this equipment, see the
photographs, Figures 3-6.) Soviet military deliveries reached a peak of $100
million in 1971 (see Table 2).
Estimated Communist Military Aid
Deliveries to Syria
Million Ilion' US $
1956-71
1967-71
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
USSR
573
268
48
35
35
50
100
Eastern
Europe
71
26
2
3
2
10
9
China
2
2
-
-
-
1
1
4. Another agreement probably was signed in May 1972, but details are not known.
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Figure 3. ZSU-23-4 self-propelled antiaircraft gun
Figure 4. Syrian air force MIG-17 jet that landed in Israel in August 1968
Figure S. Soviet MIG-21 jet fighter
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Figure 6. Soviet SU-7 fighter bomber
8. Since mid-1967, East European countries nave concluded five
military aid agreements with Syria totaling nearly $50 million.
Czechoslovakia, which extended $37 million, has delivered more than
100 T-54 tanks and 20 L-29 MAYA training aircraft. Poland agreed to
provide $10 million for tanks in 1970 and East Germany provided token
assistance.
Terms of Repayment
9. Moscow sells Damascus arms at low prices and on favorable terms.
Discounts from list prices average about 45% for most weapons systems.
Repayment varies from five to ten years at 2% interest and generally is
made in Syrian commodities. By the end of 1971, Damascus had repaid
some $65 million on its arms debt to the USSR, about 20% of the amount
owed. Repayments reached an estimated high of $13 million in 1965, but
an agreement that year rescheduled the remaining debt over 15 years. In
1968 the USSR agreed to a moratorium on principal payments during
1969-72; interest payments averaging $3 million a year, however, are
continuing.
Military Technical Assistance
10. Under the military technical assistance program, Syrian personnel
are trained in Communist countries. By the end of 1971, more than 1,500
Syrians had received such training, about 1,150 in the USSR.
11. The number of Communist (mainly Soviet) military technicians
in Syria has varied with the flow of arms. These technicians generally deliver,
assemble, and maintain military equipment; train Syrian personnel in tactics
and in the operation and maintenance of equipment; and serve as advisers
to staff and line military officers. Their numbers, which varied between
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100 and 400 until 1967, jumped to an estimated 1,100 after the June
1967 War. By 1971, about 800 military technicians, all Soviet, still were
employed in Syria. The cost - estimated at nearly $6 million in 1971 -
represents a current account outlay since Moscow rarely provides credit
for such purposes.
Amount and Character of Communist Economic Aid
12. Communist countries have extended Syria nearly $485 million
of economic assistance since early in 1955 (see Table 3), making them the
largest source of foreign capital for Syrian economic development. The
Soviet Union has committed nearly $235 million, Eastern Europe some $190
million, and Chiiia about $60 million.
13. Czechoslovakia and East Germany extended the first Communist
aid, a number of credits for small industrial plants, in 1955-56. The first
large credit, however, was some $170 million from the USSR in 1957 for
various development projects. This was later reduced to $100 million when
Moscow decided in 1960 not to undertake the Euphrates Dam. In 1966
the Soviets again reversed themselves and extended a $133 million credit
for the dam's construction.
14. Nearly all Communist economic aid has been for project
construction. About 30% has been channeled into major power and
irrigation projects. An estimated 20% has gone for industrial development
(exclusive of the petroleum industry), 15% for petroleum and phosphate
development, and 15% for transportation and communications facilities.(5 )
The Euphrates River Project
15. The largest Communist-aided power and irrigation undertaking
(about $140 million extended) is the Euphrates River project (see the
photograph, Figure 7). The World Bark surveyed this project in 1955, but
Moscow was the first to provide aid. (For Soviet-assisted projects, see the
map.) An estimated $70 million was included for construction in the 1957
credit. After completing a $1.3 million survey, however, Moscow withdrew.
While the Soviets never disclosed their reasons, the inability of riparian
countries - Syria, Iraq, and Turkey - to settle the water distribution
question probably was a major factor.
16. In June 1961, Syria concluded a $120 million agreement with
West Germany for construction of the project. Bonn, however, reconsidered
the scope of its aid, after the dissolution of the Egyptian-Syrian union later
that year, and reduced the credit to less than $90 million. The West Germans
5. For a list of Communist-aided projects in Syria, see Table 8.
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Communist Economic Aid Extended to Syria
Million US $
1955-72
1955-60
1961-65
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
197
a
1
1972
Total
483.9
125.2
47.6
216.8
0
25.0
25.0
N.A.
0.3
44.0
USSR
233.6
100.0
0
133.3
0
0
N
A
N
A
.
.
.
.
0.3
0
Eastern
Cn
Europe
190.0
25.2
31.3
83.5
0
25
0
25
0
0
.
.
0
0
Bulgaria
Czecho-
15.0
15.0
slovakia
East Ger-
57.2
22.5
5.2
29.5
many
53.8
25.0
Hungary
14.0
14.0
Poiaiid
25.0
Romania
25 n
25.0
China
60.3
0
16.3
0
0
0
0
0
0
44.0
a. January-June.
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Figure '1. Euphrates Dam under construction by the Soviets
Major Soviet Assisted Projects in Syria
l~taNl(t(~
Fm' lry Rescafr r
Cenlit
BlnIyI,
VGLfTF.kRANkAN '
SRA TuID'S
,Ar. Ra Q Gap.... _ ..._..
SYRIA
International boundary
O Notlonol Capital
Railroad
Road
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continued to drag their feet, largely because of doubts over Syria's ability
to finance its share of the cost and to repay the credits. After more than
five years of such frustration, Damascus again turned to Moscow.
17. In addition to a dam about 200 feet high and 1.5 miles long
at Tabaqah, the project includes a 300,000-kilowatt powerplant, irrigation
facilities for some 575,000 acres, electric power transmission lines, auxiliary
railroads, a small city, and a technical training center. Moscow's credit will
cover about half the estimated $260 million cost, presumably the foreign
exchange portion. An estimated 12,000 personnel, including about 1,000
Soviet techr_icians, currently are employed on the project, which is
scheduled for completion in 1975.
Petroleum Development
18. About $60 million have been channeled into Syria's oil industry.
Moscow committed about $18 million in 1957 for exploration, and later
helped develop three oilfields in As Suwayda, Qarah Shuk, and Rumaylay.
Crude oil production from these fields totaled 5.5 million metric tons in
1971 and is expected to reach 12 million tons by 1975, yielding an
estimated annual gross income of nearly $80 million. Moscow signed
additional contracts early in 1971 for a seismic survey and development
of the Al Jebissa oilfield and probably will construct a pipeline and
associated storage facilities from the oilfields to the port of Tartus.
Czechoslovakia extended more than $40 million to construct and
subsequently expanded the Hims oil refinery. The plant, with an annual
capacity of 2.7 million tons, now meets most of Syria's requirements.
Phosphate Development
19. Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania are providing at least $10 million
to develop Syria's phosphate industry. Three extraction plants are expected
to produce over 1.2 million tons of low-grade phosphates annually. A
Romanian-built plant with an annual capacity of 300,000 tons already is
in operation. Nearly all the production of these plants will be e,-:ported
to Eastern Europe, mainiy as aid repayment. Estimated income from
phosphate exports is expected to reach some $6 million annually.
Railroad Construction
20. The 1957 Soviet agreement included some $40 million to
construct a 420-mile railroad linking Al Qamishli in the northeast with the
port of Latakia, including a trunk line south to Aims-'Akkari. Work on
the project was not begun until early in the 1960s and apparently still
has not been completed. The USSR also is building a line connecting Tartus
and Tudmur, the location of large phosphate deposits, and is providing
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locomotives and railway cars valued at some $12 million. Financing
arrzngements for the rolling stock are not known but they probably are
under long-term credits.
Drawings
21. By the end of 1971, more than $260 million of Communist
economic assistance had been drawn. An estimated $170 million have been
drawn on Soviet aid and more than $55 million on Czechoslovak aid.
Drawings rose slowly during the early years of the program. They averaged
about $11 million annually during 1961-65, continued to rise slowly the
next two years, and surged to nearly $40 million annually during 1968-70
because of sizable deliveries for the Euphrates project.
Economic Aid Reps; nents
22. Soviet credits to Syria are repayable in local goods over 12 years
at 2.5% interest. East European terms vary from seven to 12 years at 2.5
interest largely in coma aodities; most require downpayments, with a few
as high as 30%. By the end of 1971, Syria had paid an estimated $18
million on its Soviet economic debt and some $8 million on its East
European debt, practically all in agricultural commodities.
23. Although Syria's total foreign debt service ratio was a low 6%
in 1970, its poor financial position compelled Damascus to ask Moscow
for a rescheduling. Moscow deferred the 1970 principal payment and in
the following year postponed 1971-75 principal payments until 1984-86.
Annual interest payments, however, continue to be made on schedule. East
European debts have not been rescheduled.
Economic Aid Financing for Syria's Develo
rnent Plan
24. Communist aid deliveries represented about 17% of public sector
investments during the 1966-70 development plan and Western sources
about 3%. Syria's reliance on foreign financing, however, is expected to
increase during the curreh;t development plan. The Third Five-Year Plan
(1971-75) calls for $1.5 billion of public investment. About $420 million
are earmarked for major irrigation projects, inclu: mg completion of the
Euphrates Dam and $170 million for petroleum development. Estimated
capital requirements have increased substantially, but the growth of
domestic revenues has slowed while military-related expenditures have
remained high. Thus, foreign capital inflow probably will have to exceed
the current projections of $75 million annually if a substantial part of the
plan is to be implemented. The Communist countries are likely to continue
as a source 'of large-scale aid.
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Non-Communist Economic Aid
25. During 1959-71, Syria received about $75 million from
non-Communist sources. In the past two years, however, there have been
indications of Syrian interest in developing a greater inflow of Western
official and private capital. In recent years, Syria has accepted $38 million
in Kuwaiti aid, including a $28 million grant in 1972. Late in 1971, Syria
applied to the International Development Association for a $12 million
credit for highway construction - only its second request for a credit from
a multilateral lending agency. Syrian officials ostensibly are encouraging
foreign private investment and are studying French offers to invest in food
processing and plastics plants worth more than $40 million.
Technical Assistance
26. Communist technical assistance has increased steadily since the
early 1960s. The number of economic technicians employed in Syria reached
more than 1,100 in 1971 (see Table 4), most of them Soviet personnel
working on the Euphrates project. The salaries and expenses of these
technicians - estimated at about $8 -million in 1971 - are covered by
Soviet credits. The number of Soviet personnel has increased during the
first few months of 1972 and some 1,300 are expected to be employed
during the year. The number of East European technicians has ranged
between 150 and 200 annually since 1966. There were an estimated 60
Chinese technicians working on a textile mill in 1971.
Communist Economic Technicians
in Syria
Year
Total
USSR
Eastern
Europe
China
1966
515
350
150
15
1967
760
545
200
15
1968
860
650
200
10
1969
860
650
150
60
197J
1,000
780
160
60
1971
1,130
910
160
60
27. Nearly 3,700 Syrian students and technicians have received
training in Communist countries since 1956 (see Table 5), about 50% since
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Estimated Number of Students and Technical Trainees
from Syria Trained in Communist Countries
Academic Students
Technical Trainees
Eastern
Eastern
Year
Total
USSR
Europe
Total
USSR
Europe
Departures
1956-71
2,885
1,300
1,585
790
245
545
Being trained?
1966
400
250
150
-
-
-
i967
285
210
75
25
25
-
1968
235
210
25
60
35
25
1969
805
510
295
320
75
245
1970
1,290
625
665
30
30
-
1971
1,435
770
665
100
50
50
a. As of December of the stated year.
1968. Some 58% have trained in East European counu?es and the rest in
the USSR.
Impact of Communist Aid on Syria's Trade
28. As the Communist aid program has expanded, Syrian trade with
the donor countries also has grown. Communist trade rose from about
$5 million in 1954 to a peak of $200 million in 1969 and since 1965
has accounted for about one-third of Syria's total trade (see Table 9, in
the Appendix). Deliveries of economic aid during the 1960s accounted for
about 30% of Syrian imports from Communist countries, while repayments
of economic and military aid accounted for nearly 25% of Syrian exports.
The latter would have been much higher in recent years if the USSR had
not rescheu;?.:!e! Syria's debts.
29. Syrian imports from Communist countries (nearly 35% of total
Syrian imports since the mid-1960s) have consisted largely of machinery
and equipment, petroleum products, transportation equipment, ferrous
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metals, and various other ,n;;nufactured goods. Exports to these countries
(more than 30% of total Syrian exports) have been overwhelmingly
agricultural products, principally cotton, and wool. Phosphates, and possibly
oil, are likely to become, important exports to Communist countries in the
neat few years.
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Statistical Tables
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Communist Military Aid Agreements with Syria
Million US $
Estimated
Date of Communist Value of
Agreement Signatory Agreement Credits Discount
ist half
1956 Czechoslovakia 35a 35 -
Nov 1956 USSR 42 14 28
Oct 1957 USSR 75 25 50
Feb 1958 USSR 90 60 30
Mar 1962 USSR 60 30 30
Oct 1963 Czechoslovakia 5 5 -
Oct 1964 USSR 35 18 17
Mar 1965 Czechoslovakia 5 5 -
Apr 1966 USSR 25 .13 12
Jul 1967 East Germany Negl. - -
Aug 1967 USSR 100 50 50
Oct 1967 Czechoslovakia 10 10 -
Aug 1968 USSR 75 45 30
May 1969 China 2 2 -
Aug 1969 Czechoslovakia 12 12 -
Apr 1970 Czechoslovakia 15 15 -
2nd half
1970 Poland 10 10 -
2nd half
1970 USSR 40 30 10
Feb 19 71 USSR 40 30 10
Total 676 409 267
a. The total agreement was for $37 million; a $2 million downpayment was required.
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Major Communist Military
Equipment Delivered to Syria
1956-71
Equipment
Land armaments
Tanks
Armored personnel
carriers
Artillery'
Self-propelled guns
Naval ships
1,233
700
1,750
150
Minesweepers 2
Motor torpedo boats 16
Guided missile boats 6
Light jet bombers
Jet fighters
Helicopters
Other
Guided missile systems
Surface-to-surface,
antitankb
Surface-to-air
Air-to-aird
6
340
38
145
34
10
138
a. Including recoilless rifles, rocket launchers, and
mortars over 100-mm in size.
b. Indicating the number of vehicles used as
launchers (three missiles per vehicle).
c. Indicating the number of SAM firing battalions
(sites) -- (six launchers per SA-2 site).
d. Indicating the number of fighter aircraft
equipped with AAM (two to four per aircraft).
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Communist Economic Assistance to Syria, by Project
Donor
Date Extended
Projects
Amount Extended
(Million US $)
Statusa
Bulgaria
Jun 1966
Line of credit:
Agricultural projects
Wine distillery
Phosphate industry
development
Tobacco processing-
machinery
Refrigerated warehousing
Communications project
UC
C
1955
2 cement plants
4.5
C
1955
Sugar refinery, Damascus
1.3
C
1955
China factory
0.2
C
Dec 1956
Sugar refinery, Rims
1.3
C
Mar 1957
Petroleum refinery, Hims
11.3
C
Dec 1960
Municipal development:
46 electric generators
($0.4 million)
2.8
C
Jun 1964
Sugar refinery, Al Ghab
5.2
C
Dec 1966
Expansion of petroleum
refinery, Hims
29.5
C
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Communist Economic Assistance to Syria, by Project
(continued)
Date Extended
P
Amount Extended
rojects
(Million US $)
East Germany
Sep 1955
Weaving mill
0.1
C
Jul 1956
Cement plant, Aleppo
1.9
C
Sep 1956
Textile mill
0.4
C
C!)
t17
1957
1957
Shoe factory, Hims
Hospital equipment
0.2
0.1
C
C
Cl)
C)
1965
Equipment for Euphrates River
1
1
C -
t17
Apr 1966
Line of credit:
.
25
0
C)
1
.
Foundry
Port equipment
Water purification and storage
equipment ($0.6 million)
Cement plant equipment
Power transmission equipment
Paper mill equipment
Tj
H
5 automatic flour mills
Highway construction equip-
ment ($3.6 million)
Aid to higher education
($5.5 million)
Tobacco plant
Prefab housing plant
Credit added to 1966 credit
UC
UC
UC
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Communist Economic Assistance to Syria, by Project
(continued)
Hungary
Date Extended
Aug 1966
Projects
_Lin- of credit:
Telephone network
($1.0 million)
May 1972
May 1963
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Line of credit:
Slaughter house, Aleppo
($0.8 million)
Phosphate exploitation
($4.8 million)
Steel rolling mill, Hamah
($5.0 million)
Spinning mill, Aleppo
Iron ore exploration
Glassware plant
Telephone assembly plant
Line of credit:
Commodities ($8.1 million)
Cotton textile mill, Harrah
($3.6 million)
Yarn spinning mill
Line of credit:
Amount Extended
(M,ilion US $) Staius
C
UC
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Communist Economic Assistance to Syria, by Project
(continued)
Donor Date Extended
Roma is Jun 1968
USSR Oct 1957
Credit - machinery and equip-
ment
Oil pumps ($0.3 million)
2 phosphate plants, Khunayfis
($1.3 million)
Euphrates Valley surveys
($1.3 million)
Orontes River and Al Ghab
Valley development
Other agricultural surveys
($3.6 million)
Latakia-Qamishii railroad
projects ($40.0 million)
Nitrate fertilizer factory,
Hims ($13.5 million)
Petroleum exploration and
geological surveys ($17.8
million)
Pipeline design
Forestry research center,
Latakia
Dry farming research center
Amount Extended
(Million US $) Status
UC
C
C
UC
tTl
n
71
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Communist Economic Assistance to Syria, by Project
(continued)
Donor Date Extended Projects
USSR
(cont'd)
Cotton research center,
Ar Raqqah
Rastan electric power
station ($1.2 million)
Topographical survey
($0.5 million)
Geological studies ($1.0
million)
Bridge studies
Concrete reinforcing rod plant
Petroleum products storage
Dec 1966 Euphrates Dam, Tabaqah
.
Jul 1969 Credit - irrigation projects b
1970 Credit - telecommunications
equipment b UC
Feb 1971 Grant - experimental farm 0.3c UC
a. Symbols used in status column have the following meanings: C - completed; UC - under construction.
b. The amount extended is not known.
c. Minimum estimated value.
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Amount Extended
(Million US $) Status
133
3 UC
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Table 9
Syrian Trade with Communist Countries
Million US $
Estimated
Economic
Aid Drawin
s
Estimated Economic
and Military
g
Aid Repayments
Total
Total
Imports from
Exports to
Percent of
Communist
Percent of
Communi
t
Year
World
Trade
Communist
Trade
Communist
Countries
Communist
C
t
i
Million
Exports
Million
s
Imports cn
.-
oun
r
es
US $
to Syria
us $
from Syria n
1960
359
41
19
22
5
23
1961
309
47
19
28
9
47
6
21
1962
1
402
71
31
40
11
35
7
18
963
424
94
32
62
12
38
11
18
1964
411
113
41
72
1
27
16
22
1965
381
97
38
59
14
37
1.8
31
1966
462
148
87
61
20
23
16
26
1967
419
140
94
46
22
23
12
26
1968
489
163
120
43
40
33
14
33
1969
576
201
126
75
32
25
10
13
1970
563
171
114
57
44
39
14
25
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